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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the communicative turn in critical theory, beginning with Jürgen 
Habermas’s and Axel Honneth’s criticisms of the work of the early Frankfurt school; it then 
analyses Habermas’s ideas on language and discourse ethics (Chapter One) alongside Axel 
Honneth’s critique of Habermas and his development of a ‘recognitive-theoretical’ model of 
Critical Theory (Chapter Two). Following Honneth’s lead, I then bring the work of Michel 
Foucault into dialogue with the communicative turn and explore the relative merits of both 
approaches (Chapter Three). Despite the appeal of Habermas’s and Honneth’s attempts to 
provide a concrete model of democracy, strongly linked to the public sphere, I find their 
accounts of non-coercive dialogical exchange problematic. Although there are clear 
differences, I argue that they both end up idealising the public sphere, communication and 
recognition, and they ultimately reproduce procedural conceptions of freedom that abstract 
from difference and particularity. Foucault’s work, in many ways, compensates for this, 
although I argue that his genealogical work displays an excessive and indiscriminate view of 
power, alongside an inadequate conception of subjectivity, whilst his later work on 
ethics/aesthetics idealises the self as a work of art and fails to adequately connect this to a 
more substantive account of culture, democracy, and responsibility. 
The failings of both the communicative turn and Foucault’s alternative critical theory point 
back towards the philosophy and negative aesthetics of Theodor Adorno (Chapter Four). I 
argue that Adorno’s account of non-reified culture and ethics – as a response to the suffering 
produced by commodification, identity thinking and technological rationality – overcomes the 
shortcomings of the work of Habermas, Honneth and Foucault, whilst providing us with a 
more complete account of recognition and solidarity, and is therefore the most promising 
critical-theoretical response to the instrumentality and atomism of our late capitalist 
acquisitive culture. I particularly focus on Adorno’s commitment to non-identity and 
particularity, his notion of dialectical experience, his critique of the culture industry and 
related politics of representation, and also his outline of an aesthetic praxis. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Why Critical Theory? 
In his essay ‘The Social Dynamics of Disrespect: On the Location of Critical Theory Today’ 
(in 2007, pp. 63-79), Axel Honneth provides an overview of his position in relation to earlier 
Critical Theory and Habermas. He outlines his commitment to a Left-Hegelian model of 
critique and explores the alternative possibilities for renewing Critical Theory along with their 
shortcomings. In the process, he provides us with a good, over-arching account of the 
development of ‘critical theory’ from its earlier incarnation in the work of Adorno and 
Horkheimer, amongst others, to its development through Habermas’s ‘communicative turn’ 
and towards his own ‘recognitive’ model. Despite Honneth’s criticisms of the original 
Frankfurt School project, he remains committed to a ‘critical theory of society’ which he 
refers to as: 
 
‘that type of social thought that shares a particular form of normative critique with 
the Frankfurt School’s original program – indeed, perhaps, with the whole 
tradition of Left Hegelianism – which can also inform us about the pre-theoretical 
resource in which its own critical viewpoint is anchored extratheoretically as an 
empirical interest or moral experience’ (2007, pp. 63-64). 
 
The ‘unrenounceable premise’ of Critical Theory, its Left-Hegelianism, demands that any 
(materialist) theory of society that attempts a critique of social relations must be able to 
identify a social source for its critique within social reality – it must be able to identify what 
Honneth refers to as a moment of ‘intramundane transcendence’.1 Such a programme is 
identifiable in the work of Marx and Lukács but is made most explicit in Horkheimer’s 
‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ essay of 1937 (in Horkheimer, 1999), where he emphasises !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Honneth pursues these ideas further in his ‘A Social Pathology of Reason: On the Intellectual Legacy of 
Critical Theory’ and ‘Reconstructive Social Criticism with a Genealogical Proviso: On the Idea of ‘Critique’ in 
the Frankfurt School’ in Honneth (2009). 
 2 
the need for a ‘critical’ theory to be able to account for its own origins in social reality (or 
‘pretheoretical experience’) whilst also reflecting on its role in future social change. Critical 
theory is not therefore simply a philosophical pursuit, at least not in its original form, but 
requires a sociological account of its own emergence – i.e. it justifies its own emancipatory 
claims through recourse to a theory of society that is able to identify the emancipatory 
impulse at work in current social forces and, in turn, encourage us to resist domination. The 
difficulty with such a project is its ability to comprehend its own history and social context 
without succumbing to a relativist position that would compromise its ‘critical’ normative and 
political intentions. Habermas’s and Honneth’s work in many ways remains committed to the 
original project of a Critical Theory outlined by Horkheimer’s ‘Traditional and Critical 
Theory’ essay, but both believe that they have successfully outlined an alternative direction in 
which to take this project, particularly when compared to the pessimism of Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s 1947 work, Dialectic of Enlightenment (1997). My thesis critically explores 
their attempts to develop the original project of Critical Theory in a communicative direction 
and asks whether, and in what way, such attempts are fruitful for contemporary Critical 
Theory and social theory conceived more broadly. 
 
Horkheimer’s division between ‘traditional’ theory and ‘critical’ theory is a response to what 
he saw as the key methodological problem of his time, that of the separation between the 
empirical sciences and philosophical thought (Horkheimer, 1999). The charge of idealism 
aimed at the likes of Hegel’s philosophy of history, an account that had attempted to mediate 
between these two approaches, severed the relationship and resulted in the empirical sciences 
concerning themselves with discovering ‘facts’ divorced from philosophical self-reflection, 
and philosophical thought concerning itself with speculative thinking about ‘essence’ 
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divorced from any relationship to the empirical world. This division had consequences for 
forms of social criticism that sought to compare the world as it is, with its particular social 
and political relations, with the world as it ‘ought’ to be. But most pernicious was the way in 
which the empirical sciences, and their ‘facts’, were accepted as producing ‘true’ knowledge 
and increasingly seen as representing the whole of reason. Horkheimer turned to Marx in an 
attempt to expose the flaws in the conflation of the empirical sciences with ‘objectivity’ and 
sought to demonstrate the importance of social labour and its connection to the 
‘interestedness’ of positivist science. In other words, he criticised positivism in the empirical 
sciences for remaining at the methodological level, neglecting epistemological issues, and 
thereby claiming ‘objectivity’ despite its practical interests in the domination and 
manipulation of nature for human needs. In this sense, the empirical sciences have the same 
interests as social labour but are operating on the level of scientific knowledge. The 
subsumption of facts under conceptual knowledge in scientific theory mirrors the 
requirements of the control of nature in societal labour2. We might say that societal labour 
provides the practical context (or pre-theoretical resource) for the empirical sciences. 
Horkheimer refers to such theories, apparent as far back as Descartes, which neglect the social 
and practical determination and emergence of their own origins and see themselves as ‘pure’ 
theory, as examples of ‘traditional theory’. In response to this he wants to outline the 
possibility of a ‘critical theory’ with emancipatory intent that is able to acknowledge its own 
historical and social determination along with its practical interests. Horkheimer also argued 
that such a conception of ‘critical theory’ would require an interdisciplinarity that would 
overcome the division between a transcendent philosophy separated from concrete social 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 This is not an idea restricted to those of a ‘critical theory’ persuasion. For example, see Barnes, B. 
(1977) Interests and the Growth of Knowledge, Routledge, London. 
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reality, and those empirical sciences engaged in the positivistic pursuit of facts with no 
comprehension of the wider context of their activity or the possibility of transcendence. 
 
The possibility of a ‘critical’ theory sought by Horkheimer relied on a philosophy of history 
able to justify the development and position of such a theory in the historical process, and this 
would in turn mean going beyond the division of knowledge into the empirical sciences and 
philosophical thought. At first the answer seemed to lie in making explicit what had been 
implicit in his criticisms and theoretical allegiances so far. By adhering to the classical 
Marxist theory of history, whereby developments in the forces of production necessitated 
changes in social relations, Horkheimer suggested that the developments in the forces of 
production had unleashed certain social relations, and a form of reason, able to critically 
outline the self-knowledge of society – this would therefore explain the historical and social 
determination of Critical theory along with its practical role (Horkheimer, 1999). Whereas the 
empirical sciences could be appealed to as authoritative knowledge in the mastery of nature, 
critical theory could be appealed to as authoritative knowledge in the self-reflection of a 
society. If reason and progress are apparent in history through the development of the 
productive forces, and become manifest through social conflict in the relations of production, 
the key issue becomes identifying the processes at work that hinder the development of reason 
and progress through social conflict and therefore the possibility of the ‘rational’ organisation 
of society that meets the needs of all, i.e. the processes at work in advanced capitalism 
hindering (or rather integrating) the consciousness of the working class.  
 
 
 
 5 
The communicative critique 
According to the criticisms made from the ‘communicative’ position of Habermas and 
Honneth, the development of earlier critical theory is ultimately unable to satisfy its own 
criteria (Honneth, 1995; Honneth, 1991; Habermas, 1992; Habermas, 1984). Given the 
historical context within which the Frankfurt School were writing - Stalinism, Fascism, and 
the decline of proletarian revolutionary activity - the ‘inner circle’ of the Frankfurt School set 
about trying to understand the inability of the proletariat to realise their ‘real’ interests. The 
‘inner circle’ members who Honneth sees as central in carrying out this task - through 
elaborating theories at the level of political economy, Freudian psychology and culture - were 
Friedrich Pollock, Erich Fromm and Adorno respectively (Honneth, 1995). Horkheimer’s 
original project had sought to supplement the levels of political economy and psychology 
with the study of culture due to the need to explain the cultural conditions for the integration 
of the individual – in this case mass culture – rather than assume a direct relationship between 
socio-economic demands and individual conformity. Pollock’s theory of ‘state capitalism’, in 
the light of Nazism and Soviet Communism, reflected on the development of the planned 
economy as the post-liberal administration of the market by the bureaucratic state, and 
provided the backdrop for the analysis of cultural and psychological integration. Fromm 
applied this organisational change in the structure of capitalism to changes in the bourgeois 
nuclear family such that the patriarchal authority of the male is lost along with his economic 
authority, which in turn produces authority-hungry, ego-weak, conformist personalities3. In an 
attempt to avoid a crude functionalist connection between economic demands and 
psychological developments, Horkheimer originally, according to Honneth, sought to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See also part 3, chapter 4 (‘End of the Individual’) of Habermas (1988) Legitimation Crisis, Heinemann, 
London. 
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investigate ‘those ‘moral customs’ and ‘life-styles’ in which the everyday communicative 
practice of social groups finds expression’. Had he pursued this train of thought:  
 
‘it could have been demonstrated that socialised subjects are not simply passively 
subjected to an anonymous steering process but, rather, actively participate with 
their own interpretative performances in the complex process of social integration 
… [and had he realised this] … that logically independent dimension of social 
action-orientations and value patterns, which cannot be viewed as a merely 
functional element in the reproduction of domination, would have become visible 
to him’ (Honneth, 1995, p.69).4 
 
However, a functionalist conception of culture followed according to Honneth whereby, in the 
form of a base-superstructure model, culture played the role of further integrating individuals 
into wider socio-economic demands; it increasingly lost its critical function and assumed an 
administrative role in the name of economic efficiency. Honneth sees this analysis of culture 
as particularly exemplified in Adorno’s work on the culture industry.5 
 
Rather than understanding this impoverished conception of social action as an accurate 
reflection of the times, Honneth seeks to confront what he sees as a functionalist 
reductionism, or a return to traditional theory, apparent in the inner circle of Critical Theory 
and lays the blame at the door of their philosophical-historical presuppositions (Honneth, 
1995, p. 70). Notwithstanding the historical context of Stalinism and Fascism, the problem 
with their scenario of a totally administered society is the need to conceive of the different 
levels of analysis (economy, individual, culture) in terms of the functional roles each plays in 
relation to social labour. In a consistently Habermasian manner, Honneth outlines what he !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 This is also a repeat of Habermas’s critique of Parsons. See section 7 of Habermas (1987b) The Theory of 
Communicative Action, Volume two: Lifeworld and System, a Critique of Functionalist Reason, Boston MA, 
Beacon Press  
5 Despite Honneth’s broadly sympathetic account of Horkheimer here, contra Adorno, his recent work has 
shown signs of renewed appreciation for Adorno’s work. See Honneth (2005) and his essay ‘The Possibility of a 
Disclosing Critique of Society: The Dialectic of Enlightenment in Light of Current Debates in Social Criticism’ 
in Honneth (2007). 
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sees as the two key premises shared by Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse in their philosophy 
of history: 
 
‘First, all three assume that human reason or rationality must be capable of being 
understood as the intellectual faculty for the instrumental disposal over natural 
objects; to this extent, all three remain bound to the conceptual tradition of the 
philosophy of consciousness which construes human rationality according to the 
model of the cognitive relation of a subject to an object. Second, all agree on the 
conclusion that can be drawn from the philosophical-historical premises for a 
theory of history: namely, that historical development takes place above all as a 
process of unfolding precisely that potential for rationality which is articulated in 
the instrumental disposal of man over natural objects. To this extent, they remain 
bound to the tendency already predominant in Marx, to instrumentally foreshorten 
human history to a developmental unfolding of the societal processing of nature’ 
(1995, p.71). 
 
According to this account – an account I will ultimately call into question - their 
philosophical-historical approach leads to a functionalist reductionism that only really 
considers social action in terms of social labour. Consequently the whole sphere of everyday 
communicative practice is omitted and it appears that society reproduces itself separately 
from the intersubjective (and creative) social action and self-understanding of its members. It 
is this omission that is central to the ‘communicative turn’ in Habermas’s work and becomes 
integral to the development of Honneth’s. 
 
Honneth (1991) further rehearses a relatively loyal Habermasian account of the weaknesses of 
early Critical Theory in his criticisms of Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment and the further ‘repression of the social’ in Adorno’s later work. He argues 
that a theoretical shift occurs in the 1940s, encapsulated in Dialectic of Enlightenment, with 
consequences for both the philosophical-historical approach and interdisciplinarity adopted 
thus far. A more pessimistic philosophy of history is assumed - in the light of Fascism and 
Stalinism, and the integration of the working class in the commodified and administered 
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society of the US - along with a turn away from the ills of capitalism (and the emphasis on the 
forces and relations of production) and towards issues of human consciousness and the 
dangers inherent in human reason. An increasing scepticism around the possibilities of 
progress and civilisation inaugurates a re-thinking of their philosophy of history in the 
direction of a ‘logic of disintegration’ from the origin of the species to the barbarism evident 
in Fascism (Honneth, 1995, p. 73). This grand philosophy of history adheres to the previous 
emphasis on work and the social mastery of nature but no longer in the direction of social 
emancipation according to Honneth. They emphasise the cognitive component of the mastery 
of nature that they associate with ‘objectivised thinking’ or ‘instrumental rationality’ – the 
reification of thought apparent in human interaction with nature. The theoretical consequences 
of this was the revision of Marx’s broadly positive account of the emancipatory potential 
latent in scientific and technological developments, and the emphasis on a Weberian 
conception of formal rationality at work in the scientific and technological domination of 
nature – what they referred to as ‘instrumental reason’. 
 
It is the Marxist reception of Weber’s theory of rationalisation and the ‘disenchantment of the 
world’ in Lukács, Adorno and Horkheimer that Habermas blames for the impasse reached by 
early Critical theory (Habermas, 1984, Chapter IV). With a notion of ‘reification’, borrowed 
from Lukács’s analysis of the forms of thought that develop out of the abstraction inherent in 
commodity exchange, Adorno and Horkheimer build what Honneth refers to as an 
‘anthropology’ that seeks to account for the origin and development of this logic of 
disintegration. Whereas from Lukács to Sohn-Rethel, the forms of consciousness of bourgeois 
society are traceable to the abstract nature of commodity exchange, in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment commodity exchange is seen as the modern form of a broader instrumental 
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rationality.6 Commodity exchange is seen as a form of mediation that generalises the type of 
rationality that developed out of the aims of self-preservation in the human confrontation with 
nature. Honneth therefore argues that Adorno and Horkheimer base their philosophy of 
history on the pre-historical act of human self-preservation (1991, p.38). They argue that 
instrumental thinking is established with the first act of the mastery of nature – ‘myth is 
already enlightenment’, already a means of reducing the uncontrollability of nature – and the 
development of this thinking proceeds to dominate the physical and social life of humanity. 
This domination of nature is apparent in the ‘civilising’ process of managing the instincts, the 
championing of reason over sensual capacities, and the social relation of domination. Honneth 
claims that presupposed in this philosophy of history is the aesthetic idea, apparent in German 
Romanticism, of a reconciliation with nature, and therefore their Dialectic of Enlightenment 
deals with the link between the notion of the mastery of nature and the ‘self-alienation of the 
species’ (1995, p.74). 
 
Honneth explains the conclusions of this work as being due to the persistence of the ‘mastery 
of nature’ at the centre of its philosophy of history. By inflecting the positive (or 
emancipatory) notion of labour from the original Critical Theory program into a negative one, 
he argues that Adorno and Horkheimer are unable to sidestep the key theoretical weakness of 
Critical Theory – namely the ‘philosophy of consciousness’. This logic of subject/object, 
where the human subject seeks to represent and master the object (nature), is the only lens 
through which early Critical Theorists perceive social action and subsequently, this ‘logic of 
reification’ is applied to ‘the three dimensions of societal labour, the socialisation of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 For Lukács on reification and the ‘antinomies of bourgeois thought’ see Lukács (1971); for Sohn-Rethel on 
abstraction see Sohn-Rethel (1978). 
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individuals and, finally, social domination’ (Honneth, 1995, p.75). Honneth expands on this 
by suggesting that because they:  
 
‘conceptualised from the beginning both the process of the formation of 
individual needs and the process of the social exercise of domination according to 
the model of instrumental acts of disposal, they could, in retrospect, effortlessly 
see the civilisation process as a whole dominated by the same instrumental 
rationality that underlies the act of the mastery of nature’ (1995, p.75).  
 
A key problem with this account for Honneth is that a whole range of communicative 
practices and social achievements, such as developments in legal equality and process along 
with extended individual freedoms, fall out of the picture presented by the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. Honneth’s criticisms also end up outlining the oft-repeated point that Adorno 
and Horkheimer do not consider the (autonomous) interpretative qualities of oppressed groups 
and are therefore unable to recognise social and cultural resistance and opposition. Their 
emphasis on the social domination of nature, and the parallels with social class domination 
and individual self-discipline, leaves them with an impoverished conception of social action. 
What arises here is a similar, and connected, problem to the issue of providing a theoretical 
justification for (rational) critique given the entwinement of rationality and domination - if 
society and consciousness, as the possible (social) sources for independent and critical 
consciousness, have become completely reified, then any attempt at social critique that 
grounds itself in social reality must be considered impossible. To put it another way, if 
mundane social experience is considered from the viewpoint of the ‘administered society’, 
then any attempt to identify a critical element of ‘intramundane transcendence’ will be found 
wanting. Honneth therefore suggests that early critical theory fails to ground its critical 
position in actual social experience. He argues that their reduction of social action to the 
realm of social labour, and their account of the administered society, impoverishes a critical 
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theory that seeks to ground its reflective position in practical social activity. Without a form 
of rationality free from domination, their theoretical position is reduced to a utopian 
negativity that exposes any (false) claims to social reconciliation; without a pre-theoretical 
resource for social emancipation apparent in social history, their critical position – 
particularly Adorno’s - seeks grounds in the non-instrumental, yet rarefied, sensuous 
particularities of modern art. This, at least, is the communicative account of early Critical 
Theory proposed by Habermas and Honneth. 
 
An additional, but connected problem, according to Honneth is the fact that the original 
interdisciplinary project, combining philosophical reflection and the empirical sciences, is 
abandoned in favour of the championing of a self-reflective philosophy over and above the 
‘reifying’ empirical social sciences. Adorno and Horkheimer’s philosophy of history based on 
the domination of nature alters the interdisciplinary focus of critical theory and finally leads to 
Adorno’s conception of the inherent resistance of aesthetics. The various scientific disciplines 
are seen as ultimately connected in that they all arise out of the instrumental character of the 
human domination of nature and are therefore part of the process of the technical control of 
external nature and the social control of internal nature. In response to this, Adorno and 
Horkheimer sideline the other disciplines and prioritise philosophy. However, as their 
philosophy ‘already makes the pure act of conceptual operation into an elementary form of 
instrumental reason’, Honneth argues that: 
 
‘it cannot justify any form of discursive thought, even its own. Philosophy is the 
reflective form of a critical theory that discovers in each step of conceptual 
reflection a piece of the continued history of domination. Therefore, strictly 
speaking, it prohibits itself’ (1991, p. 61-62).  
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Here Honneth rehearses Habermas’s argument that once ‘rationality’ itself is implicated in the 
process of social domination and the domination of nature, as Adorno and Horkheimer seek to 
demonstrate in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, then a ‘critical’ theory that seeks to provide 
us with a ‘rational’ account of the possibilities of emancipation is found wanting (Honneth, 
1991, p.129). Their account of the entwinement of rationality and domination places their 
own critical-theoretical philosophy under threat according to Honneth – how is it possible, 
given such entwinement, to ground a (rational) critical position able to provide an account of 
the (rational) possibility of emancipation? (Honneth, 1995, pp. 61-91). As philosophy itself is 
intimately tied to instrumental thought, Adorno and Horkheimer limit its activity to the 
negative task of criticising conceptual thinking and renounce the possibility of any claims to 
positive knowledge. This negative task of philosophy is the logical conclusion to their 
attempts to avoid self-contradiction and an idea that is explicitly worked through in Adorno’s 
1966 work, Negative Dialectics (1990).7 
 
The question for Honneth and Habermas now becomes: How is Critical Theory possible 
within a philosophy of history that sees the human domination of nature, and therefore the 
alienation of humanity, lurking behind all attempts at conceptual knowledge? How is an 
accurate representation of reality possible when the only access to it is through (instrumental) 
conceptual knowledge? Adorno looks to the realm of aesthetics due to his belief that art, 
although still cognitive, allows for non-conceptual knowledge of reality. If conceptual 
objectification initiates a process of human domination over external and internal nature then 
art, in its non-conceptual (or rather more than simply conceptual) relation to nature, represents 
the possibility of freedom. Freedom here is seen as possible only once humans are able to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 I return to these points in chapter 4. 
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have a communicative relationship with nature and each other free from coercion in the name 
of technical control. Art does not treat nature (and other human beings) as material for control 
but as an equal element in communication and emphatic experience. Once the logic of the 
domination of nature encroaches on social life, art becomes the only sphere able to liberate 
repressed nature. For Adorno, art in many ways assumes the normative tasks that Lukács had 
previously assigned to the proletariat. In its capacity to remain a form of reason without 
instrumentality, art is able to provide substantive awareness of social life without becoming 
subject to the critique of instrumental reason. Critical theory, to avoid self-contradiction, 
therefore emerges as the representative of the emancipatory element inherent in the work of 
art by forwarding the logic immanent to this process. In addition to this, Adorno attempts to 
replicate this logic immanent to art in the style of his own work that, in trying to be non-
coercive, often appears to lack the usual systematic requirements of writing.8 However, as 
Honneth argues:  
 
‘since even a philosophical aesthetic can in each case only refer to other 
experiential modes of artistic production, it cannot itself create this experience. 
The critical theory that emerges in Adorno’s post-war writings thus vacillates 
helplessly between philosophical reflection and aesthetic experience, not wanting 
to be the one and not able to be the other’ (1991, p. 69). 
 
Honneth’s history of Critical Theory is a history of the failed attempts to meet Horkheimer’s 
original methodological demands. It is the Marxist inheritance in the work of Adorno and 
Horkheimer that marks their failure, according to Honneth – specifically their attempts to base 
a critical theory on a Marxist philosophy of history, that grounds its critique in the ‘practical’ 
interests of the proletariat, or on Marx’s critique of fetishism, and is unable to conceive of any 
sphere of social action besides social labour. These attempts are ultimately seen to lead !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 I will explore and defend Adorno’s emphasis on aesthetics, as well as the political possibilities it throws up, 
contra Habermas and Honneth, in Chapter 4. 
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Adorno and Horkheimer towards a ‘Marxist functionalism’ that emphasises the relationship 
between capitalist domination and cultural manipulation to such an extent that they miss the 
‘mode of the social organisation of societies’ (Honneth, 1991, p. 99) and therefore foreshorten 
the possibility of practical critique. The ‘pre-theoretical resource for emancipation’ sought in 
social history, and providing the grounding for critical theory, is lost and takes refuge in the 
sensuous particularities of modern art. For Habermas and Honneth, the promise of modern art 
is too rarefied an aspect of social life to represent the possibility of emancipation and is 
therefore a weak pre-theoretical resource for social critique. The unsatisfactory negativism 
associated with this account leaves Honneth in no doubt as to the pressing problem of 
contemporary critical theory: 
 
‘If the Left-Hegelian model of critique is to be retained at all, we must first re-
establish theoretical access to the social sphere in which an interest in 
emancipation can be anchored pre-theoretically. Without some form of proof that 
its critical perspective is reinforced by a need or movement within social reality, 
Critical Theory cannot be further pursued in any way today, for it would be no 
longer capable of distinguishing itself from other models of social critique in its 
claim to a superior sociological explanatory substance or in its philosophical 
procedures of justification’ (2007, p. 66) 
 
Given the nature of the impasse of early Critical theory according to Habermas and Honneth, 
what is therefore needed is a non-instrumental form of rationality and evidence of a pre-
theoretical (‘critical’) resource in social reality. An alternative form of rationality, 
autonomous in relation to instrumental rationality, is required such that all conceptual 
knowledge is not simply a reflection of the instrumental demands of social domination and 
the domination of nature; for them, this would avoid the contradiction of attempting to present 
a ‘rational’ critique of society while arguing for the entwinement of rationality and 
domination. It would also allow for the possibility of reconnecting the empirical sciences with 
reflective philosophy. Alongside an alternative form of rationality, Habermas and Honneth 
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need to reconnect to a form of practical social critique or concrete social ‘interest’ in 
emancipation that can provide them with a pre-theoretical resource for their ‘critical’ theories. 
This requires a conception of societal development very different to the notion of an 
‘administered society’ where strong parallels are made between social domination and the 
process of the instrumental domination of nature. 
 
Habermas and Honneth hope that these tasks are satisfied by the communicative turn. By 
outlining a logic of ‘intersubjectivity’ at work in an alternative ‘communicative rationality’ 
Habermas and Honneth hope to sidestep the philosophy of consciousness, with its 
subject/object logic and what they see as its reduction of reason to instrumentality, and 
identify a pre-theoretical resource for critique in the emancipatory possibilities at work in the 
‘conditions for the communicative sociation of individuals’ (Habermas, 1984, p. 398) – be 
they ‘built into the linguistic mechanism of the reproduction of the species’ (ibid) or apparent 
in ‘identity claims acquired in socialisation’ (Honneth, 2007, p. 70). To achieve this, they 
need to substantiate the claim that communicative action is to some extent relatively 
autonomous in relation to social labour and the instrumental domination of nature. If the 
notion of the ‘administered society’ led early critical theory into a cul-de-sac whereby a pre-
theoretical resource for their critique was not available due to their account of the extensive 
reification of consciousness and society, then Habermas and Honneth need to demonstrate the 
potentially emancipatory (and non-reified) interests at work in contemporary society. I 
explore the relative successes of Habermas’s and Honneth’s communicative developments in 
chapters 1 and 2 respectively, before then drawing their positions into a dialogue with the 
work of Michel Foucault. 
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Why Foucault? 
A more radical rejoinder to the impasse of early Critical theory can arguably be found in the 
work of Foucault despite a lack of conscious engagement with that tradition until late in his 
career. Addressing the neglect of the Frankfurt school in French philosophical thought, 
Foucault states that:  
 
‘Now, obviously, if I had been familiar with the Frankfurt school, if I had been 
aware of it at the time, I would not have said a number of stupid things that I did 
say and I would have avoided many of the detours which I made while trying to 
pursue my own humble path – when, meanwhile, avenues had been opened up by 
the Frankfurt school. It is a strange case of nonpenetration between two very 
similar types of thinking which is explained, perhaps, by that very similarity. 
Nothing hides the fact of a problem in common better than two similar ways of 
approaching it’ (Foucault in Kelly (ed), 1994, p. 17). 
 
In many ways it is rather odd to include Foucault here in an assessment of earlier Critical 
Theory and the communicative turn, as I do in Chapter 3, however I believe he helps us to 
sharpen some of the key issues and draw out what is at stake in the differences between early 
Critical Theory and Habermas, and between influential post-structuralist accounts and critical 
theory. He has been a major source of critical engagement with Habermas and was also used 
in Honneth’s Critique of Power (1991) as an alternative ‘rediscovery of the social’ - an initial 
corrective to what Honneth sees as the lack of an adequate conception of both power and 
struggle in Habermas’s initial communicative model. In addition to this, the developments in 
Foucault’s later work share with earlier critical theory, particularly Adorno, an inclination 
towards an aesthetic critique of modernity, albeit with a different focus.9 
 
The most obvious connection between Foucault and early Critical Theory is the concern with 
the connection between domination and reason, or power and knowledge. There are also !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 I will draw out this link further in Chapter 4. Honneth also explores the parallels between Foucault and 
Adorno’s work in his collection of essays, The Fragmented World of the Social (1995), chapter 6. 
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parallels between what appear to be non-progressive and dystopian accounts with the 
Frankfurt School emphasising the all-encompassing nature of instrumental reason and 
Foucault the all-encompassing nature of ‘power’. They both recognise the way in which 
reason is embedded in social and cultural contexts, is historically variable, and is connected to 
interests and power; this also leads to an emphasis on the reflexive nature of their social 
theories. They also both recognise the practical context of social theory and seek to de-
naturalise current social and political relations such that theory can potentially be a force for 
social change (see McCarthy in Kelly (ed), 1994). 
 
However, Foucault’s work displays some clear differences when compared to early critical 
theory and charts an alternative route out of the impasse of their work – however, rather than 
taking a route that would pursue the original project of Critical Theory under communicative 
conditions, Foucault’s work arguably threatens to undermine their whole critical-theoretical 
project. Rather than reigniting the possibility of a domination-free rationality, or a framework 
for non-coercive dialogue - and therefore a more stable normative ground for critique – as 
Habermas and Honneth seek to do, Foucault resolutely restates the entwinement of power and 
knowledge and emphasises the radically historical and contingent nature of reason (Gordon, 
1980). His work questions the very possibility of formulating a more adequate conception of 
reason and he particularly seeks to expose any pretensions to the possible context 
transcendence of truth. This more radical critique of reason has far-reaching consequences for 
the practical and theoretical grounding of a ‘critical’ theory and suggests that we should give 
up on the idea that the critique of current social practices can serve the practical goals of 
reducing the effects of ideology and contributing towards a more ‘rational’ and just society. 
Rather than starting from the premise that we can (rationally) distinguish between legitimate 
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and illegitimate exercises of power, Foucault’s work emphasises that all knowledge and 
practices are produced by power relations, and therefore we must relinquish the idea of a 
power-free discourse that can provide us with the possibility of critique. Rather than exposing 
existing power relations from a perspective of ideology critique, and exploring the possibility 
of a truly rational society whereby a collectively and rationally exercised power remains 
accountable and transparent, we must accept the pre-ideological nature of power. Foucault’s 
Nietzschean account sees the origin of ‘the social’ in power/knowledge relations rather than 
in terms of a communicative-democratic origin of the social in the intersubjective pragmatic 
of language or identity-formation. 
 
The structure of the thesis 
I begin by exploring Habermas’s response to the impasse of early Critical Theory, which I’ve 
briefly stated here. Chapter 1 provides a broad outline of Habermas’s social theory, exploring 
his attempts to move beyond early critical theory, the development of his ‘linguistic turn’, his 
notions of system and lifeworld, and the normative and ethical issues at the heart of his 
‘discourse ethics’. The final section of that chapter rehearses a number of key criticisms of his 
work, particularly those from Honneth, but also from his more Hegelian critics. Chapter 2 
begins with Honneth’s appropriation, and critique, of Habermas and Foucault as the starting 
point for his ‘recognitive-theoretical’ model of critical theory. Habermas is championed by 
Honneth for his emphasis on communicative action but criticised for reifying the categories of 
system and lifeworld and for neglecting the importance of social struggle and power between 
cultural groups. Foucault is initially adopted as a corrective to this criticism of Habermas but 
is ultimately charged with ‘cryptonormativism’ and a ‘systems-theoretic solution to the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment’ with his ‘administrative theory of power’. I then outline, in detail, 
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the theoretical heart of Honneth’s project - his 1992 work, Struggle for Recognition (1996) – 
alongside some of his later work, followed by a brief discussion of some of the problems 
highlighted by recent critics. 
 
Despite the theoretical and political appeal of Habermas and Honneth’s work - through their 
attempts to offer a concrete institutional model of democracy strongly linked to the public 
sphere, civil society, cosmopolitan institutions etc - I find their attempts to outline a 
framework for non-coercive dialogical exchange wanting. Although there are clear 
differences in their work, and Honneth is critical of the reified separation of system and 
lifeworld in Habermas’s work, I argue that both thinkers end up idealising and purifying the 
public sphere, subjectivity, work and consumption, and they ultimately conclude with overly 
procedural conceptions of freedom. 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the main phases of Foucault’s theoretical trajectory as they relate to the 
problematic of Critical Theory. I therefore concentrate on both his middle ‘genealogical’ 
period and the transition to his later work on ‘ethics/aesthetics’.10 Critics of Foucault’s 
genealogical emphasis on power/knowledge, which shares a number of themes with early 
Critical theory, have mainly focussed on the all-encompassing nature of Foucault’s notion of 
power, with its lack of a clear conception of resistance, along with his crypto-normativism 
and the lack of an adequate conception of subjectivity. I outline a number of these criticisms 
before exploring Foucault’s shift from a focus on techniques of objectivisation and 
domination towards on emphasis on subjectivisation and ‘techniques of the self’. This phase 
of his work also parallels certain aspects of early Critical Theory, particularly Adorno’s late !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 As a result, I spend very little time discussing his work on ‘archaeology’ despite the formative role it played 
and the continuation of a number of themes throughout his work as a whole. 
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work, inasmuch as he provides an aesthetic critique of modernity. However, I will argue that 
the nature of his aesthetic critique – the self-creation of identity as a ‘work of art’ - ends up 
asserting a somewhat idealised and autonomous aesthetic practice with a poorly articulated 
link to wider socio-historical power relations. It is also overly subjective and fails to present 
us with a more substantive conception of culture, democracy, recognition, and ethical 
responsibility. 
 
The problems encountered in Foucault’s work, and my criticisms of Habermas and Honneth, 
lead us to reconsider the impasse of early critical theory outlined above and the contemporary 
relevance of Adorno’s work. In the final chapter I tackle the communicative critique of 
Adorno’s position and outline a number of aspects of his work that might help us overcome 
the idealisation and proceduralism that ultimately hinder the communicative turn, whilst also 
providing us with the tools to resolve some of the problems encountered in Foucault’s overly 
totalising genealogical period and the overly aesthetic and subjective conclusions of his later 
work. To this end, I focus on three areas of Adorno’s work. Firstly the (Hegelian) notion of 
‘dialectical experience’, and the importance of contradiction and aporia, which is neglected by 
Habermas and Honneth and is absent from Foucault’s work; secondly, the ways in which such 
dialectical experience is threatened by the culture industry and the forms of representation it 
produces, and how this might help us to question Habermas and Honneth’s faith in the public 
sphere and their version of communicative autonomy; finally, Adorno’s (political) aesthetic 
critique of modernity and the notion of non-reified culture it produces. The ethics of non-
identity that emerges from his work on aesthetics – an ethics predominantly responding to the 
damage and suffering produced by identity thinking and its regime of rational-technological 
administration - leaves us with markedly different conceptions of culture, autonomy, 
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community and instrumentality than Habermas and Honneth, but also a more fragile version 
of ‘spirit’ than that found in their work. However, despite the shared inclination towards an 
aesthetic critique of modernity in the work of Foucault and Adorno, and a shared tendency to 
criticise the kinds of idealisation and proceduralism found in Habermas and Honneth, I argue 
that Adorno’s political aesthetics offers us a more substantive conception of culture, 
democracy, ethical satisfaction and responsibility.  
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CHAPTER 1: JÜRGEN HABERMAS & THE COMMUNICATIVE TURN 
 
This chapter explores the origins of the communicative turn in Critical Theory led by Jürgen 
Habermas. It seeks to grasp what is at stake in the differences between earlier Critical Theory 
and the communicative turn, which has come to dominate the development of Critical Theory 
as a project, and sets the scene for the further developments outlined in Honneth’s work. 
Given the extent of Habermas’s work in a number of disciplines, I will not be trying to give a 
comprehensive overview of the whole of his oeuvre in this chapter1. What I will attempt to do 
is provide an outline of what I believe to be the core of his project and the central theoretical 
impasse in his work. To this end I will explore some of the formative ideas leading up to what 
is arguably his central theoretical work, The Theory of Communicative Action (1984, 1987), 
alongside the pragmatic theory of meaning and theory of communicative rationality contained 
in this work, and his later programme of discourse ethics. The chapter is divided into five 
sections: ‘Beyond Marx and Critical Theory’ sets the scene for my discussion of Habermas’s 
later work, and deals with Habermas’s relationship to Marx and the Frankfurt School and his 
early formative innovations; ‘The Linguistic Turn’ concentrates on his theory of meaning and 
his theory of communicative rationality; ‘System and Lifeworld’ tackles the core of his 
‘critical’ social theory; and ‘Discourse Ethics’ looks at the normative and ethical issues at the 
heart of Habermas’s more recent work. Having provided an overview of his work, the final 
section briefly explores some of the criticisms that have been aimed at Habermas’s 
philosophy, and it is here that I argue that Habermas’s ‘critical’ theory is excessively 
                                                
1 I will particularly neglect his work on religion and Europe which has been at the heart of his more recent 
publications. See Habermas, J. (2006) The Divided West, Cambridge, Polity Press; Habermas, J. (2007) The 
Dialectics of Secularization (with Joseph Ratzinger), San Francisco CA, Ignatius Press; Habermas, J. (2008) 
Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, Polity Press; Habermas, J. (2009) Europe: 
The Faltering Project, Cambridge, Polity Press; Habermas, J. (2012) The Crisis of the European Union, 
Cambridge, Polity Press. 
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idealising and abstracted from concrete social experience, and that he provides us with an 
overly procedural account of freedom. 
 
Beyond Marx & the Frankfurt School 
In response to what he sees as the limitations of earlier critical theory, Habermas seeks to 
provide a new critical theory that is again able to account for its own socio-historical context 
while providing a rational foundation for critique in relation to a pre-theoretical, critical 
moment in social reality. He also seeks to reinvigorate the original interdisciplinary project of 
Critical Theory by reconnecting his philosophical concerns with developments in a range of 
empirical sciences. His first attempts, and ones that retain significance for much of his later 
work, are concerned with establishing a form of rationality markedly different from 
instrumental rationality. This project is apparent in his works of the early 1960s, Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989) and Theory & Practice (1988). Here Habermas 
makes clear his debt to the classical Greek conception of politics in its separation from the 
question of technical skill. Politics was considered a honourable pursuit, concerning itself 
with human ends, ethics and the possibility of a virtuous collective life; the technical aspects 
of production and their relationship to the exact sciences, on the other hand, were considered 
far removed from the educational and cultivated sphere of politics. Also removed were related 
questions of economy and contractual relations that were themselves considered as technical 
questions requiring means-end logic and involving legal issues concerned with the protection 
of the interests of private individuals. In contrast to such technical issues, politics here is pure 
politics and, echoing Arendt, Habermas conceives of it as a space for the free and uncoerced 
exchange of opinions. It is this intersubjective form of communicative action, unencumbered 
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by instrumental issues, that is at the very heart of political community for Habermas and 
provides a starting point for an alternative form of rationality. 
 
Given the complexity of modern societies, Habermas accepts that modelling the modern state 
on the Greek polis would be both impractical and ethically undesirable, especially given the 
desirable modern extension of ‘freedom’ beyond the boundary between political and socio-
economic concerns. However, he finds a promising model for normative progress, relevant to 
contemporary societies, in what he calls the ‘bourgeois public sphere’. Habermas defines it 
as: 
 
‘a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be 
formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes 
into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a 
public body. They then behave neither like business or professional people 
transacting private affairs, nor like members of a constitutional order subject to 
the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy. Citizens behave as a public body when 
they confer in an unrestricted fashion-that is, with the guarantee of freedom of 
assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions-
about matters of general interest.’ (Habermas, 1974b, p. 49). 
 
Originating in the eighteenth century as a result of newly acquired political rights to freedom 
of association and press, and developing out of the literary salons and coffee houses of 
Europe, the ‘bourgeois public sphere’ came to fill the gap between the state and civil society 
owing to the increasing number of wealthy individuals excluded from significant positions in 
government but with clear interests in the organisation of public life. Their political goal was 
to ensure that the State worked in the interests of more than the traditional ruling groups and 
that it did this in an open and accountable manner, a goal the participants of the public sphere 
pursued through the newly developed media of newspapers and learned journals (Habermas, 
1989, p. 43) 
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Despite these being points of historical interest, Habermas is centrally concerned with the key 
characteristics that distinguish the public sphere and provide a model for what we might see 
as political progress. He argues that above and beyond the legal rights that protect the private 
individuals of civil society, political liberty requires a free and active public sphere where 
these individuals can voluntarily engage in public debate and also transcend their private role, 
as economic ‘person’, and be involved in the formation of a public opinion, as ‘citizen’, 
linking the general interest to the activity of the state. Firstly, the public sphere plays a key 
role in the formation of public opinion, again as a political pursuit in itself rather than a 
technical one, and this public opinion involves the deliberation over the activity of the state as 
the governing institution and provides the state with democratic legitimacy. The public sphere 
also aims to ensure that such public opinion is formed freely with the process and outcome of 
debates being decided by the force of the (rationally) better argument rather than by 
traditional privilege or custom2. The freedoms presupposed by the public sphere are to be 
guaranteed by a series of liberal political freedoms – of speech, assembly and press – which 
are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for a fully democratic society. Without an active 
public sphere, without the free and critical space that provides public opinions on matters of 
the state, such freedoms are susceptible to the influence and interests of the few in the form of 
managed ‘public opinion’ and ‘public relations’, and they become merely formal freedoms 
lacking in substance. The modern State may still appear democratic by defending the 
freedoms of speech, assembly and press, but without the underlying public sphere the State 
will lack legitimacy. Unfortunately this has been the historical fate of the public sphere for 
Habermas. His account of the decline of the modern public sphere argues that the increasing 
                                                
2 Gadamer (2006) presents an alternative view to Habermas and challenges this Enlightenment argument as a 
‘prejudice against prejudices’ and suggests that ‘The overcoming of all prejudices, this global demand of the 
Enlightenment, will prove itself to be a prejudice, and removing it opens the way to an appropriate 
understanding of the finitude which dominates not only our humanity but also our historical consciousness’ (p. 
277). I will return to this criticism of Habermas at the end of the chapter. 
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demand for newspapers and other forms of mass communication led to their subsumption 
under capitalist interests and a gradual decline in their autonomous and critical function 
(Habermas, 1989, p.180)3. In relation to the mass media, he suggests that they have: 
  
‘become autonomous, to obtain the agreement or at least acquiescence of a 
mediatized public. Publicity is generated from above, so to speak, in order to 
create an aura of good will for certain positions. Originally publicity guaranteed 
the connection between rational-critical public debate and the legislative 
foundation of domination, including the critical supervision of its exercise. Now it 
makes possible the peculiar ambivalence of a domination exercised through the 
domination of nonpublic opinion: it serves the manipulation of the public as much 
as legitimation before it. Critical publicity is supplanted by manipulative 
publicity’ (Habermas, 1989, pp. 177-178).  
 
Alongside the increasingly privatised and consumer-based public sphere there developed the 
manipulation of public opinion, in the interests of ‘legitimacy’, for increasingly self-serving 
economic and political institutions.4 
 
In his Toward a Rational Society (1971), Habermas sees the decline of the bourgeois public 
sphere, with its democratic process and its concern with the good life and ideals of equality 
and justice, alongside the rise of what we might call ‘technical’ politics. Rather than 
governments pursuing practical – i.e. normative and ethical - goals legitimated by the 
deliberations of a public sphere, Habermas suggests that we see the increasing collapse of the 
distinction between practical and instrumental concerns as governments busy themselves with 
technical questions concerning the management of economic stability and growth divorced 
from the norms and values of a free and open public sphere. Social problems are increasingly 
                                                
3 However, we might want to question the unnuanced nature of this assertion, or at least the general level at 
which Habermas tackles it, given the separation of ownership and control, the rise of journalism as a profession 
etc. 
4 It is important to note here that throughout his work Habermas makes ‘legitimation’ an issue of all systems of 
inequality. He tends to fluctuate between emphasising ‘inequality’ as the key problem on the one hand, and the 
‘rational justification of inequality’ on the other. It seems reasonable to suggest that his emphasis on rational 
justification is a veiled concern for the problem of inequality. 
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seen as requiring technical solutions and, although scientific and technological developments 
have significantly improved many aspects of social life, Habermas argues that they have dire 
political consequences once they are accepted as the only way to deal with political 
questions5. The suppression of normative and ethical questions in favour of technical 
solutions is in danger of depoliticising the populace, devaluing the political importance of the 
public sphere, and ultimately robbing us of the reflective and interactive practices that 
distinguish the human intersubjectivity of pure politics from the (technically driven) human 
relationship to the material world. 
 
Despite the pessimism of Habermas’s account, he is clear as to what the alternative, 
emancipatory path should have been or should be. It is here where his position is a clear 
alternative to the negativism of Adorno and Horkheimer, and also a noticeably different to the 
work of Marx regarding the relationship to the liberal ideals of justice, equality and legal 
personhood prevalent in the idea of the bourgeois public sphere. For Marxists, such ideals are 
inevitably and inescapably attached to their ideological origin, in that they are a reflection of 
the needs of the market society of capitalism and aim to protect the contractual relations that 
have exploitation at their heart. Habermas on the other hand suggests a degree of autonomy, 
and emancipatory potential, for such ideals. They are not reducible to the ideological demands 
of market capitalism, although he accepts that this clearly played a role in their origin, but are 
to be seen as emanating from the public opinion formed out of the relatively free deliberation 
of the public sphere. Whereas Marxists would argue that such ideals are merely formal and 
lack substance, Habermas argues that this is only the case once such ideals are divorced from 
an active public sphere. Habermas’s attempt to sever such ideals from the context of market 
                                                
5 This division between technical and non-technical solutions might be challenged on the grounds that it is an 
overly neat and idealised separation. A similar criticism has been aimed at Habermas’s distinction between 
system and lifeworld and I will explore this in more depth towards the end of the chapter. 
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relations though is questionable and I will argue plays a role in the developing proceduralism 
of his later work. Not that Habermas is uncritical of the historical bourgeois public sphere in 
reality as he is keen to point to the obvious discrepancy between the egalitarian claims of the 
bourgeois public sphere and its exclusionary practices. Deliberations over matters of state and 
moral-political possibilities were confined to a section of the population distinguished by 
education, property and sex, and arguably the proposed notions of common interest merely 
reflected the partial interests of those involved. However, he is keen to defend the principles 
of the public sphere and to suggest that we should look to revive and extend them. 
 
Habermas takes his analysis of the public sphere, at the level of institutions, and the 
distinction between technical interests and communicative politics, and attempts to translate 
them into an analysis of different forms of human interests and related forms of knowledge. In 
his 1968 work Knowledge and Human Interests (1987a), he takes his lead from Marx’s 
distinction between the forces of production and the social relations of production, while 
trying to avoid what he sees as the Marxist reduction of the latter to the former, i.e. the 
reduction of sensuous, practical activity to technical activity. For Habermas, Marx is guilty of 
reducing the relatively autonomous sphere of interaction, carried out by language-using 
humans, to the realm of production6. In response to this, Habermas develops an account of 
how the scientific and technological developments that have greatly increased human control 
over nature, came to dominate intersubjective communication; in other words, how one aspect 
of reason, in the form of instrumental rationality, came to dominate another aspect of reason, 
human interaction or ‘communicative action’.  
 
                                                
6 However, as we shall see, Habermas struggles to clarify what the relative autonomy of work (from interaction) 
and interaction (from work) might mean. 
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Habermas’s distinction between instrumental action and communicative action seeks to 
outline two key features, or anthropological ‘interests’, of human experience. The kind of 
action or ‘interest’ reflected in instrumental rationality is that geared towards technical control 
and the exploitation of nature for the purposes of social reproduction, and manifests itself in 
socially organised labour and work. The empirical knowledge of the hard sciences provides 
the measure of validity for instrumental action (1987a, p. 195). ‘Communicative rationality’ 
on the other hand reflects the human interest in mutual understanding and manifests itself in 
interaction mediated by ordinary language. Processes of communication and socialisation 
contain agreed upon norms, often backed up by social sanctions should anyone exceed their 
boundaries, and their measure of validity does not have the exactness of instrumental 
rationality but is determined by intersubjective understandings about mutual obligations and 
expectations. The ‘hermeneutical sciences’, particularly the work of Dilthey and Gadamer, are 
seen by Habermas as the form of knowledge reflecting this ‘interest’ in understanding and 
consensus. These sciences seek to ‘grasp interpretations of reality with regard to possible 
intersubjectivity of action-orienting mutual understanding specific to a given hermeneutic 
starting point’ (ibid). A key distinction here for Habermas, as already mentioned, is that 
between the subject-object logic of instrumental rationality, whereby an object is constituted 
and treated according to instrumental rules, and the subject-subject logic of communicative 
rationality, whereby intersubjectivity reigns and there is reciprocal action between subjects. 
The additional, and central, claim that Habermas makes here relates to the primacy of 
intersubjectivity in social life and the way in which our own self-relation and individual self-
consciousness is formed out of communicative action. So not only is communicative action 
concerned with the relationship between subjectivities, but Habermas argues that individual 
subjectivities are only possible within the context of intersubjective relations, such that one 
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only has a sense of self through one’s sense of difference from others and through the ways in 
which others see you, and how we internalise these social perceptions. 
 
Although Habermas accepts that in concrete historical circumstances both instrumental action 
and communicative action are often linked, he is keen to distinguish the logics of each and 
emphasise that the removal of scarcity would not necessarily entail freedom from servitude 
and repression. What has to be guarded against, according to Habermas, is the encroachment 
of technical, instrumental knowledge and action on reflective and communicative knowledge 
and action, or what is often the ideological denial of the very distinction between the two. In 
relation to material forms of reproduction, and instrumental action, oppression is conceived of 
as the constraint placed on human action by external nature; emancipation from such 
constraints is achieved by the development of the forces of production or the technical control 
over nature and related labour processes. For cultural reproduction, and communicative 
action, oppression is conceived of as the inhibition of our fundamental ‘social’ nature by ‘the 
unreflected, ‘natural’ force of social dependence and political power, which is rooted in prior 
history and tradition’ (1987a, p. 53). Emancipation in this instance would be through the 
replacement of institutions based on force and ‘necessity’ with social relations organised 
according to communicative relations free from domination; the wellspring for such 
emancipation would come from the political struggles of oppressed groups and the ‘critical’ 
work of what Habermas calls the ‘reflective sciences’ – the third of his types of science that 
reflect knowledge constitutive interests. 
 
However, the exact nature of these ‘critical’ reflective sciences is yet to be determined. They 
would need to be able to identify their own social-historical determination, in the same way 
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that the origins of the empirical and hermeneutic sciences have been determined, while also 
being able to justify a ‘critical’ relationship to current social relations. Here marks 
Habermas’s clear continuation of the Frankfurt School project. The empirical sciences are not 
in a position to do this due to their instrumental concerns and lack of reflexivity and, although 
the hermeneutical sciences are promising in this respect, Habermas is cautious of what he 
takes to be their idealisation of everyday interaction, and of the self-interpretations of those 
involved.7 He wants to reinstate the possibility of normative criticism by making the kind of 
distinction apparent in Marx between appearance and reality or, in this case, between ‘true’ 
communication and ‘false’ or inhibited communication. He wants to highlight the fact that 
there are complex structural factors at work behind the backs of social actors who are unable 
to grasp them in their totality, and also unable to grasp the power complexes that determine 
their own understanding of the world. He wants to connect the understanding of the 
hermeneutical sciences (i.e. the self-interpretations of social actors) to the underlying social 
relations that inhibit true communication so that individual and collective actors are in a 
position to clearly perceive the sources of social domination. Highlighting the inconsistencies 
and contradictions in current forms of communication will hopefully therefore contribute to 
their transformation. 
 
Habermas sees Marx’s work as promising in many respects here, but as he argues in 
Knowledge & Human Interests, Marx’s emphasis on the determination of ideas by the 
material conditions of production leads to the primacy of labour in the possibility of ‘critical 
reflection’. If the autonomy of social reflection on our experiences is compromised by the link 
                                                
7 This is at the heart of Habermas’s critique of Gadamer. Gadamer is taken to task for being unable to 
incorporate a critique of ideology and recognise the ways in which language is used for the purposes of social 
domination. See Habermas’s ‘Review of Gadamer’s Truth and Method’ in Dallmayr, F. and T. McCarthy (eds.) 
Understanding Social Inquiry, Indiana, University Press. 
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to our socio-economic position, then the danger arises of the kind of mechanical view of 
history and class struggle prevalent in orthodox Marxism. Habermas argues that Marxist 
thought tends to suggest that certain ‘objective’ conditions have to be in place for the 
possibility of ‘subjective’ reflection and political practice – in other words, only once the 
productive forces have developed to a certain level of development and come into conflict 
with the relations of production, would the scene be set for critical reflection and struggle by 
those in a particular socio-economic position to benefit from the overthrow of capitalist 
relations. Habermas suggests that this leaves no form of ‘critical’ knowledge separate from 
natural-scientific knowledge with its concern for the technical control of nature in the 
production process. He argues that Marx’s work is therefore partial due to its being caught 
within the logic of the ‘empirical-analytical’ sciences and being unable to incorporate 
alternative forms of reason, action and knowledge. As Habermas had already argued in 
Theory and Practice, ‘Marx does not actually explicate the interrelationship of interaction and 
labour, but instead, under the unspecific title of social praxis, reduces the one to the other, 
namely: communicative action to instrumental action’ (1974a, p. 129).8 Habermas seeks to 
resist what he sees as the reduction of human relations to labour on the grounds that it would 
reduce human relations to instrumental subject-object relations rather than the non-
instrumental relations between subjects. Rather than a history of the species in terms of 
material activity, labour and instrumental action, Habermas proposes an alternative history 
that incorporates these factors within a broader context of normative structures and moral 
consciousness. The sphere of labour and work can be contrasted with more normative areas of 
social life, such as the family and the public sphere, which are arguably less concerned with 
means and ends and more concerned with the attainment of ‘understanding’. Emphasis on 
                                                
8 Habermas argues further that ‘liberation from hunger and misery does not necessarily converge with liberation 
from servitude and degradation, for there is no automatic developmental relation between labour and interaction 
[yet] there is a connection between the two dimensions’ (1974a, p. 169). 
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these normative spheres allows for a less instrumental conception of culture too, i.e. one not 
premised on labour, and also a reconstructed version of historical materialism that 
acknowledges the negative effects of exploitation on communicative relations without 
reducing social, political and power relations to the economy (or strictly material forces). 
 
So in addition to our technical interests, characterised by labour and instrumental action and 
expressed in the empirical sciences, and our practical interests, characterised by interaction 
through language and expressed in historical and hermeneutic sciences, Habermas is keen to 
outline the interests and forms of action that might be expressed in a ‘critical’ social science. 
Again, in line with Horkheimer’s original programme for a ‘critical’ theory, Habermas has to 
be able to account for his ‘rational’ critique with recourse to a pre-theoretical source for his 
critical viewpoint. In response to this problem he proposes a third, ‘quasi-transcendental’ 
knowledge-constitutive interest that sits alongside those of labour and interaction. He suggests 
a human interest in ‘self-reflection’ and the capacity to act autonomously and ‘rationally’: 
 
‘In self-reflection, knowledge for the sake of knowledge comes to coincide with 
the interest in autonomy and responsibility (Mundigkeit). For the pursuit of 
reflection knows itself as a moment of emancipation. Reason is at the same time 
subject to the interest in reason. We can say that it obeys an emancipatory 
cognitive interest, which aims at the pursuit of reflection’ (1987a, p. 198). 
 
The ability of humans to reflect on their own social development, Habermas argues, allows 
them to act with greater consciousness and autonomy, and this is why this form of ‘interest’ is 
what he calls an ‘emancipatory interest’. By reflecting on previous experience human beings, 
both individually and collectively, are able to recognise the influence of previously 
unacknowledged forces that have negatively influenced their lives. Also, it is only through 
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self-reflection that we have been able to identify the relationship between knowledge and 
interests, or theory and practice, in the first place.9 
 
‘Critical’ social science therefore seeks to encourage the process of self-reflection and 
challenge any barriers to the formation of self-consciousness. Habermas initially turns to 
psychoanalysis as a promising model for the critical, self-reflective, sciences. The 
significance of psychoanalysis, and what Habermas refers to as its ‘depth hermeneutic’, is that 
it goes beyond the surface-level interpretations of the hermeneutic sciences to uncover the 
repressed needs and wants of the analysand. However, this is not simply a case of the analyst 
providing a correct ‘scientific’ interpretation of the analysand’s symptoms, rather the 
analysand has to accept this version of events in the process of reliving particular past 
experiences. In other words, psychoanalysis involves a complex mixture of causal 
explanation, through meta-psychological theory, and ‘dialogue’ (1987a, p. 237)10. Scientific 
verification in this case is not about agreement concerning an observation, as in the empirical 
sciences, nor a consensus about an interpretation, as in hermeneutics, but involves a self-
reflective acceptance by the analysand of a reconstruction of her life history in such a way 
that her neurotic symptoms can be overcome. This process of defining a problem, engaging in 
dialogue, developing general theories that interpret the causes of repression, and then testing 
these theories to see if they are able to remove the communicative distortions, becomes the 
model for a ‘critical’ theory of society.11 
                                                
9 This is a point of contention in the debate between Habermas and Gadamer as, despite their agreement about 
our ability to transcend tradition, Gadamer criticises Habermas’s ‘formal’ account of the process of reflection 
freeing us from tradition and suggests that our reflection on tradition can only be carried out from within some 
other tradition. 
10 Both Gadamer (in 2006 and 2008) and Ricoeur (1977), contra Habermas, emphasise the hermeneutic nature of 
psychoanalysis’ constructs and question its claims to science. Gadamer also challenges the extension of the 
psychoanalytical model to society as a whole. 
11 For an insightful and sympathetic reading of Habermas’s use of psychoanalysis in his Knowledge and Human 
Interests, see chapter 3 of Bernstein, J. M. (1995) Recovering Ethical Life, London, Routledge. 
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Responding to some criticisms in the reception of his Knowledge and Human Interests, 
Habermas seeks to clarify his idea of a critical social science in a way that will prove decisive 
for the future development of his ideas, and decisive for our analysis of his work. Partly he 
had problems clarifying the very nature of his three interests, and critics certainly were not 
satisfied with them being referred to as ‘quasi-transcendental’, particularly his hermeneutic 
critics (McCarthy, 1978, p. 95). On the one hand they could be seen as ‘transcendental’ in the 
Kantian sense, as they were considered as a priori presuppositions of knowledge, while on the 
other hand they were arguably ‘empirical’ due to their development in the context of human 
history. The emancipatory interest was considered the most problematic of the three, partly 
due to its reliance on the other two, but was crucial if Habermas was to defend a ‘critical’ 
theory from what he saw as the relativism of hermeneutics. However, dissatisfied with the 
uncertain nature of the psychoanalytical dialogue and its ability to justify a strong ‘critical’ 
position, Habermas attempts to clarify his position by making the distinction between ‘the 
reflection upon the conditions of potential abilities of a knowing, speaking and acting subject’ 
and ‘the reflection upon unconsciously produced constraints to which a determinate subject 
(or a determinate group of subjects, or a determinate species subject) succumbs in its process 
of self-reflection’; what he calls ‘rational reconstruction’ and ‘self-reflection’ respectively 
(1987a, p. 377). Rational reconstructions aim to establish general human competences in 
areas such as language use or cognitive development, and can tell us what ‘know-how’ is 
required for successful engagement in particular contexts. They are theoretical, in that they 
abstract from everyday communication to establish the conditions of ordinary action, while 
remaining attached to the empirical in outlining the everyday exercise of competences by 
subjects in interaction. Self-reflection, in the form of psychoanalysis, on the other hand is 
intimately tied to practice as it is concerned with the particular formative processes of 
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individuals or groups, and depends upon its capacity to produce a practical transformation 
through dialogue. Habermas suggests that this form of self-reflection itself depends upon 
rational reconstructions to aid the process of understanding, e.g. therapy requires the rational 
reconstructions of Freudian meta-psychology.  
 
To translate all this into critical-social theoretical terms, ‘critical’ reflection on the forms of 
distorted communication is only possible, according to Habermas, with a (transcendental) 
rational reconstruction of what ‘undistorted communication’ might look like. Habermas’s 
work now increasingly shifts away from the idea of ‘reflection’ and towards the idea of 
‘reconstruction’, and it carries with it some significant changes in his conception of power 
relations. Whereas Knowledge and Human Interests saw power at work in the reified (or 
unconscious) processes that inhibit autonomous action, and conceives of emancipation in 
terms of the psychoanalytical dialogue between analyst and analysand, Habermas is 
increasingly concerned about the inherent power differential between analyst and analysand, 
or theorist and society, and its possible political consequences. His response to this is to 
replace the power relationship of the Freudian model of dialogue with the idea of a 
‘community of scientists’ taken from the work of Peirce.12 Dialogue is now explicitly 
concerned with openness and equality, and power is conceived of as that which prevents 
participants from exercising their ‘communicative competence’ by excluding them from 
engaging in communicative discourse. 
 
 
 
                                                
12 I return to Habermas’s appropriation of Peirce in the section on ‘discourse ethics’. 
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The Linguistic Turn 
The appeal of the hermeneutical sciences for Habermas relates to the emphasis they place on 
meaning and to their sensitivity to the norms and values of (everyday) social interaction, an 
area often neglected in the empirical, structural social sciences. He is sensitive to the claims 
of the hermeneutical sciences that all meaning is contextual, and that to know the meaning of 
an action or utterance is not to understand it in relation to some universal criteria but rather to 
understand it in relation to what Wittgenstein would call a ‘form of life’, i.e. to its own 
language and culture. However, to understand an action or utterance or symbolic expression 
in its wider context also raises the question of the possibility of ‘understanding’, as we 
inevitably grasp the meanings of others according to our own meaning-contexts. So what 
makes communicative action distinctive from instrumental action is that it is not geared 
towards identifying ‘causes’ or constructing general laws from empirical instances, as is the 
case with the natural sciences, but is rather concerned with dialogue and with the kind of 
understanding that seeks a horizon of shared meanings. As we have seen, the problem with 
hermeneutics, according to Habermas, is the tendency to idealise everyday communication, 
and the self-interpretations of those involved, and make it impervious to broader normative 
criticisms in the process. To avoid what he sees as the dangers involved with the full 
acceptance of the hermeneutic view of the world, Habermas believes that a ‘critical’ account 
is only possible if it can maintain some sort of transcendental or universalistic criteria. If the 
communication of meaning between subjects, which is at the heart of the hermeneutic 
account, is open to distortions resulting from social inequalities or from the market system or 
bureaucratic demands, then a ‘critical’ theory needs to go beyond the immediate self-
interpretations and meanings of subjects to demonstrate the links between these meanings and 
broader structural deformations. By outlining the ‘causes’ of such deformation, a critical 
38 
 
theory is in a position to encourage the self-reflection of individuals and collective subjects 
such that they re-evaluate their own self-interpretations and meanings and remove the causes 
of communicative distortion.  
 
Habermas’s own version of ‘critical’ theory, after his Knowledge and Human Interests, 
attempts to make the distinction between appearance and reality, false freedom and ‘true’ 
freedom, pseudo-communication and ‘true’ communication, through recourse to an ‘ideal 
speech situation’ (Habermas, 1974a, p. 19). He is keen to emphasise that ‘true’ freedom is not 
achievable without the possibility of real, free and open communication leading to consensus. 
However, he has to be able to distinguish between true and false communication by setting 
out a critical standpoint from which actual (and particular) forms of public discourse and 
consensus can be critically exposed as illusory. Habermas outlines his ideal speech situation 
as follows: 
 
‘…the ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor simply a 
construct, but a reciprocal supposition unavoidable in discourse. This supposition 
can, but need not be, counterfactual; but even when counterfactual it is a fiction 
that is operatively effective in communication. I would therefore prefer to speak 
of an anticipation of an ideal speech situation… this alone is the warrant which 
permits us to join to an actually attained consensus the claim of a rational 
consensus. At the same time it is a critical standard against which every actually 
realised consensus can be called into question and tested’ (Habermas, 1973 in 
McCarthy, 1978, p. 301) 
 
This critical standpoint has to be perceivable in mundane interaction, as well as being 
potentially perceivable by those involved, whilst being sufficiently disruptive of the 
assumptions of current forms of (false) consensus. To make the critical standpoint a 
normative ‘ideal’, too far removed from actual forms of communication in everyday life, is in 
danger of alienating those involved and placing the social theorist in the position of 
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prescribing what their ‘true’ interests might be regardless of what they actually believe 
themselves. To make a critical standpoint reflect too closely the actual forms of 
communication in everyday life runs the risk of merely reflecting the status quo, i.e. reflecting 
the false consensus of an unequal social relationship13. 
 
To formulate the ‘ideal speech situation’ as his critical standpoint, Habermas turns to the 
assumptions at work in everyday communication and language. Here he constructs the 
competences that we all use in everyday communication and outlines a theory of ‘universal 
pragmatics’ in the hope that it will be robust enough to justify a theory of society whilst also 
justifying a normative critique of society14. Habermas’s turn to the everyday use of language 
is appealing in critical-theoretical terms inasmuch as he appears to meet the criteria of a 
‘critical’ standpoint that avoids both an abstracted idealism and an acceptance of the world as 
it currently is. He avoids the charge of abstracted idealism by identifying certain ideals for 
communicative understanding that, he claims, are already implicit in our everyday use of 
language, i.e. our ability to understand a language and to communicate with others already 
assumes certain competences. However, he avoids the charge of merely reflecting the status 
quo by suggesting that current forms of communication and consensus do not adhere to the 
implicit ideals of communicative understanding; adhering to such ideals would require that a 
variety of extra-discursive forms of force and constraint be excluded from open dialogue 
geared towards understanding. To distinguish between ‘true’ communication and false 
communication, Habermas seeks to outline what we might mean by a successful 
communication of meaning from one person to another. Here he identifies certain consensual 
                                                
13 Again, it is worth noting that Habermas tends to emphasise inequality as the measure here rather than 
consensus. 
14 Central here is his essay ‘What is Universal Pragmatics?’ in Habermas, J. (1979) Communication and the 
Evolution of Society, Boston, Beacon Press. 
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background assumptions, which he refers to as ‘validity claims’, involved in the process of 
communication geared towards understanding.  
 
By distinguishing between the propositional aspects of meaning, concerned with the ‘truth’ 
conditions of sentences, and the pragmatic aspects of meaning, concerned with shared 
understanding and consensus, Habermas believes that he can identify the ‘universal’ 
presuppositions of communication via speech. Rather than accepting the propositional aspect 
of speech as providing the fundamental function of language, Habermas suggests that it is the 
‘pragmatic’ aspect of speech, which he sees in terms of seeking consensus and understanding, 
which is fundamental15. Inherent in this pragmatic aspect of our speech-acts, according to 
Habermas, are ‘cognitively testable’ validity claims that ensure that our utterances are (i) true 
(and we can provide grounds), (ii) right (and for which we can provide justification), and also 
(iii) truthful (for which we can demonstrate trustworthiness) (1979, pp. 59-68)16. When I, as 
speaker, attempt to communicate with someone, as listener, the listener has to be able to 
understand what I am trying to communicate, and this assumes that we can agree on the 
meaning of the terms used in communication, and that I will use certain grammatical and 
semantic rules. Should the listener not understand what I am saying, she could ask for 
examples or ask me to re-phrase my original utterance. The listener will also expect that what 
I say will have some claim to being true and therefore that my relation between language and 
reality is the same as hers. Should this not be the case, the listener will be in a position to ask 
                                                
15 Although, of course, Habermas’s notion of ‘pragmatism’ differs markedly from ‘old’ pragmatism (or 
Gadamer’s version) where the focus is on problem solving. It is also notable that Habermas’s reference here to 
‘truth’ (as a validity claim) is at odds with the pragmatist tradition. 
16 The three validity claims (truth, rightness, and truthfulness), that Habermas suggests are presupposed in our 
speech acts, map neatly onto the three differentiated value spheres (science, morality/legality, aesthetics) that he, 
following Weber, suggests emerge in the wake of cultural rationalisation in Europe whereby modern natural 
science, with its mathematisation of nature and experimental observation, supplants religious worldviews and 
transfers authority from the Church to these separate realms of validity. These validity claims and value spheres 
also clearly link to what he calls theoretical, moral and aesthetic discourses. See Habermas (1984, chapter 2, 
particularly pp. 157-68). I will discuss this distinction further in the final chapter. 
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for further details of my claim or further evidence for my claim. Sincerity, on the part of the 
speaker, is therefore also expected by the listener, although the listener may come to mistrust 
my intentions and believe that I am trying to mislead her in some way or even that I am 
deceiving myself in putting forward my claim. Under these circumstances, the listener may 
expect me to assure them in some way of my sincerity or take further action to convince her. 
Finally, the listener will expect that my utterances are morally justifiable and therefore in line 
with certain standards of behaviour as part of a wider normative context. Should she doubt 
this, she will be in a position to question whether the underlying norms expressed in my 
assertions are justified. The key point in relation to these validity claims is that it is the 
justifiability of the reasons given that provides an utterance or action with meaning; the 
question of meaning cannot be separated from the question of understanding, as meaning is 
attained intersubjectively. 
 
The validity claims Habermas identifies are clearly at work in our everyday communication 
and we are familiar with the expectations they entail. We are also familiar with the ways in 
which conflict over certain validity claims in our interactions can lead to a number of 
outcomes: either we attempt to reach a consensus or an acceptance of difference, or we seek 
to deceive or even coerce others, or we cease communicating with them. On a broader 
collective or discursive level, Habermas argues that such validity claims are exposed to 
thorough testing regarding their empirical or normative validity; for example, he suggests that 
we think of the institutionalisation of modern science as being concerned with empirical 
validity and the public and legal spheres as dealing with normative validity (and the arts as 
being concerned with aesthetic-expressive truthfulness). He suggests that these 
institutionalised forms contain certain assumptions when it comes to investigating our 
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collective knowledge of the natural world and our moral and political beliefs. The key point 
he makes here is that we can come to some sort of ‘rational’ consensus about empirical and 
normative validity claims, and that this consensus will be achieved through no other means 
than the force of the better argument (Habermas, 1990, pp. 89-90). Although this state of 
affairs is rarely, if ever, achieved, Habermas claims that its status, as the underlying 
assumption of rational discourse, makes it into an ideal of ‘true’ communication against 
which we can identify and criticise forms of pseudo-communication17. It is Habermas’s 
theory of communicative action and discourse that links up his pragmatic theory of meaning 
and his social theory. To put it rather crudely, we could say that at the very heart of all human 
action is the use of language, and when we use language we commit ourselves to a number of 
(universal) validity claims that we may be asked to justify on the basis of defensible ‘reasons’. 
These unavoidable validity claims introduce a moral commitment into our interactions with 
others and provide the possibility of consensus and social order. Should our communication 
break down in some way, we will (or should) move to a level of ‘discourse’ with the aim of 
reaching a new level of understanding and consensus. The discourse we engage in over 
particular validity claims can be characterised as theoretical (truthful), moral-practical (right) 
or aesthetic (sincere) discourse. I will discuss these issues further in the section on ‘discourse 
ethics’ below, however I will firstly turn to the relevance of these issues for Habermas’s 
‘social’ theory. 
 
System & Lifeworld 
Despite the diversity and interdisciplinarity of Habermas’s work, the central consistent theme 
running from his work on the public sphere to his more recent political and legal theory, via 
                                                
17 It is worth noting here that Habermas’s appeal to rational consensus in relation to the empirical validity claims 
of science differs from Adorno and Horkheimer’s criticism of empirical science as a form of ‘pseudo-
communication’. 
43 
 
his linguistic turn, is arguably the ‘pathological’ consequences of the encroachment of 
‘system’ imperatives on the communicative ‘lifeworld’18. Habermas’s key work, and in many 
ways a culmination of what has gone before, is his Theory of Communicative Action (1981, 
1984), and it is here where he focuses on this distinction.19 He pursues the division between 
instrumental forms of rationality and communicative rationality and emphasises the priority 
of the latter in terms of the need for social co-operation, whilst also highlighting the origins of 
instrumental forms of strategic action in communicative action. The ‘rationalisation of the 
lifeworld’ leads to the development of instrumental forms of interaction, along with the 
strategic interests of money and power, and can come to obstruct the ideals implicit in the 
different validity claims, i.e. the possibility of understanding and consensus achieved through 
meaningful, and democratic forms of communication. These strategic forms of interaction 
produce a distorted (or false) consensus, or even invalidate the need for consensus in the first 
place given the superior knowledge of ‘experts’. It is against this ‘colonisation of the 
lifeworld’ that Habermas further develops his ‘critical’ theory of society.20 
 
Consistent with earlier Critical Theory, Habermas sees instrumental action as based upon the 
means-ends logic of instrumental rationality whereby one works out the most efficient means 
to achieve a specified goal. It involves taking an objectifying attitude towards the world and 
manipulating objects (social and material) to succeed in attaining one’s goal. To make 
someone do something through coercion or subterfuge would be a form of strategic action as 
they have not given their consent or agreed to act based on acceptance of your reasons for 
                                                
18 His first real engagement with the notions of ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’, via systems and action theory, is in 
chapter one of his 1973 work, Legitimation Crisis (1988). 
19 For a thorough overview of Habermas’s oeuvre, see Outhwaite (1994); Chapter 7, pp. 109-120, provides a 
particularly good, critical assessment of The Theory of Communicative Action. 
20 It is worth noting that Habermas’s argument against colonisation depends on a functional analysis – i.e. a 
notion of structural differentiation, where colonisation is de-differentiation. 
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action21. Communicative action on the other hand is concerned with attaining mutual 
understanding with other subjects; it is action achieved through communication, and on the 
basis of agreement through the mutual acceptance of reasons given in response to validity 
claims. Here means and ends coincide, as the ‘end’ of mutual understanding cannot be 
separated from the ‘means’ used to achieve it. Habermas builds on this distinction in 
linguistic terms with reference to Austin’s division of speech-acts into ‘illocutionary’ effects 
and ‘perlocutionary’ effects (Habermas, 1979, p. 36). The illocutionary aspect of speech is 
concerned with the understanding and acceptance of what is spoken, and is thereby geared 
towards consensus, whereas the perlocutionary aspect of speech is concerned with the 
strategic deployment of language, e.g. using it to manipulate others into complying with our 
wishes. However, Habermas is keen to establish the reliance of the perlocutionary aspects of 
speech on what he sees as the prior illocutionary aspects, i.e. the strategic use of language is 
only successful if it is able to appear as if the validity claims raised in the speech-act are 
redeemable. What Habermas is trying to do with this argument is to establish the primacy of 
communicative action and, in the process, outline a form of rationality more fundamental than 
the strategic forms of rationality prioritised by the likes of Weber and Adorno and 
characterised as increasingly pervasive, and inescapable, in modern culture. 
 
The significance of this distinction between instrumental and communicative action, and the 
primacy of the latter, is further taken up by Habermas at the level of a theory of society. He 
distinguishes between different ‘forms of life’ that correlate with the internal characteristics of 
language: the forms of life that provide the context for instrumental action and 
communicative action are the ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ respectively. The ‘lifeworld’ is 
                                                
21 However we could also argue that persuasion, with good reasons, would also potentially be strategic if it was 
to secure someone’s goals. 
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understood as the repository of the kind of knowledge that subjects require, in addition to the 
universal aspects of communicative competence, to act in particular social situations. 
Habermas gives the example of the interaction between builders on a building site where an 
older builder asks a new, and younger builder to fetch some beer for their break (1987b, p. 
121-3). In terms of communicative competence and the issue of validity claims, the younger 
builder is in a position to challenge the older builder over how the request was phrased, 
whether he is in a ‘rightful’ position to request that someone fetch it for him, or whether there 
is truthfulness to the request, e.g. the availability of beer at that time or from a nearby shop. 
However, additional issues are raised should the young builder refuse to comply with the 
request – maybe he doesn’t understand the hierarchy of the building site, maybe they both 
have different conceptions of when a break should be etc22. Contextual knowledge of the 
situation is required here rather than just the validity claims of utterances. What Habermas is 
getting at is that particular meaningful situations rely upon taken-for-granted assumptions or 
cultural presuppositions that subjects bring to their understanding of the social world. When 
relatively stable forms of communication and understanding break down, these taken-for-
granted assumptions come to the fore and certain beliefs might be challenged in such a way as 
to repair the interaction. These beliefs and assumptions that make up the lifeworld are then 
defended or criticised or transformed through language. 
 
Habermas moves from this level of analysis to try and identify the structural characteristics of 
‘lifeworlds’ more generally. He suggests that the lifeworld is made up of those spheres 
outside of formal economic and political life that serve the function of symbolic reproduction, 
                                                
22 Here we might ask whether Habermas considers this hierarchy to be legitimate – i.e. that the builders accept 
that it is appropriate for young builders to fetch the beer. Couldn’t we say that the exertion of authority, by the 
foreman, is strategic? We might also enquire about the possible legitimacy of accepting authority, and therefore 
the status of false consensus. 
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e.g. family, cultural tradition, media, community groups, social movements etc. It provides 
shared meanings, consensus and social integration - whilst also being open to challenges - and 
transmits knowledge and traditional beliefs. He argues that it is structurally very complex and 
serves a number of functions that have increasingly become separated over the course of 
social evolution: specifically cultural reproduction, social integration and socialisation 
(1987b, p. 152). Introducing a Durkheimian thought-experiment, he suggests that we could 
think in terms of a gradual emergence out of a totally integrated society - where cultural 
beliefs, social practices and individual identities are uniform - towards an internally 
differentiated society where people increasingly come to distinguish their own perspectives 
from those of others. This occurs as a result of what Habermas calls the ‘linguistification of 
the sacred’ whereby the development of what he calls ‘communicative competence’ opens up 
traditional beliefs to rational debate (1987b, p.77)23. Once agreement is no longer guaranteed 
in advance by cultural traditions, linguistic communication and the validity claims contained 
therein come to take their place. Habermas suggests that the resultant weakening of social 
integration leads to a ‘rationalisation of the lifeworld’ whereby social conflict and crises are 
less able to be contained by cultural traditions and require more abstract forms of resolution. 
The functions of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialisation become 
increasingly separated from each other and each comes to require universal and abstract forms 
of justification. Cultural traditions are increasingly subject to rational scrutiny, normative 
legitimacy is determined by democratic and rational procedure, and individual identities are 
increasingly autonomous. 
 
                                                
23 It goes without saying that, for all his criticisms regarding the separation of system and lifeworld and the 
increasing ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’, Habermas sees the development of secular morality as a broadly 
positive one whereby individuals are no longer tied to traditional values but come to base their co-ordinated 
actions on discourse and communication. 
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However, Habermas introduces the notion of the ‘system’, in contrast to the lifeworld, in an 
attempt to move beyond the kind of ‘pure hermeneutics’ that an argument purely concerned 
with the lifeworld is in danger of producing. If we were to understand social reproduction 
purely in terms of the social competences of social actors, and the lifeworld resources they 
draw on, we would ignore the processes of material reproduction on which the lifeworld 
depends and therefore the possibility of ‘systematically distorted communication’ (1987b, p. 
388). Habermas suggests that social evolution is not simply a process of rationalising in terms 
of the lifeworld but entails an increasing lack of transparency in social relations as society 
becomes more complex24. The development here is one whereby processes and mechanisms 
above and beyond mutual understanding and interpretation, i.e. beyond lifeworld relations, 
come to increasingly hold society together, and these processes are problematic for Habermas 
as they are not amenable to the questioning of validity claims apparent in communicative 
action. These processes and mechanisms are referred to by Habermas as the ‘system’, and 
whereas the lifeworld is the home for communicative action, he uses the term ‘system’ for 
those aspects of modern society that co-ordinate strategic action geared towards the material, 
rather than symbolic, reproduction of society. He argues that the system has, necessarily, 
become ‘uncoupled’ from the communicative context of the lifeworld and become 
institutionalised in the form of the modern state and modern economy, with money and power 
as the ‘steering media’. Despite the instrumental logic embodied in these system institutions, 
Habermas recognises the necessity of uncoupling to ‘fulfil conditions for the maintenance of 
socio-cultural lifeworlds’ (1987b, p. 152), and he emphasises the ways in which the ‘system 
                                                
24 Here Habermas is implicitly suggesting that transparency not only reveals the necessity of connections, but 
also the need for their transformation. Rather than seeing transparency as a means of reconciliation to social and 
material necessity, he is committed to a view that transparency necessarily uncovers problems. A more 
hermeneutical position might suggest that (transparent) authority could be accepted as necessary without being 
‘false’. 
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integration’ characteristic of these subsystems is crucial for the co-ordination of social 
cohesion in complex modern societies. 
 
However, despite the necessity of forms of system integration, Habermas focuses on the 
inherent dangers of what he terms ‘the colonisation of the lifeworld’. Money, as the co-
ordinating mechanism for the capitalist economy, and power, which determines the 
organisation of the State and its subsidiary institutions, are the instrumental ‘steering media’ 
at the heart of the ‘system’ according to Habermas. They take on the form of a ‘second 
nature’ in that they are often determined independently of collective consensus – left instead 
to the impersonal mechanisms of markets and the remote, non-democratic decisions of 
administrative experts - and often pass unnoticed as we automatically adopt the instrumental 
requirements they dictate. As Habermas argues: 
 
‘The transfer of action coordination from language over to steering media means 
an uncoupling of interaction from lifeworld contexts. Media such as money and 
power attach to empirical ties; they encode a purposive-rational attitude toward 
calculable amounts of value and make it possible to exert generalized, strategic 
influence on the decisions of other participants while bypassing processes of 
consensus-oriented communication. Inasmuch as they do not merely simplify 
linguistic communication, but replace it with a symbolic generalization of 
rewards and punishments, the lifeworld contexts in which processes of reaching 
understanding are always embedded are devalued in favor of media-steered 
interactions; the lifeworld is no longer needed for the coordination of action’ 
(Habermas, 1987b, p. 183) 
 
The compulsions often experienced by people in the face of complex economic and 
administrative functions, that are primarily concerned with means rather than questioning 
ends, leaves them devoid of the kind of understanding and autonomy Habermas argues is 
necessary for the social integration of the lifeworld. The economic system of exchange, 
although developing out of the material needs of the lifeworld, becomes a ‘delinguistified’ 
49 
 
system with a life of its own and threatens to subsume the lifeworld in line with its own 
instrumental demands. The system then tends to be experienced by social actors as a ‘quasi-
natural reality’ (1987b, p. 154), outside the realm of mutually recognised validity claims, with 
its own autonomous logic above and beyond human control and responsibility. Although the 
economic and political subsystems of the ‘system’ developed out of the lifeworld, and 
continue to rely on it for normative reproduction, they tend to invade and dislocate it and 
produce a series of ‘social pathologies’ in a process that ultimately leads to a crisis in cultural 
reproduction – anomie, alienation, disintegration, instability, and lack of personal 
responsibility (1987b, pp. 142-5). 
 
In many ways, these broad social experiences provide the empirical basis for Habermas’s 
‘critical’ theory of society – a theory that accepts the necessary role of the system but seeks to 
police the boundary between it and the communicative lifeworld. His solutions to the 
problems associated with the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ tend to involve the containment 
of markets and power, and the attempt to make them answerable to democratic decision-
making through fostering a stronger public sphere. Civil society generally, and new social 
movements specifically, are seen as offering the most promise in terms of redeeming the 
immanent feature of communicative action and building ‘a democratic dam against the 
colonising encroachment of system imperatives on areas of the lifeworld’ (Habermas in 
Calhoun, 1992, p. 444). However there is no clear-cut Marxian or Lukácsian agent of change 
in this scenario, and this role falls neither to the State itself or New Social Movements; the 
former being politically powerful but compromised by systemic demands, and the latter being 
politically promising but relatively powerless and often in danger of compromising its values 
once in a position of power.  
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Discourse Ethics 
‘There is only one reason why discourse ethics, which presumes to derive the 
substance of universalistic morality from the general presuppositions of 
argumentation, is a promising strategy: discourse or argumentation is a more 
exacting type of communication, going beyond any particular form of life. 
Discourse generalizes, abstracts, and stretches the presuppositions of context 
bound communicative actions by extending their range to include competent 
subjects beyond the provincial limits of their own particular form of life’ 
(Habermas, 1990, p. 202).  
 
Habermas’s distinction between the system and lifeworld is at the heart of his later ‘critical’ 
theory but in many ways draws upon aspects of his earlier work discussed above. To further 
clarify the normative content of Habermas’s ‘critical’ theory we have to look to the project of 
a ‘discourse ethics’ contained in his 1983 work Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action (1990) and his 1991 work Justification and Application (1994); I will concentrate on 
the former. A useful, and common, way to understand Habermas’s work in this area is to see 
it in terms of its relationship to Kant. In many ways, Habermas’s conception of the ideal-
speech situation is the linguistic and social equivalent of Kant’s categorical imperative. 
Kant’s ‘critical’ philosophy produced a specifically ‘modern’ conception of morality in that it 
attempted to produce a ‘rational’ account of normativity that no longer relied on the dogmatic 
conceptions of morality inherited from religious or other positive authorities, i.e. legislative 
reason was to rely on nothing but itself. 25 Kant is also seen by Habermas as reflecting the 
increasing split in modernity between ethical questions of the ‘good’ and the formal issues of 
justice and morality. Whereby Kant’s uniquely ‘modern’ conception of morality sought to 
equate moral authority, and the freedom of the will, with the universalisability of maxims 
guiding individual action however – ‘act only on that maxim by which you can at the same 
time will it to be a universal law’ - Habermas conceives of morality in ‘intersubjective’ terms 
                                                
25 As Habermas suggests, ‘Modernity can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its orientation 
from the models supplied by another epoch; it has to create its normativity out of itself’ (1992, p. 7) 
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as the possibility of reaching free and open consensus about what we accept as universal 
norms. However, Habermas’s work has to be understood in terms of its relationship to Hegel 
too, and its sensitivity to Hegel’s critique of Kant’s formalism. 26 Regarding his theory of 
discourse ethics, Habermas claims that it ‘takes its orientation for an intersubjective 
interpretation of the categorical imperative from Hegel’s theory of recognition but without 
incurring the cost of a historical dissolution of morality in ethical life’ (1994, p. 1). So on the 
one hand Habermas seeks to maintain Kant’s pretensions to the universality of morality, so as 
to avoid falling into a historically relativist account that reduces moral life to substantive 
conceptions of the good. Whilst on the other hand he uses Hegel’s intersubjective theory of 
recognition to avoid the excessive formalism and individualism of Kant’s monological 
project: a project whereby solitary individuals, with recourse to the categorical imperative, 
can determine for themselves whether or not a moral norm is valid. Habermas’s dialogical 
project seeks to establish the intersubjective nature of determining whether a norm is 
(universally) valid or not. 
 
A key political difference follows from contrasting Kant’s monological account and 
Habermas’s dialogical account. Kant’s individualistic account of morality sets up a distinction 
between private interests and public good and assumes that individuals determine their own 
interests and desires, and are able to decide whether they are acting morally, in isolation from 
wider social relations. If it is the autonomous individual that determines her own interests, and 
is able to act morally according to the categorical imperative, then negative freedom becomes 
the political priority, i.e. we have to ensure that others are not able to impose their values and 
priorities on us. Habermas on the other hand, following Hegel, argues that individual interests 
                                                
26 Hegel’s account of political and philosophical formalism can be found in Chapter 2 of his Science of Logic 
(‘Determinate Being’). 
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and desires are socially constituted, and therefore that there is not quite the clear distinction 
between private interests and public good27. If we accept that wider social relations determine 
the content of individual interests, desires and the validity of moral norms, then the political 
priority for Habermas is to guarantee that certain conditions are in place to ensure that the 
process for the formation of these interests, desires and norms, is open and equitable. An 
‘ideal speech situation’ aims to outline the social conditions necessary to guarantee the 
freedom of social beings in the formation of their interests, desires and moral norms. 
 
To avoid the ‘historical dissolution of morality in ethical life’, which Habermas sees as one of 
the key problems with Hegel’s thought, he attempts to defend an interpretation of modernity 
with recourse to a notion of ‘discourse ethics’ and a reconstructive science in the form of a 
theory of moral development. There are echoes of Kant here, particularly in his attempt to 
build a theory of ethics by appealing to rationality alone without reference to particular 
cultural traditions; yet Hegel’s argument about the way rationality is rooted in cultural 
traditions is also present.28 However Habermas turns away from what he sees as the 
‘philosophy of history’ option adopted by the later Hegel. This account of the entwinement of 
reason and subjectivity in social evolution is taken to task for sacrificing concrete historical 
experience and individual subjects in the name of a teleological account of ‘absolute 
subjectivity’ and Geist (Habermas, 1992, p. 40-42); we will see this critique of Hegel repeated 
in Honneth’s work on recognition. The problem with the later Hegel’s ‘philosophy of 
consciousness’, and a key problem in the work of Marx and earlier critical theory according to 
Habermas, is the tendency to concentrate on the issue of subjective representations of 
                                                
27 However a more hermeneutical account might question whether Habermas does in fact take seriously the 
social constitution of individual interests and desires, as he tends to construct the social modelled on a dyad – i.e. 
he begins with the standard form of an individualistic account, with an imagining ego encountering an alter ego. 
28 As we will see, this tension between Kantian and Hegelian traditions has resonance for both Honneth and 
Adorno, albeit in different ways and with different outcomes. 
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objectivity, and the attempt to provide an account of the possibility that subjects are able to 
make (increasingly) valid claims about objects outside of their own (inter-subjective) 
conscious states. The logical extension of this is that Hegel’s philosophy is said to seek some 
sort of total explanation, one adverse to the possibility of ‘otherness’, by recourse to a self-
determining Spirit29. Habermas’s (and Honneth’s) answer to such problems lies in the 
appropriation of the early Hegel’s theory of intersubjectivity, and for Habermas this takes the 
form of a linguistic account of the possibility of communicative understanding. His approach 
here claims to solve, or at least sidestep, the problem of scepticism by shifting from a subject-
object model to a subject-subject model. It also, hopefully for Habermas, is sufficiently 
sensitive to concrete historical context whilst avoiding historical relativism. 
 
Habermas claims to have overcome the contextualist dilemma with a notion of ‘discourse 
ethics’, that appeals to a Kantian form of argumentation, alongside a ‘universal’ conception of 
morality taken from Kohlberg’s theory of post-conventional morality. In this way, he claims 
to have identified a core aspect of morality (Moralität) that transcends cultural and historical 
tradition whilst also being firmly embedded in ethical life (Sittlichkeit). If successful, he is in 
a position to criticise ‘distorted’ forms of social life according to a transcendent standard that 
is immanent in social life – what Honneth calls ‘intramundane transcendence’. The Kantian 
aspect of this standard is implied in Habermas’s appropriation of Peirce’s notion of an ideal 
community of scientists. As Kant steps back from empirical enquiry to identify the 
transcendental conditions of possibility of such an enquiry and trace them back to the 
capabilities inherent in the subject itself, Peirce also steps back from empirical enquiry to 
identify the transcendental conditions of possibility of such an enquiry; however he suggests 
                                                
29 This more traditional reading of Hegel has, quite rightly, been challenged for some time now by a number of 
Hegelian scholars. In particular see Rose (1981), Pippin (1989, 1991 and 1997), Pinkard (1996), Redding (1996) 
and McDowell (1994). 
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that these conditions involve the mutual agreement of a community of scientists regarding 
what they consider to be ‘valid’ judgements. Habermas follows Peirce here by shifting the 
emphasis from the fallible representation of objects to the communal assumptions and 
discourses involved in establishing what we accept as valid (1987a, p. 95).30 Rather than 
studying scientific truth in this way though, Habermas concentrates on the formation of 
normative categories and the conditions of possibility of reaching agreement about normative 
claims. One way to conceive of this is by referring Habermas’s argument back to Kant. In 
relation to questions of practical reason, we could say that whereas Kant was concerned with 
what rational subjects ‘ought’ to do, Habermas takes a further step back and asks what the 
conditions of possibility are for subjects to be able to collectively determine for themselves 
what they ought to do. 
 
One way in which he does this is to explore what he sees as the historical shift in conceptions 
of morality with recourse to the argument that modern societies are characterised by what 
Kohlberg refers to as ‘post-conventional’ morality. Kohlberg argues that child moral 
development passes through a ‘pre-conventional’ stage, where morals are learnt simply on the 
basis of consequences for actions, to a ‘conventional’ stage, where one conforms to the 
expectations of a wider social group, and finally on to a ‘post-conventional’ stage, where one 
is able to justify morals according to universalistic points of view. Although Kohlberg’s 
theory of moral development was formulated in relation to the stages of child development, 
Habermas suggests that the different moral stages identified by Kohlberg can be elucidated at 
the level of societal development (Habermas, 1990, p. 33-42). A number of problems 
                                                
30 It is noteworthy here that Habermas chooses Peirce over other pragmatists precisely because of Peirce’s 
commitment to ‘convergent realism’, an assumption not made by other pragmatists. Other pragmatists might 
argue that it is Habermas’s commitment to Peirce that leads to him getting caught up in the issue of objectivity 
and the problem of expertise. 
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accompany such an ambitious translation from individual child development to societal 
learning processes, although there is not space to explore these here. 31 The key point 
Habermas wants to make however is that post-conventional moral subjects do not simply 
conform to moral expectations but act according to principles that they, and everyone else, are 
able to justify as valid. Post-conventional moral subjects know the difference between the 
justification of norms and the authority of those who subscribe to them. 32 Habermas is aware 
of the problems here associated with the claim to universality and superiority in his account of 
this ‘decentred worldview’, but he is convinced that the openness and reflexivity involved 
shows it to be cognitively superior to, and the rational development of, more conventional 
worldviews (1990, p. 62-74).  
 
Post-conventional moral subjects, according to Habermas, engage in communicative action 
geared towards understanding and consensus, and this consensus is dependent upon the 
acceptance of reasons given for validity claims. The three main validity claims raised in 
dialogue, and discussed earlier, connect to three key spheres of modern society: truth 
(science), normative rightness (justice and morality), and truthfulness or sincerity (ethics and 
aesthetics). Habermas’s account of communicative rationality seeks to reconstruct how these 
validity claims are redeemed in intersubjective dialogue geared towards understanding and 
consensus; to put it another way, he wants to establish what the (rational) conditions of 
possibility are for participants to be able to reach agreement in practices of communicatively 
                                                
31 Besides the famous feminist critiques of Habermas – e.g. the appropriation of Kohlberg, his neglect of ‘care’, 
the emphasis on male ‘rational’ morality etc (see Gilligan, 1993 on Kohlberg, and the essays in Meehan, 1995) – 
we might also highlight the Eurocentric implications of this appropriation. However, Habermas is mindful of, 
and sensitive to, such criticisms, and he is determined to avoid the accusation of ethnocentrism in his formal 
derivation of the ‘moral’ or ‘universalisability’ principle (U). See in particular his The Inclusion of the Other 
(1998). 
32 However, this is noticeably different to the pragmatist idea of science, i.e. that authority is the means of 
justification – e.g. we decide which journals to look at, whose arguments count etc, on the basis of the operation 
of authority rather than against it. 
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mediated interaction. He argues that each validity claim has its own form of rationality geared 
towards agreement, but it is only the validity claims to truth and normative rightness that 
involve the idea of ‘universality’, i.e. everyone involved in a particular discourse has to be 
able to agree on the proposed ‘truth’ or norm, and they have to agree that this truth or norm is 
valid for everyone. Habermas argues that the third validity claim, concerning ethical questions 
about what is ‘good’ rather than ‘right’, is not universal and always depends on context. This 
is an important point that I will return to later in my criticisms of Habermas. 
 
What makes the redemption of validity claims in argumentation ‘rational’ for Habermas are 
the ‘universal’, and ‘idealising’, presuppositions at work in all forms of communicative 
action. He suggests that there are logical-semantic rules and procedural rules as follows 
(1990, p.87-8): 
 
Logical-Semantic rules: 
(1.1) No speaker may contradict himself. 
(1.2) Every speaker who applies predicate F to object A must be prepared to 
apply F to all other objects resembling A in all relevant respects. 
(1.3) Different speakers may not use the same expression with different 
meanings. 
 
Procedural rules: 
(2.1) Every speaker must assert only what he really believes. 
(2.2) A person who disputes a proposition or norm not under discussion must 
provide a reason for wanting to do so.33 
 
These rules involve consistency, mutual recognition and reciprocity, and for Habermas they 
are broad features assumed in all forms of consensual interaction where the force of the better 
                                                
33 However, these logical-semantic and procedural rules raise a number of contentious issues. For example, we 
might question the ban on contradiction (1.1) from a variety of positions – Adorno might ask whether non-
contradictoriness is possible in an unreconciled society, and Winch (1964) might ask, as he does in relation to 
Evans-Pritchard’s work on the Azande, who gets to judge whether there should be any contradictions? In 
relation to 1.2, Habermas appears to be insensitive to social conventions – e.g. if ‘all swans are white’ is 
contradicted by a black swan, why is a large black bird judged to be a swan? In relation to 2.1, 
ethnomethodologists such as Garfinkel would argue that we assert in order to find out what we believe. 
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argument, rather than coercion, is at play. He suggests that, although these rules tend to be a 
general feature of all lifeworlds, the questioning of validity claims does not necessarily occur 
in a radically open way, but tends to happen in lifeworld contexts that contain shared ideas 
about facts, norms and values, and about what might constitute a ‘relevant argument’. 
 
However, he also suggests that there are additional idealising presuppositions of 
communicative action that characterise ‘post-conventional’ societies, and these are ones that 
mark a ‘transcendental moment of universal validity’ that ‘bursts every provinciality asunder’ 
(Habermas, 1992, 322). In addition to the logical-semantic rules and procedural rules, 
Habermas suggests a third set of ‘social’ rules specific to post-conventional contexts (1990, 
p.89): 
 
(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take 
part in the discourse. 
(3.2) a) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatsoever. 
b) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatsoever into the 
discourse. 
c) Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs. 
(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from 
exercising his rights as laid down in (1) and (2) above.  
 
It is not sufficient for there to be merely linguistic conditions in place, e.g. principles of 
consistency and sincerity; guaranteeing the force of the better argument also requires freedom 
from coercion, self-deception and inequality. The ‘truth’ of validity claims would be empty 
without freely offered consent, and therefore Habermas’s ideal speech situation contained in 
these rules is also a social ideal.34  
 
                                                
34 More radically, we could say that these ‘social’ rules are also subject to contention and contradiction. In 
relation to 3.1, we might ask how ‘competence’ is to be judged, and how this relates to expertise. In relation to 
the issue of ‘self-deception’, some might argue that it contradicts the individual’s rights in 3.3. And how can 
freedom from self-deception ever be established? 
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Habermas argues that these ‘rules of discourse’ are ‘universal’ presuppositions due to the fact 
that they guarantee that mutual understanding and consensus will only be the result of the 
force of the better argument. The ideal speech situation (or unlimited communication 
community) that emerges from these idealising presuppositions is therefore identified as a 
regulative ideal, and critical yardstick, immanent in all speech acts. By turning these 
presuppositions into rules of discourse, Habermas makes a distinction here between the 
discourse principle (D) and the moral (or universalisation) principle (U). The principle (D) is 
a negative principle that regulates whether a norm is valid in terms of it gaining (or potentially 
gaining) the agreement of all those affected by it. If the rules of discourse are followed but 
consensus is not reached then we can say that the norm is not valid, although it does not 
necessarily follow that if consensus is reached then a norm is valid35. An account of what 
does make a norm ‘valid’ is provided by Habermas’s principle of universalisation (U), which 
suggests that all participants cannot accept a controversial norm: 
 
‘unless all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that the 
general observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for the 
satisfaction of the interests of each individual’. (1990: p. 93) 
 
The stronger aspect of principle (U), which is effectively Habermas’s reformulation of Kant’s 
categorical imperative, claims impartiality by suggesting that each participant in discourse 
does not accept a particular norm unless it can claim to represent ‘generalisable interests’. 
Habermas appropriates Mead’s conception of the ‘generalised other’ here for his U principle 
of dialogical morality (see Habermas, 1990, pp. 116-194; Mead, 1967). He argues that 
                                                
35 This is a source of contention in the debate between Habermas and Rawls, with the latter emphasising the 
political (rather than metaphysical) justification for right. As with his critique of hermeneutics, Habermas finds 
this emphasis on social stability separated from validity (and truth) problematic. Instead he seeks to emphasise 
the moral over the ethical by reference to (secular) cognitive grounds, and accuses Rawls of prioritising the 
moral on merely functional grounds. See the debate, and comments on this debate, in Finlayson & Freyenhagen 
(2013). See also Baynes (1992) for a good overview of the issues at stake. 
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morality requires us to adapt our own desires and interests in accordance with an awareness of 
the needs of others, an awareness that involves us putting ourselves in the place of others and 
also requires us to develop a sense of self informed by the way others see us. The position of 
the ‘generalised other’, which is carried out as a concrete member of the lifeworld rather than 
from the position of a perspectiveless observer, requires that we consider the interests of all 
those who might be affected by a particular norm. It serves the role of socialising individual 
interests in line with the collective interest so that, in the process of moral discourse, a moral 
agent should be able to test her own interests against those of someone in different 
circumstances. This ‘general’ consideration should therefore avoid the promotion of norms 
that only work in the interests of particular groups. 
 
Habermas believes that his work here - his reformulation of Kant’s categorical imperative and 
his account of the idealising presuppositions of communicative action - is able to move us 
beyond both the distinction between morality and ethical life, and the distinction between 
abstract ideals and actual forms of communication. Although he is proposing a ‘universal’ 
principle of validity, he is careful to distinguish his project from one that would claim to be 
able to determine the ‘content’ of the validity claims in different discourses. Although he is 
often read as a ‘universalist’, he wants to be clear that he is not, nor could be, in a position to 
legislate what is ‘good’ concerning substantive ethical issues; for him these remain local 
issues. The complexity and diversity of modern life does not necessarily throw up universal 
answers as to what the ‘content’ of self-realisation, self-understanding or the good life should 
look like. As philosophers or social theorists we are not in a position to legislate for the 
‘content’ of the substantive issues raised in deliberation, which is ultimately decided by social 
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actors themselves, but he suggests that we are in a position to outline the (implicit) formal 
aspects of what constitutes a rational procedure of deliberation (in Dews, 1986, p.203-11).  
 
Although this is a more modest claim, it is still rather ambitious in suggesting that philosophy 
is able to prescribe the rational procedure for deliberation due to the presuppositions of 
communication being universal regardless of time, space and context. Habermas also suggests 
that even if we were to reach an ‘ideal speech situation’; whereby dialogue was free from 
coercion and restraint, it is unlikely that there will be agreement on substantive issues. Rather, 
there would be a ‘compromise’ in terms of group interests rather than any clear ‘universal’ 
interests36. The presuppositions of discourse commit us to the possibility of an ideal speech 
situation where, should the conditions be met, we can reach a rational consensus accepted by 
all. So on the one hand, the ideal speech situation is a regulative ideal that is only ever 
approximated, yet on the other hand Habermas argues that it is not an ‘abstract ideal’ as it is 
inscribed in the ‘real’ context of communication. It is an ideal derived from actual 
communication, and actual communication presupposes such an ideal. Habermas’s notion of 
a ‘discourse ethics’ walks a fine line between acknowledging the importance of lifeworld 
contexts on the one hand – and their role in providing meaning, identity, agency and solidarity 
                                                
36 Habermas pursues these issues in a legal and political direction in his 1992 book Between Facts and Norms 
(1996). Here he explores the role of law and politics in the maintenance of social solidarity in modern, plural 
societies. In the context of competing ethical visions of the good life, law and politics have an important 
mediating role to play should such visions come into conflict. However, he argues that these can only be truly 
successful as stabilising mechanisms on the basis of normative legitimacy and universal democracy. In the 
absence of traditional means for integrating facticity and validity - e.g. recourse to sacred authority, habit and 
custom etc – modern law unifies by being both positive (in the sense of being enforced by a recognised 
authority) and normatively legitimate (insofar as it gains consent from those it applies to). The version of 
legitimate law that Habermas espouses is informed by his ‘deliberative paradigm’ which seeks to protect both 
(liberal-democratic conceptions of) private autonomy and (civic-republican conceptions of) public autonomy; as 
he argues, ‘Under postmetaphysical conditions, the only legitimate law is one that emerges from the discursive 
opinion-and will-formation of equally enfranchised citizens’ (p. 408). He also suggests that legitimate law is in 
line with the ‘common good’ of post-conventional morality and that such laws can be deemed self-determined 
(in Western democracies) due to the openness of decision-making bodies to the discursively produced opinions 
of civil society and the public. For a critique of Habermas’s book, for apologizing for ‘systems paternalism’ and 
for compromising the critical thrust of his earlier work, see Cook (2001). 
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for its members - and on the other outlining a critical ‘moral’ standard independent of that 
lifeworld to which oppressed members can appeal.  
 
Some Critical Reflections 
Hopefully it is clear from this brief overview of Habermas’s work that he has produced a 
powerful body of work and a strong viable alternative for a reconfigured Critical Theory. 
However, the breadth and ambition of Habermas’s work has, not surprisingly, provoked a 
number of criticisms in a number of areas and from a number of theoretical and political 
positions. Needless to say it would be impossible to summarise all of them here, although I 
have made reference to a number of them already, so I will concentrate on the criticisms I feel 
are most pertinent for a ‘critical’ theory and the ones I feel are most threatening to the core of 
his position. These can broadly be split into criticisms directed at Habermas’s system & 
lifeworld thesis, along with his separation of instrumental and communicative rationality, and 
what we might call ‘Hegelian’ objections directed at his distinction between morality and 
ethical life.37 Honneth’s criticisms of Habermas encapsulate these two dimensions (Honneth, 
1991). He takes Habermas to task for producing an overly neat dualism between the system 
and lifeworld that has the theoretical advantage of separating communication from power, but 
ultimately produces the ‘fiction’ of a ‘norm-free’ domain of power and a ‘power-free’ domain 
of communication. Honneth (2007, p. 70) is also critical of the ‘emancipatory process in 
which Habermas socially anchors the normative perspective of his critical theory’. For 
Honneth, the key characteristic of Critical Theory is its attempt to ground its ‘critical’ (i.e. 
potentially emancipatory) intent in what he calls the ‘pre-theoretical resource’ apparent in 
social needs or social movements; without this critical theory becomes just another form of 
                                                
37 Which is not to say that both categories of criticism are not clearly linked. 
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social (scientific) critique. The problem, according to Honneth, is that the ‘critical’ and 
emancipatory element of Habermas’s theory appeals to the normative presuppositions 
‘implicit’ in linguistic understanding and is therefore too far removed from the actual (moral) 
experiences of social actors. If a pre-theoretical resource for a ‘critical’ perspective is to be 
found in social reality, then Honneth suggests that it has to articulate ‘an existing experience 
of social injustice’ (2007, p. 70). I will explore Honneth’s criticisms of Habermas, and his 
attempts to develop this communicative position, in the next chapter. 
 
The two categories of criticism I have outlined are apparent in a number of accounts by 
different social theorists38. Critics such as McCarthy (1991) have questioned Habermas’s use 
of systems theory in preserving the dualism of system and lifeworld. They argue that the role 
of social groups in concrete struggles against the pathologies of system integration is 
relegated to a sphere supposedly free of power relations. Also, to assume that the material 
reproduction of society is instrumental and develops according to an autonomous logic is to 
compromise the Marxian insight that what is assumed to be a ‘natural’ feature of social life is 
in fact the product of particular socio-economic relations at a particular period of history. 
McCarthy wants to question Habermas’s assumption that the formal aspects of organisations 
and systems take total precedence over the informal aspects of interactions within them, and 
he suggests that it is possible to look at forms of social action from both ‘social integration’ 
and ‘system integration’ perspectives. For McCarthy, these problems are related to 
Habermas’s increasing appeal to ‘objective standards’ of critique outside of our political and 
lifeworld practices: 
 
                                                
38 Habermas responds to a number of his critics in Thompson & Held (eds.) (1982). Also see his essays in 
Habermas (1990), (1994) and (2003). 
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‘Habermas once criticised Marx for succumbing to the illusion of rigorous 
science, and he traced a number of Marxism’s historical problems with political 
analysis and political practice to this source. The question I have wanted to pose 
here is whether in flirting with systems theory he does not run the danger of being 
seduced by the same illusion in more modern dress’ (1985, p. 53 in Rasmussen, 
1990, p.46) 
 
Nancy Fraser extends these criticisms to suggest that no matter how questionable the appeal 
to norms and consensus might be in certain forms of strategic action, they are always there; 
therefore, however convenient it might be for theoretical purposes, we are not in a position to 
analytically separate strategic action from the context of shared norms and meanings. She 
argues that the ‘system’ is permeated with moral and cultural elements, and the ‘lifeworld’ is 
unavoidably permeated with the ‘systemic’ elements of money and power. The latter has 
consequences for the theoretical understanding of gender as well, as the assumption that the 
family is simply characterised in lifeworld terms separately from the system, risks missing the 
elements of power in gender relations and also glossing over important issues such as unpaid 
(domestic) labour (Fraser, 1989, pp. 118-120).39 
 
Rather than seeing the system and lifeworld in dualistic terms as separate spheres with 
separate practices, whereby the systemic steering media of money and power gradually 
supplant the communicative practices of the lifeworld, we might more fruitfully see 
instrumental and strategic power relations and economic exchanges as themselves part of the 
lifeworld, and therefore mutually entangled in rather complex ways with a communicative 
orientation directed towards recognition and meaning. To separate out a sphere of strategic 
action from a sphere of shared norms is also to rob everyday or ordinary communication of 
the difficult process of what we might call ‘dialectical experience’ which involves both 
                                                
39 Habermas self-critically acknowledges the gendered aspects of the public sphere in Calhoun (ed.) (1992). 
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strategic action (with its subsumption of particulars under general categories) and reflection 
(on such subsumption and its inadequacy).40  
 
These criticisms of the system and lifeworld distinction are intimately linked to a number of 
‘Hegelian’ criticisms that suggest that principles of rationality are always embedded in the 
development of historical and cultural forms. 41 The dangers of a neat separation between 
system and lifeworld, and between a reconstructive science and concrete social practice, 
manifest themselves in terms of the problem of motivation, and the problem of 
universalisability. However much Habermas might provide us with new ways of thinking 
about limitations on freedom, particularly those conditions that prevent social actors from 
freely formulating their ‘true’ needs, he is still vulnerable to the kind of criticism Hegel 
levelled at Kant in terms of the emptiness of universal laws. 42 Habermas’s theory might be 
able to tell us what the presuppositions of communication are, and also what social conditions 
need to be in place for us to fully exercise our communicative competences, but it is still too 
rarefied to guide everyday social actors in their specific duties. In his quest to distinguish 
between progressive and regressive social developments, he purifies the ideals of 
communicative reason and turns practical norms into formal-theoretical norms on the 
assumption that their formality is what provides them with universality and ‘rational’ 
authority; however, in the process, he arguably deprives these norms of their link to action, 
motivation and solidarity (see Bernstein, 2005, pp. 307-8). As Pensky argues: 
 
                                                
40 I will explore this notion of ‘dialectical experience’ in more depth in chapter 4. Habermas would of course see 
this notion as part of the problem, i.e. as signifying a return to an instrumental, subject/object logic of 
representation rather than a learning process of (mis)representation and (mis)recognition. 
41 These ‘Hegelian’ criticisms could also be equally directed against critics such as McCarthy and Fraser. 
42 Of course Habermas is very mindful of, and sensitive to, such criticisms. See his "Morality and Ethical Life: 
Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?" in Habermas (1990) pp. 195-212. 
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‘Deriving solidarity from the application of universal moral or legal norms 
supposes that people are capable of forming relationships of intersubjective 
interdependence and mutual support, even care, from precisely those features of 
one another that are most abstract and that they share in principle with all other 
human beings, and this is indeed a significant explanatory burden’ (in 
Petherbridge, 2011, p. 136). 
 
Similarly, Hegel suggested that Kant’s categorical imperative suffered by abstracting ‘reason’ 
from the concrete activities of everyday life that give reason its content and its binding 
character.43 At the heart of Hegel’s notion of ‘ethical life’ (sittlichkeit) is the idea that moral 
principles are, and always have been, inseparable from cultural values and their broader 
concrete social context; indeed this is what provides such principles with authority and 
meaning44. Bernstein argues that once Habermas ‘purifies’ the ideals of communicative 
action, he ends up with an idealisation which repudiates ‘the material and temporal conditions 
of meaning’ such that the meaning of these ideals becomes separated from their use and they 
lack the practical authority which makes them ‘intrinsically motivating’ (2005, p. 308).  
 
Further to this, if we are only able to perceive our ‘true’ needs and interests in the future-
projected state of an ‘ideal speech situation’, and an ideal speech situation itself depends upon 
social actors not deceiving themselves, then perceiving what ‘full rationality’ might entail is 
surely not possible before this end-state is achieved. This is to argue, in others words, that 
                                                
43 It is worth noting that Hegel’s take on language – as ‘the middle term, mediating between independent and 
acknowledged self-consciousnesses’ - is also markedly different to Habermas’s emphasis on the (abstract) 
communicative presuppositions in our linguistic exchanges. Habermas neglects the ‘expressive’ dimension of 
language, and the role it plays in the constitution of the self through relations of mutual recognition; 
paraphrasing Hegel in his critique of Kantian moral consciousness, we can say that the interlocutor in 
Habermasian discourse ethics is ‘shut up with itself within its inner life, for there the self does not as yet have an 
existence: existence and the self stand as yet only in an external relation to each other’ (Hegel, 1977, p. 396 
§653). 
44 Having said this, there are some grounds for exploring the idea that the overly Kantian framework of 
Habermas’s position is intentional and involves the development of strong idealisations as a response to the 
broader context of moral scepticism (e.g. See Bernstein, 1995, p. 7 and p. 174, and Bernstein, 2005, pp. 308-9). 
Also, Habermas is clearly mindful of the temptations and dangers of idealising – for his self-critical reflections 
on the public sphere, see Habermas in Calhoun (ed.) (1992). 
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what is ‘rational’ is always historical, all the way down. The tension here is between 
maintaining a ‘critical’ position, which appears to require some way of transcending the 
historically concrete situations that social actors find themselves in, while ensuring that those 
social actors consider the espoused ideal acceptable and ‘rational’. Benhabib (1986) outlines 
similar criticisms to those of Bernstein and asks whether the separation of a principle of 
universalisability from concrete social practices is a convincing prospect for a critical theory. 
She suggests that ‘discourses arise when the intersubjectivity of ethical life is endangered; but 
the very project of discursive argumentation presupposes the ongoing validity of a reconciled 
intersubjectivity’ (1986, p. 321). The danger here is of a communicative ethics divorced from 
the actualities of life struggle, or in other words a theory abstracted from practice. Pippin 
(1997, pp. 157-84), in his Hegelian critique of Habermas, moves some way to answering 
these problems by suggesting that Habermas needs to give a historical account of how we 
have collectively come to adopt (or create) the norms for communicative action that he 
outlines, alongside why such norms are yet to be acknowledged as universal. For Pippin, there 
can be no ‘given’ norm that we presuppose in communicative action, and the justification for 
a norm is reliant on a (complex) historical narrative that is able to demonstrate how and why 
communities came to adopt (or create) such a norm45. In this way, ‘empirical’ reconstruction 
of such norms, for the purpose of criticism, is only possible with recourse to a historical 
narrative. 
 
A related problem is the feasibility of ‘universally’ valid moral norms. If a norm is to get the 
free consensus of those it affects, while those affected are expected to take the position of the 
‘generalised other’, it is very unlikely that there will be many universally valid norms. If these 
                                                
45 Putnam (2004) makes a similar point by suggesting that the separation of values and norms is not as straight 
forward as Habermas hopes, and argues that norms presuppose certain values or what he calls ‘thick ethical 
concepts’. See Chapter 7, pp. 111-134 (‘Values and Norms’). 
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valid norms are also supposed to be playing a socially integrative role, then surely social 
cohesion is being dealt with by other mechanisms. Habermas’s insensitivity to these other 
mechanisms is echoed in Benhabib’s concern that the position of ‘generalised other’ tends to 
neglect the uniqueness of the ‘concrete other’. In other words, for subjects to take the position 
of the ‘generalised other’ is to abstract from important aspects of concrete individuality and 
identity so that we can treat each other as equal rational beings with equal rights. She suggests 
that this position needs to be complemented by the standpoint of the ‘concrete other’ where 
we: 
 
‘view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, 
identity and affective-emotional constitution. Our relation to the other is governed 
by the norm of complementary reciprocity: each is entitled to expect and to 
assume from the other forms of behaviour through which the other feels 
recognised and confirmed as a concrete, individual being with specific needs, 
talents, and capacities. The norms of our interaction are … the norms of solidarity, 
friendship, love and care’ (Benhabib, 1986, p. 341).46 
 
In terms of ‘universalisability’, Habermas is claiming to have started from the everyday moral 
actions of concrete subjects to discover his D and U principles, as these are principles that 
individuals supposedly use themselves in judging the validity of norms. However he has 
trouble demonstrating that these principles are not just the reflection of another, historically 
contingent, ethnocentric bias and simply based on partial moral and ethical assumptions. He is 
also unable, simply on the basis of his rules of discourse, to formally specify that a norm is 
valid if it is open to consensus. Pippin argues that such procedural norms already contain an 
ethical ideal - i.e. ‘justice’ via the public role of reason - and therefore also restrict what the 
ethical goals of modern society could be. In other words, Habermas needs to give a historical 
and cultural account of how and why such ideals have come to acquire collective legitimacy 
                                                
46 This critique will have particular resonance when we consider Honneth’s development of the communicative 
turn in a recognitive direction. 
68 
 
without relying on any claims to transcendental ‘givens’ (Pippin, 1997, pp. 179). The norms 
of our current practices are already implicated in the ‘procedural’ practices of deliberation. It 
is not simply the case that we can extract the ‘rational’ procedural aspects from our 
interactions and then use this as a measuring stick against our current lifeworld practices. To 
assume the division between substantive lifeworld issues and the rational procedures of 
deliberation, is to assume that the rational procedures of deliberation are free from the 
substantive content of radically diverse lifeworlds (and therefore universal). An alternative, 
Hegelian, response would be that such procedures themselves arise out of the (substantive) 
norms of lifeworld practices. As Mendelson suggests: 
 
‘The historical potential of the ideal speech situation for becoming the actual 
organising principle of society can only come to fruition in a society which comes 
close to articulating it on the level of more historically specific and conscious 
traditions, for instance, the Western democracies of the twentieth century. While 
in a sense the ideal of rational consensus may be immanent in language per se and 
not simply an external standard, in most societies it is bound to remain 
unarticulated in the actual culture. It becomes politically relevant as an ideal to be 
consciously striven for only in societies which have begun to approach it on the 
level of their own cultural traditions.’ (Mendelson in Benhabib, 1986, p. 303) 
 
Benhabib’s use of Mendelson here tries to demonstrate the partial nature of Habermas’s 
notion of universalisability due to its reliance on additional assumptions, namely the way 
reason has been institutionalised. The principles espoused by Habermas, in other words, are 
arguably derived from a particular social, historical and political context. Young also makes 
this point when she suggests that: 
 
‘The deliberative model of communication derives from specific institutional 
contexts of the modern West – scientific debate, modern parliaments, and courts 
(each with progenitors in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy and politics, and 
in the medieval academy). These were some of the aspiring institutions of the 
bourgeois revolution that succeeded in becoming ruling institutions. Their 
institutional forms, rules, and rhetorical and cultural styles have defined the 
meaning of reason itself in the modern world. As ruling institutions, however, 
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they have been elitist and exclusive, and these exclusions mark their very 
conceptions of reason and deliberation, both in the institutions and in the 
rhetorical styles they represent. Since their Enlightenment beginnings, they have 
been male-dominated institutions, and in class- and race-differentiated societies 
they have been white- and upper-class dominated. Despite the claim of 
deliberative forms of orderly meetings to express pure universal reason, the norms 
of deliberation are culturally specific and often operate as forms of power that 
silence or devalue the speech of some people’ (Young, 1996, p. 123 in Ashenden 
and Owen, eds., 1999, p. 139). 
 
There are clear parallels here with the fact that Habermas’s ideal speech situation can only 
claim to be ‘universal’ by abstracting what is ‘rational’ from the complexity of a ‘far from 
rational’ social world, i.e. one divided by class, gender, ethnicity etc. Is it possible, under 
these conditions, to separate what is deemed ‘rational’ from its social context, or can we 
expect that ‘rationality’ will carry the remnants of class or gender bias? In such a conflictual 
world, we might expect that what is deemed ‘rational’ for one group may not be what is 
rational for another (Bernstein, 1995, p.56). Without an acknowledgement of this, Habermas 
is in danger of producing a social theory with no concrete connection to the actual (and 
complex) lives of social actors. Habermas is sensitive to such criticisms but would want to 
question the ‘partial’ nature of his deliberative model, or at least insist that the exclusions 
described above are ones to which a deliberative model addresses itself and which would 
hopefully be challenged when guided by such a model as a socio-political ideal. 
 
A connecting feature of all the criticisms of Habermas outlined above, and one which is at the 
heart of the remainder of my argument, is the danger that a communicative critique ends up 
repeating a number of the features of an increasingly abstract and pervasive instrumental form 
of rationality. Although instrumentally-rational proceduralism, and its concomitant nihilism, 
is at the heart of Critical Theory’s understanding, and critique, of contemporary societies – 
both in the form of Adorno’s critique of instrumental rationality’s subsumption of the non-
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identical and Habermas’s critique of the colonisation of the lifeworld by a subject-centred 
instrumentality – we can argue here that the strong idealising presuppositions at the heart of 
Habermas’s discourse ethics tend to display the purifying and procedural properties of such 
instrumental rationality. As Bernstein argues, ‘what Habermas ranges against the 
proceduralism of instrumental reason and the purposive-rational frameworks of the functional 
subsystems of society is another form of procedural rationality’ and as ‘formalism and 
proceduralism are themselves the primary criteria that make a form of reasoning instrumental 
… communicative reason is a component of the very disintegrative process it means to 
remedy’ (Bernstein, 1995, p. 33). The proceduralism at work in Habermas’s idealising 
presuppositions of communication, which seeks to separate out universal norms from ethical 
values, shares the hallmarks of instrumental rationality inasmuch as it abstracts from 
difference, particularity, subjectivity, and social – as well as material and temporal – context. 
Unique things are treated as alike for the sake of procedural success and exchangeability, and 
all particular features that make such things qualitatively incomparable are deemed 
contingent and extraneous. As Hegel suggests in his critique of Kant, such ‘universal’ reason 
is unable to account for the claims that might be made by desire, the body, nature, 
particularity etc. Therefore, in the same way that Habermas suggests that the steering 
mechanisms of power and money are unable to foster meaning and community, we could 
equally argue that a procedural rationality, even in its communicative form, will find itself in 
a similar position. 
 
The next chapter furthers some of these criticisms of Habermas, and explores Axel Honneth’s 
attempts to overcome a number of them by taking the communicative turn in critical theory in 
a recognitive direction. He particularly attempts to tackle the overly formal separation of 
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power and communication (and norms and values/ethics) in Habermas, along with the 
problem of motivation, and the insensitivity to the unique Other. He does this by connecting 
to what he sees as the more concrete moral experiences of those suffering injustice - injustices 
which Habermas’s linguistic model is unable to fully appreciate - and he explores how the 
appropriation of implicit moral norms by social and political struggles has developed (and 
might still develop) historically.  
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CHAPTER 2: AXEL HONNETH & THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION 
 
Axel Honneth has been increasingly recognised as an important figure in contemporary 
Critical Theory and in contemporary social theory as a whole. His work has been at the 
forefront of what has often been termed a ‘third generation’ of Frankfurt School Critical 
Theory and has developed the ‘tradition’ in a number of new and interesting ways.1 In a 
similar vein to Habermas, his work covers a broad number of areas and disciplines including 
moral theory, social philosophy, philosophical anthropology, politics, sociology, and 
psychoanalysis. It has also attracted a growing number of followers and critics, and there is a 
rapidly growing secondary literature developing around his ideas.2 This chapter explores the 
ways in which Honneth has addressed a number of criticisms directed at Habermas’s 
communicative project and how his work both continues and differs from this original 
project. Honneth’s own trajectory has developed in a number of ways, although there are clear 
continuities between his early essays on Marx, his book on philosophical anthropology with 
Hans Joas, his exploration of different versions of critical theory in his Critique of Power 
(which includes Foucault) through to his more recent essays on psychoanalysis, his debate 
with Nancy Fraser, his work on reification, and his essays on individualisation and capitalism. 
Although I will cover all of these areas of his work in varying degrees of depth, I concentrate 
on the heart of his project - and still his most significant work to date – which is his Struggle 
for Recognition (1996). 
 
I begin the chapter with Honneth’s attempt to ‘rediscover the social’ from within the earlier 
Frankfurt School project, before exploring his sympathies for, and criticisms of, Habermas’s 
                                                
1 For a brief overview of the ‘third generation’ see Joel Anderson in Petherbridge (ed.) (2011) pp. 44-48. 
2 For example, see Van Den Brink and Owen (eds.) (2007), Deranty (2009), Huttunen (2009), and Petherbridge 
(ed.) (2011). 
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emphasis on communication. I then consider Honneth’s use of Foucault to complement 
Habermas, along with his other reflections on post-structuralist writers and what they might 
contribute to his critical-theoretical project. However, the bulk of the chapter is dedicated to 
Honneth’s turn to Hegel’s early work on recognition (and to Mead’s ‘postmetaphysical’ work 
on interaction) following his abandonment of Foucault’s ‘systems-theoretic solution to the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment’. At the heart of his Struggle for Recognition are the underlying 
forms of mutual recognition – love, rights and solidarity – along with the accompanying 
forms of self-relation and realisation, disrespect and the potential for moral development and 
resistance. I explore these along with Honneth’s ‘formal conception of ethical life’ which he 
hopes can successfully mediate between formal Kantian morality and substantive 
communitarian ethics whilst also providing him with both a philosophical justification for his 
normative position and a standard of moral development for evaluating forms of, and 
struggles for, recognition. My discussion of this is followed by a brief outline of his recent 
work on reification and recognition before then considering a number of critical responses to 
Honneth’s project as a whole. My criticisms of his work, in the final section of the chapter, 
focus on his tendency to idealise the notion of recognition, his lack of a sufficient conception 
of misrecognition and the ideological role that recognition often plays, and ultimately the 
abstract and procedural nature of his ‘formal’ conception of ethical life. 
 
Rediscovering the social 
Honneth initially attempts to outline a ‘social-theoretical alternative’ to what he sees as a 
‘functionalist’ program implicit in the original project of the inner circle of the Frankfurt 
School (Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse) – and to the linguistic version of Habermas’s Critical 
Theory - by referring to those more marginal members (Neumann, Kirchheimer, Benjamin, 
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Fromm) in whose work he sees an implicit reference to an alternative communicative project. 
One point of reference is the work of Neumann and Kirchheimer, who opposed Pollock’s 
‘state capitalism’ thesis by suggesting that National Socialism did not mark the point where 
bureaucratic administrative controls had been able to supplant the mechanism of the market or 
the centrality of the interests of private capital, but rather that the latter came under the control 
of totalitarian management as the result of a political compromise between a range of interest 
groups with the furtherance of opportunities for profit as their goal. Another point of 
reference for Honneth is the difference between Benjamin’s position and the ‘Marxist 
functionalism’ of the ‘inner circle’ in the debates over aesthetics and politics. Benjamin’s 
strengths are seen as being due to his attempt to counter the key problem with Adorno’s 
conception of the culture industry - a notion of social control and integration which ‘reaches 
into all cultural life-contexts’ such that he cannot ‘credit social groups with the creative 
performances which would be necessary in order to learn spontaneously new forms of world 
disclosure from the mass arts’ (Honneth, 1995, p.81). In response to this, Honneth sees 
Benjamin’s work as promising an alternative conception of social experiences, one centred 
around social interaction and collective forms of perception such that ‘the experiential worlds 
of different groups and collectives represent not so much the material of domination but rather 
the stubborn energies themselves from which the movement of social life emerges’ (Honneth, 
1995, p.81).3 Despite Fromm’s earlier contributions to a functionalist conception of individual 
integration, he is also singled out by Honneth as making a promising contribution to an 
alternative communication-theoretic perspective, specifically at the level of psychology. His 
psychoanalytical thinking is seen to have moved, under the influence of the work of Karen 
Horney amongst others, away from a classical Freudian theory of relatively immutable self-
                                                
3 I will return to this in chapter 4. 
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preserving instincts, towards a more ‘interactionist’ theory of malleable, socially-oriented 
instincts or needs.  
 
Referring to Neumann and Kirchheimer here, but effectively summarising the advantages of 
this ‘outer circle’, Honneth argues that they:  
 
‘always start from the interests and orientations that social groups themselves 
bring into societal reproduction on the basis of their class position. From the 
communicative process in which different groups negotiate these interests among 
themselves through the utilisation of their respective power potential, there 
emerges the fragile compromise which finds expression in the institutional 
constitution of a society’ (1995, p.79). 
 
Social integration is always therefore the result of a compromise between a range of 
conflicting interests groups with their group-specific norms of self-understanding and action 
rather than ‘a steering process which simply extends into the symbolically mediated interests 
and orientation of social groups’ (Honneth, 1995, p.79). Although Honneth does not further 
pursue the work of the outer circle in his conception of Critical Theory, it is the 
communicative possibilities implicit, yet undeveloped, in their work which Honneth wants to 
develop into a theory of society; a project which, despite its differences, is highly sympathetic 
to the direction in which Habermas has taken Critical Theory. 
 
Habermas represents the important alternative to earlier Critical Theory for Honneth and 
opens up the possibility of meeting Horkheimer’s original criteria. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, his ‘paradigm of communicative action’ replaces the Marxist emphasis on production 
and social labour and pins its hopes for emancipatory action and social progress on the 
rational potential inherent in ‘social interaction’. The ‘rational potential of communicative 
action’ is found in the normative presuppositions contained in the pragmatics of language, and 
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it is here (in this ‘pre-theoretical sphere of emancipation’) that Habermas is able to ground his 
normative position. In the process of communicative action, we carry with us certain 
normative expectations connected to the linguistic rules that are implicit in communication 
geared towards understanding. Should our normative expectations not be fulfilled, certain 
moral demands arise that expose the forms of domination at work in current forms of 
communicative action. In comparison to Horkheimer who ‘saw capitalist relations of 
production as setting unjustified limits on the development of the human capacity for labour’, 
Honneth suggests that Habermas ‘sees the social relations of communication as putting unjust 
restrictions on the emancipatory potential of intersubjective understanding’ (2007, p. 69). By 
arguing that there is a normative impulse at the very heart of human communication, and that 
this normative impulse is expressed in the implicit linguistic rules of communication, 
Habermas is in a position to propose a ‘critical’ theory that aims to highlight, and hopefully 
contribute to changing, the social obstacles that impede the full expression of these rules. 
 
Habermas emphasises that subjects are always already in relation to each other due to 
processes of linguistic understanding, and it is this language-mediated intersubjectivity which 
distinguishes human beings as a species. If linguistically-mediated intersubjective action is 
such a distinguishing feature of human life, then social reproduction cannot therefore simply 
be seen in terms of, or seen as determined by, material reproduction - the interaction of 
humanity and nature in the form of social labour. Rather language and communication must 
be seen as playing an equally important role in history, after all, collective material 
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reproduction relies on communicative understanding and agreement.4 Equipped with this 
distinction between ‘labour’ and ‘interaction’, Habermas attempts to develop a theory of 
societal rationalisation that outlines the different forms of knowledge production and 
rationality associated with each; this is a task more straightforwardly carried out with regards 
to labour due to its close relationship with instrumental action and technical knowledge, but 
proves somewhat more difficult for interaction. As we have seen, Habermas wants to 
demonstrate not only the development of strategic action in society through the lens of social 
labour and political administration, but also to identify a separate communicative sphere 
whereby certain institutions play the role of reducing barriers to the free communication of 
the social norms and values which are central to social integration and reproduction. From 
here, according to Honneth, the task is set for Habermas to develop three key areas of this 
emerging theory: (a) the linguistic presuppositions of language and communication, (b) a 
notion of social evolution able to explain the process of societal rationalisation (in both 
instrumental and communicative spheres), and finally (c) an outline of the ways in which 
‘realms of social action become independent purposive-rationally organised systems’ (1995, 
p.88) 
 
Habermas’s development of these themes throughout his Theory of Communicative Action 
provides Honneth with an alternative ‘communicative-theoretic’ version of Critical Theory 
able to maintain the key features of the tradition while avoiding what he sees as the 
                                                
4 Honneth explores many of these ideas in his early work on philosophical anthropology, particularly his work 
with Hans Joas – Social Action and Human Nature (1988). Here Feuerbach is identified as playing a key role in 
outlining the ‘a priori intersubjectivity of the human being’ (p. 15) and Marx’s work is also dissected for its 
intersubjective insights. After an exploration of the development of these ideas in Western Marxism, they 
analyse theories of social action (e.g. Mead) and the historical-anthropological elements in the work of Foucault, 
Elias and Habermas. This work in many ways establishes certain foundations for Honneth’s later concerns with 
the implicit normativity of intersubjective relations. It also seeks to emphasise the unavoidability of 
anthropological assumptions in social philosophy whilst trying to sidestep the association of anthropology with 
ahistoricism; philosophical anthropology instead is portrayed as exploring the ‘invariant conditions of human 
historicity’ (1988, p. 7). 
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pessimistic conclusions of Adorno and Horkheimer’s one-sided account of societal 
rationalisation. Habermas is applauded for developing a historical account of societal 
development from the standpoint of communicative rationality in a similar way to the 
historical account from the standpoint of instrumental rationality and the mastery of nature in 
the Dialectic of Enlightenment. As we have already seen, Habermas sees the development of 
systemic forms of strategic action as increasingly separate from other communicative forms 
of social life, which he collectively refers to as the ‘lifeworld’. He is then able to conceive of 
a dualistic development of society, albeit one where the two logics of development are 
unevenly weighted. Communicative rationality and linguistic understanding are seen as 
fundamental to social reproduction, whereas the norm-free sphere of action encapsulated in 
his notion of ‘system’ is conceived of as a historical consequence of a process of abstraction. 
In characteristic medical language, Honneth then outlines Habermas’s ‘diagnosis’ of 
contemporary society (or rather modernity more broadly) along with its central ‘pathology’: 
the systemic forms of instrumental action are not to be seen simply as the logical outcome of 
humanity’s mastery of nature, as he suggests Adorno and Horkheimer would have us believe, 
but rather as the outcome of a process of societal rationalisation emerging from the lifeworld. 
Consequently, it is not merely the existence of such instrumentally driven forms of 
administration, organisation and steering that pose the problem for contemporary society, but 
rather the way in which they unjustifiably encroach on those areas of social life premised on 
communicative understanding – what he calls the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’. 
 
A key problem of Habermas’s work for Honneth is the very fact that he produces an account 
of social evolution in terms of a conflict between communicative and purposive-rational 
action spheres rather than conflict within a wider process of understanding between social 
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classes or groups. This conflict is not even seen as being mediated through social struggle but 
rather as a process of rationalisation over and above classes whereby the purposive-rational 
actions, whose origin is in intersubjectively produced norms, assume a life of their own and 
adversely turn upon the sphere of social interaction.5 Habermas reifies the distinction between 
the two action spheres by seeing the sphere of communicative action as not influencing the 
sphere of purposive-rational action, which in turn only acts destructively upon the 
communicative sphere of action. For Honneth, as for a number of critics I referred to in the 
previous chapter, Habermas’s conception of contemporary capitalist societies, in terms of the 
autonomous and opposing spheres of system and lifeworld, lead to what Honneth calls 
‘complementary fictions’, reifications resulting in the supposition of ‘(1) the existence of 
norm-free organisations of action and (2) the existence of power-free spheres of 
communication’ (1991, p. 298). Honneth opposes the notion of ‘norm-free’ strategic action by 
arguing that ‘the organisational structures of management and administration can be generally 
clarified only as institutional embodiments of both purposive-rational and political-practical 
principles’ (1991, p. 298).6 He criticises the notion of ‘power-free communication’ by 
questioning Habermas’s presupposition of the cognitive separation of actions oriented to 
success and actions oriented to understanding, and the fiction of a social lifeworld that is 
reproduced independently of strategic influences. Also, if power is only considered at the 
level of systems integration, he argues that Habermas ignores ‘the importance of pre-state, 
                                                
5 This criticism of Habermas, in many ways, pushes Honneth back towards Marx and the importance of class. 
Honneth is particularly critical of Habermas’s tendency to reduce work to instrumental action and therefore to 
give up on a ‘critical concept of work’. For Honneth’s attempts to work through these issues, see his 
‘Domination and Moral Struggle: The Philosophical Heritage of Marxism Reviewed’, ‘Work and Instrumental 
Action: On the Normative Basis of Critical Theory’, and ‘Moral Consciousness and Class Domination: Some 
Problems in the Analysis of Hidden Morality’ in his The Fragmented World of the Social: Essays in Social and 
Political Philosophy (1995). For an excellent study that explores these earlier elements of Honneth’s thought, 
see Deranty (2009). 
6 This is very similar to the problem of the analytical and the concrete in Parsons, and in the forms of ideal types 
in Weber; concrete actions are mixed, but they are represented through analytical abstractions. See Parsons 
(1968) and Weber (1949). 
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situationally bound forms of the exercise of everyday domination in the reproduction of a 
society’; conversely, if social integration is only perceived in lifeworld practices concerned 
with the symbolic reproduction of society then he ignores ‘the importance of processes of 
social interaction internal to an organisation for the functioning of social organisations’ (1991, 
p. 301). In response to this, Honneth’s work moves in a direction that seeks to identify the 
moral presuppositions at work in all social interactions (i.e. both social and systemic). 
 
For Honneth, Habermas’s social theory ends up with an analysis of the social consequences of 
autonomous power complexes, and his dualism of system/lifeworld parallels that of an 
organisation/individual dualism in Adorno, and a power apparatus/human body dualism in 
Foucault; all of which adhere to what he calls a systems-theoretic, rather than a 
communication-theoretic, approach. The central pathology of contemporary society for 
Habermas becomes the ‘penetration of systemic forms of steering into the previously intact 
region of a communicative everyday practice’ (Honneth, 1991, p. 302). However, despite the 
conception of social spheres as systems, Honneth sees Habermas’s approach as having the 
advantage over the other critical social theorists due to the serious consideration of moral 
processes of understanding through his notion of the centrality of communicative action for 
social reproduction. Yet, the dualistic conclusions of Habermas’s thought lead to a two-fold 
sacrifice. On the one hand he abandons a conception of ‘the communicative organisation of 
material production which, under the title “self-administration”, belongs to the productive part 
of the tradition of critical Marxism’ thereby sacrificing ‘the possibility of a justified critique 
of concrete forms of organisation of economic production and political administration’ 
(Honneth, 1991, p. 303). On the other hand, he ends up sacrificing ‘the communication-
theoretic approach he had initially opened up: the potential for an understanding of the social 
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order as an institutionally mediated communicative relation between culturally integrated 
groups that, so long as the exercise of power is asymmetrically distributed, takes place 
through the medium of social struggle’ (1991, p. 303). These criticisms provide the backdrop 
for the future direction of Honneth’s work. 
 
The Uses of Foucault & post-structuralism 
Despite Honneth’s general commitment to a Habermasian version of critical theory and his 
criticisms of Adorno and Horkheimer, he distances himself from what he sees as Habermas’s 
increasingly abstract formulations – ones that separate communicative understanding from 
actual critical social praxis, discourse from social conflict and struggle, and power-free 
communication from norm-free power. Honneth’s initial attempts to transcend this division 
with a notion of morally motivated struggle (1996, p. 1) employ a conception of struggle 
taken from Foucault’s notion of discipline before then emphasising Hegel’s early work on 
recognition. Honneth brings Foucault into the problematic of Frankfurt School Critical 
Theory as an alternative ‘rediscovery of the social’ alongside Habermas’s communicative 
approach.7 Foucault is of use in emphasising the role of power in the dimension of the social 
in a way arguably absent from Habermas’s account of communicative action which tends to 
see power as simply an external and corrupting influence. Habermas, in his critique of Marx 
and his aligning of social labour with instrumental action, had also abandoned the importance 
of social struggle. For Honneth, Foucault’s notion of discipline is useful in reintroducing a 
notion of struggle and conflict once the purely strategic emphasis is replaced with an 
emphasis on morality. He argues that Foucault’s work moves into the realm of the Frankfurt 
school problematic once his object of study changes in his ‘genealogical’ period - from the 
                                                
7 Honneth had also already engaged with the work of Foucault in his earlier book with Joas (see Honneth and 
Joas, 1988, pp. 129-150). 
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history of culturally determining forms of knowledge in European modernity to the stabilising 
effect of institutional and cognitive strategies of social integration on societies of modern 
Europe – and he begins exploring how theories of knowledge are at once theories of power 
(Honneth, 1991, p.153). Honneth’s criticism of Foucault however broadly parallels that of 
Habermas – i.e. that his implicit critique of social relations displays a ‘cryptonormativism’ 
due to his inability to establish a normative position that is not reducible to its historical 
function. Honneth plays Foucault and Habermas off against each other in an attempt to 
produce a theory that is able to emphasise the role of communicative action in an adequate 
Critical Theory on the one hand, whilst incorporating a notion of struggle, and an explicit 
sensitivity to the role of power in the social, on the other hand. 
 
Criticising the Marxist theory of state, Foucault suggests that social domination is not 
explainable in terms of one centralised point of control that rules by means of the political 
apparatus; alternatively, he proposes a centre-less (or ‘de-centred’), net-like conception of 
power – a ‘microphysics of power’. A system of power emerges when different objectives or 
results of action from various social contexts momentarily coincide and form a common 
objective. The permanence of a system of power is dependent on its ability to repeat such 
interrelated results in similar contexts of struggle. In contrast to the notion of an individual 
subject or social group possessing power, Foucault proposes that power be seen as the ‘fragile 
and open-ended product of strategic conflicts between subjects’ (Honneth, 1991, p. 155). This 
emphasis on struggle represents for Honneth, initially at least, an action-theoretic approach to 
power. What Honneth highlights as important here, and what he sees as calling Adorno’s 
work into question, is ‘the practical foundation of the exercise of power, the substate 
situations of social struggle’ (ibid, p. 159). Before the state apparatus can function smoothly, 
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there already has to be a system of power in place established through the interconnection of 
outcomes at a substate level.8  
 
However, according to Honneth, Foucault is unable to sufficiently account for the 
stabilisation of power, given a conception of the social world in terms of strategic action and 
the dismissal of moral orientations and legal norms as simply covering up strategic objectives; 
Honneth suggests that this pushes him towards a more ‘administrative’ theory of power. A 
system of power is seen as ensuring its stability by developing more thorough means of 
control - something Foucault attempts to clarify with his notion of the ‘productive’ (rather 
than simply repressive) nature of power. Modern forms of power produce ‘norms of conduct’ 
which routinise and discipline patterns of behaviour. To do this, and in turn reduce their own 
instability, societies seek to control (and produce) the ‘body-bound expressions of life’. In 
addition to norms and bodies, Foucault emphasises the importance of knowledge, as the 
disciplining of individual bodies and general life processes are dependent on strategically 
useful knowledge about humans. Foucault conceives of scientific knowledge as serving the 
purpose of social control, and its objectivity is measured in relation to its efficacy in the social 
control of individuals. Every practical attempt to control human life extends the base of 
scientific knowledge, and every extension of information about human life extends the locus 
of power and deepens disciplinary control. Here Honneth highlights the key contradiction that 
he sees in Foucault’s work – if Foucault takes his conception of the human sciences seriously 
then he calls into question his own work, which is surely nothing more than a reflexive form 
of strategic action.  
 
                                                
8 I explore Foucault’s work in more depth in the next chapter. 
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Honneth is also critical of what he sees as Foucault’s shift of focus from the intersubjective 
nature of social struggle towards a conception of social institutions (such as factories, schools, 
and prisons) as the subjects of the exercise of power. By doing this Foucault displaces the 
question of the establishment of such institutional powers through social struggle and 
attempts to avoid the problem of the stability of power. Ultimately for Honneth, Foucault has 
a number of choices in explaining the stabilisation of power and these come down to ‘the 
interruption of the struggle in the form of a normatively motivated agreement, or of a 
pragmatically aimed compromise, or of a permanently emplaced use of force’. For Honneth, 
Foucault forgoes the first two ‘two-sided’ options and opts for the latter ‘one-sided’ 
possibility (1991, p. 174), presumably on the basis that any form of normative consensus 
would be seen as a function of power. His model of strategic conflict therefore precludes any 
conception of the mutual resolution of struggle in an ultimately transitory stabilisation of 
power. For Honneth, Foucault’s work increasingly emphasises the all-encompassing 
disciplining power of modern institutions at a distance from his starting point of the unceasing 
process of social struggle.  
 
This contradiction, due to Foucault’s reduction of social action to strategic action, is 
superseded in his historical writings, which go on to emphasise the systematic process of 
techniques of power. Here he attempts to describe how a number of autonomous disciplinary 
centres developed into a homogeneous self-regulating system due to institutional overlaps but, 
for Honneth, he fails to identify the social groups responsible for institutionally linking these 
separate centres of power. Although social struggle provided the starting point for Foucault’s 
theory of power, his account of the process of increasing power, which adapts to its 
environment from time to time, conceives of social groups as the bearers (or objects) of 
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systemic processes rather than the subjects of the institutionalisation of forms of domination. 
Also, modes of human conduct, especially their bodily forms, are seen as mere material to be 
manipulated by the prevailing system of power at the time, leaving subjects without the 
motives or means for the production of social conflict (ibid, p. 194-195). Honneth suggests 
that Foucault ends up with a ‘functionalist’ account of ‘the augmentation of social power’ and 
social control whereby social groups end up as the mere effects of such systemic processes, 
and strategic action by motivated social actors is sidelined along with any notion of social 
struggle. 
 
As is the case in his interpretation of Adorno, Honneth sees Foucault as relying on a systemic 
conception of societal organisation - accomplished for Adorno by centralised administration 
and for Foucault by the disciplinary procedures of institutions such as prisons and factories - 
and as dismissing any role for social groups, or the cultural or normative orientations of 
socialised subjects, in the social integration of late-capitalist societies (Honneth, 1991, p. 
199). In fact Foucault’s account ends up in a worse predicament than Adorno, according to 
Honneth, as he provides an ontology of the pliability of human subjects whereas Adorno’s 
account of the ‘administered society’ at least sees it as a historical product of civilisation.9 
Once Foucault moves from a conception of the social in terms of struggle to one in terms of 
disciplinary institutions, ‘it is no longer a question of the complementary process of a gradual 
human self-alienation as found in Adorno’s philosophy of history’, but rather Foucault’s 
theory of power represents a ‘systems-theoretic solution to the Dialectic of Enlightenment’ 
                                                
9 Although it is worth noting that elsewhere Honneth tends to interpret Adorno and Horkheimer’s view of the 
socialising role of culture (in the culture industry) as a theoretical decision characteristic of a ‘Marxist 
Functionalism’ rather than a (despairing) socio-historical analysis of the fate of culture in contemporary 
capitalism. Foster (1999, p. 7) also makes this point. 
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(ibid, p. 201).10 Despite their differences, this model of ‘critique’ suffers the fate of Adorno’s 
account of reification according to Honneth – i.e. if society and consciousness, as the possible 
(social) sources for independent and critical consciousness, have become completely reified, 
then any attempt at social critique that grounds itself in social reality must be considered 
impossible. To put it another way, if mundane social experience is considered from the 
viewpoint of the ‘administered society’, then any attempt to identify a critical element of 
‘intramundane transcendence’ will be found wanting.11 Honneth must turn elsewhere for his 
development of Habermas’s communicative turn. 
 
In addition to his engagement with Foucault, Honneth explores the work of other post-
structuralists. Despite his critical comments here, he is rather sympathetic in places and seeks 
to incorporate some of their insights into his own work on recognition. In his essay 
‘Pluralisation and Recognition’ (in Honneth, 1995), Honneth tends to sympathise with a 
number of societal diagnoses put forward by theorists such as Lyotard, Baudrillard and Rorty 
– e.g. the death of grand narratives, the end of the social, the decline of shared traditions, the 
media simulation of reality etc - although he disagrees with their explanations and 
conclusions. Whereas Lyotard, Baudrillard and Rorty are often portrayed as celebrating a 
number of these developments, particularly in relation to what they see as an increased 
opportunity for freedom, difference and (self) creativity unmoored from the restraints of 
social norms, Honneth questions the possibility of self-realisation without normativity and 
communicative understanding, and also reads the socio-economic developments that have led 
                                                
10 For an additional exploration of the parallels and differences between Foucault and Adorno, see Honneth’s 
‘Foucault and Adorno: Two Forms of the Critique of Modernity’ in his The Fragmented World of the Social: 
Essays in Social and Political Philosophy (1995). 
11 Honneth later acknowledges however that this doesn’t conclude his thoughts on Foucault and he suggests that 
‘I have rethought my relationship to Foucault’s works many times over the years, because I have never been 
wholly satisfied with the results of my critique’ (in Petherbridge, 2011, p. 410). 
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to the disintegration of the social world as producing largely negative consequences of 
atomisation, fragmentation, and the decline of solidarity. Honneth also questions the aesthetic 
model of freedom and self-creation adopted by many of the post-structuralists for relying on a 
solipsistic account of self-realisation that neglects the importance of recognition and 
normativity for self-identity and intersubjective freedom.12 
 
A more sympathetic engagement with post-structuralism appears in Honneth’s 1994 essay 
entitled ‘The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism’ (in 
Honneth, 2007). Here he explores the relative ethical merits of post-structuralism and the 
ways in which a project that has often been conceived as nihilistic or apolitical can help us 
transcend both Kantian forms of morality and Habermasian universalist discourse ethics. 
What Honneth sees in the work of Levinas and Derrida, and to some extent in aspects of 
Adorno’s work, is a valuable attempt to remain sensitive to the particularity and singularity of 
concrete others which is often lost in accounts of morality and justice (and even accounts of 
communicative solidarity) that focus on formal equality. In this way he draws parallels 
between the post-structuralist (and Adornian) concerns with the exclusion of ‘others’ in 
metaphysical systems of thought and a concern with those ‘others’ excluded from social and 
political institutions and discourses. Honneth assesses the success of Lyotard’s ‘ethics of the 
differend’ but ultimately finds it wanting when compared to Habermas’s discourse ethics, 
despite the latter’s tendency to neglect the importance of singularity and particularity.13 
According to Honneth, Lyotard’s attempt to do justice to value pluralism and diverse 
knowledge claims (i.e. the voice of the excluded), with his notions of incommensurable and 
                                                
12 Here I am in agreement with Honneth. I explore this in greater depth, in relation to Foucault, in the next 
chapter. 
13 Honneth had already critically engaged with Lyotard’s work in his earlier essay ‘An Aversion Against the 
Universal: A Commentary on Lyotard’s Post-Modern Condition’ in Theory, Culture and Society, (1985) Vol. 2, 
No. 3: 147-56 
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competing genres and ‘language games’, ends up implicitly appealing to a version of ‘justice’ 
framed in (not un-Habermasian) terms of domination-free discourse. 
 
However it is Derrida’s Levinasian inspired ‘ethics of care’ that is seen to surpass Habermas’s 
discourse ethics in terms of responsibility to the singular other. Derrida outlines the tension 
between two (equally legitimate) moral principles which he sees as united, or rather co-
existing, in a ‘politics of friendship’ – on the one hand, the treatment of the other as an equal 
to oneself and other people, and on the other, the asymmetrical and affective care of the other 
as a unique individual.14 This tension between equality and justice goes to the very heart of 
(Kantian) universal forms of morality and legal-formal rights, and in many ways also 
challenges a perspective which emphasises the importance of mutually recognising others as 
equals. However, Honneth seeks to use it for his own purposes by highlighting the ways in 
which the emphasis on asymmetrical care serves to reflexively correct the perspective of 
equality and increase sensitivity to the concrete other. He claims that deconstructive ethics 
does a better job of incorporating a notion of care than what he sees as Habermas’s appeal to 
an affective ‘solidarity’ between communicative partners, because the latter requires us to 
abstract ourselves from the particularity of our social and cultural (and value) communities – 
where we often experience concrete forms of solidarity – to find a form of solidarity based on 
broader shared goals of communication. Honneth also champions the former model on the 
grounds that our early childhood development attests to the experience of care before 
equality. Having said this, and despite his inclination towards Derrida’s position here on the 
productive tension between care and equality, Honneth ends up asserting an incompatibility 
and opposition between the two rather than a supplementarity, and remains firmly in the 
                                                
14 See Derrida (2005).  
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Habermasian camp.15 He also then abandons his exploration of Derrida’s work, and that of 
other post-structuralists, without sufficient explanation. 
 
Following the explorations of Foucault and Adorno - whose deficiencies he argues provide an 
immanent justification for his championing of the work of Habermas - and his brief flirtation 
with post-structuralism more generally, Honneth turns his attentions to the early Hegel to 
work through a notion of ‘morally motivated struggle’. I will outline the work of Foucault in 
more depth in the following chapter, along with the links between his work and the project of 
Critical Theory. I will explore the later ‘aesthetic’ turn in his work, which is neglected by 
Honneth, to see what implications this might have in relation to Honneth’s criticisms above, 
and in relation to the communicative turn in Critical Theory as a whole. Adorno also returns 
in the final chapter and significantly informs my arguments in relation to both Foucault and 
the communicative turn. Now I turn to the book, and argument, which is in many ways at the 
heart of Honneth’s critical-theoretical project. 
 
Struggle for Recognition 
What is at stake in the Critical Theory offered by Habermas, amongst other things according 
to Honneth, is the absence of a pre-theoretical connection to moral experiences of injustice. 
Habermas’s theory still meets Horkheimer’s methodological criteria by replacing social 
labour with communicative understanding, but he has no replacement for the moral 
experiences of injustice faced by the proletariat. It was these practical experiences that 
provided the everyday social reality and pre-theoretical resource for Horkheimer’s normative 
standpoint, experiences that could be articulated in a more systematic manner in the form of a 
                                                
15 For criticisms of this conclusion see Critchley (1999, pp. 267-80) and Sinnerbrink (in Petherbridge, 2011, pp. 
201-2). 
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‘critical’ theory. Honneth follows Habermas in rejecting the idea that the possibility of 
emancipation is attributable to ‘a group of people who have nothing but socio-economic 
circumstances in common’, but he follows Horkheimer in seeking to identify the moral 
experiences of social actors that would indicate the justifiability of a ‘critical’ normative 
standpoint. The key criticism here is that the process of emancipation that grounds 
Habermas’s ‘critical’ standpoint is not necessarily apparent in the moral experiences of the 
social subjects involved; it does not give voice to experiences of social injustice that already 
exist. The ‘communicative rationalisation of the lifeworld’, whereby the linguistic rules of 
understanding are developed, and become apparent, occurs ‘behind the backs of the subjects 
involved; its course is neither directed by human intentions nor can it be grasped within the 
consciousness of a single individual’ (Honneth, 2007, p. 70).  
 
Honneth points to his specific resolution of this problem by seeking to broaden what is at 
stake in our processes of social interaction. He is still working with a Habermasian notion of 
the normative presuppositions of communicative action but seeks to make them more 
substantial than Habermas’s linguistic account; he does this by making these presuppositions 
into explicitly social prerequisites for successful self-relations. Rather than isolating the 
linguistic rules implicit in communicative action, Honneth wants to emphasise how human 
subjects can only be said to have moral experiences, and to respond to a sense of injustice, 
when a broader sense of self is under threat. This broader sense of self is expressed in the 
following: 
 
‘(Subjects) experience an impairment of what we can call their moral experiences, 
i.e., their “moral point of view”, not as a restriction of intuitively mastered rules of 
language, but as a violation of identity claims acquired in socialisation’ (2007, p. 
70) 
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In other words, to prevent Habermas’s ‘idealising presuppositions’ concerning rules of 
language from forming a moral law without connection to the moral self-understanding of 
social agents, and thereby reproducing the problem of motivation for which Hegel criticises 
Kant, Honneth suggests that the normative potential of social interaction lies with the moral 
experiences of disrespect at work in everyday communication and emerges from the lack of 
recognition given to one’s (implicit) identity claims. Evidence for such experiences is sought 
in historical and sociological studies, such as those of Barrington Moore or E. P. Thompson, 
which are concerned with the everyday social resistance of the lower social classes. What 
Honneth sees here are examples of resistance that, rather than resulting from articulated moral 
principles, emerge out of implicit and intuitive notions of justice, unarticulated raw material as 
such that can be worked up into positive moral principles:  
 
‘The normative core of such notions of justice is always constituted by 
expectations of respect for one’s own dignity, honour or integrity. If we generalise 
these results beyond their particular research context, we arrive at the conclusion 
that the normative presupposition of all communicative action is to be seen in the 
acquisition of social recognition: subjects encounter each other within the 
parameters of the reciprocal expectation that they be given recognition as moral 
persons and for their social achievements’ (2007, p. 71).  
 
Honneth is therefore able to make a stronger link than Habermas between the normative 
presuppositions of social interaction and the moral feelings of those involved. By identifying 
the need for recognition as a core (anthropological) aspect of the development of our 
identities, Honneth argues that any threat to such recognition in the form of ‘social disrespect’ 
will lead to a threat to our very identity and will inevitably evoke feelings of ‘shame, anger or 
indignation’ (2007, p. 72). It is these feelings in the face of ‘structural forms of disrespect’ 
that provides Honneth with the ‘pre-theoretical resource’ for a coherent critical theory. 
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Honneth develops these ideas in more detail in arguably still his central work to date, Struggle 
for Recognition (1996). Here he turns to the notion of recognition in the Jena writings of the 
young Hegel, along with the work of George Herbert Mead, and seeks to identify the 
communicative presuppositions involved in successful identity-formation, with an emphasis 
on autonomy and self-realisation. Hegel’s Jena writings serve Honneth’s project well, as they 
did for Habermas’s distinction between communicative action and instrumental labour, due to 
their emphasis on the moral-developmental potential of conflict between social subjects for 
the collective ethical life of the community. Criticising the atomism at work in the Hobbesian 
notion of struggle and the natural law tradition, Hegel utilises the Classical doctrine of the 
state along with the politics of Aristotle and the notion of the polis to propose that 
intersubjective forms are always already part of human nature and at the heart of every 
process of human socialisation. Social struggle is understood to be driven by moral impulses 
rather than by motives of self-interest and preservation, and the life of the community is not to 
be conceived of in terms of a necessary limitation of individual liberty, but rather as opening 
up the possibility for the freedom of every individual. As Honneth argues: 
 
‘Hegel was convinced that a struggle among subjects for the mutual recognition of 
their identity generated inner societal pressure toward the practical, political 
establishment of institutions that would guarantee freedom. It is individuals’ claim 
to the intersubjective recognition of their identity that is built into social life from 
the very beginning as a moral tension, transcends the level of social progress 
institutionalised thus far, and so gradually leads – via the negative path of 
recurring stages of conflict – to a state of communicatively lived freedom’ (1996, 
p. 5). 
 
However, according to Honneth, this ‘original plan’ of Hegel’s is sacrificed in the 
development of his thought in favour of the ‘philosophy of consciousness’ apparent in the 
 
93 
Phenomenology of Spirit.16 Honneth suggests that what is lost in this later conception, with its 
emphasis on the ‘stages of the self-mediation of individual consciousness’, is the notion that 
communicative relations between subjects actually precedes individuals. The earlier 
conception proceeded from relationships of communication out of which individuals become 
differentiated, and led to the notion that through the struggle for recognition individuals 
become emancipated while also rationally understanding their intersubjective similarities - 
from a state of ‘natural ethical life’ to a state of ‘ethical totality’, or from ‘embryonic forms of 
community’ to ‘more encompassing relations of social interaction’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 15). 
The later conception however proceeds from the confrontation between individuals and their 
environment allowing ‘first, a consciousness of totality to emerge in the individual subject, 
which leads, second, to the stage of universalisation or decentralisation of ego-perspectives 
that accompanies the struggle for recognition’ (1996, p. 29). Honneth sets himself the task of 
completing the lost trajectory of Hegel’s early thought which he sees as consisting of ‘making 
the necessary distinctions between various degrees of personal autonomy within the 
framework of a theory of intersubjectivity’ (1996, p. 30).17 
 
Despite the relatively inconclusive nature of Hegel’s work in the Jena period, Honneth takes 
from Hegel’s System of Ethical Life a distinction between three forms of recognition and 
proceeds to outline their general structure: 
 
‘[I]n the affective relationship of recognition found in the family, human 
individuals are recognised as concrete creatures of need; in the cognitive-formal 
                                                
16 Here Honneth agrees with Habermas and Theunissen who argue that later Hegel sacrifices his earlier work on 
intersubjectivity in favour of absolute spirit or the rational state (see Habermas, 1992, and Theunissen in Cornell 
et al, 1991). It is also of note that Honneth’s account of recognition is markedly different from Hegel’s account 
of the master/slave dialectic in the Phenomenology whereby reciprocal recognition is born out of domination and 
fear of death. I will return to this briefly in Chapter 4. 
17 However, as already stated in the previous chapter, this Habermasian reading of Hegel has been contested by a 
number of recent Hegelian scholars such as Rose, Pippin, Pinkard, McDowell, and Redding. My reading in 
Chapter 4 also questions the interpretations put forward by Habermas and Honneth. 
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relationship of recognition found in law, they are recognised as abstract legal 
persons; and finally, in the emotionally enlightened relationship of recognition 
found in the state, they are recognised as concrete universals, that is, as subjects 
who are socialised in their particularity’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 25). 
 
For Hegel, the emergence from natural ethical life and the subsequent increase in the 
individuality of subjects occurs through two stages of mutual recognition. Firstly, there is the 
relationship between parents and children whereby subjects recognise each other as 
emotionally needy beings, and the aim of parenthood is to develop the secure independence of 
a child. Secondly, Hegel refers to the exchange relations between property owners, which 
initiates a process of legal universalisation whereby ‘particular conditions of validity’ are 
‘transformed into universal, contractually established legal claims’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 18). 
However, such negative freedom only formalises the elements of individuality that are 
recognised. Hegel’s use of the term ‘crime’ for the next stage of ethical life directly relates to 
this in that the subject who commits a destructive criminal act is seen as doing so in response 
to the merely negative form of their integration in collective life. Despite Hegel’s lack of a 
sufficient explanation for the motivation for such criminal acts, Honneth argues that the 
origins of such crime can be traced to conditions of incomplete recognition and the criminal’s 
individual experience of not being sufficiently recognised. Such struggles, even in the 
perverse form of crime, occur due to the need for honour, the need for a positive evaluation of 
ones traits and abilities; the reason this takes the form of an interpersonal struggle is because 
one is dependent upon the recognition of others for this positive relation to self.18 
 
                                                
18 It is worth briefly noting here the links to Habermas’s functionalism and also the curious absence of any 
sustained engagement by Honneth with the issue of censure, sanctions and punishment as recognition. 
System/social integration must also play upon an individual’s sense of self in the form of power as sanctions. My 
sense of self can be impaired through guilt concerning actions I have committed – in other words, it cannot 
always be assumed that a threat to the sense of self is negative. The right to recognition has its other side, the 
right to be the object of censure for moral failures, e.g. MPs and their expenses. 
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The transition from natural ethical life to absolute ethical life, and consequently from ‘person’ 
to ‘whole person’, only occurs through such acts of destruction, according to Honneth on 
Hegel. It is through the experiences of different crimes that subjects come to understand their 
particular identity more fully – the ‘person’ obtaining their identity through the recognition of 
their legal status turns into the ‘whole person’ who obtains recognition for their particularity. 
In addition, the attainment of greater autonomy is achieved through increased knowledge of 
mutual dependence that subjects come to gain through their collective experience of dealing 
with various crimes. In his account of Hegel’s ‘absolute ethical life’, Honneth emphasises the 
point that intersubjective relations extend beyond cognitive recognition and ‘provide the 
communicative basis upon which individuals, who have been isolated from each other by 
legal relations, can be reunited within the context of an ethical community’ (1996, p. 24). This 
Hegelian conception of the State would result in the ‘respect of each and every person for the 
biographical particularity of every other’ becoming ‘the habitual underpinnings of a society’s 
common mores’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 58). However, he argues that this is a stage left 
undeveloped by Hegel’s turn to a philosophy of consciousness. 
 
Another key problem Honneth identifies, in his attempt to appropriate Hegel’s notion of a 
struggle for recognition, is that of Hegel’s reliance on what he sees as certain ‘metaphysical 
premises’. Despite the initially ‘materialist’ sounding project – ‘to reconstruct the ethical 
formation of the human species as a process in which, via stages of conflict, a moral potential 
that is structurally inherent in communicative relations between subjects comes to be 
recognised’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 67) – Honneth argues that Hegel (unjustifiably) presupposes 
an underlying ‘objective movement of reason’ with recourse to either ‘(in Aristotelian terms) 
the social nature of human beings or (in terms of the philosophy of consciousness) the self-
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relation of Spirit’ (1996, p. 67). Given the criticisms of such idealist notions of reason in post-
Hegelian thought, and the need for an empirical grounding free from metaphysical 
assumptions, Honneth conceives his task as one which should account for Hegel’s ‘movement 
of recognition’ in terms of ‘an inner-worldly process occurring under contingent conditions of 
human socialisation’ (1996, p. 67). 
 
Honneth therefore sets himself three tasks in relation to Hegel’s theory. Firstly he attempts to 
rid Hegel’s thesis of what he sees as its speculative foundation by using empirical social 
psychology, in the form of G. H Mead, to ground the importance of intersubjective 
relationships – i.e. to demonstrate that the intersubjective process of identity development, 
whereby individuals only recognise themselves as ‘individuated selves’ through the 
confirmation of others, is an empirical event in the social world. Secondly, he seeks to 
develop an ‘empirically supported phenomenology’ that is able to concretise the different 
forms of mutual recognition that Hegel had ‘constructed purely conceptually to cover 
empirical reality’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 69). The forms of mutual recognition discernible in 
Hegel’s System of Ethical Life and Realphilosophie – what Honneth calls ‘love’, ‘law’ and 
‘ethical life’ – are to be read as relations whereby individuals recognise each other in 
increasingly individuated and autonomous ways. Finally, Honneth seeks to develop Hegel’s 
idea of a parallel development between the sequence of forms of recognition presupposed in 
successful ego-development (i.e. love, rights and solidarity) and the formation of societal 
structures that develop as a result of moral struggle. In summary, he argues that incomplete 
identity formation, due to the incomplete nature of societal structures of recognition, produces 
an experience of disrespect that informs individuals of the ‘absence of recognition’ and 
impels them to engage in intersubjective conflicts that result in the (institutionally-mediated) 
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social affirmation of new claims to mutual recognition and autonomy. Again, to avoid the 
metaphysical and teleological implications of this account, Honneth suggests that each 
hypothesis has to be tested separately: 
 
‘first, whether Hegel’s assumption that stages of recognition move in a certain 
direction can withstand empirical doubts; second, whether these forms of 
reciprocal recognition can be mapped onto corresponding experiences of social 
disrespect; and, finally, whether there is historical or sociological evidence for the 
claim that such forms of disrespect have actually served as a source of motivation 
for social confrontations’ (1996, p. 70).  
 
It is to the details of this project that I now turn. 
 
G. H. Mead (or ‘postmetaphysical’ Hegel) 
Honneth, in a manner similar to Habermas, turns to the social psychology of Mead for a 
‘postmetaphysical’ development of Hegel’s notion of the importance of intersubjective 
recognition for individual identity. Mead’s pragmatist-influenced work looks at those 
disturbances in practical action (and interaction) that provoke individuals into reflecting on 
their own subjectivity and producing creative resolutions to such disturbances. He argues that 
a subject’s consciousness of self is dependent upon the consciousness of the social meaning 
of its behaviour. Mead distinguishes between the ‘I’ and ‘Me’ to grasp this point. To put it 
rather simply, the ‘Me’ refers to the cognitive image of oneself as object, a reflection of how 
our partners to interaction perceive us, and demonstrates that our consciousness-of-self is only 
attainable through our relations with others. The ‘I’ on the other hand is meant to represent 
the creative source of spontaneous activity, which cannot be grasped cognitively, and 
precedes our consciousness of self in the ‘Me’ whilst responding to its behaviour. This 
relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ constitutes a dialogue within an individual’s 
personality. Honneth suggests that Mead extends this account of self-consciousness beyond a 
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mere ‘epistemic self-relation’ to ‘the issue of the subject’s moral and practical identity-
formation’ (1996, p. 76). To put it rather crudely, a child develops a sense of self by reflecting 
upon the moral values of a partner in interaction (e.g. parent), and this is achieved by 
incorporating the reactions of the interaction partner to one’s own actions. One changes one’s 
behaviour when reflecting on one’s actions according to a second-person perspective, and this 
perspective carries certain normative expectations. As the child develops, and engages with 
more partners in interaction, the reference point for her practical self-image becomes 
increasingly generalised. Famously, Mead suggests that the child moves from a position of 
‘play’, which involves communicating with the self by imitating a particular interaction 
partner (e.g. parent), towards the ‘game’ position whereby she integrates a more abstract and 
generalised position of social expectations – or ‘generalised other’ - into her own actions and 
self-image (Mead, 1967). 
 
In addition to using Mead’s ‘empirical’ justification for the necessity of the perception of the 
other in the development of self-consciousness, Honneth argues that his work also provides 
the means for a convincing explanation of the practical relations-to-self that parallel the forms 
of social recognition outlined by Hegel. Mead’s notion of the ‘generalised other’, and his 
further association of this with the idea of recognising oneself as a ‘legal person’, is clearly of 
use in Honneth’s theory of recognition. The ‘internalisation of the social norms of the 
community’, as Honneth suggests, allows for the realisation on the part of individuals of both 
their obligations in relation to others and the legitimate rights they can expect to be respected 
by the generalised other.19 Such rights are only attainable if one is fully considered a member 
                                                
19 The language of ‘internalised norms’ here is arguably Honneth’s own rather than that of Mead, who would 
more likely emphasise the ‘reflexive’ ability to perceive one’s actions from the perspective of the other rather 
than ‘internalisation’, reserving the latter term for dispositions and emotional responses such as anxiety and 
guilt. See Mead (1967). 
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of one’s community, and this provides the individual with ‘self-respect’ as it is through such 
social recognition that they are able to develop a positive relation-to-self. Mead suggests that 
the realisation that all other partners to interaction are obliged to respect one’s rights gives 
one the trait of morally responsible agency. He also argues that the level of self-respect one 
has is dependent upon the level of individualisation of the traits recognised; however as this 
trait of moral responsibility is potentially shared by all, the legal person is unable to relate 
positively to his own unique characteristics as a ‘biographically individuated subject’ 
(Honneth, 1996, p. 80). 
 
The ‘I’ is clearly important for Honneth here as it represents the resistance to any simple 
internalisation of the generalised other. The demands emerging from the ‘I’, as ‘the sudden 
experience of a surge of inner impulses’ or ‘creative reaction-potential’ (Honneth, 1996, pp. 
81-2), conflict with the intersubjectively recognised social norms and therefore places one’s 
‘Me’ in doubt. In simple terms, Honneth suggests that this conflict explains the moral 
development of the individual and society, as the ‘I’ seeks to expand the norms embodied by 
the ‘Me’ in order to gain increasing recognition for one’s individuality. A moral conflict 
ensues between the subject and its social environment, as the subject is dependent on the 
collective will for its sense of self. The individual attempts to resolve this moral conflict by 
recourse to idealisations, i.e. the demands of the ‘I’ require a counterfactual future community 
if they are to be satisfied, and the anticipations of expanded recognition relations involved 
increasingly turn into a system of normative demands that drive societal progress in the 
direction of expanded personal autonomy.  
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According to Honneth, Mead also expands the urges of the ‘I’ to the desire not only for 
personal autonomy but also for self-realisation. He argues that this separate class of ‘‘I’-
demands’ allows the self to ‘gain a consciousness of one’s individual uniqueness’ which in 
turn is dependent on social recognition (ibid, p. 86) – i.e. what is required is a ‘‘me’ of 
individual self-realisation’ where one is ‘able to understand oneself as a unique and 
irreplaceable person’ (ibid, p. 87). Beyond the formal equality of the legal recognition 
relation, a subject develops traits and abilities that they seek to understand as unique by 
having them valued as unique by their partners to interaction. Honneth, via Mead, further 
argues that one is only able to do this, and in the process to conceive of oneself as making a 
unique contribution to society, if everyone is able to generalise the values of all their 
interaction partners and form an abstract idea of the necessary collective goals of the entire 
community. Honneth argues that the concept of the generalised other necessary to fulfil this 
task would have presented Mead with a conception not dissimilar to Hegel’s ‘ethical life’: 
 
‘The ethical concept of the ‘generalised other’ that Mead would have arrived at, 
had he considered the idealizing anticipation of subjects who know themselves to 
be unrecognized, serves the same purpose as Hegel’s conception of ethical life. It 
identifies a relationship of mutual recognition in which every individual can know 
himself or herself to be confirmed as a person who is distinct from all others in 
virtue of his or her particular traits and abilities’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 88). 
 
Mead does not really pursue this idea though and for Honneth fails to sufficiently move 
beyond the form of recognition required for ‘the intersubjective establishment of rights’ 
towards one that deals with ‘the confirmation of individual particularity’ (p. 88). Instead he 
concludes with the less ambitious notion that self-realisation, along with the consciousness of 
individual particularity, is achieved through one’s identification with the positive contribution 
one makes within the societal division of labour. However, the prioritising of the ‘division of 
labour’, in an attempt to provide a more objective grounding for self-realisation than the 
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generalised other, ends up begging the question as to how one’s achievement in the current 
division of labour points beyond the current ethical goals of the community. The collective 
conception of the good life not only determines what constitutes a job well done but also what 
counts as socially useful work in the first place (Honneth, 1996, p. 90).20 
 
The comparative stage to Mead’s ‘division of labour’, and which Honneth finds more 
convincing, is Hegel’s notion of ‘solidarity’. In his earlier work, Hegel sought to combine the 
element of emotional concern from the previous stage of ‘love’ and the cognitive element of 
universal equality from the stage of ‘law’ to conceive of ethical life as universal solidarity 
between all members of the community. It is this idea that Honneth pursues further. 
 
Love, Rights & Solidarity 
Having sought to rid Hegel’s speculative thesis of metaphysical presuppositions by using the 
empirical social psychology of Mead to provide a more ‘materialist’ formulation for the 
importance of intersubjective relationships, Honneth now seeks to differentiate more clearly 
between the various forms of mutual recognition. He wants to justify the three-fold division 
of forms of recognition found in Hegel and Mead by recourse to empirical research from 
individual sciences, and also seeks to identify those forms of disrespect, passed over by Hegel 
and Mead, that mark the negative elements of recognition relations. These forms of disrespect 
would not only allow subjects to perceive their lack of recognition, but would also provide the 
motivation for them to engage in struggles for recognition. What Honneth wants to do in 
                                                
20 Honneth has since abandoned Mead due to him not providing a sufficient normative dimension for recognitive 
relations – e.g. he ‘reduces recognition to the act of reciprocal perspective-taking, without the character of the 
other’s action being of any crucial significance’ (2002, p. 502). However, despite his criticisms of Mead for 
reducing self-realisation and the recognition of individual particularity to the role one assumes within the 
societal division of labour, Honneth has since concluded that ‘individual contributions in economic exchange’ 
rather than ‘individual particularities’ is the only way to conceive of solidarity in ethically pluralist societies (in 
Petherbridge, 2011, p. 407; also see Fraser and Honneth, 2003). 
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distinguishing between the three forms of recognition – love, rights and solidarity – and in 
testing them in relation to empirical studies, is demonstrate that they ‘form independent types 
with regard to (a) the medium of recognition, (b) the form of the relation-to-self made 
possible, and (c) the potential for moral development’ (1996, p. 95).  
 
Hegel identified love as the first stage of mutual recognition whereby subjects respond to each 
other’s needs and recognise each other as needy beings. Subjects come to recognise their 
dependence upon each other and that their recognition must take the form of affective 
approval and esteem. In an attempt to empirically support Hegel’s assertion that love be 
understood as ‘being oneself in another’, Honneth turns to psychoanalytic object-relations 
theory which he sees as dealing particularly well with the mutual balance between 
independence and attachment necessary in those primary relationships of reciprocal 
recognition. Object-relations theory, particularly the work of Donald Winnicott and Jessica 
Benjamin’s later work, emphasises the psychological importance of early interactive 
experiences, in addition to libidinal drives, and argues that the success of such early 
affectional bonds depends upon the capacity of the child and ‘mother’ to successfully balance 
self-assertion and symbiosis.21 The negotiation between forms of boundary-dissolution and 
boundary-establishment in later relationships develops out of this originary experience of 
symbiosis and can take the form of unforced moments in friendship or sexual union in erotic 
                                                
21 For some feminist critiques of Honneth’s notion of love, and his characterisation of the mother-infant 
relationship, see Allen’s ‘Recognising Domination: Recognition and Power in Honneth’s Critical Theory’ in 
Haugaard and Clegg (eds.) (2012), Young’s ‘Recognition of Love’s Labour: Considering Axel Honneth’s 
Feminism’ in Van Den Brink and Owen (eds.) (2007), Meehan’s ‘Recognition and the Dynamics of 
Intersubjectivity’ in Petherbridge (ed) (2011), and Butler in Honneth (2008, p. 107). At the heart of their 
criticisms is Honneth’s neglect of the unequal power relationships already at work in such ‘primary’ 
relationships. Meehan also questions Honneth’s tendency to describe the initial mother-child relationship as one 
of symbiosis rather than acknowledging research that emphasises distinctive selves within the first few days. 
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relationships.22 These intimate forms of recognition provide ‘a type of relation-to-self in 
which subjects mutually acquire basic confidence in themselves’ and they are ‘both 
conceptually and genetically prior to every other form of reciprocal recognition’ (Honneth, 
1996, p. 107).23 For Hegel too, according to Honneth, the communicative structure of love is 
at the heart of ethical life as it is love that provides the required degree of self-confidence for 
the autonomous participation in public life. 
 
The recognition relation at work in the sphere of law is based on the notion that we can only 
understand ourselves as legal persons, with assurances that our claims will be satisfied, once 
we have assumed the position of the ‘generalised other’ and recognised others as bearers of 
rights. Here Honneth identifies a key difference between the accounts of legal recognition in 
Mead and Hegel. He takes this difference to be representative of the transition from 
traditional legal relations, whereby the recognition of an individual as a legal person is tied to 
the social esteem accorded to their social status (Mead), to modern legal relations, whereby 
rights are detached from social roles and given to all human beings as free individuals 
(Hegel). Traditional legal recognition is hierarchical, whereas modern legal relations, in 
                                                
22 Although Honneth does acknowledge the ways in which this initial formative relationship sets the stage for 
future love relations, and involves the lifelong task of mediating between independence and attachment, he tends 
to provide a Habermasian idealised form of resolution by assuming that this is something that is a ‘crisis’ in 
infant development and is then successfully resolved, rather than something associated with dispositions laid 
down in this period and continuing as forms of ambivalence within the self. See the work of Melanie Klein 
(1975) and Isaac Balbus (2005), who emphasise the ways in which the impulse towards reparation also has to 
have its correlate in resistance to reparation – i.e. self-assertion. Judith Butler makes a similar point (in Honneth, 
2008, p. 106) as does Jonathan Lear (in Honneth, 2008, p. 133). 
23 Honneth emphasises the connections between Winnicott’s psychoanalysis and Mead’s social psychology in 
Honneth (1999). The importance of psychoanalysis and Winnicott, without Mead, is pursued in his later work: 
see Honneth (2001a) and Honneth (2002), and also Honneth’s ‘The Work of Negativity: A Psychoanalytical 
Revision of the Theory of Recognition’ in Deranty et al (eds.) (2007) and republished in Honneth (2012), and his 
‘Appropriating Freedom: Freud’s Conception of Individual Self-Relation’ in Honneth (2009). Honneth has 
increasingly emphasised psychoanalytical notions such as ‘symbiosis’ and ‘transitional object’ to help him 
explain the emotional dimensions of recognition (‘affective recognition’). In many ways his earlier conception of 
struggles for recognition being fuelled by moral experiences of injustice appears to have been replaced by an 
account whereby ‘established forms of recognition can be traced to a deep-seated need to deny the independence 
of those with whom one interacts and to have them ‘omnipotently’ at one’s disposal’ (2002, p. 504). In other 
words, our struggles for recognition are fuelled by a desire to re-enact that primary experience of fusion with the 
‘mother’ (or main caregiver). See also Honneth’s ‘Rejoinder’ in Honneth (2008, p. 394). 
 
104 
principle, are equal and universal. For Honneth, this process marks the historical juncture at 
which two aspects of respect are clearly discernible due to the uncoupling of legal recognition 
from social esteem. The principle of rational agreement concerning societal norms, inherited 
from political theory and philosophy, affects the established sphere of law such that the legal 
system is now expected to act in the interests of all members of society without exception or 
privilege. On the premise that subjects will accept legal norms if they have been able to freely 
agree to them on an equal basis, a recognition relation is established whereby legal subjects 
‘recognise each other as persons capable of autonomously making reasonable decisions about 
moral norms’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 110).  
 
Honneth outlines a historical development of personhood, seen in terms of an increase in 
individual rights-claims, whereby the definition of a morally responsible person is expanded 
due to certain struggles for recognition which highlight the increasing number of prerequisites 
which have to be taken into consideration for participation in rational will-formation. For 
Honneth, this process is due to the way in which the ‘institutionalisation of bourgeois 
liberties’ set in motion a moral guiding principle that throughout history has been redeemed 
by disadvantaged groups who have demonstrated that their conditions are not adequate for 
full and equal participation in the rational will-formation of the current political community. 
The demand for equality, so that all citizens have the right of the equal representation of their 
political interests, develops through social struggles to the point where even economic 
inequalities are affected: 
 
‘Thus, during the last few centuries, the enrichment of the legal status of the 
individual citizen was accompanied by the successive expansion of the core 
constellation of capacities that constitutively characterise a human being as a 
person. In particular, the characteristics that put a subject in a position to act 
autonomously based on rational insight have since come to include a minimum of 
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cultural education and economic security. In this sense, then, to recognise one 
another as legal persons means more today than it possibly could have at the start 
of the evolution of modern law. In being legally recognised, one is now respected 
with regard not only to the abstract capacity to orient oneself vis-à-vis moral 
norms, but also to the concrete human feature that one deserves the social 
standard of living necessary for this’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 117).24 
 
Utilising the work of T. H. Marshall and his historical distinction between civil, political and 
social rights, Honneth identifies two developmental paths that mark the continuation of the 
struggle for recognition in the legal sphere. The principle of equality in modern law leads not 
only to a broadening of the content of the status of a legal person, in terms of differences in 
individual opportunities for taking advantage of socially guaranteed freedoms, but also to the 
expansion of such status to an increasing number of previously excluded people. The conflicts 
that arise in the legal sphere therefore are responses to a lack of recognition, or being treated 
with disrespect, and aim to expand both the ‘substantive content and social scope of the status 
of a legal person’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 118). For Honneth, self-respect is to the legal sphere 
what self-confidence is to the sphere of love. The granting of rights allows one to relate to 
oneself as a morally responsible person, and respect oneself as one who deserves the respect 
of all others. He suggests that it is only with the onset of universal human rights that there is 
an objective point of reference for an individual to see himself or herself as being recognised 
for the capacity to make morally responsible autonomous judgements.  
 
                                                
24 Honneth is right to highlight the importance of economic security here, but he tends to neglect the link to the 
issue of autonomy. He also avoids certain difficult issues relating to capitalism here, unlike say Hegel or Marx 
and Adorno, by attributing the positive aspects of autonomy to law rather than to the market or property; Hegel’s 
definition of the modern subject is, after all, the ‘subject capable of property’ (see part 3, section 2 on ‘Civil 
Society’ in Hegel, G. W. F. (1967) Philosophy of Right). For an emphasis on the recognitive dimensions of the 
market, see Winfield, R. D. (1988) Just Economy. Honneth does however tackle market-related issues in his 
more recent work, particularly in relation to a critique of neo-liberalism: see Fraser & Honneth (2003), also 
Honneth (2004) and Hartmann & Honneth (2006) which are both republished in Honneth (2012). He also agrees 
with Hegel that civil society is insufficient in itself to build adequate relationships of social solidarity as it is 
premised upon satisfying individual needs and desires and therefore cannot unite the particular and the universal 
(see Hegel, 1967, para 184; also Honneth, 2001b). 
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The problem of providing empirical support for the phenomenon of self-respect is that it only 
appears once people suffer from a lack of it. Honneth therefore appeals to those examples 
whereby groups who have been denied certain rights linguistically express their experiences 
of the denial of recognition and its effect on individual self-respect. Here he uses the example 
of the civil rights movement in the US whereby ‘in the relevant publications one regularly 
finds talk of how the endurance of legal under-privileging necessarily leads to a crippling 
feeling of social shame, from which one can be liberated only through active protest and 
resistance’ (1996, p. 121).25 
 
Having outlined the spheres of love and law, Honneth now turns to the importance of the 
recognition relation he terms ‘solidarity’ – the relation, discernible in Hegel’s concept of 
‘ethical life’ and Mead’s emphasis upon the division of labour, that recognises an individual’s 
particular traits and abilities. Honneth stresses how this recognition relation presupposes an 
‘intersubjectively shared value-horizon’ in that subjects can ‘mutually esteem each other only 
on the condition that they share an orientation to those values and goals that indicate to each 
other the significance or contribution of their qualities for the life of the other’ (1996, p. 121). 
The social medium that is required to fulfil the task of expressing individual differences in a 
universal and intersubjective manner, rather than the universal characteristics of human 
subjects found in modern law, Honneth terms the ‘cultural self-understanding of a society’. 
This cultural self-understanding is therefore the measure used for the social esteem of 
individuals due to the fact that their particular traits and abilities are judged according to how 
they contribute to the culturally defined goals of a society. Thus: 
                                                
25 Although Honneth does discuss the ways in which individual experiences of disrespect can motivate people to 
connect with those who have been similarly disrespected and develop forms of social resistance, he doesn’t 
sufficiently explore the details of this and the ways in which the self can be understood as an expression of a 
group identity. 
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‘The more conceptions of ethical goals are open to different values and the more 
their hierarchical arrangement gives way to horizontal competition, the more 
clearly social esteem will be able to take on an individualising character and 
generate symmetrical relationships’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 122). 
 
This recognition relation also undergoes a historical transformation marked by the transition 
from pre-modern notions of ‘honour’ to modern categories of ‘social standing’ or ‘prestige’ 
according to Honneth. In pre-modern societies, or ‘corporatively organised societies’, ethical 
goals and their corresponding areas of responsibility are organised hierarchically according to 
their contribution to the achievement of certain societal values, and individuals attain 
‘honour’ by participating in behaviour which is collectively expected of their social status. A 
person does not act as a ‘biographically individuated subject’ but rather acts in line with the 
expected behaviour of their status group. The social ‘worth’ of the individual is dependent 
upon the social worth of their status group, which is, in turn, dependent upon the socially 
determined criteria of their collective contribution to societal goals. This process results in the 
symmetrical relationships within a status group, who are able to esteem each other according 
to the traits and abilities that they share due to their common social standing. Also, there are 
asymmetrical relationships between status groups, as societal members are able to esteem 
subjects outside of their own status groups for their traits and abilities according to their 
contribution to collectively shared values.  
 
The decline of traditional ethical life, according to Honneth’s somewhat simplistic model 
here, occurred due to the increasing influence of the ‘cultural innovations’ of ‘post-
conventional ideas of philosophy and political theory’. Not only were legal relations 
transformed in the light of such historical changes but so were the ethical goals of society as 
well. Honneth sees this change as being due to a transformation in the cultural self-
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understanding of a society, from one largely still dependent on religious and metaphysical 
presuppositions to one that recognised ‘ethical obligations’ as inner-worldly decisions’ (1996, 
p. 124). The loss of this transcendental basis removed both the ‘objective’ character of a 
value-system that tied expectations of conduct to the measure of social honour, and the ability 
for such a value-system to determine a fixed hierarchy of social prestige. Honneth sees this 
historically in terms of the bourgeoisie’s confrontation with the nobility over notions of 
honour and conduct in accordance with one’s ‘estate’; a confrontation that not only 
established new value-principles but also questioned the very status of such value-principles. 
For Honneth, this historical juncture marks the point at which social esteem is accorded to 
individuals as individuated beings rather than as a member of a particular social group. The 
differences in relation to others, that allow one to feel ‘valuable’, are no longer defined 
collectivistically but rather individualistically, and according to the traits that individuals 
develop along with evaluation of these traits in terms of the realisation of societal goals.26 
 
‘The individualisation of achievement is inevitably accompanied by the opening 
of societal value-ideas for differing forms of personal self-realisation. From this 
point on, it is a form of value pluralism – albeit one defined in class-specific and 
gender-specific terms – that constitutes the cultural framework of orientation 
within which individuals’ level of accomplishment and thus their social worth are 
defined. It is in this context that the concept of social honour gradually becomes 
watered down into a concept of social prestige’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 125). 
 
For abstract ideas of self-realisation to be applied in the sphere of recognition, under 
conditions with very little in the way of a universal value system for judging the social worth 
of particular traits and abilities, Honneth argues that ‘they must always be made concrete 
through supplemental cultural interpretations’ (1996, p. 126). If this is the case, then the social 
worth accorded such ideas comes to depend upon the ruling interpretations of societal goals, 
                                                
26 Again, Honneth fails to explore the role of the market and property here. In fact, he only mentions the 
importance of the market for Hegel very briefly in a few places (see 1996, pp. 11, 13 and 61). 
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which in turn depends upon the dominance of particular social groups in having their forms of 
life publicly recognised as valuable. It is in this sense that Honneth considers relations of 
social esteem to be subject to cultural struggle. The control of symbolic force and the current 
state of public attention are central factors in a group being able to stabilise the struggle and 
gain social worth through the assertion of the significance of their neglected traits and 
abilities.  
 
Whereas the practical-relation-to-self experienced through status groups in corporatively 
organised societies can be considered in terms of collective honour, the practical-relation-to-
self experienced after the individualisation of this form of recognition is seen by Honneth as 
‘self-esteem’. An individual’s socially recognised achievements are no longer attributed to a 
collective and the individual refers them positively back to themselves. ‘Self-esteem’ now 
becomes a parallel concept with ‘self-confidence’ and ‘self-respect’ for Honneth, and he 
looks forward to the ‘social relations of symmetrical esteem between individualised (and 
autonomous subjects)’ which would lead to a ‘state of societal solidarity’ whereby all 
members of society are able to esteem themselves (1996, p. 129). Honneth points out that 
solidarity would mean relationships of shared concern for each other’s particular abilities and 
traits, rather than a negative relation of tolerance, and this would be necessary for the 
achievement of shared goals. The ‘symmetricality’ of esteem can not be identified in 
quantitative terms but rather refers to a state where ‘every subject is free from being 
collectively denigrated, so that one is given the chance to experience oneself to be recognised, 
in light of one’s own accomplishments and abilities, as valuable for society’ (1996, p. 130).27  
                                                
27 However, of course, this returns us to the question of how to conceive of a post-traditional ethical life, i.e. one 
that accepts the loss of a substantive cultural consensus under conditions of social modernity and 
individualisation. Once a broadly cohesive consensus over social ideals is lost, and recognition relations are 
increasingly individualised and abstract rather than based on honour and esteem between hierarchically 
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Disrespect and Resistance 
The tripartite distinction between forms of recognition, evident in Hegel’s more speculative 
account and Mead’s more empirically-oriented account, is able to disclose ‘the moral 
infrastructure of interactions’ according to Honneth (1996, p. 143). These forms of 
recognition can also be mapped onto the ways in which individuals relate positively to 
themselves and therefore can be seen to represent types of ‘practical relations-to-self’. Once 
these relationships have been set up, Honneth argues that there are also discernible forms of 
social disrespect that match up to the practical relations-to-self. In other words, love, rights 
and solidarity (as forms of recognition) map onto self-confidence, self-respect, and self-
esteem (as practical relations-to-self), and these practical relations-to-self are under threat by 
what he calls ‘the violation of the body’, ‘the denial of rights’, and ‘the denigration of ways of 
life’ (as forms of social respect). The diagram that Honneth includes in his book (p. 129) 
summarising the structure of relations of recognition is included below:28 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
positioned groups, then how are we to understand the recognition of individuals in their difference and 
specificity? And how are we to conceive of the cultural consensus which might recognise the individual 
contributions towards shared societal goals? Honneth (in Petherbridge, ed., 2011, p. 406-7) has since criticised 
his conception of esteem here suggesting that he ‘made the mistake of confounding this kind of social esteem 
based on individual achievement with the recognition of the differend between individual life aims’ giving the 
false impression of the possibility of a normative consensus in times of ethical pluralism; he opts instead for the 
possibility of agreement on ‘constitutional principles’ rather than ‘ethical values’. I will return to these issues at 
the end of the chapter. 
28 It is worth noting at this point that the diagram is what we might call a ‘Habermasian diagram’ which invokes 
the ideal (speech) situation, i.e. a presupposition without an account of what distorts the ideal. My criticisms 
towards the end of this chapter make this more explicit. 
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Mode of  
recognition 
emotional 
support 
cognitive respect social esteem 
Dimension of 
personality 
needs and 
emotions 
moral 
responsibility 
traits and 
abilities 
Forms of  
recognition 
primary  
relationships 
(love, friendship) 
legal relations 
(rights) 
community of 
value 
(solidarity) 
Developmental 
potential 
------- 
generalisation, 
de-formalisation 
individualisation, 
equalisation 
Practical  
relation-to-self 
basic 
self-confidence 
self-respect self-esteem 
Forms of  
disrespect 
abuse and rape 
denial of rights, 
exclusion 
denigration, 
insult 
Threatened 
component  
of personality 
physical 
integrity 
social integrity 
‘honour’, 
dignity 
 
As we have already seen, Honneth refers to the use of ordinary language to ‘empirically’ 
support his assertions about people’s experiences of ‘disrespect’. Terms such as ‘disrespect’ 
and ‘insult’ are meaningless without reference to claims to recognition made on other human 
beings, and such words appear in the self-descriptions of those who consider themselves to 
have been wrongly treated by others. These terms refer not only to direct forms of harm or 
restrictions on freedom, but also to the damage done to the positive understanding of self 
acquired by subjects intersubjectively. If one is dependent on recognition from others for 
 
112 
one’s normative self-image, then disrespect harbours the possibility of destroying one’s 
personal identity.29 In light of this, Honneth wants to determine how ‘the experience of 
disrespect is anchored in the affective life of human subjects in such a way that it can provide 
the motivational impetus for social resistance and conflict, indeed, for a struggle for 
recognition’ (1996, p. 132).  
 
He outlines how physical injury, especially in the form of torture or rape, deprives a subject of 
the ability to dispose over his or her own body. This most fundamental form of disrespect not 
only causes physical pain to its victim, but also affects their practical-relation-to-self by 
damaging the basic self-confidence, acquired through love, in autonomously controlling one’s 
own body. Along with social shame, the experience of being at the mercy of another subject 
damages one’s trust in oneself and the world; this in turn affects further interaction with other 
subjects. Honneth sees this basic self-confidence, acquired through the intersubjective 
achievement of balance between symbiosis and independence, as historically and culturally 
invariant and therefore he also applies this to the negative experience of disrespect. The 
second form of disrespect Honneth identifies, aligning itself with the sphere of ‘law’, is 
concerned with experiences of exclusion and the denial of rights which affect an individual’s 
moral self-respect. Being denied rights not only limits an individual’s autonomy, but also 
takes away their ability to experience themselves, according to intersubjective expectations, 
as a morally responsible partner-to-interaction. As the content of what counts as a morally 
responsible legal person changes historically with developments in legal relations, so the 
                                                
29 Van Den Brink (in Petherbridge, 2011, pp. 168-169) questions Honneth’s conception of personal identity and 
disrespect here. He argues that Honneth tends to ‘understand experiences of disrespect as in principle avoidable 
threats to sound conditions of achieving an integrated personal identity’ rather than ‘as often unavoidable and 
irreparable occurrences in the social world that a sufficiently firm identity enables persons to deal with’. He also 
suggests that this tends to contradict Honneth’s earlier account of the ways in which ‘minor subjective 
experiences of misrecognition gradually ‘teach’ children to deal adequately with more grave and, in a way, more 
‘real’ experiences of disrespect’ (p. 170). Van Den Brink argues that ‘the lack of full recognition seems to me a 
condition rather than a hindrance for a flourishing personal identity in a pluralistic environment’ (p. 172). 
 
113 
accompanying form of disrespect also changes according to Honneth. In this sense, the denial 
of rights develops in terms of content and scope as well as in terms of universalisation. The 
third and final form of disrespect that Honneth outlines is concerned with ‘the denigration of 
individual and collective ways of life’. If an individual’s status is dependent upon the 
collective esteem accorded to their approach to self-realisation within society’s cultural value 
system, then a cultural system that denigrates certain individual forms of life prevents the 
subject from socially valuing their own particular traits and abilities. This in turn creates a 
loss of personal self-esteem for the individual. Also, as the individualisation of this 
experience of cultural denigration developed historically, so does this third form of 
disrespect.30  
 
Honneth likens the effects of these forms of disrespect upon one’s identity to the effects of 
diseases and infections upon one’s body. He supports this assertion by arguing that our 
linguistic responses to such forms of disrespect are steeped in metaphors relating to the 
human body. He refers to particular studies that report the language of victims of torture and 
rape in terms of ‘psychological death’, the exclusion and denial of rights through slavery in 
terms of ‘social death’, and the experience of the cultural denigration of forms of life in terms 
of ‘scars’ or ‘injuries’. From these parallels drawn with physical illness, Honneth suggests 
that two conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, we should be able to identify ‘symptoms’ of social 
disrespect that make subjects aware of the state they are in such as the ‘negative emotional 
reactions expressed in feelings of social shame’ (1996, p. 135). Secondly, by obtaining an 
overview of the different forms of disrespect, a positive sense of what constitutes 
‘psychological health’ can be identified along with the ‘social guarantees associated with 
                                                
30 Honneth elaborates on this point in his ‘Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation: John Dewey and the Theory of 
Democracy Today’ in Honneth (2007). 
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those relations of recognition that are able to protect subjects most extensively from suffering 
disrespect’ (1996, p. 135). 31 Honneth seeks to fill the motivational deficit found in Hegel and 
Mead by emphasising the importance of negative emotional reactions to disrespect, and how 
this links with conflict and struggle. These negative emotional reactions, such as shame and 
rage, are seen as psychological symptoms of the lack of the sufficient intersubjective 
recognition of one’s traits and abilities necessary for a successful relation-to-self. Utilising 
Dewey’s idea that emotions are a response to frustrated actions, Honneth argues that the 
failure to meet one’s expectations in normative action leads to moral conflicts, and also that 
negative emotional reactions are therefore seen as a response to the violation of normative 
expectations32. Under conditions of disrespect, he argues that such an emotional experience 
can provide the motivation to enter into a struggle for recognition, as this kind of action is 
able to relieve the emotional tension. This struggle can then turn into political resistance once 
the subject is aware of the cognitive content of the emotional response, i.e. moral knowledge. 
Honneth argues that the likelihood of the moral knowledge, implicit in experiences of 
disrespect, becoming political resistance is dependent on the subject’s cultural-political 
context: ‘only if the means of articulation of a social movement are available can the 
experience of disrespect become a source of motivation for acts of political resistance’ (1996, 
p. 139).  
                                                
31 We might want to draw a third conclusion here – that the language used by Honneth marks a pervasive 
‘medicalisation’ of critical theory. For a discussion of some of the dangers of this see Gane (2002). For 
Honneth’s discussion of the issue see his ‘Pathologies of the Social’ in Honneth (2007). See Zurn in 
Petherbridge (ed.) (2011) for a discussion of Honneth’s work with the notion of pathology at its centre, and for a 
discussion of critical theory in terms of symptom, epidemiology, etiology and prognosis/therapy. Needless to 
say, as we will see in the next chapter, Foucault would want to question the normalising and subjectivising role 
of such medicalised discourse. 
32 Honneth does briefly discuss the positive role of shame (1996, pp. 137-8) – i.e. the feeling of guilt and 
inferiority when we violate a moral norm – but neglects the issue of reintegration and the role of sanctions. His 
position tends to be rather one-sided here, and he bypasses the important role of frustration in the experience of 
the I, i.e. my frustrations at not getting my way are not necessarily to be interpreted as a failure to realise a 
normative expectation. See Melanie Klein (e.g. ‘The Psychological Foundations of Child Analysis’ in The 
Psychoanalysis of Children (1984)) and Donald Winnicott (e.g. ‘Transitional Objects and Transitional 
Phenomena’ in Playing and Reality (1971)). Judith Butler makes a similar point in relation to Honneth’s failure 
to sufficiently integrate aggression into his account (in Honneth, 2008, pp. 103-4). 
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Once Honneth has made the case for the distinction and relationship between patterns of 
recognition, practical relations-to-self, and forms of social disrespect, he develops the thesis 
that a ‘struggle for recognition’ exists as ‘the moral force within lived social reality that is 
responsible for development and progress’ (1996, p. 143). To back up this claim, and 
demonstrate that affective experiences of disrespect provide knowledge for social resistance 
and collective struggle, Honneth explores the (flawed) ‘traces of a tradition’ in the social 
philosophy of Marx, Sorel and Sartre, as well as some historical research on political 
movements which exposes the normative, rather than utilitarian, motives for resistance, e.g. 
the work of E. P. Thompson and Barrington Moore. With the aim of supporting his thesis so 
far, Honneth looks to parallel attempts in post-Hegelian philosophy that place struggles for 
recognition at the centre of their theorising. Marx is obviously a key figure, alongside Sartre 
and Sorel, however he is charged with reducing the demands for recognition solely to the 
sphere of self-realisation through labour. Despite this, Honneth sees in his early work a 
‘philosophical anthropology’ steeped with normative demands that allows production to be 
viewed in terms of intersubjective recognition. Honneth sees this in Marx’s assertion of the 
‘double affirmation’ apparent through labour (conceived of as artistic or craft activity) 
whereby the objectification of one’s abilities allows one to experience oneself as both a 
person with particular capabilities and someone able to provide for the needs of others (as 
potential consumers). Capitalism therefore represents a social system that destroys 
intersubjective recognition mediated by labour, due to the ruling class’s control of the means 
of production. Without control of their own activity, workers lose ‘a social precondition for 
their being able to recognise each other as co-operative partners within a context of 
community life’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 147). A tension in Marx, between recognitive and 
utilitarian tendencies, is apparent for Honneth in the differences between his ‘expressivist’ 
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historical and political writings (e.g. ‘Civil war in France’ and ‘Eighteenth Brumaire’) and his 
more technical analysis of capital. 
 
In those ‘traces of a tradition’ that do deal with struggle and conflict, Honneth sees an overall 
lack of serious consideration of the moral experiences of disrespect in favour of conceptions 
concerned with the competition over material interests. This applies to Sartre and Sorel as 
well as Marx.33 Those social theories that do take seriously the moral elements of social 
integration, such as those of Durkheim and Tönnies, Honneth sees as neglecting the 
importance of confrontation and conflict. Although the ‘Chicago School’ again breaks this 
mould in some senses by considering the struggle for recognition as central to social conflicts, 
they also end up neglecting the ‘moral logic of social struggles’ that Honneth seeks to outline. 
As he argues: 
 
‘Thus, within academic sociology, the internal connection that often holds 
between the emergence of social movements and the moral experience of 
disrespect has, to a large extent, been theoretically severed at the start. The 
motives for rebellion, protest, and resistance have generally been transformed into 
categories of ‘interest’, and these interests are supposed to emerge from the 
objective inequalities in the distribution of material opportunities without ever 
being linked, in any way, to the everyday web of moral feelings. Relative to the 
predominance that the Hobbesian conceptual model acquired within modern 
social theory, the incomplete, even misguided, proposals of Marx, Sorel, and 
Sartre have remained mere fragments of an invisible, undeveloped theoretical 
tradition. Today, anyone who tries to reconnect with this disrupted effective 
history of Hegel’s counter-model, in order to acquire the foundations for a 
normatively substantive social theory, will have to rely primarily on a concept of 
social struggle that takes as its starting-point moral feelings of indignation, rather 
than pre-given interests’ (1996, p. 161). 
 
                                                
33 Honneth focuses on Sorel’s Reflections on Violence (1950) and on his ‘The Ethics of Socialism’ essay (in 
Stanley, ed., 1976); he singles out Sartre’s political writings (e.g. his Anti-Semite and Jew (1965) and his 
introduction to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth (1963)). Sorel is charged with having ‘never managed to 
separate the moral achievements of the bourgeois state from its class-specific implementation’ (Honneth, 1996, 
p. 155); likewise, Sartre ‘failed to draw an analytically clear line between law-based and law-transcending forms 
of mutual recognition’ and therefore ‘could not avoid confounding the pursuit of self-realisation and the pursuit 
of an expansion of rights’ (ibid, p. 158). 
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Honneth seeks to outline such an alternative paradigm and looks to recent historiography for 
support. Whereas the goals of the love relationship are not generalisable beyond the sphere of 
primary relationships, the socially generalised nature of the forms of recognition associated 
with rights and social esteem do provide a moral context for social conflict to arise34. In these 
forms of recognition, individual experiences of disrespect have the potential and likelihood of 
affecting other subjects, and therefore the potential, in turn, to motivate collective struggles 
for the expansion of relations of recognition. This broad definition of social struggle has the 
advantages, for Honneth, of being neutral with regard to the types of tactics employed in 
different social struggles, and also neutral as to whether the actors are aware of the moral 
motivation for their action, e.g. they may interpret their struggle as being about a clash of 
material interests. Another advantage for Honneth of his conception of social struggles is that 
it is able to provide a bridge between individual experiences of injury and the impersonal 
goals of social movements. Social resistance is motivated by the violation of moral 
expectations regarding recognition, expectations internally connected to the formation of 
personal identity. The feelings activated in response to experiences of disrespect can only 
become the motivation for resistance ‘if subjects are able to articulate them within an 
intersubjective framework of interpretation that they can show to be typical for an entire 
group’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 163). Such ‘shared semantics’, which develop out of the moral 
norms that inform our notions of social community, not only extend recognition relations but 
allow for the identification of the social causes of individual injuries according to Honneth. 
 
‘Thus, as soon as ideas of this sort have gained influence within a society, they 
generate a subcultural horizon of interpretation within which experiences of 
disrespect that, previously, had been fragmented and had been coped with 
privately can then become the moral motives for a collective 'struggle for 
recognition'’ (1996, p. 164). 
                                                
34 Although presumably struggles against torture and rape do also provide a moral context for social conflict to 
arise. 
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Victims of disrespect who experience some form of social shame are able to regain a positive-
relation-to-self by engaging in political action, and Honneth suggests that individuals can gain 
a sense of self-respect both through the solidarity within political groups, and by 
contemplating a future community that will recognise them for their present abilities in a way 
that the current social and political situation does not allow.  
 
Honneth wants to make clear that many struggles in the name of collective interests are often 
dependent upon moral experiences as, for example, some circumstances suggest that adequate 
recognition is dependent upon the acquisition of certain goods. To support this point, Honneth 
turns to the historical studies of E. P. Thompson and Barrington Moore. The work of 
Thompson is useful for Honneth’s purposes in that it looks at the moral context of the 
resistance of the lower classes to capitalist industrialisation and points out that social 
resistance can not be simply an expression of economic deprivation as ‘what counts as an 
unbearable level of economic provision is to be measured in terms of the moral expectations 
that people consensually bring to the organisation of the community’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 166). 
Changes in economic situation provoke social conflict, as they are experienced as violations 
to the implicit moral consensus. Honneth complements Thompson’s notion of ‘moral 
economy’ with Moore’s notion of an ‘implicit social contract’. By looking at the 
revolutionary periods of 1848 and 1920 in Germany, Moore outlined how the most active 
groups within the working class were those whose recognised self-understanding was most at 
threat from social and political changes. Once the underlying normative consensus between 
groups is disrupted, a consensus that determines the conditions for mutual recognition, 
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individual groups experience the disrespect of their identity, and this in turn opens up the 
possibility of political resistance.35 
 
A Formal Conception of Ethical Life 
Having built his ‘critical’ theory on Hegel’s notion of a ‘struggle for recognition’, and made it 
more concrete with recourse to Mead’s empirical social psychology, Honneth finally seeks ‘a 
philosophical justification for its underlying normative principle’ (1996, p. 144) in a 
frustratingly brief final chapter on what he calls ‘the formal conception of ethical life’. Here 
he takes the ‘intersubjective conditions for personal integrity’ to be the ‘presuppositions for 
individual self-realisation’, and wants to extend his conception of social conflict from being a 
framework for explaining social struggles to being part of a wider process of moral formation. 
The important role social struggles play in the logic of recognition relations means that they 
can be evaluated in terms of the moral progress in the historical development of society. It is 
in this sense that Honneth sees the moral feelings arising out of experiences of disrespect not 
only in terms of motives for action, but also in terms of the moral role they play in recognition 
relations; he suggests that such moral feelings can be judged as either beneficial or 
detrimental moments in a developmental process. However, to be able to make such 
judgements, Honneth suggests that he has to be able to identify a normative standard point 
from which to outline the developmental direction of moral progress.36 Starting with the 
tripartite distinction between love, rights and solidarity and acknowledging the distinction 
itself as a historical product, Honneth imagines a past where ‘the existence of an archaic 
group morality, in which aspects of care are not fully separated from either the rights of tribal 
                                                
35 However, we might want to argue here that Honneth has been operating with a distinction between the 
traditional and the modern, especially over the development of legal norms, and his examples of moral economy 
are an invocation of the traditional against the emergent modern. 
36 Honneth has since re-emphasised this point in his debate with Fraser (see Fraser and Honneth, 2003) 
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members or their social esteem’ (1996, p. 169). The function of this speculative projection is 
to determine the moral learning process as one that both differentiates between the different 
forms of recognition, and also unleashes the normative potential inherent in each – e.g. 
universalisation and de-formalisation in legal relations, and individualisation and equalisation 
in communities of value. He argues that these developmental normative potentials are 
identifiable in experiences of disrespect and can be appealed to in the struggles arising out of 
such experiences. With this general logic of the expansion of recognition relations in place, 
Honneth seeks to outline the idealised developmental path that would allow for the evaluation 
of particular struggles in terms of their positive or negative contribution towards the goal of 
undistorted recognition.37 Accepting the necessarily hypothetical nature of such a task, 
Honneth thereby sets out to contemporise Hegel’s ‘formal conception of ethical life’. 
 
Honneth is dissatisfied with what he sees as the dominant, Kantian, philosophical position on 
morality, which insists that all subjects be justly given equal respect, on the grounds that it is 
unable to incorporate all elements necessary for undistorted recognition relations. He is more 
ambitious in his attempt to outline the necessary conditions for a ‘good’ rather than a merely 
‘just’ life, and these conditions would include universal respect as one, but not the only, 
important factor. Honneth’s conception is instead concerned with the self-realisation of 
human beings in addition to their moral autonomy.38 However, he insists that: 
                                                
37 In his debate with Fraser (in Fraser and Honneth, 2003), Honneth has extended this point with recourse to a 
notion of ‘validity surplus’ at work in the three forms of recognition, including love. Each form is characterised 
as having its own internal source of conflict ‘whose normative significance is expressed by the constant struggle 
over its appropriate application and interpretation’ (p. 186). In addition to this he agues that the normative 
possibilities contained in each form of recognition always exceed the current institutionalised forms and 
therefore remain open to rational public debates and future development and education (ibid). See also 
Honneth’s ‘Recognition as Ideology’ in Van Den Brink and Owen (eds.) (2007) and republished in Honneth 
(2012). 
38 In many ways, Honneth’s emphasis on a recognitive account of autonomy and self-realisation follows the 
attempt to move beyond the liberal notion of justice made by Hegel in his Philosophy of Right. Honneth explores 
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‘in contrast to those movements that distance themselves from Kant, this concept 
of the good should not be conceived as the expression of substantive values that 
constitute the ethos of a concrete tradition-based community. Rather, it has to do 
with the structural elements of ethical life, which, from the general point of view 
of the communicative enabling of self-realisation, can be normatively extracted 
from the plurality of all particular forms of life’ (1996, p. 172). 
 
Similarly to Habermas and his notion of ‘discourse ethics’ then, what Honneth wants to do 
here is place himself in the middle of Kantian moral theory and communitarian ethics39, by 
championing the former’s emphasis on general norms, while insisting on the importance of 
the latter’s emphasis on human self-realisation. The problem as Honneth sees it now is as 
follows: 
 
‘The desired characterisations must, then, be formal or abstract enough not to 
raise the suspicion of representing merely the deposits of concrete interpretations 
of the good life; on the other hand, they must also have sufficient substantive 
content to be of more help than Kantian references to individual autonomy in 
discovering the conditions for self-realisation’ (1996, p. 173). 
 
Honneth justifies the three forms of recognition as necessary conditions for a successful life 
by suggesting that it is impossible to imagine successful self-realisation - understood as 
having the freedom to achieve one’s chosen goals - without self-confidence, legally 
guaranteed autonomy, and affirmation of the value of one’s abilities. The ‘freedom’ to 
achieve one’s chosen goals is not just freedom from external coercion, but freedom from 
internal barriers as well. The internal trust necessary to overcome these internal barriers and 
develop a basic confidence in one’s abilities – a positive-relation-to-self – is only acquired 
through the experience of intersubjective recognition. So on the one hand, Honneth now 
considers the three forms of recognition, which are also necessary conditions for self-
realisation, as ‘formal or abstract enough not to raise the suspicion of representing merely the 
                                                                                                                                                   
this in more depth in his Spinoza lectures, published as Suffering from Indeterminacy: An Attempt at a 
Reactualisation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (2001b) and republished in Honneth (2010). 
39 Arguably, therefore, in the middle of traditional, rather than critical, theory. 
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deposits of concrete interpretations of the good life’. They are generalised enough to be 
applicable to all particular forms of life. On the other hand, he argues that there is sufficient 
detail ‘to be of more help than Kantian references to individual autonomy in discovering the 
conditions for self-realisation’, i.e. they provide the sufficient conditions for the protection of 
internal as well as external freedom. 
 
In fleshing out what this might mean, Honneth seeks to provide an outline of what a ‘post-
traditional ethical life’ might look like. He begins with ‘love’ which, as it is a necessary 
precursor for other types of self-realisation in that it allows individuals to express their needs, 
‘represents the innermost core of all forms of life that qualify as ‘ethical’’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 
176). He argues that the basic structure of love will remain the same in post-traditional ethical 
life, as it is not open to normative development. 
 
‘On the other hand, however, it is possible that the development of its invariant 
basic structures will be all the freer from distortion and coercion, the more rights 
come to be shared by partners in a friendship or love relationship. In this sense, a 
formal conception of post-traditional ethical life must be constructed in such a 
way that it can defend the radical egalitarianism of love against external forces 
and influences’ (1996, p. 176).40 
 
Turning to the sphere of rights, Honneth finds Hegel’s and Mead’s conceptions limited in 
their reference predominantly to liberal civil rights, and instead insists that post-traditional 
ethical life allows the legal sphere to become more sensitive to individual circumstances.41 
The legal sphere is able to accommodate the fact that there are certain prerequisites that allow 
                                                
40 Honneth has since revisited the claim that love is exempt from the possibility of normative development in 
Fraser and Honneth (2003). Here he acknowledges that love can only be conceived as a recognition relation 
necessary for self-confidence once the family as a private sphere, and ‘childhood’ as a distinct phase, has 
emerged historically. 
41 Honneth is not suggesting here that Hegel and Mead are only concerned with liberal civil rights – i.e. he 
accepts that Hegel argues that the state has a role to address the general beyond private acts and that Mead was 
also part of the US progressive tradition on inequality – only that their conception of law doesn’t sufficiently 
acknowledge ‘how heavily the individual enjoyment of these liberties can also depend on the legal improvement 
of the conditions for their application’ (1996, p. 177).  
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individuals to enjoy the liberties that come with civil rights, while not sacrificing its universal 
quality. Honneth adds to this that the sphere of rights has also come to affect both 
relationships of love and of solidarity.  
 
Finally, Hegel and Mead are charged with not sufficiently giving the recognition relation of 
‘solidarity’ a potentially empirical formulation, as he suggests that they only referred to it as a 
cultural value-system open enough to allow all members of society to regard themselves as 
socially esteemed in relation to their particular traits and abilities. Honneth reiterates his 
criticisms of Hegel’s conception of ‘solidarity’, and Mead’s emphasis upon the division of 
labour, and speculates upon a resolution to this problem for the present: 
 
‘Indeed, in the meantime, social-structural upheavals in developed societies have 
so greatly expanded the possibilities for self-realisation that the experience of 
individual or collective difference has become the impetus for a whole series of 
political movements. In the long run, their demands can only be satisfied once 
culture has been transformed so as to radically expand relations of solidarity. In 
this new situation, the only lesson that the conception sketched here has to learn 
from the failure of Hegel’s and Mead’s proposals is to be content with an 
ineluctable tension: we cannot refrain from allowing substantive values – which 
are supposed to be in a position to generate post-traditional solidarity – to take 
their place alongside the forms of recognition found in love and developed legal 
relations; nor, however, can the present proposal, on its own, fill the position that 
is thereby circumscribed as the locus of the particular in the fabric of relationships 
belonging to a modern form of ethical life. For, whether these substantive values 
point in the direction of a political republicanism, an ecologically based 
asceticism, or a collective existentialism, whether they presuppose changes in 
socio-economic circumstances or are compatible with the conditions of a capitalist 
society – this is no longer a matter for theory but rather for the future of social 
struggles’ (1996, p. 179). 
 
I will return to Honneth’s formal conception of ethical life towards the end of this chapter. 
However, before outlining a number of key criticisms of Honneth’s work on recognition, I 
will briefly explore some of the more recent developments in his work. 
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Pathologies of recognition 
Despite remaining within Habermas’s communicative paradigm, it is clear that the ‘social 
pathologies’ of Honneth’s recognitive theory of society differ markedly from those of 
Habermas’s linguistic approach. The shift of emphasis towards the analysis of ‘structural 
forms of disrespect’ necessitates a social-theoretical exploration of ‘the social causes 
responsible for the systematic violation of the conditions of recognition’ (2007, p. 72) rather 
than Habermas’s analysis of the systemic ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’. Despite his self-
conscious relationship to the Frankfurt School tradition, Honneth’s work in some ways 
signals a notable change in direction for Critical Theory. Although Habermas arguably 
initiated a more significant break with earlier Critical Theory, he remained committed to the 
idea that ‘instrumental reason’ and societal rationalisation were the key pathological features 
of modern societies. Adorno and Horkheimer, and Habermas (and Foucault) all concern 
themselves with the threat of autonomous, self-reproducing systems of power and social 
organisation. Honneth, however, is critical of accounts that only explore social pathologies in 
terms of human rationality, and thereby omit other forms of pathology and critique such as 
those discernible in Durkheim’s account of social bonds and the dangers of individualisation. 
A critical theory of ‘recognition’ aims to move beyond what Honneth sees as narrow accounts 
of rationality, even if those accounts concern themselves with intersubjective forms of 
rational understanding; he suggests instead that we should concern ourselves with: 
 
‘the intersubjective condition of human identity development. These conditions 
can be found in social forms of communication in which the individual grows up, 
acquires a social identity and ultimately has to learn to conceive of him- or herself 
as both an equal and unique member of society. If these forms of communication 
do not provide the amount of recognition necessary to accomplish the various 
tasks involved in forming an identity, then this must be taken as an indication of a 
society’s pathological development’ (2007, p. 74). 
 
 
125 
To identify ‘pathological’ developments in society, Honneth seeks to explore the institutional 
embodiments of love (via studies of family and socialisation), rights (via studies of legal 
processes), and solidarity. He argues that the latter is predominantly made up of the societal 
recognition accorded us through our contribution to society in the form of organised labour, 
an argument he supports with reference to studies on the psychological effects of 
unemployment.42 This emphasis on the societal organisation and distribution of social labour 
alters the theoretical transformation that the category of ‘social labour’ underwent in 
Habermas’s division of work and interaction (or instrumental and communicative action). 
Although Honneth wants to emphasise the link, severed by Habermas, between work and 
moral experience, he also wants to avoid reintroducing the role of ‘emancipatory 
consciousness formation’ assigned to labour in Marxist philosophies of history. He sees social 
labour as being of significance to the extent that the development of personal identity is 
connected to the social recognition accorded one’s work within society. A key example that 
Honneth feels exemplifies this issue is the feminist discussion around unpaid societal labour 
in the form of childcare and housework. The unequal value, and therefore low social esteem, 
given to these forms of societal labour in the context of patriarchal cultural values has 
restricted women from gaining the necessary social respect for a positive sense of self.43 
Therefore, the cultural value accorded to social tasks is directly related to the social esteem 
acquired by individuals who carry out those tasks – ‘the chances of forming an individual 
identity through the experience of recognition are directly related to the societal 
institutionalisation and distribution of labour’ (Honneth, 2007, p. 76). 
                                                
42 However, he doesn’t sufficiently explain here how this connection between social labour and solidarity (with 
the practical self-relation of self-esteem) differs from the position he criticises Mead for in Struggle for 
Recognition. 
43 Although he doesn’t make this explicit, Honneth appears to be using market value here as an indication of 
respect; he also assumes, without sufficient elaboration, that inequality is necessarily a form of disrespect. We 
might also want to suggest that the link between market value and respect is guilty of applying a male standard 
of what counts as respect. 
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Although Honneth feels that his overarching account of recognition satisfies the 
methodological criteria outlined by Horkheimer – particularly in the sense that a pre-
theoretical resource for a critical theory of social communication can be identified in the 
moral experiences of those whose identity claims have not been satisfied – he acknowledges 
that in other respects it is found wanting. Just because his critical theory is able to point to 
examples (i.e. moral experiences) in social reality that confirm his analysis of that reality, 
there are no guarantees that ‘the normative direction of its critique is shared by the victims of 
disrespect’ (2007, p. 78). In fact: 
 
‘social esteem can just as well be sort in small militaristic groups, whose code of 
honour is dominated by the practice of violence, as it can in the public arenas of a 
democratic society. The sense of being no longer included within the network of 
social recognition is in itself an extremely ambivalent source of motivation for 
social protest and resistance. It lacks any normative indication or direction that 
would stipulate in what ways one should struggle against the experience of 
disrespect and humiliation’ (2007, p. 77, emphasis is mine). 
 
The question for Honneth therefore becomes one of how a democratic public sphere can 
foster the kind of ‘moral culture’ that would give those suffering from disrespect ‘the 
individual strength to articulate their experiences in the democratic public sphere, rather than 
living them out in a counterculture of violence’ (2007, p. 78). He leaves his answer to this 
question open, but his faith in the democratic public sphere remains unshaken. Before 
exploring a number of criticisms that see this commitment to the democratic public sphere as 
idealised, I want to briefly consider Honneth’s recent turn to the importance of reification, 
which is where he extends his notion of what constitutes ‘pathological’ development. 
 
In his book, Reification (2008), he attempts to further his links with the history of Critical 
Theory, and its links to Lukács, whilst also wrestling the term ‘reification’ for his recognitive 
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version of Critical Theory. In many ways this book is a clarification of some of his earlier 
ideas but it also marks a not insignificant shift in his emphasis on recognition. Although he 
still maintains his earlier categorisation of recognition relations in terms of love, law and 
achievement – and the formal conception of ethical life they imply – he argues that 
underlying these normative forms of recognition there is an  ‘existential’ (and transcendental) 
level of recognition. This ‘affective’ level of recognition is described as a primary mode of 
relating to the world which colours all of our future human relations and provides a 
foundation on which other recognition relations are built. As he argues: 
 
‘Normatively substantial forms of recognition such as are embodied in social 
institutions of traditional honour, modern love, or equal law, represent various 
manners in which the existential scheme of experience opened up by elementary 
recognition gets “filled out” historically. Without the experience that other 
individuals are fellow humans, we would be incapable of equipping this schema 
with moral values that guide and limit our actions. Therefore, elementary 
recognition must be carried out, and we must feel existential sympathy for the 
other, before we can learn to orient ourselves toward norms of recognition that 
compel us to express certain specific forms of concern or benevolence. The 
implication for the structure of my own theory of recognition is that I must insert 
a stage of recognition before the previously discussed forms, one that represents a 
kind of transcendental condition’ (2008, p. 152).44 
 
So in order to be able to engage in other forms of recognition relations, or language-mediated 
intersubjective relations to use more Habermasian terms, we must already have affirmed our 
interaction partners in some way, and this affirmation is a form of recognition which involves 
empathetic engagement.45 In his attempt to explore the idea that ‘recognition precedes 
cognition’, Honneth makes reference to a number of similar ideas including Dewey’s 
                                                
44 This argument also explains Honneth’s increasing distance from Mead’s work which he criticises for 
neglecting the emotional attachment to an other which, Honneth argues, precedes our ability to assume the 
perspective of the other (2008, p. 42).  
45 In response to criticisms of his work by Butler (also in Honneth, 2008), he is quick to assert that this originary 
emotional receptivity to another (or ‘existential affectedness’) can be made up of ‘love and hate, ambivalence 
and coldness’ and therefore does not have a ‘normative orientation’ as such (p. 152). Butler makes the point that 
hateful and sadistic impulses question Honneth’s distinction between failing to take the position of the other and 
engaging in participatory relations with the other (p. 102). 
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‘practical involvement’46, Cavell’s ‘acknowledgement’, Heidegger’s ‘care’, Adorno’s 
‘mimesis’47, and Lukács’s ‘engaged praxis’. He ultimately reconfigures Lukács’s original 
notion of reification in the direction of a ‘forgetting’ of our primordial recognitive praxis such 
that our cognitive, detached, and spectator-like approaches to the world – and our tendency to 
instrumentalise others, ourselves and our environment - forget that they are underwritten by a 
pre-cognitive, affective engagement with others, ourselves and the world. Honneth describes 
reification as ‘an atrophied or distorted form of a more primordial and genuine form of praxis, 
in which humans take up an active and involved relationship toward themselves and their 
surroundings’ (2008, p. 27) and he emphasises ‘the notion that the stance of empathetic 
engagement in the world, arising from the experience of the world’s significance and value 
(Werthaftigkeit), is prior to our acts of detached cognition’ (2008, p. 38).48 Honneth 
articulates this idea further in relation to ‘forms of knowledge sensitive to recognition’ 
whereby ‘the act of cognition or detached observation remains conscious of its dependence on 
an antecedent act of recognition’, and other ‘forms of knowledge in which every trace of their 
origin in an antecedent act of recognition has been lost’, i.e. where ‘it has freed itself of the 
                                                
46 It is worth noting that in addition to Honneth’s use of Dewey here, and in relation to emotions in his Struggle 
for Recognition, he also makes use of certain aspects of his work on democracy: see Honneth’s ‘Democracy as 
Reflexive Cooperation: John Dewey and the Theory of Democracy Today’ in Honneth (2007). For a defence of 
Dewey’s arguments for democracy, which makes reference to Honneth’s appropriation of Dewey in relation to 
reification and instrumental rationality, see Cruickshank (2014). 
47 Honneth also makes reference to Adornian ideas inasmuch as he considers both the ways in which our 
relationship to objects is coloured by the significance which those objects had for our primary carers and 
significant others, and the ways in which we might be said to have a recognitive relationship to objects as well as 
people. 
48 In this way, he distances himself from a number of assumptions and conclusions made by Lukács in his notion 
of reification: in particular, the importance of homo faber, the privileged role of the proletariat as ‘universal 
class’ (what Jay (in Honneth, 2008, p. 6) calls ‘ontological creators and epistemological knowers of their 
creation’), and the Marxian emphasis on commodity fetishism whereby the totality is lost through exchange 
value and commodified labour and current social relations assume the form of a ‘second nature’. Honneth 
follows Habermas and Arendt in their arguments against the reduction of communication to labour, whilst also 
emphasising the importance of recognition underneath both communication and labour. We might say that 
Honneth replaces a notion of ‘production/creation preceding cognition’ with a notion of ‘recognition preceding 
cognition’. It is worth noting that Lukács’s work, particularly his earlier work, had already provided a point of 
reference in an early essay by Honneth - see ‘A Fragmented World: On the Implicit Relevance of Lukács’ Early 
Work’ in Honneth (1995). For an alternative recent exploration of reification, which emphasises the link 
between the decline of religious experience and our anxieties around reification, see Bewes (2002). 
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knowledge of this dependency and deludes itself that it has become autonomous of all non-
epistemic prerequisites’ (2008, p. 56).49 Although he accepts that an objectivating stance can 
be harmless in certain rational, problem-solving contexts, Honneth suggests that an 
institutionally reproduced, and socially widespread, form of forgetting has had dire 
consequences for the forms of intersubjective recognition that are at the heart of our ethical 
life. The objectivation of others involves the usage of prevalent forms of thought and action 
which involve turning others into objects for our own self-interest (e.g. market-mediated 
interaction, viewing others as ‘means’ rather than in terms of intrinsic worth). The reification 
of the physical world involves forgetting the ways in which objects have meaning for 
ourselves and others only in the context of intersubjective relationships. Finally, the 
reification of the self involves forgetting the ways in which our notion of self has been 
constituted in various relations with others. He suggests that this takes the form of either 
‘detectivism’, whereby we accept ourselves as rigid personality types determined by certain 
fixed inner states, or ‘constructivism’, whereby our inner states can be changed at will and 
understood as forever adaptable to instrumental purposes (e.g. to be sufficiently malleable and 
marketable in the context of ‘flexible’ economies).50 Despite the bleak consequences of this 
increasingly pervasive reification, Honneth’s optimism lies in the fact that ‘even in the midst 
of the false, ontologically blinded present circumstances, the elementary structures of the 
human form of life characterized by ‘care’ and existential interestedness are always already 
there’ (ibid, p. 34). Having said this however the implications of this for social analysis and 
emancipatory politics are left indeterminate for Honneth.51 
                                                
49 It is worth noting here that this structure of antecedent acts of recognition and the forgetting of such acts tends 
to replicate the lifeworld/system structure that Honneth criticises Habermas for. 
50 For a thoughtful exploration of the latter, see Sennett (1998). 
51 Zurn (in Petherbridge, ed., 2011, p. 346) argues that although Honneth does a good job of outlining 
recognitive pathologies at the level of personal experiences, he fails to provide ‘insightful sociological 
explanations of the causes of those pathological distortions’ (what Zurn refers to as an ‘etiological account of 
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(Mis)Recognition in Honneth’s Recognitive Turn 
As Honneth’s work has become increasingly well-known and influential over the past ten 
years or so, a number of critical arguments and positions have developed in relation to it. It 
would be impossible to do justice to all of these here, but I will concentrate on the most 
significant ones and those that tend to support the thrust of my arguments. I will begin with 
those who question Honneth’s emphasis on recognition as the underlying focal point for 
explaining suffering and injustice, before then outlining those criticisms that I feel get to the 
heart of the problems with Honneth’s account.  
 
A number of critics, most famously Nancy Fraser, have criticised Honneth’s tendency to 
single out ‘recognition’ as the underlying source of all forms of injustice and suffering. 
Ferrara (in Petherbridge, ed. 2011, pp. 371-90) and Zurn (in Petherbridge, ed. 2011, pp. 345-
370), for example, mainly criticise Honneth for relying on a monocausal account of social 
pathologies that operates with a grand narrative and reduces all injustices and pathologies to 
the realm of recognition. Instead they suggest that a more multi-dimensional approach would 
be more effective at addressing the specificities of particular pathologies, something Zurn 
believes Honneth is attempting to do in his more recent work on organised self-realisation and 
the paradoxes of capitalism.52 Ferrara’s analysis of Honneth’s Reification book criticises the 
implication in Honneth’s work that the different forms of reification (in terms of what Ferrara 
calls ‘technical fetishism’, ‘misrecognition’ and ‘inauthenticity’) share the same social causes 
                                                                                                                                                   
social pathologies’) which are necessary so that ‘social members can comprehend the discontinuities between 
their first-order experiences and their second-order reflexive understandings of them as discontinuities caused by 
specific social institutions, structures and practices, and for them to engage productively in the manifold social 
struggles necessary to overcome the causes of the pathological disorders’ (Zurn in Petherbridge, ed., 2011, p. 
346). In relation to reification, he argues that Honneth’s ‘socio-theoretic explanations’ for forgetting are 
inconclusive, and we are left wondering whether the social causes of reification are ‘ineliminable features of 
human life’ or ‘socio-culturally specific forms of pathology that are amenable to amelioration or eradication 
through the transformations of current social structures, institutions and practices’ (pp. 357-8). 
52 See Honneth (2004) and Hartmann & Honneth (2006), both of which are republished in Honneth (2012). 
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rather than developing out of differential processes.53 A key critic of Honneth here, and as we 
have seen of Habermas also, is Nancy Fraser whose exchange with Honneth in Redistribution 
or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange (2003) centres around the difference 
between her dualistic approach to injustice (recognition and redistribution) and his monistic 
approach (recognition). Although this debate is not as important for my key criticisms of 
Honneth, it is worth briefly considering some of the main arguments. Fraser claims that an 
approach based solely on recognition tends to miss important aspects of economic equality 
and she therefore sets up an analytical distinction between injustice premised on the lack of 
economic and political resources and injustice resulting from the lack of social and cultural 
recognition of one’s identity.54 Beyond both ‘culturalism’ and ‘economism’, she sets herself 
the task of outlining what a society might look like where all its members are accorded 
participatory parity and the equal opportunity to lead an autonomous life; for her this 
includes the importance of both distributive and recognitive goods. Honneth on the other 
hand, according to Fraser, reduces all struggles and injustice to a core of recognition 
(supplemented with moral psychology) and seeks to provide an excessively strong notion of 
the good life in the form of ‘self-realisation’, rather than the more formal account of ‘parity’ 
which Fraser believes to be more appropriate in modern, pluralist societies.  
 
In response to this, Honneth suggests that his notion of recognition is sufficiently robust to 
cover economic and political injustices in addition to cultural recognition, for example he sees 
struggles over redistribution as being centrally concerned with how we ‘recognise’ different 
                                                
53 Honneth however appears to agree with the criticisms of Zurn and Ferrara here but responds by suggesting 
that his work does in fact avoid a simplistic monocausal approach by concentrating on a range of social, cultural 
and economic causal factors, however he dismisses the idea that this might constitute a form of ‘theoretical 
eclecticism’ in favour of an explanation of social causes akin to Weber’s notion of an ‘elective affinity between 
different developmental processes’ (Honneth in Petherbridge, ed., 2011, p. 419). 
54 It is worth noting that Fraser has now developed an updated three-dimensional rather than dualistic approach 
(see Fraser, 2005). For her original conception of injustice in terms of recognition/redistribution, see her New 
Left Review article (Fraser, 1995). 
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types of labour and economic contribution; he finds the more justice-based approaches, such 
as Fraser’s, as overly formal and lacking substance. Honneth refers to the ‘achievement 
principle’ and the notion of ‘equal respect’ as examples that demonstrate the way in which the 
capitalist economy is rooted in a broader normative context and displays symptoms of 
‘asymmetrical forms of recognition’. He suggests that although these principles have served 
ideological purposes (i.e. justifying wealth inequalities in capitalism), they have also been 
used to support welfare distribution and used as tools by worker’s movements, women and 
other groups to challenge inequalities and gain recognition for societal contribution.55 I tend 
to broadly agree with Honneth and the other critics of Fraser in this debate, who have not only 
contested Fraser’s tendency to separate out a sphere of the economy (driven solely by the 
maximisation of profit) from the ‘social limits on markets’ set by laws and forms of cultural 
evaluation (see Honneth in Fraser and Honneth, 2003, p. 256), but also questioned the 
redistribution/recognition division and demonstrated that her own theory of participatory 
parity, in outlining the necessary conditions for social participation, is ‘already a theory of 
recognition and misrecognition’ (Bernstein, 2005, p. 310).56  
 
Having briefly explored the criticisms of Honneth’s focus on recognition, I will now consider 
what I feel to be the most pertinent criticisms of his position. These will fall into four broad 
                                                
55 Although Honneth is right to challenge Fraser on this issue, Smith (in Petherbridge, 2011, pp. 341-3) makes 
the point that Honneth’s language concerning the moral ‘constraints’ that recognitive norms exercise over 
economic processes fails to develop an adequate conceptualisation of market mechanisms - i.e. what is being 
constrained – and the ways in which markets might be (inherently) tied to asymmetrical recognition and tend 
towards constantly undermining norms of mutual recognition. Honneth’s response to Smith suggests that he 
favours the view that the development of the capitalist market towards undermining these norms is not the result 
of an inherent tendency but rather the temporary result ‘of a social conflict in which different collective actors – 
employer’s associations, governmental institutions, and labour unions – are involved’ (Honneth in Petherbridge, 
ed. 2011, p. 401). 
56 There is also a clear tension here with Fraser’s earlier criticism of Habermas’s distinction between system and 
social integration. For notable criticisms of Fraser’s recognition/redistribution distinction see Butler (1998), and 
Fraser’s response to Butler (in Fraser, 1998), Young (1997) and Fraser’s response to Young (in Fraser, 1997), 
Philips (1997), Bernstein (2005), and Smith in Petherbridge (ed.) (2011), pp. 335-6. 
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(and related) categories: the tendency to idealise the notion of recognition, the lack of an 
adequate conception of misrecognition, his neglect of the ideological role that recognition 
often plays, and the abstraction at work in his ‘formal’ conception of ethical life. 
 
Idealising Recognition 
The critics of Honneth’s recent work on reification tend to bring a number of these key 
criticisms together. Despite their differences, all seek to question the idealised notion of 
mutual recognition at work in his notion of (precognitive) empathetic engagement.57 Judith 
Butler questions Honneth’s tendency to idealise a notion of empathetic engagement and to 
neglect the ‘negative’ aspects of what this engagement often involves (e.g. hate, sadism, 
aggression etc). She suggests that:  
 
‘if a normative value is to be derived from involvement, it is not because 
involvement presupposes a normative structure of genuine praxis, but because we 
are beings who have to struggle with both love and aggression in our flawed and 
commendable efforts to care for other human beings … It is not a matter of 
returning to what we “really” know or undoing our deviations from the norm, but 
of struggling with a set of ethical demands on the basis of myriad affective 
responses that, prior to their expression in action, have no particular moral 
valence’ (in Honneth, 2008, p. 104).  
 
She also suggests that ‘there is no innate moral trajectory in involvement, participation and 
emotionality, since we are beings who, from the start, both love and resist our dependency, 
and whose psychic reality is, by definition, ambivalent’ (in Honneth, 2008, p. 106). Jonathan 
Lear makes a similar point and also argues that Honneth’s account assumes the narrative 
structure of ‘the fall’ with the concomitant tendency to ‘build too much goodness into the 
prior condition’ (in Honneth, 2008, p. 132 and p. 139). 
 
                                                
57 For Honneth’s response to the critics of his Reification book, see his ‘Rejoinder’ in Honneth (2008). 
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Foster (2011) develops these ideas further and argues that rather than being a primal layer of 
social interaction as such, recognition is a ‘dynamic process’ driven by an ‘existential 
ambiguity’ – the fact that ‘we both want and need recognition, and we fear and refuse it, and 
neither of these tendencies is more primordial than the other’ (p. 257). Foster goes someway 
towards explaining this ambiguity by suggesting that recognition both humanizes us but at the 
same time leaves us feeling ‘exposed, dependent, injurable, and mortal’ (ibid); he argues that 
‘we are (have become) selves that are invested in this refusal of recognition; it is the 
continually re-enacted work of denial by the self for whom the exposure to the other is 
experienced as a source of fear’ (p. 263). So rather than following Honneth in his account of 
the ‘forgetting’ of recognition as being akin to amnesia or ‘reduced attentiveness’, we might 
be more convinced by Foster’s more Freudian, psycho-social conception whereby our 
involvement with others ‘is instead actively, and continually, repressed’ (p. 260). By 
exploring the relationship between reification, subject-formation and cognitive activity, Foster 
suggests an Adornian conception of ‘movement, or better, struggle, towards self-awareness 
within cognition itself’ (ibid), whereby our empathy is enlivened by our acknowledging ‘our 
own self-disfigurement in so far as we have become the type of subjects who are able to 
function in a way that enforces the dominance of the neutralised point of view’ (pp. 260-261). 
This way the recovery of such recognition underlying reification would involve the subject 
becoming aware of the way its own self has been damaged by reified forms of thinking. Here 
Foster refers to the importance of ‘transformative experiences’ and, following Cavell and 
Adorno, places a special emphasis on the de-reifying role of aesthetics. I agree with Foster on 
these points and pursue these ideas further in Chapter 4. 
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Mis-Recognising 
In addition to these criticisms of Honneth for idealising recognition, Foster and other critics 
question the curious absence of a notion of misrecognition in Honneth’s work as a whole. As 
Foster suggests, recognition ‘is possible only by working through our inevitable tendency to 
misrecognise the object’ or other (p. 258), and to ‘deny, repudiate, and refuse the voice of the 
other’ (p. 256) in the process. Instead Honneth gives the impression that recognition is a fixed 
and constant factor underlying social life and is characterised by positive relations to the self 
and other. What this misses out according to Foster is the fact that ‘recognition is a process 
that is conflictual and involves struggle, both within the self and between self and others, 
[and] its realization must encompass a movement of self-transformation’ (p. 258).58 Without 
an account of how we attempt to recognise others, fail to do so, and transform our self-
conception in the process, Honneth is unable to do justice to the importance of recognition in 
our collective lives. Along similar lines, Osborne (1996) criticises Honneth’s use of 
‘recognition’ for the tendency to separate out the social aspect, whereby individuals or groups 
are assigned a certain status, from epistemological issues, i.e. how we come to know the other, 
and what we come to know about them. It is for this reason that the opposite of recognition for 
Honneth is ‘disrespect’ rather than ‘misrecognition’. In other words, it tends to be the 
phenomenological aspects of Hegel’s notion of recognition that are missing in Honneth’s 
work, including the notion of desire which is at the heart of the struggle for recognition for 
Hegel. I will also pursue the importance of these aspects further in chapter 4. 
 
                                                
58 Sinnerbrink (in Petherbridge, 2011, pp. 177-206) makes a similar point here in relation to the loss of a notion 
of ‘struggle’ in Honneth’s work. He argues that despite Honneth’s engagement with Foucault due to the 
advantages of a notion of power and struggle he sees missing in Habermas’s work, and his subsequent move to 
the early work of Hegel due to the lack of a notion of ‘morally motivated struggle’ in Foucault’s account of 
disciplinary institutions, Honneth in fact ends up losing sight of the importance of struggle in his own account of 
recognition. Sinnerbrink also argues that the emphasis on morality rather than the politics of recognition in 
Honneth’s later work also leads to the abandonment, or at least the neglect, of the importance of an action-
theoretic model of the social. 
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By neglecting the importance of misrecognition, we might also want to ask some difficult 
questions about which identities are recognised, along with which aspects of our identities, 
and whether the simple recognition of these identities necessarily constitutes a step forward in 
terms of emancipatory politics. Despite his earlier appropriation of Foucault’s work for 
example, Honneth tends to miss or at least downplay the point that, as subjects, we tend to be 
formed partly through our subjection to particular power relations, and therefore the 
affirmation (or ‘recognition’) of one’s identity or cultural specificity may well serve to affirm 
certain (socio-economic) power relations. Renault (in Petherbridge, 2011, pp. 207-232) 
criticises Honneth’s account of recognition for being predominantly ‘expressivist’ rather than 
‘constitutive’. What he means by this is that Honneth tends to understand social institutions as 
‘expressions’ of underlying recognition relations and tends to focus exclusively on the way in 
which recognition relations transform these institutions. What gets lost in this account, 
according to Renault, is the way in which social institutions both form and restrict – or 
‘constitute’ - subjects and also pervert certain moral claims; there is an absence of a notion of 
‘subjectivisation’ in the Foucaultian sense of becoming ‘subject’ to particular institutional 
discourses.59 By neglecting, or not fully appreciating, the importance of this institutional 
level, Renault suggests that Honneth misses the complexity of struggles for recognition, e.g. 
the ways in which institutions are evaluated according to people’s ‘already constituted (social 
and professional) identities’ rather than simply through the lens of self-confidence, self-
respect and self-esteem, or the ways in which ‘groups can use institutional recognition models 
either as a central claim (for instance when minorities struggle for alleged universal rights), or 
as merely strategic means (for example, when a group calls for more cultural recognition as 
the only way to benefit from more economical integration)’ (ibid, pp. 228-9). 
                                                
59 In his response to this criticism Honneth suggests that we might see the relationship between institutions and 
recognition as one marked by ‘co-evolution’ (Honneth’s ‘Rejoinder’ in Petherbridge, 2011, pp. 403-4). The next 
chapter explores the relevance of Foucault’s work as a response to Honneth’s position. 
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Related to this is Foster’s argument (in Foster 1999), with reference to the work of Wendy 
Brown (1995), that we might consider genuine cultural critique to be neutralised within the 
public sphere of late capitalism and that ‘by converting cultural opposition into claims to the 
affirmation of cultural particularity, the link is effectively broken between oppression and the 
reproduction of socio-economic structures – that is to say, between ‘cultural’ exclusion and 
material exclusion’ (Foster, 1999, p. 12). This criticism directly relates to the tendency in 
Honneth to perceive claims to recognition as ‘identity’ claims. Foster argues that this runs the 
risk of affirming the notion of a fixed (and private) identity, as a ‘victim’ that merely needs to 
be protected by law, rather than allowing for the possibility of a transformative identity, e.g. 
the difference between affirmative gay rights and more transformative queer politics. Osborne 
(1996) makes a similar point and criticises Honneth for both lacking a sense of how cultural 
forms already mediate the process of recognition and for focussing on the legal recognition of 
identity-claims rather than more complex ‘social forms of subjectivity’. He argues that 
Honneth idealises the formal universality of legal recognition and thereby ‘abstracts from the 
existence of the state with its ‘class- [and, we might add, gender- and race-] specific 
implementation’ of the law; not to mention the specificity of state forms in different social 
formations’ (ibid, p. 36). Osborne also suggests that we pay significant attention to what we 
might call ‘injuries of recognition’, and the ways in which the law actually forms certain 
identities through exclusion, rather than simply focusing on how we might go about 
recognising already existing identity claims.60 
 
                                                
60 Honneth goes some way towards tackling some of these criticisms in his ‘Recognition as Ideology’ essay (in 
Van Den Brink and Owen, eds., 2007 and republished in Honneth (2012)) where he seeks to distinguish between 
ideological forms of recognition (e.g. the recognition of a housewife for her cleaning skills, the recognition of a 
slave for his subservience etc) and ‘socially productive’ forms. He suggests that the former are characterised by a 
gap between what they promise and the material and institutional context within which that promise can be 
fulfilled. He also suggests here that we might want to distinguish between ‘recognition orders’ that primarily end 
up affirming forms of domination and those that create new identities and extend the scope of our normative 
claims. 
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Recognition as Ideology 
Foster supports the above argument further by drawing attention to the ways in which what 
appears as successful recognition can be the result of the attempt by dominant interests to 
undermine emancipatory possibilities. He gives the example of the recognition of trade 
unions, as the ‘legal subjectivity of the working class’, and the way that the recognition of 
certain freedoms (e.g. to strike) paralleled certain administrative procedures (e.g. collective 
bargaining) that sought to undermine class conflict by establishing unions as mediators 
between workers and the state. Bernstein makes a similar point in terms of ‘idealising 
identification’ when he suggests that ‘it is recognising wage labourers as free and equal that 
secures their domination; just as it is recognising the table as worth a hundred dollars that 
secures its fetish character’ (2005, p. 318). Here Bernstein defends Marx’s (dialectical) 
critique of rights: ‘that rights as they now are preserve the very lack their possession promises 
– the right to vote as a continuation of disenfranchisement, the right to welfare as a way of 
keeping people impoverished’ (2005, p. 324 n.31). Instead, our notions of injustice ‘must 
exceed ideal, established justice because justice’s mechanisms of recognition till now 
simultaneously systematically misrecognise’ (2005, p. 318). So not only does Honneth have 
to be more sensitive to the ways in which recognition is a fragile and ambiguous process, as 
well as a threat to self-identity and therefore often actively avoided, but he also has to make 
sense of the struggles that take place over what it is that is being ‘recognised’ and the often 
exclusionary practices of established forms of recognition.  
 
Another point of contention is the tendency for Honneth to operate with an idealised notion of 
cultural autonomy that assumes that individual experiences of disrespect are (directly) 
translatable into group experiences which are then channelled into collective resistance 
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without the intervening impact of a liberal ideology (and liberal culture) which encourages us 
to understand our fate in individualistic terms. Honneth in other words lacks a sufficient 
account of how power and ideology thwart the emancipatory possibilities of struggles for 
recognition. Foster (1999) suggests that although Honneth is correct to question the tendency 
of earlier critical theory to see culture as serving an ideological and socialising function, he 
doesn’t sufficiently explore to what extent contemporary culture can ‘serve as the focal point 
for resistance against dominant norms’ (p.11) and the ways in which individual and collective 
action ‘occur under conditions of severe structural constraint and the ubiquitous (but in no 
sense all-powerful and all-determining) operation of liberal ideology’ (p. 13). Foster argues 
that: 
 
‘All too often, in fact, the potential of cultural resistance gets stuck between the 
‘rock’ of a neutralizing assimilation to dominant interpretations of liberal 
individualism and the ‘hard place’ of an outright rejection of the dominant value 
system. In neither of these cases can culture form the basis for the constructive 
critique of dominant norms, which Honneth’s account of the moral logic of social 
resistance requires’ (1999, p. 11) 
 
Foster goes on to suggest that forms of social and economic exclusion may well result in the 
inversion of dominant values and the redefinition of ‘respect’ in countercultural terms. 
Although, as we have seen, Honneth takes this point on board and responds with the hope that 
a ‘moral culture’ will give those suffering from ‘disrespect’ the ‘individual strength to 
articulate their experiences in the democratic public sphere’, Foster suggests that this 
demonstrates an overly optimistic and idealised faith in the democratic public sphere and 
thereby ‘overlooks the extent to which oppositional subcultures can be understood as a 
reaction to patterns of social exclusion whose very existence is denied within the democratic 
public sphere itself’ (Foster, 1999, p. 12). He argues that Honneth neglects the way in which 
participation in the public sphere tends to require groups to adhere to the demands of a liberal-
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individual ideology which in turn neutralises resistance and reproduces structures of 
domination. Following Foster then, and in the light of our criticisms so far, we might ask 
whether it might be the case ‘that normative claims emerge through forms of struggle which a 
liberal-communitarian structuring of the conditions of self-realisation proves unable to 
satisfy’ (Foster, 1999, p. 10). I will explore this further in my return to Adorno in the final 
chapter. 
 
We might also criticise Honneth’s account for seeing social and political institutions as 
‘conditions for the formation of self-consciousness’ whereby such institutions are slowly 
transformed in the light of struggles for recognition into conditions adequate for a positive 
relation to self. This poses the danger that we see politics, and moral progress, through the 
lens of (individual) self-relations, such that ethical life is reduced to providing the 
intersubjective context for (individual) self-realisation, we end up instrumentalising politics 
and turning cooperation and ethical life into the means for our private ends (see Bernstein, 
2005, p. 304). We thereby lose the relational aspect of recognition which is concerned with, 
amongst other things, the destabilising of identity through communal relations, and also the 
destabilising of current communal relations. 
 
Questioning a ‘Formal’ Conception of Ethical Life? 
The final set of criticisms which are of importance for the thrust of my argument, concern the 
problems with Honneth’s ‘formal conception of ethical life’. At the heart of these criticisms is 
both the question of the appropriateness of Honneth’s conception in the context of pluralist 
societies, and the tendency for Honneth to follow Habermas in formalising and purifying 
practical norms. Pensky (in Petherbridge, 2011, pp. 125-54) and Brink (in Petherbridge, 2011, 
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pp. 155-76) focus their criticisms of Honneth on the notions of ‘ethical life’ and ‘solidarity’, 
and at the heart of their critique is the tension, or rather irreconcilability, between a formal 
conception of ethical life and the pluralism of modern societies. They argue that our modern, 
ethically pluralist, societies are unlikely to agree upon the kind of common idea of the good 
life that Honneth believes is necessary to provide the recognition (and esteem) of individuals 
in their particularity. They remain unconvinced by Honneth’s attempt to mediate between 
abstract, formal accounts of solidarity on the one hand, and substantive, but often exclusive, 
accounts of solidarity on the other (see Pensky in Petherbridge, 2011, p. 148). In the light of 
their comments, it is hard to see how Honneth takes us beyond either the Rawlsian account of 
an overlapping consensus in terms of broad agreements about how we disagree, or 
Habermas’s account of the solidary effects of communicative rationality. We are left with the 
dilemma of broad, yet inclusive, social goals that are too formal to produce solidarity (i.e. 
notions of procedural justice and public reason), or a substantive version of ethical life which 
risks forms of denigration and exclusion. Pensky suggests that Honneth’s ‘formal’ conception 
of ethical life tends to side with the former and therefore lacks a true sense of the ‘ethical, in 
the sense of describing a sphere of interpretations of the kind of life desirable for us’ (ibid, p. 
152).  
 
Brink also suggests that a formal conception of ethical life is incoherent and that Honneth’s 
conception of ethical life should be conceived as ‘one substantive account of ethical life 
among several, rather than the formal account of ethical life for post-traditional societies’ 
(Brink in Petherbridge, p. 160).61 In other words, he suggests that self-realisation, autonomy 
and pluralism can be seen as substantive values, rather than formal ones abstracted from 
                                                
61 For a similar critique see Owen’s ‘Self-government and ‘Democracy as Reflexive Co-operation’’ in Van Den 
Brink and Owen (eds.) (2007), pp. 290-322. 
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plural versions of the good life, and that a solution to the problem might take the form of a 
‘public dialogue among several substantive positions’ (ibid, p. 164).62 Honneth however 
seems to accept the terms of this dilemma and these criticisms in his later work (e.g. see 
Fraser and Honneth, 2003) and suggests that there might be an ‘overlapping consensus’ 
regarding constitutional principles but not regarding ethical values. In an attempt to avoid this 
problem Honneth takes what he sees as a Durkheimian route and links social esteem to ‘the 
exchange of services’ (as a ‘transcendentally institutionalised medium’) and argues that 
‘independent of the ethical aims that individual members of society might pursue, they must 
share an interest in securing the material conditions of their social existence’ (in Petherbridge, 
2011, p. 407). Honneth recognises that the way different tasks are esteemed relies upon 
‘ethical or cultural background assumptions’ but believes that this doesn’t involve ‘competing 
ideas of the good’ and that we can transcend such concerns in a more rational and objective 
manner by concentrating on the ‘more “concrete” question of which activities are necessary 
and indispensable for society’s material reproduction’ (ibid, pp. 407-8). However, he fails to 
elaborate on this in any sustained and convincing way. The fate of Honneth’s original link 
between self-esteem and individual particularity - i.e. those elements of esteem attached to 
individual self-realisation that are outside of economic exchange and dependent on ethical 
convictions – is also in many ways subsumed back within the sphere of legal recognition 
where the emphasis is on individuals being given the autonomy to pursue their own particular 
aims (ibid. p. 409). 
 
                                                
62 In fact, Van Den Brink goes further in suggesting not only that ‘in a pluralistic world, the best we can hope for 
is that we will mutually respect each other’s life-choices even if we cannot really set ourselves to granting them 
our full esteem’, but also that ‘as long as the mutual respect that is implicit in our recognising valid legal 
relations is warranted, the lack of full esteem and, at times, even the mutual devaluation of each other’s 
convictions need not be a constant threat to our wellbeing’. For him, contra Honneth, ‘we make ourselves 
needlessly vulnerable to the impossibility of social harmony if we conceive of ethical life as presupposing 
undistorted and unrestricted relationships of recognition’ (in Petherbridge, 2011, p. 172). 
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These final criticisms of Honneth return us to some of the criticisms of Habermas outlined at 
the end of chapter 1. As we have seen, Honneth seeks to develop a critical theory that 
maintains Habermas’s commitment to communicative action whilst also avoiding the 
tendency to both oppose norm-free strategic action to power-free social action and to abstract 
‘reason’ from concrete social practices and the moral experiences of social actors. He, like 
Habermas, wants to avoid the accusation that he is presenting a partial set of ‘critical’ moral 
principles as if they are universal, and he also wants to develop an account that is sensitive to 
the position of the ‘concrete Other’. He seeks to meet all of these criteria by shifting the focus 
away from linguistic communication and towards the ‘mutual recognition’ of identities. He 
wants his theory of recognition to be able to outline general norms in a manner similar to 
Kantian moral theory so that they are ‘formal or abstract enough not to raise the suspicion of 
representing merely the deposits of concrete interpretations of the good life’ (Honneth, 1996, 
p. 173), while also containing the ‘sufficient substantive content’ he associates with 
communitarian ethics. Honneth is critical of the way in which the development of Habermas’s 
thought has led him away from the need to ‘socially anchor the normative perspective of his 
critical theory’. Without grounding his ‘critical’ position in some sort of social ‘pre-
theoretical resource’, his critical theory becomes just another form of social-scientific 
critique. In other words, the emancipatory element of Habermas’s later work appeals to the 
normative presuppositions ‘implicit’ in linguistic understanding and which operate behind the 
backs of social actors rather than in line with their actual (moral) experiences. By turning to 
experiences of ‘disrespect’, and the ‘moral logic’ contained in the forms of resistance and 
social conflict triggered by such experiences, Honneth hopes to have identified existing forms 
of social injustice that can provide the ‘pre-theoretical resource’ for his ‘critical’ perspective. 
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In many ways, I believe that Honneth’s work has been important in broadening the 
communicative perspective and in developing a deeper sense of what binds us together, what 
provides us with a sense of solidarity, and what also motivates us to resist forms of injustice 
and suffering. However, despite Honneth’s attempts to close the gap between abstract rational 
principles and the (substantive) norms of lifeworld practices, I agree with critics such as 
Bernstein (2005) who argue that Honneth repeats the tendency in Habermas to ‘purify’ the 
ideals of communicative reason for the purposes of distinguishing between progressive and 
regressive societal developments. Ideals (as quasi-transcendental principles) – i.e. a ‘formal 
conception of ethical life’ and ‘the general presuppositions of communicative action’ - 
become separated from their (empirical) use in everyday social practices for the purpose of 
providing a critical yardstick by which to assess such practices. In addition to this, there is the 
assumption in Honneth, as in Habermas, that the ‘formal’ nature of such ideals is what gives 
them their ‘rational’ authority. Bernstein (2005, p. 308) argues that the ‘formal’ ideals 
outlined in Habermas and Honneth are in many ways part of the problem: despite their 
attempts to ground such ideals in the ‘pre-theoretical resource’ of social action and resistance, 
they end up turning practical norms into ‘theoretical norms’, i.e. the ‘purification’ of practical 
norms robs them of their immanent link to motivation and action and they become merely 
contemplative. As Bernstein argues: 
 
‘however delicate, a formal conception of ethical life, even if it does accurately 
reconstruct the recognitive achievements of modernity, must nonetheless purify 
those achievements, denying both that those forms are implicated in the 
reproduction of the domination they oppose – as if Marx in On the Jewish 
Question had not emphatically demonstrated that the duality between state and 
civil society, between the ideal and its material base, that continues unmodified to 
this day, itself perverts the republican end into becoming an instrument serving 
what should only be the economic means for societal reproduction – and that, in 
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order to comprehend this constant cooptation or perversion, we must assume that 
what is at issue is historical formations of reason itself’ (p. 317).63 
 
Despite pointing to this in his criticisms of others, Honneth’s ultimate emphasis on ‘rights’, as 
we have seen, tends to neglect the fact that they might be implicated in forms of 
‘misrecognition’, e.g. the tendency for legal recognition to be premised on mutual 
indifference and to abstract from particularity. As Bernstein suggests therefore ‘Honneth’s 
purification of recognition reiterates without shifting the wild hopefulness implied by 
Habermas’s wish to obtain a clean separation of instrumental and communicative rationality’ 
(p. 317).64 Foster (2011) also suggests that Honneth is guilty of too neatly ‘analytically 
separating the instrumental from the intersubjective’ and therefore risks ‘becoming blind to 
the persistence of instrumental attitudes within the intersubjective, and to the persistence of 
the intersubjective dimension of our interaction with the non-human world’ (p. 259).  
 
So despite Honneth’s desire to bridge the gap between abstract rational principles and the 
(substantive) norms of lifeworld practices, and to avoid the abstraction and proceduralism of 
Habermas’s ‘idealising presuppositions of communication’, Honneth’s ‘formal conception of 
ethical life’ again abstracts from difference, particularity, subjectivity, and social – as well as 
material and temporal – context. The proceduralism we saw in Habermas’s work, despite his 
attempts to escape the confines of instrumental rationality, reappears in a new form in 
                                                
63 García Düttman (2000) makes a similar point. In criticising Honneth’s formal conception of ethical life he 
suggests that the struggle for recognition is determined in advance by Honneth’s idealisations and he argues that 
there is ‘an essential link between the reification or objectification of recognition and an idealisation which has 
the effect of an ideologisation. It is difficult not to conclude that a politics of recognition which is determined by 
such a link cannot but produce and reproduce social conformism’ (p. 156). See also García Düttman (1997).  
64 Despite their emphasis on intersubjectivity, rather than the autonomous individual subject, there are strong 
links to be made here to Kant’s ‘practical reason’ and his separation of (autonomous) rational subjects from the 
complexity of other (heteronomous) aspects of social life, which in turn reflects the abstraction of ‘legally’ 
autonomous individuals in the separation of civil society and state. Bernstein also hints at the implicit dangers of 
excluding those forms of ethical life that do not fit Habermas and Honneth’s a priori ideals of communicative 
and recognitive legitimacy and the way this parallels ‘secular practices of purification’ such as the Terror (p. 
308).  
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Honneth’s idealising presuppositions of recognition. Again we encounter a ‘universal’ reason 
at odds with the claims made by desire, the body, nature, and particularity. At this point we 
might ask whether Honneth dispensed with the critical position of Foucault too soon? Might 
Foucault help provide us with a more promising programme for critique? One not only critical 
of the dangers of idealisation and procedural rationality - and more sensitive to the potential 
claims made by particularity, desire, and the body - but also one that centres on struggle and 
the ways in which established forms of recognition are often complicit in forms of 
misrecognition. Or does Foucault’s work return us to the points made by Honneth in his 
original criticisms of Foucault’s work as a ‘systems-theoretic solution to the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment’ – i.e. that Foucault loses the emphasis on social struggle and avoids notions of 
normative consensus in an account of the stabilisation of power which ends up outlining the 
operation of autonomous power systems over and above social actors? I will explore these 
issues in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: MICHEL FOUCAULT - POWER/KNOWLEDGE, ETHICS & 
AESTHETICS 
 
As I already suggested in the introduction, in many ways it could be construed as odd to 
include the work of Michel Foucault within a thesis concerned with the trajectory, and 
problematic, of Frankfurt School Critical Theory in its development from Adorno and 
Horkheimer, through the work of Habermas, up to the recognitive concerns of Axel Honneth. 
However, taking my lead from Honneth’s Critique of Power1, not only do I recognise the 
significance of Foucault’s work for social theory as a whole, and feel that Foucault helps us 
clarify a number of key ‘critical-theoretical’ concerns in addition to criticising Habermasian 
style universalism, but I also want to argue that his work poses a similar challenge to 
Honneth’s formal conception of ethical life and his account of recognition. The role of the 
self-normalising subject is particularly important here given the absence of a notion of 
‘subjectivisation’ in Honneth’s account of recognition. Alongside the obvious importance of 
Foucault’s work on power/knowledge here, I also want to argue that Foucault’s later work on 
aesthetics and ethics, which shares with earlier Adornian critical theory an inclination towards 
an aesthetic critique of modernity, is worthy of consideration as a possible antidote to the 
idealising and proceduralism we have identified in Habermasian and Honnethian variants of 
the communicative turn in Critical Theory. 
 
My exposition, and criticisms, of Foucault’s work will take the familiar form of three distinct 
periods in his writing: his earlier ‘archaeological’ works, his middle ‘genealogical’ period, 
                                                
1 Also see the essays in Kelly, M. (ed.) (1994) (particularly McCarthy’s ‘The Critique of Impure Reason: 
Foucault and the Frankfurt School’), Dews (1987) (particularly pp. 150-161), David Couzens Hoy’s ‘Power, 
Repression, Progress: Foucault, Lukes and the Frankfurt School’ (and other essays) in Hoy (ed.) (1986), and the 
essays in Ashenden and Owen (eds.) (1999). 
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and his later turn to ‘aesthetics/ethics’.2 However, I will concentrate on the latter two periods, 
partly due to limitations of space, but also due to the fact that these phases of his work share 
more with a Critical Theory, broadly construed, whilst helping us to clarify the problems with 
the communicative turn that we have encountered so far. As Honneth suggests, the clearest 
links between Foucault and early Critical Theory are apparent in the genealogical concern 
with the connection between power and knowledge, or domination and reason, and the 
embeddedness of ‘reason’ in historical, social and cultural contexts. However, rather than 
exploring the possibility of a domination-free rationality – however fragile that may be – or 
the idealised presuppositions of interaction which might point towards non-coercive dialogue, 
Foucault instead doggedly pursues a Nietzschean account of the origins of the ‘social’ in 
power/knowledge and emphasises the impossibility of a context transcendence of truth or 
emancipatory knowledge. I outline a number of familiar criticisms of Foucault’s genealogical 
period before considering the shift to an emphasis on subjectivisation and ‘techniques of the 
self’. I explore the merits of his aesthetic critique – the self-creation of identity as a ‘work of 
art’ – but ultimately find it overly subjective and lacking a more substantive conception of 
culture, democracy, recognition, and ethical responsibility. 
 
Foucault’s Early Work 
Foucault’s initial project - apparent in his Madness and Civilisation, The Birth of the Clinic, 
but particularly The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge – seeks to provide 
what he calls an ‘archaeological’ analysis of modern (humanist) discourses and their 
consequences and exclusions. He explores the unifying features and presuppositions of 
historical discourses – the connections between their concepts, themes and objects - and takes 
                                                
2 For this schema see, in particular, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982). 
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aim at the heart of what he calls the ‘anthropological’ modern episteme with the human 
subject (as the ‘transcendental-empirical doublet’ or both subject and object of knowledge) at 
its centre. By demonstrating that the subject is an effect of discourse, rather than its 
foundation or condition of possibility, he seeks to provide a historiography that bypasses the 
consciousness of subjects whilst also recovering those voices silenced by modern human(ist) 
sciences.3 Consistent with the Structuralist argument that thoughts and ideas are not the 
creation of individual consciousness, and that thought is inseparable from the language we 
use, Foucault explores the dominant ideas of a particular historical period as reflections of a 
particular ‘discourse’ or ‘discursive formation’. Discourses are rule-bound ways of speaking 
and writing about the world that are intimately connected to their social and historical context, 
and Foucault is primarily concerned with the ways in which different discursive formations 
operate. In his critique of our modern (subject-centred) discursive practices, Foucault not only 
appeals to the ‘thought from the outside’ with recourse to the transgressive nature of avant-
garde writers (e.g. Foucault, 1971, pp. 48-49) and the revelatory voice of madness (Foucault, 
1965), but he also hopes for the disintegration of the modern ‘episteme’ and the rise of a post-
humanist future. If the idea of man can be demonstrated to be the product of the end of the 
‘classical episteme’ and the birth of the ‘modern episteme’, he argues that the ‘end of man’ 
may well be on the horizon: 
 
‘Man is an invention easily shown by the archaeology of our thought to be of 
recent date. And whose end is, perhaps, nigh … We can readily wager that man 
will be effaced, like a face traced in the sand at the edge of the sea’ (1971, p. 387).  
 
                                                
3 In their quest to ground knowledge claims as ‘universal’ and ‘true’, Foucault argues that Enlightenment 
knowledge-claims and their modern offshoots have sought to master or suppress the notion of the (empirical) 
historically-constituted and contingent human being as ‘object’ of knowledge with recourse to the transcendental 
ego (Kant) or the self-consciousness of a collective subject (Hegel, Lukács etc) as synthetic ‘subject’ of 
knowledge. Instead of ‘universality’, Foucault argues that Enlightenment thought should be understood as the 
generalisations of a historically specific, and contingent, human subjectivity.  
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Foucault’s emphasis on the subject as an effect of discourse also provides him with a 
methodological justification for his (disinterested and non-ideological) science of discourse, 
and he appeals to ethnology as a ‘counterscience’ to justify his own scientific approach 
(Foucault, 1971, pp. 412-22).4 In an attempt to purely describe and historically analyse his 
own European culture ‘from outside’, he aims to eliminate any vestiges of the modern 
philosophy of the subject (or philosophy of reflection) from his own work and to develop a 
new theoretical language in the process. There can be no ‘objective’ knowledge as such for 
Foucault, in terms of ‘true’ pre-discursive knowledge of objective reality, because objects 
(and subjects) are themselves formed within discourse and it is discourse that produces what 
we understand as reality; however, at this stage of his thinking, he believes that there can be a 
science of discourse.5 He argues that this does not involve a ‘critical’ or ‘transcendental’ 
method as such – which he sees as products of the modern humanist episteme – but an 
archaeological method akin to mathematical science: what he calls ‘a pure description of 
discursive events’ (1972, p. 27). 
 
The prevalence of Structuralist thinking in the 1950s and 1960s, with its emphasis on the 
decentred subject, the explanatory value of unconscious structures, and the centrality of a 
system of linguistic signs, influenced the early work of Foucault and his attempts to write 
‘subject-less’ histories.6 Operating with a Kantian notion of the ‘conditions of possibility’ of 
knowledge, or rather a historical a priori of knowledge - instead of a specifically Freudian 
                                                
4 See also Honneth’s discussion of Foucault and ethnology in Honneth (1991, pp. 105-11) 
5 In this period of his work, and in common with other structuralisms, he does operate with an idea of ‘true 
sciences’ with proper objects of study – labour, language, etc – and improper sciences that are constitutive of 
their objects of study rather than constituted by them. A key concern of his Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), 
which seeks to methodologically clarify his earlier historiographical work, is to outline the scientific rationality 
he uses in his classification and analysis of other forms of scientific rationality. 
6 His archaeological work shares similarities with Saussure’s concern with the ways in which the system of 
language – as the condition of possibility of knowledge - operates as a collection of units with internal 
differences out of which meaningful sentences are constructed. 
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notion of the unconscious - Foucault attempts to uncover ‘a positive unconscious of 
knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific 
discourse’ (Foucault, 1971, p. xi).7 He sets out to identify and describe the historical and 
epistemological conditions of possibility for different systems of thought, the 
unacknowledged rules used by scientists to ‘define the objects proper to their own study, to 
form their concepts, to build their theories’ (ibid., p. xi). He refers to these underlying rules as 
‘epistemes’ and defines them as: 
 
‘the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that 
give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalised systems …, 
the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a given period, between the 
sciences when one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities’ (Foucault, 
1972, p. 191). 
 
Deep epistemic structures (savoir), as a priori conditions of possibility of knowledge, allow 
historically-specific knowledges (connaissance) and practices to function, and they make 
possible the discussion of certain ‘objects’ of knowledge.8 Discursive formations form their 
‘objects’ of knowledge and develop concepts and procedures that express the validity of 
different statements within a particular discourse. So for example, the modern ‘scientific’ 
                                                
7 The influence of Kant is apparent both in Foucault’s emphasis on the discourse-mediated nature of knowledge 
and truth, and his appeal to the conditions of possibility of experience. However, in the place of Kant’s 
transcendental subject, Foucault’s archaeology places subject-less and historically contingent epistemic rules. 
Kant’s influence on Foucault is apparent in the complementary thesis of his doctoral work - his principal thesis 
being Madness and Civilisation – which was a translation of Kant’s 1798 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point 
of View (see Macey, 1993, pp. 88-89). See Allen (2003) for an account of how Foucault’s reading of Kant’s 
Anthropology in this thesis was crucial in determining the future direction of his work. Also, the influence of 
Kant applies not only to Foucault’s early work but, as we shall see, his later work on aesthetics, ethics and 
Enlightenment. See also Foucault’s interviews ‘Critical Theory/Intellectual History’ and ‘The Art of Telling the 
Truth’ (in Kritzman, ed., 1990).  
8 Despite Foucault’s claims to be neutral and to provide a ‘pure description of the facts of discourse’ however, 
his analysis does arguably contain certain normative prescriptions in the form of his welcoming the breakdown 
of the modern episteme and the ‘end of man’. Habermas refers to this as ‘cryptonormativism’. If, as Foucault 
claims, each episteme is marked by its difference from others due to the lack of any overarching principles or 
transcendent criteria by which to judge between epistemes, then he is unable to explain why we should welcome 
a new episteme. If he welcomes a new episteme on the grounds that the modern episteme elides difference and 
otherness, then he is in danger of contradiction by positing a transcendental principle by which to judge 
epistemes (Habermas, 1992, p. 268) 
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discourse on ‘mental illness’, outlined by Foucault in Madness and Civilisation (1965), 
‘forms’ the ‘mentally ill’ as an object of the discourse of psychiatry and now operates with a 
category of person that can be diagnosed, treated with drugs or therapy etc.9 This new 
category of the ‘mental patient’, an object that could not previously be spoken or written 
about except within the confines of the previous discourse of ‘madness’, can now be 
identified and also further spoken and written about in terms of a range of ‘mental illnesses’ 
such as schizophrenia or depression. Different criteria and symptoms are used to identify the 
various illnesses and their sub-categories, and different procedures and social roles are in 
place to determine the validity of certain statements about the ‘object’ of the discourse. 
Professionally qualified individuals are in a position to diagnose and treat the mentally ill and 
their statements are considered valid in comparison to those deemed mentally ill whose 
statements may well be perceived as ‘symptoms’ of their illness. Certain ‘rules’ of discourses 
are in place such that only certain things can be said and only certain people can say them.10 
 
Each of Foucault’s significant earlier works provides us with an alternative, non-traditional 
(and non-teleological) history of its object - be it madness, health, or broader conceptions of 
knowledge. These histories are non-progressive and non-triumphal and instead outline a series 
of radical historical junctures or ‘epistemic shifts’ between different ways of understanding, 
and dealing with a topic or object of knowledge. Despite some differences in approach 
between each of his earlier works, they all explore the divergences between various historical 
‘epistemes’ and how these have been formed by a disparate range of historical and 
                                                
9 However at this stage of his research, Foucault argues that these modern discourses are not ‘truly scientific’, 
despite their claims, since they are not constituted by a proper epistemological break – in other words, these 
discourses are socially constructed, whereas ‘true’ scientific discourses are not. 
10 However this is not to argue that discourses are simply closed and coherent ways of speaking and writing 
about objects, such that everyone within that discursive formation will agree on all issues. Foucault suggests that 
discourses unleash a wide range of possibilities, which is evident in disagreements over a range of issues, but 
that this dispersal of elements still operates within the confines of a shared episteme. 
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institutional factors; these factors are seen to coalesce at specific historical moments and 
radically change dominant discourses whilst producing new ways of thinking and relating to 
objects as well as creating new objects of knowledge. Each his earlier works also tend to 
focus, as ‘histories of the present’, on the historical ‘conditions of possibility’ for our modern 
humanist discourses as well as the practical consequences of such discourses. Although 
Foucault is committed to the idea that epistemes are only related in terms of ‘difference’ and 
cannot therefore be judged according to any (historically) transcendent, and non-episteme 
specific, criteria as such (e.g. the self-realisation of the historical subject), his histories do tend 
to be histories of increasing control, classification, surveillance and normalisation under the 
(humanist) auspices of truth, morality and progress. 
 
Foucault’s history of madness from the Renaissance to the modern day, for example, becomes 
a history of increasing surveillance, silencing and control rather than the more conventional 
history of increasing respect for, and humane treatment of, the mad.11 This is not a 
‘progressive’ history whereby our ways of thinking come to more accurately represent the 
‘reality’ of madness; it is instead a history of radical junctures between different ways of 
understanding, and dealing with, madness, and how these have been formed by a range of, 
relatively contingent, historical and discursive factors – e.g. institutions, laws, political 
                                                
11 Foucault compares the madman of the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, who was often left to wander in 
the open countryside and whose ‘folly’ was often considered to contain its own wisdom or special knowledge 
about humanity, to the ‘Classical era’ (which he dates from the Hôpital Général in 1656 - where madness was 
increasingly seen as having idleness or deviance at its core (Foucault, 1965, p. 64) – through to the ‘great 
confinement’ of the Parisian poor, and on to Pinel’s liberation of the inmates of Bicêtre in 1794, and the birth of 
the Asylum). The eighteenth century is seen as the period where madness enters the ‘garden of species’ and 
where attempts are now made to scientifically (and medically) classify all those who represent the ‘other’ of 
bourgeois order and scientific ‘reason’. The birth of the asylum, and the founding of the York retreat by Tuke in 
1796, is re-read by Foucault as the site of normalisation and confessional self-identification rather than as a place 
of humane treatment - it marks the transition from earlier, overt forms of repression, to more covert forms of 
surveillance and control.  
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reforms, architectural forms, scientific and philosophical arguments.12 In many ways, 
Madness and Civilisation pre-empts many of the key issues in the rest of Foucault’s work – 
e.g. the ways in which the knowledge produced by the human sciences is not simply 
disinterested inquiry but is embedded in power relations which it also sustains, in this case the 
self-confidence of Enlightenment rationality being defined against a realm of excluded 
‘unreason’ which itself is intimately connected to the institutional confinement of the mad.13 
For our purposes, what begins to emerge in Foucault’s work at this point is a sensitivity to the 
paradoxes of modernity, the impurity of ‘reason’, and the relationship between universalist 
Enlightenment rationality and forms of (exclusionary) power relations, in addition to the 
normalising nature of universalist forms of thought (e.g. the confessional self-identification of 
the ‘mad’ with the institutional definitions and structures which ‘recognise’ them albeit in an 
ultimately oppressive and restrictive manner). His later genealogical work develops these 
ideas further and, I want to argue, challenges the ideals at work in Habermas’s and Honneth’s 
work by emphasising the ways in which humanist ideals of autonomy and recognition have 
often involved darker elements of humanist domination, and also the ways in which subjects 
are constituted by self-subjection, in addition to being oppressed by others. Foucault’s work 
helps us to remain vigilant to the ways in which communicative rationality itself, when 
applied as a ‘rational’ standard to others and ourselves, may well exclude those identities and 
                                                
12 The same applies to Foucault’s ‘archaeology of the medical gaze’ in his The Birth of the Clinic (1973). Rather 
than a history of medical progression, and an increasing approximation to the ‘truth’ of disease, he suggests that 
we witness a radical change in relations of visibility and spatialisation: a shift from the eighteenth century 
conception of disease as having a pathological essence, separate from its materialisation in the human body, to 
the modern (humanist) conception of disease as necessarily manifested in the human body. The clinical gaze 
objectifies the body by looking within and dissecting the patient in order to find the disease, and man comes to 
‘constitute himself in his own eyes as an object of science’ (1973, p. 243).  
13 Foucault’s response to this, in the form of an ‘archaeology of silence’, seeks to recover something of the 
experience of madness that has been lost (see Foucault in Macey, 1993, p. 95). He detects a ‘muffled noise’ 
breaking through the attempts of confinement to silence it, and looks to the writings and paintings of Artaud, 
Nerval, Goya, Van Gogh, Nietzsche and de Sade, for important elements of human experience absent from 
reason. It is in this ‘excess’, i.e. the forms of experience excluded by the rationality of Enlightenment thought, 
that he appears to ground freedom in opposition to ‘reason’s monologue on madness’. However, the idea that a 
‘primitive, basic and muffled experience’ of ‘madness’ could exist separately from the discourses that constitute 
it was later criticised by Foucault in his The Archaeology of Knowledge (see Foucault, 1972, p. 39). 
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forms of action, resistance and satisfaction which aren’t easily translatable into the ‘rational’ 
solidarity required of Habermas’s ‘discursive’ theory nor Honneth’s ‘recognitive’ one.  
 
Genealogy, Power/Knowledge, and Resistance 
A number of ambiguities and problems arise in Foucault’s archaeological work, mainly 
connected to the relationship between an episteme, as an a priori set of rules, and the 
determination of knowledge by wider social structures and power relations; this ambiguity 
also causes problems for his explanations for both resistance and historical change (see 
Honneth, 1991, p. 139).14 His archaeological approach aims to provide a significant degree of 
autonomy for discourse and to avoid an account of knowledge that reduces it to its socio-
economic, material determination (see Foucault Live, 1989, pp. 18-19); however, to avoid the 
charge of idealism, Foucault also acknowledges the need to relate the autonomous level of 
discourse to social and political practices and institutions. These issues are of particular 
prominence in his The Order of Things (1971), but despite his attempts here and his further 
attempts in his The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), Foucault fails to sufficiently clarify 
the relationship between discursive and non-discursive elements in his notion of ‘discursive 
formation’ (See McNay, 1994, p. 73; also Honneth, 1991, pp. 146-7).15 His acknowledgement 
                                                
14 Rather than ‘transcendence’ being an immanent possibility within an epistemic order, Foucault’s treatment of 
discursive regularities as if they were concrete realities leads to a notion of the epistemic order as absolute and 
therefore only subject to challenge from ‘beyond’, i.e. from outside its limits – despite him also later claiming 
that there can be no outside. The Other of Enlightenment rationality, previously an authentic and pre-discursive 
‘madness’, becomes the ‘epistemic break’ or is represented by avant-garde forms of aesthetic practice that have 
somehow retained their autonomy from the dominant episteme. 
15 Foucault’s The Order of Things (1971) is his general ‘archaeology of the human sciences’, where he steps 
back from the particular fields of madness and medicine etc, and attempts to outline changes in overarching 
conceptions of knowledge from the Renaissance, via the Classical period, to the modern. Each of these periods 
displayed an internal coherence in the ways in which the disciplines of economics, linguistics and natural history 
understood the world and defined their objects, but they classified the world in ways radically incommensurable 
with each other. The Renaissance period, characterised by ‘resemblances’ between things, shifts to the Classical 
period where words - previously part of the world of resemblances – are now understood as representing and 
classifying the objects they speak of; the natural and social worlds are also now seen as measurable and ordered 
according to the new scientific principles propounded by the likes of Bacon and Descartes (e.g. mathesis and 
taxonomia).The human subject replaces language as the centre of knowledge, in the modern episteme,  and 
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of the inherent problems in his archaeological work leads to an eventual reconceptualisation 
of his notion of discourse.16 Discourse is no longer seen as an internally regulating system, 
whereby rules regulate themselves, but as both determined by, and constitutive of, power 
relations.  
 
The term ‘genealogy’ first appears in a 1971 essay of Foucault’s that explicitly acknowledges 
the influence of Nietzsche – ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ (in Rabinow, ed., 1991, pp. 76-
100).17 Here Foucault uses Nietzsche’s idea of ‘genealogy’ as a challenge to those traditional 
histories which seek to understand history as a series of causal events with an overall pattern. 
The dangers associated with such histories according to Foucault are threefold: (a) the erasure 
of difference and the singularity of ‘the event’ by subsumption into a general historical 
narrative; (b) the privileging of the self-reflexive subject at the centre of historical movement; 
and (c) the retrospective, and narcissistic, reading of history as leading up to the present (as 
fulfilment). Foucault seeks to replace traditional histories with non-metaphysical histories of 
contingency and discontinuity. History is to have no immanent meaning but is to be seen as a 
history of accidents and a history of power struggles, where such struggles do not culminate 
                                                                                                                                                   
becomes the (Kantian) transcendental ‘condition of possibility’. There is a also a decline in the classification of 
what is visible, and an increase in the use of concepts that go beyond immediate description (e.g. the concept of 
‘labour’ in explaining value, internal organic features and evolutionary-historical conceptions in natural history, 
etc). Each of the human sciences explore the hidden forces that explain the existence of ‘Man’, and ‘Man’ 
becomes the object of knowledge and the transcendental subject of knowledge; this in turn gives rise to 
irreconcilable tensions at the very heart of the foundations of modern knowledge.  
16 The starting point for this shift, which Foucault makes reference to as a ‘moment of transition’ (in Gordon, 
ed., 1980, p. 183), is his inaugural lecture in 1970 - ‘The Order of Discourse’ (in Young, ed., 1981). See also 
Foucault (in Gordon, ed., 1980, p. 113) where he states: ‘what was lacking here (in the earlier work) was this 
problem of the ‘discursive regime’, of the effects of power peculiar to the play of statements’, and also ‘one’s 
point of reference should not be to the great model of language (langue) and signs, but to that of war and battle. 
The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a language: relations of 
power, not relations of meaning’ (ibid, p. 114). 
17 Although this is not the first place he tackles the influence of Nietzsche on his work, e.g. see Foucault’s 1967 
text ‘Nietzsche, Freud, Marx’ (Foucault, 1986) and the introduction to his Archaeology of Knowledge (1972). 
For some of Foucault’s reflections on his Nietzscheanism, see the interviews in Kritzman (ed., 1990) – in 
particular the interviews ‘Critical Theory/Intellectual History’ (pp. 17-46) and ‘Return to Morality’ (pp. 242-
254). 
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in mutuality ‘where the rule of law finally replaces warfare’, but rather ‘humanity installs 
each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination’ 
(in Rabinow, ed., 1991, p. 85). Foucault famously inverts Clausewitz’s aphorism to make this 
point: ‘politics is war continued by other means’. Also the body, rather than the meaning-
giving subject, is seen to be at the centre of his non-teleological histories of struggle, and 
Foucault presents us with a material history of the way in which the body is inscribed, shaped 
and reshaped by power struggles.18 It is the body that will take centre stage in Foucault’s key 
genealogical works – Discipline and Punish (1977) and History of Sexuality (volume one) 
(1990). 
 
There are a number of clear Nietzschean themes in Foucault’s genealogical period. Not only 
the notion of ‘genealogy’ itself, and the emphasis on contingent and subjectless histories, but 
Foucault also pursues Nietzsche’s obsession with exploring the sacrifices which are made in 
the formation of autonomous subjectivity.19 Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1977) echoes 
Nietzsche’s concern with the formation of morality through obedience and punishment in his 
Genealogy of Morals (1956), and there are also clear parallels with Nietzsche in Foucault’s 
exploration of the double meaning of ‘discipline’ (i.e. the role of the human sciences, as 
‘disciplines’, in calculating and ‘disciplining’ the behaviour of human beings). Foucault 
explicitly follows Nietzsche in his attempt to undermine those humanist histories which 
outline the progressive (or potential) separation of truth and power, instead opting to expose 
the (unavoidable) ‘will to power’ lurking behind the ‘will to truth’ (or in Foucault’s subtitle to 
                                                
18 A key difficulty for Foucault, as we will see however, will be to use the language of power without infusing it 
with its conventionally associated meanings of the self-reflexive agent as subject and other forms of teleology. 
19 Honneth makes clear links here between the Nietzschean influence on Foucault and some similar themes 
shared by Adorno and Horkheimer in their Dialectic of Enlightenment (see Honneth, 1991, pp. xxii). 
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Volume 1 of his History of Sexuality, the ‘will to know’).20 Both Nietzsche and Foucault see 
our interpretations of the world, and the way we give meaning to it, as an imposition on (or 
violence to) things, which in turn is dependent on our particular position of interest. This also 
fuels their interest not only in the myriad ways in which power and knowledge are entangled, 
but also in the recognition that ‘truth’ is produced and created, rather than simply unearthed, 
and also therefore open to reversals and transgressions.21 Related to this is Foucault’s 
adherence to Nietzsche’s histories of rationality and truth, which concern themselves with the 
historical construction(s) of notions of good, evil, truth etc, without recourse to any 
underlying essential ‘truthful’ interpretation or distinction between truth and ideology. 
However, having said this, they both also rather paradoxically tend to impose criteria of their 
own when deciding between alternative interpretations (or forms of knowledge), and these 
criteria are driven by an interest in promoting agonistic struggle, transgression and 
heterogeneity. 
 
Without abandoning many of the key ideas of his archaeological period, Foucault’s 
genealogical studies aim to clarify, and make explicit, the relationship between discourse and 
power; rather than lurking in the background, as they did with his archaeological studies, 
social structures and the institutional conditions of knowledge production come to the fore 
(Foucault in Gordon, ed., 1980, pp. 113-14). Here Foucault is primarily concerned with the 
ways in which specific bodies of knowledge, particularly the human sciences, have developed 
in conjunction with power relations. His history of what he calls the ‘carceral society’ focuses 
on the ways in which certain activities are regulated and transformed by professionals and 
                                                
20 Foucault also describes his project in these terms in his earlier inaugural lecture (see Foucault in Young, ed., 
1981, pp. 48-78). 
21 See in particular Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil (1990). I will briefly explore the political implications of 
this below in terms of a shared interest in a political aesthetics.  
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administrative officials on the basis of scientific bodies of knowledge. These functionaries 
serve to both redefine activities in such a way that they can operate within the confines of a 
‘rational’ science, and to reorganise human conduct in line with rational and efficient 
procedures. The ‘disciplinary power’ wielded by such functionaries operates according to a 
process of ‘normalisation’ at work in the very formation of certain bodies of scientific 
knowledge. In the process of (scientifically) defining what constitutes ‘normal’, for example 
‘normal sexuality’, scientific knowledge also operates with a notion of its Other as deviant, 
for example ‘abnormal sexual practices’ (Foucault, 1990). In applying the idea of ‘normality’ 
across a range of different activities, new categories of ‘deviance’ are constantly created, and 
the attempt to ensure ‘normal’ practices in the population at large requires both ‘surveillance’ 
and the regulation and elimination of ‘abnormal’ practices. Individuals are increasingly 
controlled through normative power - the relatively invisible standards of normality generated 
by moral and scientific discourses - rather than overt repression; hence the importance for 
Foucault of the self-normalising subject and the links between subjectivity and epistemic 
configurations. In addition to this, he emphasises the ways in which surveillance may take the 
form of policing or administration, and the ways in which it is intimately linked to the 
reorganisation of activities with the aim of making them more amenable to observation and 
supervision. In other words, the relationship between power and knowledge – between 
administration, discipline and control on the one hand, and rationality and science on the other 
– is so entwined, that it is impossible to speak of them separately, hence Foucault’s use of the 
expression power/knowledge (Gordon, ed., 1980). 
 
The ‘subject’ plays a similar role in Foucault’s genealogies to the one it played in his 
archaeologies, except there is more of an emphasis here on the dual meaning of ‘subject’ – 
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meaning both human being and the process of subjection.22 Foucault’s genealogies focus on 
the links between subjectivity and epistemic configurations with an emphasis on the self-
normalising subject. In a similar way to his portrayal of the ‘mad person’ in his earlier 
Madness and Civilisation (Foucault, 1965) – the person who is no longer the target of 
physical torture but is self-controlling in line with the moral expectations of medical authority 
- the modern subject assumes that he is autonomous and free despite the meticulous 
operations of power that have shaped him. The notion of ‘disciplinary power’ not only 
describes the punitive practices that operate in the name of power, but also, and more 
importantly, the production of obedient, well-disciplined (and self-disciplined) individuals. 
Connected to this idea of the formation of the modern subject, therefore, is Foucault’s 
definition of power as being ‘without a subject’. Whereas more traditional conceptions of 
power have seen it in terms of being something that is held, and wielded, by individuals and 
groups (e.g. by a sovereign ruler or the bourgeoisie), Foucault proposes a conception of power 
which sees it as dispersed throughout social institutions and practices, as the product of 
strategic conflict between subjects, and as integral to the formation of the subject and the 
formation of discourses. Rather than the kind of power that is external to, but exercised over, 
the activities of subjects – e.g. the power of the sovereign who rules at a distance and is 
broadly uninterested in the everyday activities of his subjects – Foucault emphasises the all-
pervasive nature of modern power which is integrated into the everyday activities it regulates 
(Foucault in Gordon, ed., 1980, p. 122).23 The proliferation of administrative activities has 
impacted upon the vast majority of aspects of modern life and has extended the effects of 
                                                
22 See in particular Foucault’s ‘Subject and Power’ essay in Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) where Foucault 
emphasises the ‘two meanings of the word “subject”: subject to someone else by control and dependence; and 
tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which 
subjugates and makes subject to’ (p. 212). 
23 Although at this point we might note that ‘power to’ always has to also be ‘power over’ if its function is to 
regulate. 
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power in all directions, although Foucault is keen to dismiss the idea of a unified and highly 
co-ordinated operation of power that works towards a particular goal, or is in the hands of a 
particular individual or group. In many ways, he conceives of power as the very social 
environment in which groups and individuals operate; power has a complex ‘capillary’ 
structure, it is everywhere and emerges from everywhere. 
 
The key texts that exemplify this genealogical stage of Foucault’s work are Discipline and 
Punish (1977) and History of Sexuality (volume one) (1990). The central thesis of his 
Discipline and Punish is that the Enlightenment notion of the triumph of scientific knowledge 
and rational organisation over authority and absolute power is in fact a history of the 
reorganisation of power and the development of an all-pervasive disciplinary power. 
Sovereign power, characterised by punishment and torture, is illustrated in Foucault’s book 
with the gruesome opening image of the death of Damiens the regicide in 1757 who was 
publicly tortured, dismembered and killed. The following image in the book, set a mere eighty 
years after the death of Damiens, involves the highly disciplined and rule-bound day of 
prisoners in Paris, whose activities include prayer, bathing, work, education etc. The short 
period between these two images is reminiscent of Foucault’s notion of an epistemic shift, 
central to his earlier ‘archaeological’ work, in this case the radical rupture in conceptions of 
power and knowledge related to punishment. This shift is not to be attributed to an increasing 
compassion in the treatment of all human beings, but as the rise of a disciplinary power that 
develops out of the objectifying and controlling tendencies of scientism. Central to this shift is 
the aim: 
 
‘to make of the punishment and repression of illegalities a regular function, 
coextensive with society; not to punish less, but to punish better; to punish with an 
attenuated severity perhaps, but in order to punish with more universality and 
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necessity; to insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body’ 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 82). 
 
Although penal reformers criticised the unrestrained nature of punishment under the feudal 
system of justice, the impetus for change was motivated predominantly by the desire for 
greater efficiency and regularity in the process of punishment.24 During the transition to the 
modern period the public spectacle of torture, characteristic of sovereign power, is replaced 
by (self-) regulation in prison, characteristic of the nation state; public trials and punishment 
are replaced by administrative procedures carried out by legal professionals; imprisonment as 
a means of simply ensuring the availability of the criminal for punishment, and also as a 
means of containing non-criminals such as the mad and the poor, is replaced by imprisonment 
as a form of punishment in itself; also the focus on whether someone is guilty is replaced by 
the focus on the social or psychological cause that led to their act. The key image used by 
Foucault to represent this shift to the disciplinary power of modern society is Bentham’s 
‘panopticon’ design of an ‘ideal’ prison. The circular building – with its central observation 
tower obscured by Venetian blinds so that prisoners are unaware as to whether they are being 
watched, and its individual cells between the tower and the outer walls – is characterised by 
its rational plan for the treatment, and control, of prisoners, and by its intention to get the 
prisoners to reflect on, and control, their own conduct. Without the need for physical control, 
architectural design ensures the more efficient functioning of power.  
 
Foucault refers to the modern forms of control as the microphysics of power and it is here that 
the inseparability of knowledge and power comes to the fore. The human sciences, or 
                                                
24 There are clear Marxist and Weberian themes at work in Foucault’s account of penal reform – the emphasis on 
capital’s need for ‘docile bodies’ ready for productive labour, and the rationalisation of social and legal spheres 
to ensure more efficient social administration For an elaboration of these connections see, amongst others, Smart 
(1983) and O’Neill (1986). 
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‘disciplines’, are seen as playing a key role in conceptualising important aspects of 
disciplinary power, such as what constitutes ‘normal’, and in creating new and more effective 
ways of controlling people. The modern penal system as an institutional practice is supported 
by conceptions of ‘truth’ created in criminological, sociological, psychological and medical 
discourses (Foucault, 1977, p. 226). The prisoner is not simply subjected to control through 
surveillance, but also through the myriad forms of assessment and diagnosis in line with the 
normative, and normalising, assumptions of these discourses. The criminal is also no longer 
judged according to the criminal act itself but according to the, often psychological, reasons 
for committing the crime. The criminal’s intentions are under scrutiny and measured against 
certain criteria of ‘normality’, and these criteria are used to understand the possibility of 
(normative) rehabilitation. This relationship between normative knowledge and social control 
leads Foucault to argue that: 
 
‘There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the 
same time power relations’ (1977, p. 27). 
 
Power operates effectively through the production of knowledge, and knowledge is never free 
from power relations, despite claims to value freedom and objectivity. Although he 
concentrates on the modern penal system, Foucault is keen to suggest that it provides a model 
for a broader carceral society of which the prison is only one institution in which individuals 
are regulated by, and regulate themselves in accordance with, surveillance; other institutions 
where power and knowledge work in tandem include schools, factories and hospitals 
(Foucault, 1977, pp. 138-9). Each of these institutions have their ‘judges’, such as teachers 
and doctors, who assess and diagnose individuals according to certain ‘normalising’ criteria, 
but they also importantly utilise architectural designs to ensure enclosure and 
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individualisation, and therefore the more efficient control of bodies within a network of 
disciplinary power. As I’ve already mentioned, for Foucault modern techniques of power seek 
to produce norms of conduct through disciplining the body. He sees the body, and its 
activities and expressions, as the lifeblood of societies and therefore as the target for control 
for the purposes of societal stability and integration25. Bodily processes at the levels of 
movements, illnesses, and reproduction, are the focal points for the operation of power and 
therefore play a central role in his studies of punishment and sexuality. In his Discipline and 
Punish he focuses on the development of training procedures for ‘docile bodies’ (e.g. the 
spatial distribution and temporal rationalisation of bodies) alongside the ‘means of correct 
training’ (e.g. surveillance and examination).26 
 
Although, as we have seen, Foucault sees power as dispersed throughout society, rather than 
simply being held by a particular group, he does reflect upon the importance of the role of the 
state. He utilises the notion of biopower to suggest that the state obtains its power from a 
large, healthy and educated population, and is therefore concerned with its general welfare 
while seeking to regulate and develop it (Foucault, 1990, p. 139). Administrative mechanisms 
attempt to ensure the reproduction and health of a population in line with society’s discipline-
related needs such as military participation and industrial production. It is in the first volume 
of his History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1990) that Foucault develops this idea, along with a 
conception of power which emphasises its productive (or rather constitutive) side. Here 
Foucault seeks to question traditional histories of sexuality, particularly the ‘repressive 
                                                
25 See ‘Body/Power’ in Gordon (ed., 1980, pp. 55-62). 
26 More specifically he refers to the training procedures for ‘docile bodies’ in terms of (a) the art of distributions, 
(b) the control of activity, (c) the organisation of geneses, and (d) the composition of forces (Foucault, 1977, pp. 
141-69); and he refers to ‘the means of correct training’ in terms of (i) hierarchical observation, (ii) normalising 
judgement, and (c) the examination (ibid, pp. 170-194). The examination brings together both hierarchical 
observation and normalising judgement inasmuch as it is ‘a normalising gaze, a surveillance that makes it 
possible to qualify, to classify and to punish’ (p. 184).  
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hypothesis’: the hypothesis which suggests that sex was increasingly repressed in the 
seventeenth century, significantly repressed as both a topic of discussion and as an activity in 
the Victorian period, then increasingly liberated in the twentieth century. He argues that rather 
than witnessing a historical absence of discourse about sex followed by an increasing 
liberation, there has instead been an important shift in the way we talk about sex.  
 
Although the Victorian period might have involved the repression of sexual feelings and 
behaviour, it was also a period marked by a rapid increase in scientific and therapeutic 
discourses about sex. There was a medicalisation of sexuality and the creation of sexuality as 
an object of knowledge, a ‘scientia sexualis’; here sexuality was attached to discourses of 
‘truth’, and ‘abnormal’ sexual practices were aligned with deviancy and mental illness. The 
attempts to generate and provoke discourses about sex are seen by Foucault as directly linked 
with, and constitutive of, attempts to regulate sex in line with the state’s concern with a 
healthy and productive population. To bring people’s sexual activities and thoughts to the 
point of articulation is to make them more easily identifiable and controllable. Rather than a 
history of the repression of discourse, we are faced with an understanding of the development 
of the discourse of sexuality as being concerned with an ‘incitement to discourse’. For 
Foucault, the Victorian period was marked by: 
 
‘… a steady proliferation of discourses concerned with sex … an institutional 
incitement to speak about it, and to do so more and more; a determination on the 
part of the agencies of power to hear it spoken about, and to cause it to speak 
through explicit articulation and endlessly accumulated detail’ (1990, p. 18). 
 
Foucault makes clear links here to the Western practice of religious confession and its 
dispersion into other areas of social practices, including scientific ones such as psychotherapy. 
A key change however involves the transition from confession about transgressive practices, 
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i.e. forbidden acts, to confession about internal thoughts, feelings and intentions. Scientific 
and medical notions of ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ sexual activities are therefore seen as 
continuing the (religious) moral notions of sin and guilt as means of social control, albeit in 
less explicit ways. The internalisation of ‘normal’ behaviour in line with such scientific and 
medical discourses, encouraged in modern medical approaches to madness and criminal 
behaviour, is continued in discourses around sexuality. It is in this light that Foucault 
conceives of psychoanalysis as the modern discipline, par excellence, due to its conception of 
the voluntary confession of inner desires as being the key to psychical liberation, a 
development Foucault sees as implicating individuals ever deeper in networks of disciplinary 
power.  
 
A central idea in Foucault’s History of Sexuality is that power is not simply repressive, 
inhibiting sexual activity or sexual expression, but is productive or constitutive in that it 
creates new discourses about sexuality along with new practices. Rather than these discourses 
simply turning sex into a reproductive activity, that is observed and regulated by medical 
professions in line with the demands of biopower, they create new sexual pleasures and 
concomitant forms of resistance. Foucault’s treatment of homosexuality illustrates this point. 
Traditional accounts of the field of sexuality suggest that homosexuality has been actively 
repressed, however Foucault concentrates on the contribution made by medical discourses in 
defining ‘the homosexual’ as someone in need of treatment and to be cured of their 
pathological illness. He argues that it was in the development of medical discourses that the 
category of ‘the homosexual’ was created; although same-sex relations clearly occurred 
before this time, ‘the homosexual’ as a category of person simply did not exist until formed 
by medicalised discourses. The creation of ‘the homosexual’ by such discourses demonstrates 
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the entwinement of power and knowledge, or rather exemplifies power/knowledge at work, as 
the formation of ‘scientific’ knowledge about this ‘object’ of sexuality is intimately tied to the 
aim of repressing same-sex relations. However, it also illustrates the point Foucault makes 
about disciplinary power creating its own forms of resistance. The category of ‘homosexual’ 
allows ‘homosexuals’ to see themselves as a group united by common interests and with 
common experiences of prejudice and exclusion, who might potentially engage in collective 
action with the aim of legitimising their sexual practices.27 As Foucault argues: 
 
‘Homosexuality began to speak on its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or 
‘naturality’ be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary using the same 
categories by which it was medically disqualified’ (1990, p. 101). 
 
Foucault’s conception of power as productive, and as productive of resistance, changes the 
focus of those traditional conceptions of power which locate power in a particular social 
group or structural location within society. The idea of confronting power in a unified way - 
e.g. via Marxist revolutionary activity - loses its significance for Foucault given the ubiquity 
of power, and resistance appears in those more localised and marginal forms emerging 
alongside attempts at regulation. Disciplinary power in prisons for example can also be seen 
as giving birth to its own forms of resistance such as everyday disobedience or prison riots; 
and it was here, amongst other struggles, that Foucault focussed his attentions as a founding 
member of the ‘Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons’ in 1971 (see Macey, 1993, pp. 257-
289).28 
                                                
27 Foucault’s productive notion of power thereby not only compensates for the formalism of his earlier 
archaeological work, but also represents an important advance over his previous notion of resistance and the 
Other. Rather than being external to the epistemic order - i.e. in the form of an authentic ‘madness’, an epistemic 
break, or certain forms of art and literature – resistance, and the Other, are now firmly within it in the guise of a 
product or effect of power relations.  
28 Foucault’s politics were notoriously varied and his activities encompassed a number of political issues. 
Amused by the frustrated attempts to label him, Foucault acknowledged that: ‘I think I have in fact been situated 
in most of the squares of the political checkerboard, one after another and sometimes simultaneously: as 
anarchist, leftist, ostentatious or disguised Marxist, nihilist, explicit or secret anti-Marxist, technocrat in the 
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Power, Subjectivity and Normativity: Some Critical Reflections on Genealogy 
Having briefly outlined the central points of Foucault’s genealogical studies, I will now 
consider some of the key criticisms provoked by this period in his work. These tend to be 
concentrated in three related areas: (a) a lack of clarity in his definition of power and the 
related problems of excessive domination and his neglect of resistance; (b) the lack of an 
adequate conception of ‘subjectivity’; and (c) the lack of a clear normative basis for critique. 
The problem of a lack of clarity in his definition of power involves the emphasis on an all-
encompassing domination, with very few resources for resistance, along with an inability to 
account for the concentration of power. Some have argued that Foucault’s notion of power is 
far too all encompassing to be in any way differentiating when describing social control. 
Although he is right to try and avoid the kind of economic reductionism at work in Marxist 
accounts of power, he is unclear about the way in which power is concentrated in certain parts 
of society, such as the State and productive relations (Poulantzas, 1978, p. 67). Also, despite 
the emphasis on power as ‘productive’, rather than simply repressive (e.g. the constitution of 
the category of ‘homosexual’ as both restrictive and resistant), Foucault still appears to leave 
us with an account of a totally administered society based on the model of dominant 
institutional forms of power such as penal systems. Accounts of power based on such models 
are in danger of overestimating the ‘total’ nature of control, and of neglecting less oppressive 
                                                                                                                                                   
service of Gaullism, new liberal etc. An American professor complained that a crypto-Marxist like me was 
invited to the U.S.A, and I was denounced by the press in Eastern European countries of being an accomplice of 
the dissidents. None of these descriptions is important by itself; taken together, on the other hand, they mean 
something. And I must admit that I rather like what they mean. It’s true that I prefer not to identify myself and 
that I’m amused by the diversity of ways I’ve been judged and classified’ (in Rabinow, ed., 1991, pp. 383-4). He 
started out as broadly Marxist and, influenced by his tutor Althusser, had been a (non-orthodox) member of the 
PCF. His politics shifted away from Marxism in the 1960s, and although he missed the student revolts in Paris in 
1968 whilst in Tunis, he was engaged with those opposed to the regime there. The early 1970s saw him mainly 
associated with the GIP prison reform group, which influenced his Discipline and Punish. He was also involved, 
alongside Genet and Sartre, in immigration and anti-racist campaigns, in demonstrations against the Vietnam 
war, and he later courted controversy with his support for the Iranian revolution and Islamic spiritual revolt 
(although later condemning the Iranian regime’s human rights abuses). He was also briefly associated with the 
Nouveaux Philosophes movement in the late 1970s, alongside Glucksmann and Levy, and was actively involved 
in supporting the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s. For a comprehensive overview of Foucault’s life 
and politics, see Macey (1993).  
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social contexts. Given Foucault’s attempts to emphasise that power is not simply repressive, it 
is surprising that he ends up with an account that reproduces such traditional conceptions of 
domination.29 Dews (1987, p. 188), for example, questions Foucault’s tendency to rely on the 
standpoint of the official aspects of oppressive institutions to understand how they work, such 
as medical procedures or architectural designs, rather than resistant elements at the heart of 
these institutions (e.g. prison subcultures); these ‘others’ within oppressive institutions might 
be conceived of as representing serious contenders to the ‘total’ nature of domination. Despite 
Foucault’s arguments about what he calls ‘the rule of tactical polyvalency of discourses’, or 
the inevitable rise of resistance in relation to power, his lack of sufficient exploration and 
clarification in this area leaves the sources of resistance relatively ill defined. Although he 
hints at ‘the body and its pleasures’, his emphasis on the subjection of ‘docile bodies’ and the 
imperative to tell the ‘truth’ about sexuality leaves us without a sufficiently clear idea as to 
the possibilities of liberation. 
 
Related to the ambiguities surrounding Foucault’s conception of power at this stage in his 
work is the lack of an adequate conception of ‘subjectivity’. In his emphasis on the socially 
constructed nature of human subjectivity, through his suggestion that the human soul is 
merely a creation of the exercise of disciplinary power upon the body (Foucault, 1977, p. 29), 
Foucault appears to undermine the possibility of autonomous action. He also neglects aspects 
of subject construction other than the corporeal effects of disciplinary power, such as social, 
legal and psychological definitions that might point the way to the possibility of autonomous 
experience (Rose, 1984, p. 178). For example, Habermas suggests that legal power should not 
to be seen simply as a normalising tool for disciplinary power, but also as liberating with 
                                                
29 For a defence of Foucault against this charge of power as totalising, see Deleuze (1988, chapter 5 – ‘Foldings, 
or the Inside of Thought’) 
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regards to guarantees of security and civil rights (1992, p. 290). Honneth argues that Foucault 
neglects the ‘universal achievements of bourgeois law’ and fails to distinguish between 
‘social organisations in which membership is regulated on the basis of juridically free 
contracts and total institutions in which membership is coerced on the basis of legal orders’ 
because ‘legal norms and moral ideas’ are conceived as ‘the cultural superstructure of a 
systemic process of the augmentation of power’ (Honneth, 1991, p. 197).30 What appears to 
be missing from Foucault’s histories is an account of the ‘paradoxes and antinomies of law in 
capitalist societies’ (Rose, 1984, p. 174). Habermas also suggests that Foucault is unable to 
account for other forms of liberation at work in modernity, particularly through the process of 
individualisation. Although Foucault would see individualisation as a key component in the 
workings of disciplinary power, Habermas suggests that it is a process that has brought 
freedom in relation to individual identity and the possibilities for reflexive action (1992, p. 
287).31  
 
A clearer conception of subjectivity might provide Foucault with more adequate tools in his 
attempts to account for resistance, otherwise he is left in the curious position of implicitly 
judging the regimes of truth and disciplinary power that he describes, without an explicit 
account of his normative position, especially given his critique of any notion of ideology or 
possibility of truth; as Fraser asks: “Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought 
domination to be resisted?” (1981, p. 283, cited in Habermas, 1992, p. 284).32 Foucault’s 
genealogical work dismisses the distinction between science and ideology as he claims that all 
                                                
30 See Foucault’s ‘Two Lectures’ in Gordon (ed., 1980, pp. 78-108) for a discussion of the distinction between 
juridical and disciplinary power. Foucault also discusses the importance of local, rather than global, critique 
here. 
31 It is the tension between the constraints on subjects and the possibility of their creative expression that 
Foucault goes on to explore in his final works discussed below. 
32 In relation to ‘domination’ here though, it is worth noting that Foucault is keen to make a distinction between 
relational forms of ‘power’ and more centralised and stable forms of ‘domination’ (see Foucault in Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, 1982, p. 225). 
 
171 
forms of knowledge, including all those claiming access to a ‘truth’ underlying reality, are 
intimately tied to regimes of power; ‘truths’ are therefore seen as tools of regulation and 
normalisation. As Habermas argues in relation to Foucault: 
 
‘Disciplinary power functions without the detour through a necessarily false 
consciousness shaped within humanistic discourses and hence exposed to the 
criticism of counterdiscourses. The discourses of human sciences merge with the 
practices of their application into an opaque power complex on which the critique 
of ideology makes no impression’ (Habermas, 1992, p. 283). 
 
However, if knowledge is always implicated in, and constitutive of, discursive regimes, then 
we might ask how Foucault is able to sufficiently separate his knowledge from disciplinary 
relations of power enough to suggest what should be resisted, and how we should go about 
it?33 Or, to put the question another way, if power and knowledge are always mutually 
entangled then which regime of power/knowledge is his work part of or formed by? Foucault 
dismisses this interpretation of his work for a number of reasons; partly because he does not 
claim to speak for others from a ‘universal’ position of progressive politics and because he 
believes that those engaged in struggles can speak for themselves without the need for 
philosophical justifications34, partly because he sees the danger of a normative position 
becoming a normalising one, and also partly because he sees the attempt to separate 
knowledge from power – and to establish some form of transcendental truth – as attached to 
the epistemology of humanism.35 However, there are certain implicit normative positions 
                                                
33 For example, Honneth (1991, p. 172) argues: ‘the kind of theory of knowledge that Foucault posits as the basis 
of his critique of the sciences would entangle him in the contradiction of no longer being able to justify 
epistemologically his own academic research activity, while it would itself be subject to the verdict of its own 
proposed claims (that is, it would have to expose itself as merely a reflexive form of strategic action)’. 
34 See his ‘Intellectuals and Power’ conversation with Deleuze in Bouchard (ed., 1977) in addition to his 
‘Subject and Power’ essay (in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982). 
35 It also follows from this, for Foucault, that the entanglement of power and knowledge in the production of 
‘truth’ does not therefore mean that the human sciences are ‘untrue’. Foucault’s genealogical ‘anti-sciences’ 
concern themselves with the broader governmental and subjugating effects of the human sciences rather than 
their ‘contents, methods or concepts’ (Foucault in Gordon, ed., 1980, p. 84). He also seeks to avoid prioritising 
his genealogical (and archaeological) work in relation to other knowledge(s), as if they were in some way ‘more 
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which are mobilised in his work - what Habermas calls ‘cryptonormativism’36 - without being 
clearly worked through.37 Related to this criticism is the absence of a theory of normative 
traditions in Foucault’s work, and therefore an account of social cohesion. Norms only appear 
to serve a disciplinary function in terms of ‘normalisation’, and therefore cohesion tends to be 
created only by violence and domination, rather than the possibility of normative agreement.38 
Law and morality are dismissed on the basis that they ultimately hide strategic goals. 
 
Foucault & the Frankfurt School 
Before considering Foucault’s responses to some of these criticisms in the final phase of his 
work, it is worth briefly exploring what is at stake in his genealogical work for the project of 
(Frankfurt) Critical Theory as a whole. It is clear that Foucault’s genealogical period, and it’s 
concern with the entanglement of power and knowledge, has the most direct links with the 
concerns of earlier Critical Theory; also, it is these links which often provide the platform for 
a number of criticisms from Habermas and Honneth and their later 
communicative/recognitive turn(s). However, it is also worth considering how some of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
true’, and instead turns to the models of ‘fictions’, ‘instruments’ and ‘tools’ that might contribute to the 
transgression of limits, transformation of identities, and produce ‘truth’ (albeit in a contingent and transient 
manner) (e.g. see Gordon, ed., 1980, p. 193; Foucault, 1985, p. 14; Bouchard, ed., 1977, p. 208) 
36 Habermas’s main criticisms of Foucault’s theory of power are summed up as follows: ‘his putative objectivity 
of knowledge is itself put in question (1) by the involuntary presentism of a historiography that remains 
hermeneutically stuck in its starting situation; (2) by the unavoidable relativism of an analysis related to the 
present that can understand itself only as a context-dependent practical enterprise; (3) by the arbitrary 
partisanship of a criticism that cannot account for its normative foundations’ (Habermas, 1992, p. 276). 
Presentism involves instrumentalising ‘the contemplation of the past for the needs of the present’ (p. 278), e.g. 
reading disciplinary power back into the power relationships of previous historical epochs; and relativism 
involves Foucault’s inability to justify the ‘validity’ claims of counterdiscourses in relation to dominant 
discourses. See also Habermas’s essay ‘Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present’ in his The New Conservatism 
(Habermas, 1991). 
37 Similar arguments are made by Taylor (1984; 1985) and Walzer (1989). However, I think we can safely 
suggest, following Simons (1995, p. 86), that Foucault operates with an implicit principle of ‘agonal 
subjectivity’ – i.e. that regimes are to be assessed according to their tendency to either open up or close down 
possibilities of individual liberty and transgression. Strategic relations of constant struggle are to be protected 
from their ossification into rigid relations of domination. 
38 This is obviously a key criticism of Foucault made by Honneth in his Critique of Power (1991: see pp. 161, 
162, 174, 197, 199) 
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parallels between Foucault’s work and that of Adorno and Horkheimer help us to draw out 
some of the shortcomings of the normative-universalist positions of Habermas and Honneth.  
 
Given their shared concern with the entwinement of rationality and domination, Foucault and 
early Critical Theory are often both charged with undermining the possibility of their own 
‘critical’ philosophy.39 Foucault’s work could be under threat from the same problem we 
considered earlier in Habermas and Honneth’s critique of Adorno’s position: how is it 
possible, given such entwinement, to ground a (rational) critical position able to provide an 
account of the (rational) possibility of emancipation?40 Honneth also accuses both Adorno and 
Foucault of relying on a systemic conception of societal organisation and neglecting to 
consider the role of social groups and the cultural or normative orientations of socialised 
subjects in late-capitalist societies (Honneth, 1991, p. 199)41. As we have seen, there are a 
number of similarities between the work of Foucault and that of the Frankfurt School 
                                                
39 Habermas (1992, pp. 126-130, 279, 282-286) and Honneth (1991, pp. 61-63, 198-202) 
40 However, an alternative response to this criticism (and that of cryptonormativism) levelled at Adorno and 
Foucault by Habermas and Honneth is to suggest that both Adorno and Foucault are primarily concerned with 
the damage done to particularity (and the particularity of suffering bodies) by universal (subsumptive) 
rationality. An interesting defence of this position (from an Adornian standpoint) can be seen in Bernstein (1995, 
pp. 161-7) who argues that: ‘Foucault’s work is not cryptonormative, but just normative otherwise, ‘internally’ 
normative perhaps. The charge of cryptonormativism presupposes that normativity is the deriving of judgements 
from universal premises or procedures, and hence that the force of normative judgements is derived from the 
general (the Categorical Imperative, or the Utilitarian Calculus, or the Ideal Speech Situation); but of course it is 
this subsumption model of the force of norms that Foucault’s ‘aesthetic’ discourse is challenging’ (p. 166). 
Bernstein emphasises the aesthetic critique of modernity in both Adorno and Foucault (e.g. he suggests that 
Foucault’s books ‘are meant to be judged as one would judge a work of art rather than raising a validity claim 
which could be vindicated by the force of better argument and outside the context of its inscription’ (p. 166)). I 
will make some parallel arguments below and in the next chapter. 
41 For Honneth, this is only true of Foucault’s genealogical work once he moves from an earlier, more 
promising, position whereby power is seen in terms of ‘the strategic intersubjectivity of struggle’, towards what 
Honneth sees as Foucault’s later problematic ‘systems-theoretical’ historical investigations. For Honneth, the 
earlier genealogical model, which concentrates on strategic action between subjects, benefits from a notion of 
struggle which undermines systems-theoretic accounts of all-encompassing institutional power – a problem to 
which the later, historical genealogical work succumbs. The latter ‘uses the idea of power-wielding institutions 
without having to refer to the process of their social establishment’ (Honneth, 1991, p. 173). The problems with 
the earlier model however are the inability to account for the stabilisation of power and the lack of a notion of 
‘normatively motivated consent’ (ibid, pp. 160-161). Missing from both genealogical models for Honneth is a 
conception of ‘the stabilisation of practically secured positions of power in the form of their social 
institutionalisation’ (ibid, p. 173). 
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concerning the nature of reason, the rational subject, the human sciences, and critique. Both 
radicalize Kantian critique by emphasizing the way in which reason is tied up with social, 
historical and cultural factors. They consider the way in which ‘reason’ varies historically in 
form and content, and the way it is intimately tied to practical interests and power. They also 
both seek to undermine the centrality of the autonomous, rational subject in its representative 
and dominating relationship to the material world of objects; they argue that this subject 
should be seen in its socio-historical context and therefore as influenced in its actions by 
particular interests, rather than being seen as the ‘disinterested’ guarantor of truth. Both see a 
dominant subject being reflected in a historically-formed egocentrism which is complicit in 
acts of exclusion and domination. In relation to the human sciences, they are both critical of 
the dominance of positivism and the implicit instrumentalism that has played a key role in the 
administration and domination of our social and natural worlds. Also, regarding their 
respective positions on critique, arguably they both emphasise the importance of a ‘critical 
distance’ from current social practices and the way this distance potentially feeds into 
practical social change (see McCarthy in Kelly, ed., 1994, pp. 243-247).42 
However, there are also key differences between Foucault and the early Frankfurt School on 
each of these dimensions. Whereas Critical Theory follows Hegel and Marx in utilizing 
determinate negation as a form of critique, one that aims for a ‘better’ form of reason, 
Foucault rejects rationalism at its very heart as inevitably connected to power. The mutual 
concern with the subject-centredness of reason also leads them in different directions - 
Foucault into an anti-humanist conception of the ‘end of man’, and (early) critical theory into 
exploring the dialectical relationship between subjectivity and (‘objective’) social 
determination. In relation to the disciplinary elements of the human sciences, Foucault 
                                                
42 For Foucault’s own brief reflections on the Frankfurt School, and his relationship to it, see Foucault (in 
Kritzman, ed., 1990, pp. 25-27, 33-35, 59, 95, and 104). 
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denounces them as disciplinary at their core whereas critical theory, to varying degrees, 
attacks only certain (instrumental) forms of social research. Finally, critical theory ultimately 
sees itself as working in the name of reason and justice, however vague and rarefied this 
might be, whereas Foucault suggests that social life is inevitably constituted by power which 
leads him towards a form of ‘critique’ dismissive of claims to truth and freedom (see 
McCarthy in Kelly, ed., 1994, pp. 248-249). 
 
Their alternative responses to the subject-centredness of reason give us a certain amount of 
clarity in terms of the above differences. Whereas Adorno and Horkheimer put forward a 
historical thesis concerning the ‘end of the individual’, a thesis connected to their concerns 
with instrumental reason and the administered society, Foucault’s work – albeit not directly - 
questions the humanist presuppositions in their argument and instead advances a theory of the 
modern subject as an illusory unity originating in rules of discourse and strategies of 
domination. The end of the individual is not to be seen as the (historical) ‘fate’ of the modern 
subject but as an inevitable consequence of its (discursive or power-determined) origin.43 
Foucault argues that what we need to do is bracket out the validity claims of subjects, and the 
notion of the subject as the origin of meaning, and understand how they are produced by 
(historically contingent) discursive or strategic means. Any (humanist) appeals to subjective 
autonomy, however implicit, should be understand as themselves part of wider discursive and 
disciplinary regimes. Whereas Adorno and Horkheimer consider the dialectic of the 
‘transcendental-empirical doublet’ - where man is both an empirical object in the world and 
                                                
43 See Honneth (1991, p. 200) for a similar outline of these differences. As we saw in the earlier chapter on 
Honneth, Foucault is accused of moving in his genealogical period from a conception of the social in terms of 
struggle to one in terms of disciplinary institutions. Honneth argues that ‘it is no longer a question of the 
complementary process of a gradual human self-alienation as found in Adorno’s philosophy of history’, but 
rather Foucault’s theory of power represents a ‘systems-theoretic solution to the Dialectic of Enlightenment’ 
(ibid, p. 201).  
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the being that constitutes the empirical world of objects - as in many ways an inevitable 
component of modern reason, Foucault claims to abandon it and to produce histories that do 
not rely on the dual conception of man, or rather histories that concern themselves with the 
consequences of our taking ourselves as the objects (and subjects) of knowledge. 
 
Foucault would therefore understand the problems encountered by Adorno (in Habermas and 
Honneth’s reading of Adorno at least) as being due to the (futile) attachment to the possibility 
of a more adequate reason, and the persistence of a humanist concern with the relationship 
between the subject and object of knowledge. From this perspective, Adorno and Horkheimer 
are caught within the ‘transcendental-empirical doublet’ and thereby seek the possible 
reconciliation of man and nature (and inner nature); he would see their account of 
instrumental reason and the ‘end of the individual’ as being due to their humanist hopes of a 
better world being compromised by historical circumstances. Foucault, on the other hand, 
refuses to concede any ground to humanist conceptions of man and pursues an alternative, 
post-humanist critique of subjectivity itself. What is required is therefore a more radical 
critique of ‘reason’ and an anti-humanist form of knowledge that allows us to transcend the 
humanist division between subject and object of knowledge, and related divisions between 
transcendental and empirical (i.e. between man as empirical object in the world and as the 
being that constitutes the empirical world of objects), cogito and unthought (i.e. between our 
acknowledgment that we are both governed by unknown forces while also being aware of 
this, therefore seeking to free ourselves by bringing such forces under our control and 
comprehension), and also between creative origin and alienated from origin (i.e. between man 
as creative origin and as alienated from that origin). These all see us as both the productive 
 
177 
authors of history and the products of a history over which we do not have control (see 
Foucault, 1971). 
 
There are certain points of agreement between Foucault and Habermas on these issues as both 
are highly critical of subject-centred reason, be it in the form of humanism for Foucault or the 
philosophy of consciousness for Habermas. However, Habermas suggests that Foucault fails 
to find a way out of the problems of subject-centred reason because his concept of power: 
 
‘has been taken from the repertoire of the philosophy of the subject itself. 
According to this philosophy, the subject can take up basically two and only two 
relationships toward the world of imaginable and manipulable objects: cognitive 
relationships regulated by the truth of judgements; and practical relationships 
regulated by the success of actions’ (Habermas, 1992, p. 274). 
 
Despite his attempts to transcend the aporias of the human(ist) sciences, Habermas argues that 
Foucault’s theory of power is merely an inversion of humanism and suffers a similar fate; as 
we have seen, it ‘gets caught all the more hopelessly in the trap of a presentist historiography, 
which sees itself compelled to a relativist self-denial and can give no account of the normative 
foundations of its own rhetoric’ (Habermas, 1992, p. 294). Whereas Foucault removes the 
subject in all its forms from the centre of western philosophy and explores its constitution 
through epistemic rules of discourse or power relations, Habermas and Honneth retain a 
notion of subjectivity but one thoroughly mediated by intersubjective relations.44 For them, 
Foucault’s rejection of subjectivity also results in his rejection of intersubjectivity by 
association, and this leaves him with no autonomous (or relatively autonomous) sphere of 
action free from determination by relations of power. They argue that he ends up with a 
                                                
44 As Honneth (1991, p. 120) argues: ‘instead of questioning the singularity of the historical subject, to which the 
constitutive achievements are assigned, and substituting the more convincing model of a plurality of historical 
actors, Foucault adopts the opposing approach of an elimination of the concept of the subject in general. He does 
not question the monological character of the philosophy of reflection, but rather rejects its underlying model of 
thought generally’. 
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functionalist account of the augmentation of social domination which removes the possibility 
of autonomy and resistance.45 Habermas and Honneth are keen to emphasise the way in which 
the reduction of all social action to the subject/object relation – and therefore the logic of 
reification - neglects the importance of ‘communicative’ action. Indeed, their emphasis on 
communicative action allows them to see many parallel mistakes in the work of Foucault and 
Adorno - particularly the problem of how to elaborate a ‘critical’ position once the 
entwinement of reason and domination is considered total, and how such a critical position 
should itself be grounded in concrete social experience or practical activity.  
 
Despite these criticisms, we are also now in a position to acknowledge the merits of 
Foucault’s genealogy and suggest that, even though it does give rise to certain aporias, it does 
succeed in posing important problems for Habermas’s and Honneth’s versions of normative 
universalism. Arguably, Foucault’s work is more sensitive to the paradoxes of modernity and 
its darker underbelly: what we might see as the historical formation of its key (humanist) 
concepts – of morality, autonomy, recognition, subjective freedom etc - in the context of 
exclusionary power relations and domination. He is more mindful not only of the complicity 
of reason - including ‘critical’ reason itself (along with its emancipatory promises) - in the 
normalising projects of the human sciences, but also of the processes by which 
(institutionalised) forms of recognition often ‘re-cognise’ (and constitute) identities in 
                                                
45 As we have seen, Honneth argues that Foucault’s historical work in Discipline and Punish culminates in a 
systems-theoretic vision of society in terms of ‘a universal transformation of techniques of social power’ 
whereby ‘during the course of the eighteenth century the disciplinary institutions that had existed alongside one 
another in society in an unconnected manner grew together into a kind of self-regulating system’ (Honneth, 
1991, p. 191). For Honneth, Foucault explains this process without recourse to ‘social groups through whose 
practical initiatives the initially isolated disciplinary centers were institutionally linked’ or ‘the societal 
institution generally responsible for bringing about such an intermeshing of systems of action’ (p. 192). Rather 
the institutional coordination, and augmentation of social power, occurs as a functional response (or ‘systemic 
adaptation’) to the potential conflict produced by an increase in population and economic growth and therefore 
the need for effective social control (and individual productivity). In this view, the importance of social struggle 
is reduced and individuals (and classes) become ‘mere bearers of systemic processes’ (p. 195). 
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restrictive ways.46 Foucault emphasises the ways in which subjects are often formed through 
subjection to power relations, and therefore the ways in which ‘recognition’ of one’s identity 
often serves to affirm certain (socio-economic) power relations, which is arguably neglected 
in Habermas and Honneth’s work. Rather than see social institutions as ‘expressions’ of 
underlying recognition relations as Honneth (and arguably Habermas) does, Foucault 
considers what we might call the ‘injuries of recognition’ and explores the ways in which 
social institutions both form and restrict subjects; for example, he considers the importance of 
‘subjectivisation’ in the sense of becoming ‘subject’ to particular institutional discourses, and 
also the ways in which new (resistant) transformative identities are formed. Foucault’s work 
keeps us conscious of the ways in which normative universalism – be it in the form of 
communicative or recognitive rationality – might exclude the possibility of fuller forms of 
recognition, satisfaction and solidarity by measuring forms of social action according to 
certain (limited) rational standards. As with other critics of Habermas and Honneth, discussed 
in earlier chapters, Foucault would also take issue with their tendency to idealise linguistic 
communication, recognition, the public sphere and the lifeworld, and to separate out strategic 
action from the context of shared norms and meanings.47 In relation to Habermas, he argues: 
 
‘The thought that there could be a state of communication which would be such 
that the games of truth could circulate freely, without obstacles, without constraint 
and without coercive effects, seems to me to be Utopia. It is being blind to the fact 
that relations of power are not something bad in themselves, from which one must 
free one’s self. I don’t believe there can be a society without relations of power, if 
                                                
46 Fraser (in Kelly, ed., 1994, pp. 202-3), who is broadly sympathetic to Habermas’s position, makes the point 
that it is conceivable that ‘members of the fully panopticized society are in an ideal speech situation, so that 
notion will have no critical force here’. The internalisation and subjectification of normalising power and 
disciplinary norms could erode the distinction between external control and internal freedom. If the ‘humanist 
ideals of autonomy and reciprocity’, which are also important for Habermas’s critical project, are themselves 
‘internal to the disciplinary regime’ as disciplinary norms, then those projects that rely on such ideals become 
‘devoid of critical, emancipatory force’. 
47 Although this is a criticism Honneth makes of Habermas, we saw in the last chapter how this criticism also 
applies to Honneth’s work as he too tends to neatly separate out the instrumental from the intersubjective thereby 
neglecting the important ways in which instrumental attitudes persist within our everyday intersubjective 
relations. 
 
180 
you understand them as means by which individuals try to conduct, to determine 
the behaviour of others. The problem is not of trying to dissolve them in the 
utopia of a perfectly transparent communication, but to give one’s self the rules of 
law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics, the ethos, the practice of 
self, which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of 
domination’ (Foucault in Fornet-Betancourt et al, 1987, p. 129) 
 
Alongside this, Foucault would also criticise Habermas and Honneth’s purification of the 
ideals of communicative reason as they seek to distinguish between progressive and 
regressive social developments and attempt to establish universal and formal standards and 
procedures for socio-political emancipation.48 His work displays a greater sensitivity to the 
ways in which the abstraction of what is ‘rational’ from the complexity of a ‘far from rational’ 
social world all too often ends up complicit with partial interests and specific institutional 
contexts which silence the speech of certain excluded groups. He would also be critical of the 
ways in which such ‘universal’ reason excludes the claims that might be made by desire, the 
body, and particularity etc.49 
Having explored a number of criticisms of Foucault’s work, and the points of similarity and 
difference between his work and the Frankfurt school, I will now briefly examine the later 
developments in his writings. These later works on ethics and aesthetics have received very 
little attention from Habermas and Honneth although they do open up new and promising 
avenues in Foucault’s work; they also point towards further parallels between the ideas of 
                                                
48 For example, in relation to Habermas, Foucault questions the idea that consensual politics as either a 
regulatory or critical principle ‘liquidates the problem of the power relation’ (in Rabinow, ed., 1991, pp. 378-9). 
See also Foucault’s ‘Subject and Power’ essay (in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p. 218). 
49 Despite a number of differences, some of which have been outlined above, I believe Foucault and Adorno 
would be in agreement as to these shortcomings of the communicative project in both its Habermasian and 
Honnethian varieties. For a defence of Foucault against Habermas in these terms see Bernstein (1995, p. 165), 
who argues that for Foucault, ‘the body signifies, as writing does in Derrida, the suppressed other of reason, 
language, logos, universality. As such, it further signifies the claim of particularity against universality; a 
particularity that would hence be further violated if its history and suffering were inscribed in a history generated 
in the very terms responsible for its suppression. The body can be given voice, its suffering made visible, only if 
its articulated particularity and integrity are, in some sense, respected’. 
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Foucault and Adorno inasmuch as both focus on the exclusion, and promise, of aesthetic 
experience in modernity. 
 
Towards an Ethics and Aesthetics of Existence 
Foucault attempts to resolve some of the problems and aporia in his genealogical work by 
clarifying his notion of power and further exploring the possible forms of resistance. His work 
on ‘governmentality’ and the ‘ethics of the self’ seeks to separate out violence and domination 
from other forms of power and aims to clarify the nature of autonomy and freedom. He seeks 
to counteract the claim that his genealogical work tended to concentrate on the effects of 
power emanating from above, despite his attempt to outline its micro-level operations, by 
emphasizing the way power flows between individuals (i.e. as ‘an endless play of 
dominations’). He suggests here that we should understand relations of power between 
subjects as only being possible on the basis of their capacity to act – i.e. ‘free’ individuals 
seek to govern others by directing their actions. The freedom to resist or to act differently now 
becomes a presupposition of power relations for Foucault, and he argues that without such 
freedom there is only domination or violence (Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p. 
221). However, Foucault is careful not to suggest any kind of ‘essential’ freedom – he 
maintains that power is the ‘condition of possibility’ of freedom and that the individual is to 
be seen as an effect of power relations, i.e. the outcome of strategies of normalization. Also, 
and related to this point, Foucault argues that the incompleteness and instability of power is 
matched by the instability of freedom. He sees freedom as a practice that cannot rely on any 
certain state of emancipation and has to be constantly renewed; new forms of emancipation 
open up new relations of power which have to be curbed by new practices of liberty etc. 
 
 
182 
The shift of emphasis in his work, to freedom being a presupposition of power, is also marked 
by Foucault’s concern with the process of ‘subjectivisation’. He acknowledged that his earlier 
work on the effects of power on the body (as ‘docile bodies’) tended to over-emphasise an all-
encompassing view of power, and now believed that the emphasis on techniques of 
domination needed to be complemented with an account of the ‘techniques of the self’. His 
later work therefore marks a shift away from the centrality of biopower, with its emphasis on 
objectivisation (i.e. the turning of individuals into docile bodies or objects), to an emphasis on 
subjectivisation (i.e. the way a human being turns itself into a subject). The earlier notion of 
power had tended to deem it unnecessary to consider the mediation of power through 
subjective consciousness, due to the direct action of power on the subject’s body; however, as 
we have seen, this led to a weak conception of subjectivity and resistance. The notion of 
power in his work on governmentality however not only sees the process of subjectivisation 
as a process of the manipulation of consciousness, in other words that the formation of 
subjectivity arises out of subjection to others or to internalized social norms, but also as 
providing the possibility of resistance through rational and purposive action by subjects. By 
concentrating on the way human beings turn themselves into subjects however, Foucault is 
not looking to any notion of the inner self as inherently resistant; in fact he is continuing the 
anti-essentialist thrust of his work and wants to criticize any notion of the self complicit with 
a ‘cult of the self’. Rather, he is interested in the self-creation of identity in everyday life as a 
‘work of art’ (Foucault in Rabinow, 1984, p. 350) - the way we are able to explore a multitude 
of possible identities and ways of being in the world, and therefore question the idea of 
inevitable or ‘natural’ identities. It is here that Foucault emphasizes the freedom of subjects to 
explore the limits of identity and resist the disciplinary process of normalization. His 
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conception of the Other, or potential ‘resistance’ to the dominant order, now resides in the 
everyday practices-of-the-self carried out by individuals. 
 
It is in the final two volumes of his History of Sexuality that Foucault seeks to counterbalance 
his previous emphasis on techniques of domination and objectivisation with an exploration of 
‘techniques of the self’ and subjectivisation – or how individuals understand themselves and 
turn themselves into subjects.50 He calls this a ‘genealogy of desire as an ethical problem’ 
(Foucault in Rabinow (ed.), 1991, p. 356). His outline of Ancient Greek, Roman and 
Christian moral practices points towards a distinction between ‘morality’ (or ‘moral code’), 
involving strict rules and laws, and ‘ethics’ (or ‘morality of behaviours’), concerned with the 
ways in which individuals relate to the rules that have been passed down to them. In his The 
Use of Pleasure (1992), Foucault wants to highlight the way in which the prohibitive codes of 
Ancient Greece and those of the early Empire weren’t significantly different but that the 
ethical responses to such codes were. Despite the similarities between classical, Roman and 
Christian forms of morality in relation to specific rules and prohibitions around sexuality, 
marriage and self-control, Foucault argues that classical thought allowed for a greater degree 
of freedom and interpretation than Christian morality at an everyday, practical level. Whereas 
the Christian system was more unified and imposed a stricter universal moral code, the 
classical system emphasised the individual practice of liberty in relation to laws and common 
rules of conduct. The key distinction being that Ancient Greek ethics were predominantly 
aesthetic whereas those of the Empire and Christianity were predominantly normalising. He 
makes the point that Greek ethics tended to focus on the personal choice of a small elite, 
rather than being a standard of behaviour for all, and he suggests that ‘the reason for making 
                                                
50 For an account that sees the later Foucault as a ‘return to the subject’ see Dews (1989). For alternative 
accounts, which argue against any ‘death of the subject’ in Foucault’s work in the first place, see Bernstein 
(1992) and Allen (2000). 
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this choice was the will to live a beautiful life, and to leave others memories of a beautiful 
existence’ (Foucault in Rabinow (ed.), 1991, p. 341).  
 
What interests Foucault is ‘the idea of the bios as a material for an aesthetic piece of art’ and 
also ‘that ethics can be a very strong structure of existence, without any relation with the 
juridical per se, with an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary structure’ (Foucault in 
Rabinow (ed.), 1991, p. 348). It is this ‘ethical’ practice that Foucault talks about when 
discussing the ‘techniques of the self’ or the ‘aesthetics of existence’. He describes this as: 
 
‘… those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves 
rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in 
their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain 
aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria’ (1992, p. 10-11). 
 
Foucault’s characterisation of the Ancient Greeks, in relation to these techniques of the self, 
emphasises the role of self-mastery in sexual conduct and the importance of ‘intensity of 
practice’ and ‘activity/passivity’. He suggests that ‘the ethical question that was raised was 
not: which desires? which acts? which pleasures? but rather: with what force is one 
transported “by the pleasures and desires”?’ (1992, p. 43). Moderation or excess, or the 
intensity of practice, was the central concern rather than the object of desire as such. In 
addition to this, it mattered who the ‘active actors’ were and who the ‘passive actors’ were, 
with adult free men in the former category and ‘women, boys, slaves’ in the latter. In sum, he 
suggests that ‘for a man, excess and passivity were the two main forms of immorality in the 
practice of the aphrodisia’ (ibid, p. 47). 
 
Foucault explores these twin variables in relation to ‘the existing and recognised practices by 
which men sought to shape their conduct: their dietary practice, their practice of domestic 
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government, their courtship practice as expressed in amorous behaviour’ (ibid, p. 93). In brief, 
the first practice of dietetics, when considered in relation to sexual conduct, warned both of 
excess and ascetic restraint and the potential harmful effects they could have on the body. The 
second practice of economics, or man’s role as the head of the family, recommended fidelity; 
however, importantly, this was not recommended as a general principle but rather as a sign of 
self-mastery for men. Foucault also outlines the way in which such sexual self-mastery was 
connected to a broader ethical and political commitment to limit oneself when exercising 
power in the realm of the state. The key point here is again the exercise of self-limitation as 
opposed to what Foucault sees as the more universal and duty-bound forms of Christian 
morality. The third practice of erotics, predominantly concerned with the relation between 
men and boys, is deemed rather problematic due to the precarious status of the boy (as future 
free-man). As the object, the boy was expected to be passive, but as an adult male the boy is 
to become active and self-limiting.  
 
‘The problem was that they couldn’t accept that a young boy who was supposed 
to become a free citizen could be dominated and used as an object for someone’s 
pleasure. A woman, a slave, could be passive: such was their nature, their status. 
All this reflection, philosophizing about the love of boys – with always the same 
conclusion: please, don’t treat a boy as a woman – is proof that they could not 
integrate this real practice in the framework of their social selves’ (Foucault, in 
Rabinow (ed.), 1991, pp. 344-5). 
 
This antinomy, as Foucault characterises it, persists until the dilemma is resolved, or rather 
diverted, by the Platonic concern with the origin and true nature of love in its relationship to 
truth. It is in Platonic erotics, for Foucault, that self-formation becomes attached to knowledge 
(of desiring man) rather than art (see Foucault, 1992, p. 243). 
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What is important in this brief overview of Foucault’s description of Greek moral reflection 
on sexual conduct is his suggestion that the medical and philosophical recommendations 
emerging from such reflections were: 
 
‘not for codifying sexual conduct in a precise way, but for “stylizing” it: 
stylizations within dietetics, understood as an art of the everyday relationship of 
the individual with his body; in economics as an art of a man’s behaviour as head 
of a family; and in erotics as an art of the reciprocal conduct of a man and a boy in 
a love relationship’ (Foucault, 1992, p. 93).  
 
However, this concern with pleasure and the aesthetics of practice declines in Hellenistic 
Rome and the emphasis is increasingly on the nature of the desiring subject. This shift of 
focus had a clear impact on the everyday practices of dietetics, economics and erotics. In 
dietetics, a stronger link was made between medical knowledge and care of the self, and 
sexual restraint was now seen as desirable due to the fear that sexual activity could damage 
the body; emphasis also shifted towards sex within marriage (see part four, ‘the body’, in 
Foucault, 1988). In economics, although sex was increasingly limited to marital relations, it 
was also limited within these relations to procreation. The link between private and public 
morality was also reduced, and the emphasis on self-mastery was replaced with a notion of 
reciprocal concern and love (see part five, ‘the wife’, in Foucault, 1988). Finally, in erotics, 
abstention from love between men and boys became increasingly important in light of the 
emphasis on sex within marriage, and also virginity was valued in light of the anxiety around 
sexual activity being destructive of body and soul (see part six, ‘boys’, in Foucault, 1988). 
 
Foucault further conceptualises the shifts described above with a wider historical focus and 
through what he sees as the four major elements in one’s relationship to oneself (Foucault in 
Rabinow (ed.), 1991, pp. 352-5). The first element relates to the aspect of ourselves most 
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relevant to morality (e.g. desire in Christianity, intention in Kant, and feelings in 
contemporary society), and this relates to ethical substance (substance éthique), or the ethical 
area of concern (e.g. flesh for Christians but unified acts of desire and pleasure for the 
Greeks). The second element is what Foucault calls the ‘mode of subjection’ (mode 
d’assujettissement) and this concerns the way in which people come to understand what their 
moral obligations are (e.g. through religious decree, through rational-universal law, or the one 
Foucault favours – ‘the attempt to give your existence the most beautiful form possible’). The 
third element is ‘asceticism’ or the ‘self-forming activity’ (techne) and involves the acts we 
need to carry out on ourselves to meet our ethical vision. The final element is the ‘telos’ 
(téléologie) and involves the question: ‘which is the kind of being to which we aspire when 
we behave in a moral way? For instance, shall we become pure, or immortal, or free, or 
masters of ourselves and so on?’ (ibid, p. 355). 
 
A key point here is that it is these relations to oneself which Foucault sees as changing most 
significantly between Greek and Christian ethics rather than the actual prohibitive codes 
themselves, give or take some changes in rigour and strictness (see Foucault in Rabinow (ed.), 
1991, pp. 356-9). In Classical Greece, the substance éthique is aphrodisia and involves a 
mixture of pleasure, desire and acts. The mode d’assujettissement is aesthetic (and political) 
and emphasises the attainment of a beautiful life; it is not an obligation as such to be honest 
and true to wives and to avoid physical relations with boys, but if one wants to live a beautiful 
life and rule over others then this is what you will do. Here, as suggested above, there is a link 
between mastery over oneself and the (unequal) ability to rule over others. The important 
point though is that whether or not you followed these obligations and lived a beautiful 
existence was a matter of personal choice. The techne in Classical Greece was ascetic in form, 
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and the téléologie was mastery over oneself. In terms of sexual behaviour, Foucault suggests 
that ‘acts’ were more important than either pleasure or desire. This begins to change in late 
Stoicism once the formation of the self becomes increasingly attached to ‘knowledge’ and 
universal rational codes (p. 356). The substance éthique is still aphrodisia, but the mode 
d’assujettissement changes once obligations are no longer an aesthetic and personal choice 
but a requirement of a universal, rational being. No longer is mastery over yourself simply 
related to the ability to rule over others but rather you are a master of yourself due to being a 
rational being. Unlike the explicit (unequal) power relations in the Ancient Greek practice of 
self-mastery, here everyone is related reciprocally through the mastery of themselves. In 
terms of sexual behaviour, ‘acts’ were still considered more important than either pleasure or 
desire, although there are early signs that desire, and its condemnation, are increasingly 
prominent. 
 
In Christianity, Foucault suggests that ‘desire’ becomes more important than either pleasure 
or acts. Desire, or more specifically the eradication of desire, was the central focus; pleasure 
was excluded, and acts were mostly deemed neutral (e.g. to procreate, fulfil marital 
obligations etc). Sexual codes had developed a religious justification, and were backed by 
religious institutions, but the obligation to follow these codes now assumed a legal form. By 
this point the nature of ethics had changed substantially. The substance éthique was no longer 
aphrodisia but desire and flesh. The mode d’assujettissement was divine law. The techne 
involved self-decipherment rather than a self-examining form of asceticism – i.e. the Christian 
self had to be vigilant when exploring the self, as that self was now seen as containing both 
overt and hidden desires of the flesh. The téléologie was immortality and purity, and self-
control served the purpose of keeping yourself pure. This also had a clear gender dimension in 
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Christianity as sexual self-restraint became linked to virginity and female physical integrity. 
Foucault suggests that virginity was barely an issue in Greco-Roman asceticism but by the 
Christian period ‘the problem of ethics as an aesthetics of existence is covered over by the 
problem of purification’ (Foucault in Rabinow (ed.), 1991, p. 366). Since the 18th Century, he 
suggests that the religious framework declines and is replaced by a mixture of scientific, 
medical and legal justification. In terms of sexual behaviour, Foucault hints that desire is still 
central but increasingly in terms of the liberation of desire, whilst ‘acts’ are particularly 
important, ‘and pleasure – nobody knows what it is!’ (Foucault in Rabinow (ed.), 1991, p. 
359). 
 
Although Foucault’s account here is in no way simplistically linear, the heart of his argument 
is that a universal notion of the desiring subject emerges during the Roman Empire, is 
consolidated in Christianity, and assumes a pernicious form in the scientific explorations of 
the self since the 18th century. The individual’s care of the self is increasingly dominated by 
‘universal principles of nature or reason’ (Foucault, 1988, pp. 67-68), and the individual 
autonomy of ethical conduct, apparent in Greek morality, gradually gives way to more 
absolute forms of (disciplinary) moral rules and codes. Hellenic Rome had emphasised the 
individual’s conformity to such codes, in a way that pointed forward to Christian morality, 
and it is the subsequent sacrifice of autonomous individual conduct in the name of the 
universal moral principles of Christianity that Foucault particularly mourns. There are clear 
links here to the earlier genealogical period of Foucault’s work, which focused on the ways in 
which social norms and moral codes are grounded in scientific, rational and legal ‘regimes of 
truth’ which served to normalise the individual; the ‘true’, ontological nature of the individual 
is determined by disciplinary scientific practices which then feed into forms of knowledge 
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which ultimately erase autonomy. It is in response to these forms of modern power that 
Foucault counterposes the (autonomous) ethics of the self, or aesthetics of existence, apparent 
in Ancient Greek ethics. 
 
Foucault develops this idea further in his The Care of the Self (1988) with the notion of 
epimeleia heautou. This refers to taking care of oneself but also has the implication of being 
concerned with and working on oneself. Again the distinction is not between a permissive 
Greco-Roman world and an austere Christian world as such, but rather between an individual 
choosing to care for themselves and an individual experiencing the imposition of religious 
obligation or civil law – ‘between a form of austerity which is linked to an aesthetics of 
existence and other forms of austerity which are linked to the necessity of renouncing the self 
and deciphering its truth’ (Foucault in Rabinow (ed.), 1991, p. 366). Besides brief ‘episodes’ 
in the Renaissance and in 19th century dandyism, Foucault suggests that what we glimpse in 
Ancient Greek culture is a unique attempt to apply aesthetic values to one’s life and oneself, 
to turn one’s life ‘into an object for a sort of knowledge, for a techne – for an art’ (ibid, p. 
362). Foucault mourns the fact that contemporary society lacks the notion that ‘the principal 
work of art which one has to take care of, the main area to which one must apply aesthetic 
values, is oneself, one’s life, one’s existence’ (ibid). Although Ancient Greek ethics are not 
directly translatable into modern ethical practices, it is the autonomous spirit of such ethics 
that Foucault wishes to elucidate and apply under contemporary conditions. It is the aesthetic 
relation to the self, and the individual’s ability to stylize one’s existence, that Foucault wants 
to reinvent for (post-)modern times. This relation to the self promises to foster new forms of 
subjectivity against prescribed, regulated, and normalizing forms of identity and individuality 
(see Foucault in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).  
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Foucault enlists Kant, and Baudelaire, here to articulate what form a (post)modern ethics of 
the self might take, and his starting point is Kant’s 1784 essay ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’ He 
begins by outlining Kant’s definition of modernity as an ‘attitude’ rather than a period of 
history: 
 
‘And by “attitude”, I mean a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary 
choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, 
too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of 
belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called 
an ethos’ (Foucault, in Rabinow (ed.), 1991, p. 39) 
 
Baudelaire exemplifies this critical attitude for Foucault, an attitude that doesn’t merely 
accept the dizzying, ephemeral nature of modernity but one which ‘consists in recapturing 
something eternal that is not beyond the present instant, nor behind it, but within it … that 
makes it possible to grasp the “heroic” aspect of the present moment’ (ibid, pp. 39-40). 
Baudelaire seeks the beauty of the contemporary age rather than some pure or invariable 
beauty. For Baudelaire, and in turn Foucault, the critical attitude involves both a fierce 
attentiveness to reality and also a freedom that seeks to transgress and transfigure such reality. 
Of central importance here is Baudelaire’s emphasis on one’s relationship to oneself, 
particularly the mode of relationship at work in the ‘asceticism of the dandy who makes of his 
body, his behaviour, his feelings and passions, his very existence, a work of art’ (ibid, pp. 40-
41). What appeals to Foucault here though, is that this conception of an aesthetics of the self 
places the emphasis on self-production and invention, in the face of subjection and limits, 
rather than the search for a hidden truth about the self. He attaches this enquiry, into what he 
calls the ‘constitution of the self as an autonomous subject’, back to a notion of the 
Enlightenment as a ‘philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our 
historical era’ (ibid. p. 42). His surprising appeal to the Enlightenment is not an appeal to any 
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true, essential rational principles as such, but to an enquiry into the ‘contemporary limits of 
the necessary’ or what is ‘no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as 
autonomous subjects’ (ibid, p. 43). This is the Enlightenment as historical self-consciousness 
operating with ‘the principle of a critique and a permanent creation of ourselves in our 
autonomy’ (ibid, p. 44).  
 
Foucault sees this conception of the Enlightenment as helping to produce a ‘practical critique 
that takes the form of a possible transgression’ whereby, 
 
‘criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures 
with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that 
have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognise ourselves as subjects of what 
we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, 
and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its 
design and archaeological in its method’ (ibid, pp. 45-46). 
 
This combination of archaeological and genealogical enquiry does not seek to identify 
universal forms of knowledge or action (what he refers to as an ‘analytics of truth’) but rather 
to both historicise our discourse and its contingencies, and to identify the cracks within such 
contingency that open up ‘the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, 
do, or think’ (ibid, p. 46). This he refers to as an ‘ontology of the present’. The key point here 
is that Foucault wants to distance himself from any Kantian appeal to a transcendental 
guarantee of freedom – an appeal grounded in a priori and universal forms of morality and 
reason (e.g. the categorical imperative). Like Adorno, contra Habermas and Honneth, 
Foucault is more sensitive to the ways in which such transcendental forms all too easily 
evolve into a normalising and oppressive procedural rationality. Freedom and autonomy are 
not to be protected by an appeal to universal rationality, instead we should be keen to sever 
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the link between morality and universal reason and to develop a more concrete, substantive, 
historical and practical ethics.  
 
Also, rather than the Kantian concern with the limits of possible knowledge, and the 
Habermasian and Honnethian push towards universal processes in communicative 
developments, Foucault asks the question: ‘in what is given to us as universal, necessary, 
obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of 
arbitrary constraints?’ (ibid, p. 45). Eschewing what he calls ‘global or radical’ projects, and 
what he see as their dangerous consequences, his alternative is characterised as a ‘historico-
practical test of the limits that we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves 
upon ourselves as free beings’ (ibid, p. 47). In sum, Foucault suggests that: 
 
‘The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, 
a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it 
has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the 
critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the 
limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going 
beyond them.’ (ibid, p. 50). 
 
At the heart of Foucault’s account then is the exploration of limits. Rather than submitting to 
external moral codes, he urges us to explore the limits of our identities and to uncover 
historical contingency and arbitrariness where we usually set out to find universality and 
naturalness. In other words, for Foucault, contra Kant, limits are not universal and necessary, 
but historical and contingent, and therefore subject to transformation. Also, autonomy is not 
to be found when we subject ourselves to a rationality free from heteronomous influences, as I 
have argued is the case with Habermas and Honneth, but when we seek to transgress the 
historical limits that have defined our identity thus far. By exploring what we are meant to be, 
our supposed limits, and the essence or truth of our identity, we can uncover other possible 
 
194 
subjective experiences for ourselves. This denaturalisation and exploration of limits also does 
not seek a final or definitive version of the self, and isn’t a historical constant as such, but is 
rather a restless process of self-production and creation in the face of various limits and 
limitations.  
 
As stated above, this emphasis on self-creation, and transgression, for Foucault is ultimately 
an aesthetic pursuit; in addition to his appeal to both Kant and Baudelaire in his 
Enlightenment essay, Foucault’s aesthetic relation-to-self is also clearly influenced by 
Nietzsche’s insistence that one should ‘give style to one’s character’ (section 290 of 
Nietzsche’s The Gay Science). One must treat oneself as the material for aesthetic creativity, 
and seek to make one’s life beautiful; in treating oneself as a work of art we practice freedom 
outside the authority of ‘true’ (scientific and moral) versions of subjectivity. Both Nietzsche 
and Foucault subscribe to the idea that it is through art and creativity that we experience 
ourselves as autonomous and powerful beings, and in many ways they both believe that the 
stylisation of the self is necessary as a bulwark against forms of oppression and normalisation. 
In relation to contemporary ethics and an aesthetics of existence, Foucault says that we have 
to move away from the fact that: 
 
‘art has become something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, 
or to life. That art is something which is specialized or which is done by experts 
who are artists. But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should 
the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life?’ (Foucault in Rabinow 
(ed.), 1991, p. 350).51 
 
Foucault distances this idea from a Sartrean existentialism, which he sees as intimately tied to 
a notion of ‘authenticity’ rather than creativity. On the contrary, he suggests that ‘we should 
                                                
51 As we will see in the next chapter, despite certain similarities, this position is markedly different to Adorno’s 
aesthetic theory. 
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not have to refer the creative activity of somebody to the kind of relation he has to himself, 
but should relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity’ (ibid, p. 351). 
This is also very different from the ‘Californian cult of the self’ which seeks to separate out, 
using the techniques of psychology, a true self from an alienated self (ibid, p. 362). If the self 
is not a given, as Foucault suggests, then ‘there is only one practical consequence: we have to 
create ourselves as a work of art’ (ibid, p. 351).  
 
An Idealised Aesthetics 
However, a number of problems arise for Foucault’s ‘ethics of the self’. Despite him 
operating with more dialectical notions of both power and subjectivity in his later work on 
ethics, Foucault ends up idealising ‘aesthetic’ practice as an autonomous sphere and 
downplays its connection to wider socio-historical processes; there is also the tendency to 
repeat some of the problems associated with a philosophy of the subject; and finally he is 
unable to sufficiently account for the norms implicit in his critique. There is a certain irony 
that a body of work such as Foucault’s, which sets out from a radical critique of the subject, 
ends up with an account of self-constitution, in the form of an ‘ethics of the self’, constructed 
through an ‘autonomous’ notion of aesthetics. Although Foucault is keen to conceive of an 
ethics of the self as a process of ‘critical’ (and reflexive) mediation, rather than simply in 
terms of either a direct reflection of wider cultural factors or a form of voluntarist self-
constitution, he insufficiently outlines this process. His appeal to a (relatively unexamined) 
category of the aesthetic blocks the sort of genealogical examination needed to identify the 
power relations that provide the social context for aesthetic practice.  
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Foucault, despite his renown as the theorist of power/knowledge, ends up neglecting the 
relationship between power and aesthetics in his later work. As Simons argues, in his broadly 
sympathetic account, Foucault fails to analyse his attachment to aesthetics and his implicit 
claim that aesthetics ‘seems to have the capacity to detach ethics from power and truth’ 
(Simons, 1995, p. 79). To sufficiently tackle this issue Foucault would need to provide a 
clearer account of the role of art and aesthetics in our culture, and he would need to articulate 
the various constraints and limits placed on art by an array of contemporary socio-political 
processes. As Simons suggests ‘Foucault confuses the conceptual differentiation of aesthetic 
ethical self-formation from power, truth and morality, with an actual or practical detachment 
of the axes of his genealogies’ (ibid, p. 80). However, this is not to say that Foucault isn’t 
sensitive to the relationship between an aesthetics of existence and wider social and political 
concerns – for example, his discussion of the relationship between mastery of the self and 
political rule over others in Greek ethics – nor to the possibility of social and political 
community above and beyond that of rational and legal subjects - for example, in his concern 
with gay friendship and S/M subcultures. He is also mindful of the ways in which artistic self-
creation necessarily draws its materials from the wider shared culture. Yet having said this, 
and despite his hints that changes in subjectivity necessitate changes in wider politics and 
government, the political aspects of his later work on ethics remain implicit, or denied, rather 
than fully articulated. 
 
Although it is certainly not his intention, he fails to mediate between a position whereby 
cultural factors are simply reproduced in the individual, and a position where the individual 
freely self-creates, and this tends to result in a broadly voluntarist ethics. As Simons (1995, p. 
70) suggests, Foucault ‘is tempted to leap into the abyss of unbearably light being as if 
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freedom were a safe place beyond all limits’. McNay also argues that Foucault fails ‘to 
contextualise the notion of an aesthetics of existence with regard to the social relations in 
which it is embedded’, and suggests that: 
 
‘in a society in which the behaviour of individuals is often governed by an 
incitement to consumption, it may be necessary to determine the point at which 
the construction of one’s life as a work of art ceases to be an act of conspicuous 
consumption – or in Bourdieu’s terms a sign of ‘distinction’ – and becomes a 
gesture of resistance’ (McNay, 1994, p. 155).52 
 
For Foucault, on the other hand, the desire to understand the connection between an aesthetics 
of existence and its social context all to often leads to the ‘idea of an analytical or necessary 
link between ethics and other social or economic or political structures’ (Foucault in Rabinow 
(ed.), 1991, p. 350), and this is something he feels we should rid ourselves of. 
 
However, by reducing all analytical connections between social structures and personal ethics 
to ‘regimes of truth’, and thereby seeking to emphasise aesthetic ethical practices as local and 
contingent, Foucault effectively neutralizes the ‘critical’ potential of the notion of reflexivity 
that lies at the heart of his ‘ethics of the self’. If reflexivity is the ethical moment that 
guarantees the individual’s autonomy – i.e. if it is the critical questioning of the construction 
of oneself that attests to one’s autonomy – then severing the analytical link between ethical 
practices of the self and wider social structures undermines the reflexive process which was 
meant to allow us to examine the mediation of such practices through social structures in the 
first place. Without recourse to an analytical link between practices of the self and wider 
social structures, or to knowledge of the normative effects of one’s behaviour in relation to 
collective social forces, we are left with an unmediated link between aesthetic practice and 
                                                
52 Again, this is an issue I will argue is more appropriately tackled by Adorno in the next chapter. 
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(critical) self-knowledge.53 And without an analytical link between individual practices and 
the social context of their application, it is difficult for individuals to assess the meaning and 
social consequences of their attempts at aesthetic self-creation; instead we end up with an 
overly isolated and inward-looking account of subjectivity. 
 
Foucault’s aesthetic practices become overheated gestures of subjectivity, and fail to make 
links to something more substantive: there is very little in the way of links between his ethics 
of the self and any conception, and culture, of democracy or responsibility to others (e.g. the 
possibility of ethical satisfaction in the other, leading to a culture of recognition, democracy 
and autonomy).  As Rose (1996, p. 7) suggests: 
 
‘It is conceptually impossible to produce a taxonomy which would sequester 
concepts of justice and the good from concepts of ‘self-creation’, for the very 
formation of ‘selfhood’ takes place in interaction with the mingled ethical and 
epistemological positings of the other, the partner in the formation of our 
contingent and unstable identities’.54 
 
Foucault is quite rightly sensitive to the ways in which normative prescriptions can often 
become normalising; he is also right to see such prescriptiveness as often tied to universal 
notions of rationality and as foreclosing possible forms of resistance. However, he provides 
very little detail in terms of how his category of the aesthetic might function on an everyday 
practical level and also how we might distinguish between resistant and affirmative practices; 
                                                
53 In her criticisms of his later work, McNay refers to this as a ‘fetishized notion of individual practice’ (McNay, 
1994, p. 160) 
54 Rose isn’t referring to Foucault directly here, but her criticisms of ‘postmodernism’ – or what she preferred to 
call ‘despairing rationalism without reason’ (p. 7) – apply to his later work on ethics. Despite clear differences 
between the work of Rose and that of Habermas and Honneth, her reference to the importance of 
intersubjectivity here would clearly be echoed in their criticisms of Foucault’s later work. Despite Foucault’s 
concerted attempts to displace the philosophy of the subject, he ends up prioritizing the relation-to-self over and 
above intersubjective relations. An undialectical account of the relations between self and others develops along 
with an emphasis on self-mastery as the means for resistance and autonomy. Besides posing problems for 
Foucault’s attempts to escape the philosophy of the subject, again this feature of his work also leaves him 
without an understanding of the importance of normative agreements, traditions and forms of solidarity 
(Honneth, 1991, p. 174).  
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instead he appears to merely assert, without qualification, the inherently critical nature of the 
aesthetic and an ethics of the self. To refuse to articulate any kind of distinction between 
progressive and regressive forms of social interaction, besides loosely defined notions of 
individual autonomy and agonistic relations, leaves us with an approach akin to political 
libertarianism.55  
 
Arguably, Foucault fails to distinguish between a normalising tendency fuelled by 
transcendental arguments, and a political judgement geared towards non-objectifying social 
relations. Foucault’s insistence on the separation of metaphysics from ethics, and a notion of 
self-creation separate from theories of justice, ends up in danger of leaving unanalysed ‘the 
preconditions and rampant consequences of power, domination and authority’ (Rose, 1996, p. 
7). Rather than having to choose between normalising forms of a priori argument and ‘partial 
and local enquiry’ (Foucault in Rabinow (ed.) 1991, p. 47), might it not be more productive to 
think in terms of ‘the persistence of always fallible and contestable representation’ (Rose, 
1996, p. 41)? Of a more dialectical relation between social context and our representations of 
ourselves?  
 
In sum, Foucault’s work sensitises us to the paradoxes of modernity - or at least the dark 
underbelly of its idealised self-conception - in ways often missing from Habermas and 
Honneth’s universalism and proceduralism, e.g. the ways in which (idealised) forms of 
normativity, morality, recognition, communication, truth etc, are often complicit in forms of 
                                                
55 Habermas’s criticism of ‘cryptonormativism’ arises again in relation to Foucault’s ethics of the self. Despite 
his reluctance to outline a positive form of critique in his genealogical work on power, he implicitly appealed to 
notions of autonomy and liberty in his confrontation of disciplinary power with ‘the body and its pleasures’. 
Similarly here he emphasizes the need for a curtailment of domination in our ‘games of power’, a suggestion 
which implicitly appeals to notions of autonomy and liberty without sufficiently tackling the question of which 
individual (or collective) acts constitute progressive or regressive forces. 
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domination. His work helps us understand how forms of recognition are often embroiled in 
deeper, more diverse forms of misrecognition, and the ways in which the claims of universal 
reason often exclude particularity, desire, the body, and those voices unable to articulate 
themselves in the rhetoric required of political philosophy and philosophical justification. He 
also presents us with an aesthetic critique of modernity, and an account of critical reflexivity, 
which helps us to explore the transgression of limits and possible avenues for resistance. 
However, as we have seen, the different phases of his work – and the relationship between 
those phases – have not been without their problems and inconsistencies. His genealogical 
work tends towards an all encompassing, and undifferentiated, account of power which often 
reproduces traditional conceptions of domination without clear resources for resistance, and it 
also leaves us with a limited (and overly determined) conception of subjectivity. He neglects 
the paradoxes (and liberatory potential) of law, morality and individualisation, and is often 
unable to satisfactorily articulate the (arguably implicit) critical and normative position that 
his genealogical work assumes. His later work on the ethics of the self and aesthetics of 
existence, for all its merits, ends up positing an autonomous notion of aesthetics overly 
separated from a broader socio-political context alongside a notion of subjectivity 
disconnected from wider relations of recognition and inter-subjectivity. This culminates in his 
failure to present us with a convincing, and sufficiently substantive, conception of culture, 
democracy, recognition, and ethical responsibility. 
 
These limitations set us the challenge of outlining a position which is not only able to provide 
a more substantive conception of culture, democracy, recognition, and ethical responsibility 
than we see in Foucault’s later work, whilst remaining sensitive to the paradoxes of 
recognition and modernity, but also one which avoids the temptations of idealisation, 
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normative universalism and procedural accounts of freedom which we discovered in the work 
of Habermas and Honneth. In the next chapter, I will argue that the problems we have 
encountered in the critical theories of Habermas, Honneth and Foucault return us to the 
political aesthetics of Adorno, particularly his work on an ethics of non-identity. To make this 
case requires not only demonstrating that Adorno can help us overcome the aporias of their 
work, and thereby produce a more promising account of critical theory, but also that his work 
can adequately respond to the criticisms it has faced both explicitly in the work of Habermas 
and Honneth, and implicitly in the work of Foucault. I seek to make this case and tackle these 
related issues in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: THEODOR ADORNO – RECOGNITION, REPRESENTATION, AND 
AESTHETICS 
 
What I seek to demonstrate in this chapter is that the problems we have encountered in the 
work of Habermas, Honneth and Foucault necessitate a return to the work of Adorno.1 I argue 
that Adorno, in many ways, represents a development beyond these later social theorists, and 
that there are resources in his thought that enable us to avoid the pitfalls he is accused of by 
Habermas and Honneth. If what I’ve argued so far is correct, then an Adornian critique of 
Habermas, Honneth and Foucault requires an account that avoids the idealisation and 
proceduralism I’ve argued is at work in both Habermas’s and Honneth’s versions of 
communicative democracy, whilst also presenting a (predominantly aesthetic) critique of 
modernity that avoids the overheated gestures of subjectivity we discovered in the late ethics 
of Foucault. I want to suggest that this is what Adorno’s account of a non-reified culture 
provides us with, however difficult it is to pin down and despite disagreements within the 
secondary literature. I will argue that Adorno’s account shares with Foucault a concern for the 
rationalising aspects of transcendental, a priori, scientific and moral accounts of human 
experience – aspects of which are at work in both Habermas’s ‘universal or transcendental 
pragmatics’ and Honneth’s ‘moral grammar of social conflict’; however, Adorno does not 
respond to this overly rationalised position by appealing, as Foucault in his later work 
ultimately appears to, to an aesthetic realm that is inherently free and transgressive seemingly 
without limits. Rather Adorno shares with Habermas and Honneth a substantive concern with 
a conception and culture of democracy, albeit a more fragile version, and also goes further in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Here I am in agreement with an increasing number of contemporary critics; e.g. see Bernstein (2001), Cook 
(2004), the essays in Huhn (ed.) (2004), Hammer (2005), and Foster (2008), to name a few. 
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emphasising the damage to, along with the responsibility for and ethical satisfaction in, the 
other. 
 
To make these points, I will firstly outline the importance of a notion of ‘dialectical 
experience’ in Adorno’s philosophy - alongside similar notions in Hegel and in the work of 
Gillian Rose - and briefly explore how this position is markedly different to, and absent from, 
those covered so far. I will argue that the conception of education and (mis)recognition it 
contains, along with an emphasis on non-identity and particularity, takes us beyond the 
idealised and procedural (and quasi-transcendental) accounts of communication and 
recognition provided by Habermas and Honneth. It also more accurately grasps the 
(educational) development of self-other relations - with their entanglement of communication 
and domination, instrumentality and intersubjectivity, morality and ethics, and truth and 
power – whilst maintaining a (dialectical) commitment to the notions of subject-object 
(mis)representation and truth predominantly abandoned by Habermas, Honneth and Foucault. 
The section on the culture industry, although in many ways well-trodden ground, seeks to 
challenge Habermas’s and Honneth’s idealisation of the public sphere and the democratic 
process whilst further highlighting a number of challenges to the educational process of 
dialectical experience and reflection. The presuppositions of liberal (and 
communicative/recognitive) accounts of democracy– e.g. autonomous political judgement, 
reflexivity, individuality, education etc – I will argue are threatened by the closed world of the 
culture industry and its claims to ethical totality, along with its sacrifice of particularity and 
heterogeneity. Adorno’s work in this area also helps us to identify a number of the ways in 
which we are often structurally encouraged to objectify, and misrecognise, others whilst 
disavowing our own need for recognition.  
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This theme is continued, with the help of the work of Gillian Rose and Nigel Tubbs, in the 
brief section on the politics of representation which not only extends Adorno’s concerns over 
the culture industry - particularly with regards to the fate of experience, universality, 
particularity and mutual recognition - but also defends the importance of re-
presentation/misrepresentation and re-cognition/(mis)recognition. This section highlights the 
centrality of complicity, self-divestiture and re-configured identity in opposition to an 
atomistic and acquisitive culture characterised by instrumentality and freedom-from-
otherness, implication and dependence. In the final section, and following on from this, I 
outline the ways in which Adorno’s work points towards a notion of ‘non-reified culture’. Not 
only do I try and draw out the key conclusions of his politics of representation here, but I also 
seek to demonstrate that his work in this area provides us with a more convincing account of 
substantive, historical and practical ethics than those put forward by Habermas and Honneth 
(and to a certain extent Foucault). Adorno’s (political) aesthetics emphasises the ethical and 
aesthetic dimensions of human experience in an attempt to avoid the abstract separation of 
formal (universal) morality from ethical values and particularity, and also thereby avoid the 
nihilistic consequences of a formalisation that both assumes the liberal separation of 
individuals and produces formal criteria which has little purchase on everyday experiences. 
However, his work in this area also provides us with a notion of mutual recognition, albeit 
negatively construed, which pushes us beyond current (institutionalised) forms; it also 
emphasises the fragile and fleeting nature of mutual recognition as an achievement, focusing 
on suffering and the injuries of recognition, as well as the capacity of these experiences to 
provide us with practical (and non-theoretical) norms without the need for quasi-
transcendental guarantees.2  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Throughout this chapter I also attempt to tackle the key criticisms of Adorno (and earlier critical theory more 
generally) that we have previously encountered in the work of Habermas, Honneth and Foucault. 
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Dialectical experience 
Of utmost importance to Adorno’s philosophical approach, and his approach to culture, is a 
conception of ‘dialectical experience’ – a notion adopted from Hegel’s Phenomenology. The 
central idea here involves the experience of contradiction or illusion, or lack of identity, 
between our initial representation or conception (or ‘concept’) of an object and the object 
itself (or ‘intuition’). During this experience the concept is faced with a reality that resists the 
concept’s own expectations and intentions. Another way to state this would be that the 
particularity of the object – be that object social or natural - resists the universal conception 
that consciousness has of it. In social and political terms, for example, this might involve the 
conflict between our conception of freedom (e.g. my acceptance of the neo-liberal version of 
‘freedom’) and our particular experience of it (e.g. my far from ‘free’ experience of instability 
in the workplace and the need to constantly adapt to market imperatives); here the concept 
can be seen as ‘ideological’, for once it is exposed to the self-reflection prompted by 
contradictory experience it is unable to live up to the claims that it makes. The despair or loss 
– or for Adorno, ‘suffering’ - contained in this negative experience of lack of identity urges us 
to re-cognise or re-conceptualise the object, and this involves a de-stabilising of 
consciousness (and the subject) as it is forced to relinquish its immediate sense of identity.  
 
This initial loss of identity is also an education of finite self-consciousness towards truth, as a 
new form of recognition is established. This process, described by Rose (1996, p. 72) as a 
‘ceaseless comedy’, continues as this new form of (relative) recognition between subject and 
object also involves the experience of lack of identity and necessitates yet another 
reconfiguration. This process of (relative) re-cognition, stated rather abstractly here, contains 
within it the notion of ‘real’ or ‘absolute’ recognition (or truth) whereby consciousness and its 
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objects - or concept and intuition3 - would be reconciled without domination. As Rose 
suggests: 
 
“Recognition’ refers to the lack of identity or relation which the initial dichotomy 
between concept and intuition, or consciousness and its objects, represents. But it 
also implies a unity which includes the relation or lack of identity. This unity 
mediates between the poles of the opposition and is hence triune. ‘Recognition’, 
‘concept’, and ‘spirit’ all have this triune structure. They all refer initially to lack 
of identity, relation, or domination. They all yield speculative oppositions, and 
eschew the propositions of identity based on the primacy of the concept of pure 
practical reason. Misrecognition implies, but does not pre-judge, real recognition’ 
(Rose, 1981, p. 71).4 
 
Real recognition therefore mediates between subject and object; however, the added 
dimension here is that we do not have direct access to what absolute recognition (or truth) 
would entail, nor any guarantees that it is a finite possibility, as it is only implied in our 
experiences of misrecognition or misrepresentation. As Jarvis eloquently states in relation to 
Adorno’s work, ‘truth is glimpsed in the determinate negation of what is false’ (1998, p. 51). 
Importantly, truth is only ever truth for a (finite) self-consciousness, and this finite self-
consciousness is always this side of (absolute) truth – i.e. ‘comprehension is always 
provisional and preliminary’ (Rose, 1996, p. 72) and is re-shaped through the changes in both 
subject-object relations and the intersubjective relations of our ethical life.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Or, in social and political terms, our subjectivity and our social and political institutions. 
4 My use of Gillian Rose here, and throughout this chapter, aims to develop and complement many of the points 
made by Adorno. However, despite the clear influence of Adorno on Rose’s work, it is important not to 
downplay their differences and present Rose as in anyway a clear Adornian. For her criticisms of Adorno, see 
The Melancholy Science (2014), Hegel Contra Sociology (1981), and Judaism and Modernity (1993), 
particularly the ‘From Speculative to Dialectical Thinking – Hegel and Adorno’ essay in the latter (pp. 53-4) 
where she sides with Hegel and accuses Adorno of reducing speculative to dialectical thinking and of thereby 
insufficiently recollecting the whole. Rose effectively accuses Adorno of a ‘dialectical dogmatism’, which in 
turn echoes Adorno’s own criticisms of Hegel (see Adorno, 1993, and especially the following sections from 
Adorno (1990): ‘Critique of Positive Negation’ (pp. 158-161) and ‘World Spirit and Natural History’ (pp. 300-
360)). Adorno accuses Hegel of operating methodically and repeating a logic of identification by turning the 
negation of negation into a positive, and Rose accuses Adorno’s work as ultimately espousing a ‘morality of 
method’ which embraces Hegel’s Bacchanalian revel but without repose. There is insufficient space here to 
adequately explore these important differences, however the main thrust of my argument seeks to draw out the 
shared positions of Hegel, Adorno, and Rose, especially as these contrast to the work of Habermas, Honneth and 
Foucault.  
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Rose suggests that philosophy itself does not escape the lack of identity between 
consciousness and its objects, or the fate of ethical life, as any ‘concept of real recognition’ 
would be abstract: 
 
‘because it arises in a society where real recognition has not been achieved. 
Philosophy, in this sense, reinforces the primacy of the concept, and falls into the 
terms of the dichotomy which it seeks to transform. It thus contains an abstract 
imperative, a moment of Sollen’ (Rose, 1981, p. 78).  
 
So real or absolute recognition cannot simply be achieved in thought but relies on the 
reconciliation of contradictions in reality; it relies on ‘absolute ethical life’, where subjectivity 
(‘subject’) and substantial freedom (‘substance’ or objective ethical life) would be reconciled 
without domination. This is expressed in Adorno as the ‘standpoint of redemption’ (1999, p. 
247). As Rose suggests:  
 
‘representation which appears as knowledge, as truth, cannot be true, but must, by 
definition, be misrepresentation. It must be ‘in truth’ the ‘unrealised concept’, for 
re-presentation is the concept which is not united with intuition and is hence 
‘unrealised’, a mere concept’ (1981, p. 153).  
 
Rather than assuming an ahistorical, transcendent position however, real recognition is an 
immanent perspective contained within the historical experiences of social (and 
philosophical) contradictions and aporia.5 Philosophy should therefore seek to comprehend 
the origins and determinations of these social and philosophical contradictions, whilst 
acknowledging its own determination within them; this is a task that requires sensitivity not 
only to the modern forms that social illusion takes but also to the way philosophy repeats such 
illusions. For Adorno and Rose, the resolution of antinomies and contradictions depends upon 
historical change rather than philosophical deftness. Rather than seeking non-contradiction, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Given the importance of the experience of misrecognition here, my discussion of this process is, of course, 
inevitably abstract and schematic and therefore doesn’t grasp the experiential and educational dimensions of 
what I am describing. 
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and thereby working in the interests of power by disavowing real social and political 
contradictions, Adorno argues that ‘the responsibility of philosophical thought in its essential 
situations is not to play this game’; philosophy should be the ‘voice of contradiction’ whilst 
also acknowledging its own place within such contradictions.6 
 
Philosophy as dialectical thinking is important here – particularly Adorno’s outline of the 
distinction, and interrelationship, between (negative) dialectics and identity-thinking. 
Dialectical thinking, or ‘cognition of non-identity’ aims to ‘say what something is, while 
identitarian thinking says what something comes under, what it exemplifies or represents, and 
what, accordingly, it is not itself’ (Adorno, 1990, p. 149). Whereas identity thinking merely 
classifies (sensuous, particular) objects and turns those objects into examples of a (universal) 
concept, dialectical thinking seeks to highlight the ‘untruth of identity, the fact that the 
concept does not exhaust the thing conceived’ and the way ‘that objects do not go into their 
concepts without leaving a remainder’ (Adorno, 1990, p. 5). Central for Adorno is non-
identity, or what is non-identical to thought. Dialectical thinking is committed to what Adorno 
calls ‘the preponderance of the object’ (Adorno, 1990, p. 183). The subject attempts to grasp 
objects conceptually but objects are not themselves reducible to concepts, and therefore 
concepts suffer under the weight of their own insufficiency over time and are replaced by new 
conceptualisations.7 Adorno’s work seeks to use concepts to point beyond the conceptual, or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 For the role of philosophy to ‘not play this game’, see the section on ‘Vertiginousness’ in Negative Dialectics 
(Adorno, 1990, pp. 31-33); for philosophy as the ‘voice of contradiction’, see ‘Philosophy and the Division of 
Labour’, pp. 242-244, and ‘Contradictions’, pp. 237-240, in Dialectic of Enlightenment (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1997). I explore these ideas further towards the end of this chapter, and in the conclusion, where I 
try and draw out the active and practical elements of philosophy (and aesthetics) in the work of Adorno: more 
specifically, the way in which seeing the world through ‘sabbath eyes’ (Adorno, 1999, p. 48) – along with the 
perspectives gained by ‘felt contact with its objects’ (ibid, p. 247) and the forms of ethical and aesthetic 
imagination this provokes – is transformative. 
7 This is quite different to Habermas’s claim that Adorno appeals to immediacy in the form of an intuitive 
‘mimetic rationality’ beyond conceptual thinking (see Habermas, 1984, pp. 382-3). See both ‘peephole 
metaphysics’ (pp. 138-140) and ‘the object’s preponderance’ (pp. 183-6) in Adorno (1990) for his criticisms of 
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as he also puts it ‘to use the strength of the subject to break through the fallacy of constitutive 
subjectivity’ (ibid, p. xx)8. Dialectical experience, and dialectical thinking itself, however 
relies on the persistence of thought’s confrontation with what it is unable to classify. 
Dialectical thinking relies on identity thinking for its own position; it is only through the 
experience of failed identity-thinking that dialectical thinking arises. It is therefore not a new 
kind of thinking or method – e.g. one that could do without identification – but a way of 
representing what happens in the very process of thought. In exposing the inadequacies of 
identification through the experience of contradiction, dialectical thinking seeks to reveal the 
interdependence of – yet lack of identity between - thought and being, concepts and objects, 
ideas and social experience. Unlike identity thinking, dialectical thinking sees contradiction as 
real; rather than seeking to dismiss and eradicate contradictions as faulty logic, dialectical 
thinking seeks to expose the way in which logical contradictions are an expression of real 
social and political contradictions. It is the reconciliation of real contradictions, rather than the 
eradication of merely logical ones, that dialectical thinking seeks.9 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
immediacy and for his claims that ‘the beyond’ is always mediated through subjectivity and conceptual 
reflection. 
8 Adorno’s position is in marked contrast here to Habermas’s intersubjective brand of humanism but also to the 
anti-humanist strains we found in Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical work. Adorno is critical of 
humanist ideals insofar as they have been both complicit in forms of exclusion and domination and lacked the 
acknowledgement of our dependence on social and natural influences; however, rather than sidestepping 
subjectivity, and subject-mediated knowledge, and positing new (anti-humanist) first principles, Adorno uses 
negative dialectics and immanent critique to demonstrate the lack of subjective mastery of the object. For 
Adorno, anti-humanism displays regressive tendencies: considering Heidegger, Adorno argues that ‘the truth that 
expels man from the center of creation and reminds him of his impotence – this same truth will, as a subjective 
mode of conduct, confirm the sense of impotence, cause men to identify with it, and thus reinforce the spell of 
second nature’ (Adorno, 1990, p. 68) 
9 These points provide us with a response to Habermas’s (and Honneth’s) claim that Adorno reduces reason to 
instrumentality and identity-thinking and therefore ends up with a performative contradiction leaving us without 
any ‘rational’ criteria for critique (e.g. see Habermas, 1992, pp. 126-7, and Honneth, 1995, pp. 61-91). Instead, 
Adorno would suggest that reason might be predominantly instrumental but is also able to criticise itself and 
recognise its own complicity in domination (which in turns has educational and transformative value etc). The 
emphasis on contradiction and particularity in dialectical thinking, alongside Adorno’s appeal to aesthetics and 
ethics, suggests that reason need not be (perpetually) instrumental. 
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For Adorno, identity thinking has been a key feature of human life to date and is tied to self-
preservation and the mastery of nature. It is particularly prevalent in capitalist exchange, as 
outlined in Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism, whereby objects with particular (and 
incommensurable) use-values are made equivalent. Commodification is seen as the social 
counterpart of identification and both are seen as misrepresenting their objects.  
 
‘The exchange principle, the reduction of human labour to the abstract universal 
concept of average working hours, is fundamentally akin to the principle of 
identification. Exchange is the social model of the principle, and without the 
principle there would be no exchange; it is through exchange that non-identical 
individuals and performances become commensurable and identical’ (Adorno, 
1990, p. 146).  
 
However, it does not follow that we can have direct, unmediated access to use-values and 
particulars or shelter them from commodification and identification; rather the aim of 
dialectical thinking is to highlight the discrepancies (and misrepresentation) concealed in 
apparently fair exchange and identification. As suggested above, dialectical thinking is not a 
method which can be (undialectically) separated from and applied to its object, but rather 
emerges out of the object itself; another way of putting this would be to say that it doesn’t 
begin with its own (transcendent) values through which it then judges the facts, but 
(immanently) starts with the values of its object. Marx’s treatment of commodification in 
Capital (1974) is indebted to this Hegelian (immanent) logic inasmuch as Marx avoids a 
predetermined methodology. The dialectical thinking apparent in Capital relies on the 
assertions of classical political economy and exposes the contradictions they contain. It brings 
out the hidden prescriptive element (the ‘ought’) in what parades as pure description (the ‘is’). 
Whereas ‘fair exchange’ appears to be a simple ‘description’ of how the economy works, 
Marx demonstrates how a society based on this principle produces experiences that contradict 
it. In this way, bourgeois political economy – its categories and the society such categories 
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describe - is found wanting when judged according to its implicit prescriptive elements. 
However, rather than such criticism leading to a description of how bourgeois political 
economy really works, dialectical thinking seeks to expose the interdependence of, yet lack of 
identity between, description and prescription, being and thought. 
 
Hegel’s Phenomenology also provides an important context for our reflections on dialectical 
experience and thought. Here Hegel famously demonstrates the ways in which forms of 
consciousness and self-consciousness are inescapably connected with concrete social 
processes. He makes the point in the Phenomenology that our assumptions of immediate 
access to truth are constantly transformed by the (dialectical) experience of mediation, i.e. 
what we take as immediate (or truth) ends up depending for its identity on certain (social and 
political) elements outside of it. This is famously expressed in Hegel’s account of master and 
slave in his Phenomenology (1977, pp. 104-119). Here he suggests that the life and death 
struggle, as the origin of self-consciousness, determines the ways in which we come to 
understand ourselves, the other, and the world. Death, as the absolute master, is central to the 
formation of sociality and to the origin of master and slave as forms of self-consciousness. 
The initial conception of the master’s sovereignty is undermined in the struggle between 
master and slave as the master learns that his autonomy and sovereignty is an illusion; he is 
dependent for his freedom (and identity) on the labour and recognition of an ‘other’, the slave. 
A new social configuration, or form of (relative) recognition, is established but the illusion of 
mastery present in ‘lordship and bondage’ persists in new forms. Throughout the 
Phenomenology Hegel demonstrates that all attempts at the mastery of social conditions 
undergo a series of contradictory experiences requiring new forms of self-consciousness and 
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relations of (relative) recognition. All attempts at mastery are exposed as ‘moments’ in a 
broader process of practical relations with things and others.10 
 
The Hegelian and Marxian thrust of Adorno’s work on dialectical experience - along with the 
emphasis on contradiction, particularity, education, complicity, and truth – is in marked 
contrast to the positions we have seen espoused in Habermas and Honneth (and Foucault), 
despite their own complex and self-conscious relationships to these traditions and issues. The 
ethical dimension of Adorno’s work - which seeks to undermine totalising forms of rationality 
and open up spaces of possibility, mutual recognition and freedom – also differs markedly 
from the ethical positions we have seen in the work of Habermas, Honneth and Foucault. A 
key feature of Adorno’s notion of experience, which in a number of ways resolves the 
weaknesses we found in Habermas, Honneth and Foucault, is the centrality of complicity and 
entanglement in self-other relations (i.e. the entanglement of truth and power, communication 
and domination, intersubjectivity and instrumentality) and the educational development such 
(mis)recognition and (mis)representation entails. Dialectical experience allows us to avoid the 
separation of norm-free power and power-free communication we saw in Habermas along 
with the proceduralism of his idealising presuppositions of communication, and it also 
sidesteps the ‘formal’ nature of recognition in Honneth along with his later idealised account 
of empathetic engagement and reification and the absence of a notion of misrecognition; in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 It is precisely this Hegelian approach to knowledge and representation that Adorno adopts, and which 
Habermas misconstrues as a problematic, subject-object based, ‘philosophy of consciousness’ which should be 
superseded by a philosophy of intersubjectivity and communication (Habermas, 1984, pp. 386-7). However, 
rather than adhering to those characteristics of a philosophy of consciousness outlined by Habermas, both 
Adorno and Hegel criticise epistemological attempts to secure the (a priori) foundations of knowledge and 
representational truth, opting instead for phenomenological accounts which make use of the language of subject 
and object in the context of the dialectical development of fallible representations of truth. At the heart of their 
accounts is not only the acknowledgement that subjectivity is only possible in the context of intersubjective 
relations of mutual recognition, but also that knowledge itself is always conditioned and is formed in the broader 
process of the social and practical engagement with others and things in the world – this would include the 
communicative positions of Habermas and Honneth. 
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relation to both Habermas and Honneth, we avoid their purification of the ideals of 
communicative reason and their procedural conceptions of freedom and solidarity. Dialectical 
experience also helps us to avoid what are in many ways the opposite problems we found in 
the work of Foucault, for example the tendency in his genealogical work on power to neglect 
the paradoxes of freedom and autonomy in modernity in favour of their reduction to pervasive 
forms of power and control - a criticism both Habermas and Honneth in fact level at Adorno 
as well11 - and the converse tendency in his later work to conceive of an aesthetic subject 
seemingly free from structural limits. 
 
Adorno’s notion of experience challenges those tendencies, apparent in Habermas’s and 
Honneth’s accounts and raised by a number of critics discussed in previous chapters, to 
idealise linguistic communication, recognition, the public sphere and the lifeworld, and to 
separate out strategic action from the context of shared norms and meanings. To overly 
separate strategic action from shared norms – as was particularly the case with Habermas’s 
tendency to separate ‘norm-free’ power from ‘power-free’ communication - neglects the 
difficult process of ‘dialectical experience’ in everyday interactions, a process which involves 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Despite some clear parallels between Foucault’s genealogical work and Adorno’s social theory, I think that 
Adorno would take a middle (and dialectical) route between Foucault and Habermas/Honneth inasmuch as he 
would agree on the one hand with those criticisms of Foucault we saw in chapter 3 - whereby Foucault is seen to 
neglect the possibility of subject construction and liberating forms of autonomous experience beyond 
disciplinary power (e.g. what Rose called the ‘paradoxes and antinomies of law in capitalist societies’) and to 
reduce normative agreement and social cohesion to ‘normalisation’ - whilst also avoiding Habermas and 
Honneth’s tendency to neglect the power relations and forms of subjugation lurking behind apparent freedom 
and liberation. Adorno would refuse the temptation to either clearly separate out freedom (or rationality) and 
domination, as is the tendency in Habermas and Honneth, or insist on their inevitable and invariant 
entanglement, as tends to be the case in Foucault’s (Nietzschean) genealogical period. For interesting accounts 
of the ‘aporia and determinate negation of morality’ in Adorno, which emphasise both the repressive and 
emancipatory moments in morality, see Schweppenhauser’s ‘Adorno’s Negative Moral Philosophy’ and 
Menke’s ‘Genealogy and Critique’ (in Huhn, ed. 2004, pp. 328-353 and pp. 302-327 respectively). The latter 
essay separates Habermas and Kant’s ‘reflective foundation of morality’ from Adorno and Nietzsche’s 
‘questioning of morality’ whilst further distinguishing Nietzsche’s questioning of morality, geared towards 
individual self-perfection, from Adorno’s other-oriented account which seeks ‘the liberation of social virtues … 
from the false models of reason and freedom with which they have grown entangled in modern morality’ (p. 
305). 
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both strategic action (with its subsumption of particulars under general categories) and 
reflection (on such subsumption and its inadequacy). Adorno would suggest that our 
relationships with others give rise to convoluted forms of both recognition and strategic 
instrumentality and this necessitates educational dialectical experiences - i.e. we learn, in our 
(failed) attempts to recognise the other, that our original intentions may well involve a 
misrepresentation and misrecognition. Adorno’s position would also be that we need to be 
sensitive to the ways in which what often appears as norm-free power (in the system) is itself 
a reification, and what appears as power-free communication (in the lifeworld) contains forms 
of exclusion, subsumption and domination. His work not only emphasises the structural 
compulsions which encourage us to objectify others and to disavow our need for the 
recognition of others, which I will explore further below in the context of the culture industry, 
but also suggests that our earnest attempts to attain genuine recognition are often perverted.12 
 
Despite the famously sombre conclusions of his work – especially sombre when compared to 
Habermas’s and Honneth’s idealised accounts of the liberatory forms of communication 
underlying the messiness of our everyday interactions - it does not follow that mutual 
recognition is unattainable for Adorno, but rather that it is often a fragile and fleeting 
achievement requiring commitment, work and ‘education’.13 Rather than idealising the notion 
of recognition, as Honneth arguably does, Adorno is more sensitive to the ambiguous nature 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 In many ways, these themes are also an extension of Hegel’s claim that self-conscious individuals often take 
themselves to be the sole purpose of ethical life, even when their ultimate end appears to be a virtuous or moral 
one. See ‘the actualisation of rational self-consciousness through its own activity’ and ‘individuality which takes 
itself to be real in and for itself’ (particularly ‘reason as lawgiver’ and ‘reason as testing laws’ in the latter 
section) in Hegel (1977). These themes are also developed in Rose (1981) where she talks about 'cultures 
of subjective consciousness’ that become split off from sittlichkeit and thereby increase its lawlessness.  
13 Here Adorno would also agree with Butler’s critique of Honneth’s notion of reification, and his related notion 
of empathetic engagement, inasmuch as mutual recognition and love are not simply necessary givens discernible 
under the surface and suppressed by society but involve ‘struggling with a set of ethical demands on the basis of 
myriad affective responses that, prior to their expression in action, have no particular moral valence’ (Butler in 
Honneth, 2008, p. 104). 
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of recognition, our desire for it alongside our desire to disavow and repress it. Instead, 
recognition is better captured through a notion of dialectical experience characterised by what 
Foster, as we saw in chapter 2, calls ‘working through our inevitable tendency to 
misrecognise the object’ (Foster, 2011, p. 258) and the ‘movement, or better, struggle, 
towards self-awareness within cognition itself’ (ibid, p. 260). This alternative reading of 
recognition (and misrecognition) not only captures the ambiguous nature of recognition and 
the importance of struggle, but also the transformative and self-transformative nature of 
recognition. Alongside Adorno’s emphasis on particularity and non-identity, this (negative) 
conception of recognition avoids the sort of reduction of recognition to (broadly already 
existing) ‘identity claims’ that we saw in Honneth. It also allows for an understanding of 
identity beyond liberal-individualist ideology and beyond a private and fixed identity 
protected by forms of legal recognition, forms which often secure domination and are 
themselves premised on mutual indifference and abstraction from particularity.14 
 
Also, as we have seen, Habermas’s and Honneth’s appeals to the normative presuppositions 
‘implicit’ in linguistic understanding and recognitive interaction tend to excessively abstract 
the ethical and emancipatory ambitions of their work from the actual experiences of social 
actors. In their attempts to separate out progressive from regressive developments, their 
purification and formalisation of the ideals of communicative reason - under the assumption 
that the formal element provides universality and ‘rational’ authority – ends up robbing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 See Chapter 2 above, and Bernstein (2005, pp. 304, 317) for an elaboration of similar points. Here he makes 
the point that Adorno uses the language of ‘suffering’, ‘non-identity’, ‘damaged life’ etc rather than the language 
of ‘justice’, due to the belief that the language of (liberal) justice often takes the competitive market as the model 
for social cooperation and thereby reproduces forms of exclusion. He warns against the fact that ‘emphatic 
justice has been sublimated into democratic procedures for the warranting of social norms as a means for 
coordinating actions among competing interests. In this respect, social norms presuppose the mutual indifference 
of a plurality of strangers forced to coordinate their actions with one another if they are to achieve their 
individual ends’ (p. 304). We end up in a situation where ‘political cooperation and a just social order 
themselves become a means to a private end – formally the end of each citizen pursuing their own conception of 
the good life, substantially the end of capital reproduction’. (p. 304). 
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practical norms of their motivating quality and their ability to foster solidarity (see Bernstein, 
2005).15 In the process, their moral universalism (overly separated from ethical values) shares 
the characteristics of the kind of instrumental rationality that is the target of Adorno’s work: 
an instrumental reason which abstracts from difference, subjectivity, and particularity. 
Adorno refuses to identify (quasi)transcendental normative presuppositions, and to purify 
practical norms, on the basis that such formalisation itself has nihilistic consequences and is 
part of the process of instrumental reason which his work seeks to resist. Adorno’s concern 
with cultural differentiation and the modern separation of the particular and the universal - 
whereby the particular takes refuge in the aesthetic and ethical dimensions of human 
experience in contrast to the universalising tendencies of technological rationality and formal 
morality - means that his philosophy is forever sensitive to false claims to ethical totality and 
the sacrifice of the particular. His work (along with Foucault’s) helps us to remain vigilant to 
the ways in which forms of rationality, in this case communicative rationality, often exclude 
those forms of action and identity, and of desire and satisfaction, that aren’t easily understood 
in terms of Habermas’s discursive (and Honneth’s recognitive) account of ‘rational’ 
solidarity. His work also - again with Foucault - highlights the paradoxes of modernity, the 
way that notions of morality, autonomy, recognition, and subjective freedom are often tied to, 
and emerge out of, contexts of oppressive power relations and domination. It also, 
importantly, draws our attention to the ways in which (formalising, instrumental) reason, 
often including ‘critical’ and emancipatory forms of reason, is complicit in forms of 
domination. His ideas help us to understand how current (institutionalised) forms of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 As we saw in chapter 2, Pensky (in Petherbridge, 2011) makes a similar point specifically in relation to 
Honneth’s ‘formal’ (and ultimately procedural) conception of ethical life which he suggests ends up lacking a 
notion of the truly ‘ethical, in the sense of describing a sphere of interpretations of the kind of life desirable for 
us’ (p. 152). 
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recognition often mis-recognise, and how normative universalism often excludes more 
comprehensive forms of recognition, satisfaction and solidarity.  
 
Adorno would suggest that freedom and autonomy are not best protected via appeals to 
universal rationality, rather we should avoid the link between morality and universal reason 
and instead seek to develop a more concrete, substantive, historical and practical ethics.16 His 
position on Habermas and Honneth would, I believe, echo his criticisms of Kant’s ‘causality 
of freedom’ in the ‘metacritique of practical reason’ section of his Negative Dialectics.17 Here 
he criticises the formal nature of Kant’s moral law on the grounds that he ends up with a 
notion of the subject as transcendentally free whilst empirically unfree; this notion not only 
makes freedom separate from our historical and empirical world, but also leads to the a priori 
deduction of a moral law which ultimately ties freedom to moral compulsion.18 He argues that 
Kant’s formal separation of moral autonomy from heteronomous influence is precisely what 
turns freedom into compulsion, and further suggests that all attempts to establish an a priori 
account of freedom - and we can add to this even those as socio-politically minded as 
Habermas’s and Honneth’s - end up reproducing a potentially coercive moral law.19 Adorno’s 
alternative account avoids positing the nature of freedom and instead is resigned to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Having said this, we might argue that there remains a gap in Adorno’s work in terms of its practical (and 
ethical) consequences, although Adorno is clearly not ignorant of these issues – see in particular some of the 
later essays he referred to in terms of ‘critical models’ (in Adorno, 2005); also, amongst others, critics such as 
Cook (2004), the essays by Menke and Schweppenhäuser in Huhn (ed., 2004), the special edition of New 
German Critique entitled ‘Adorno and Ethics’ (Gerhardt, ed., 2006), alongside Bernstein’s attempts to elaborate 
an Adornian ethics in aesthetics on the basis of social and bodily suffering and compassion (in Bernstein, 2001; 
Bernstein, 2005; and Bernstein, 2006).  
17 See the first section of part 3 in Adorno (1990), particularly pp. 231-240. See also Adorno (2000, pp. 119-20) 
where he argues that Kant ‘banishes sympathy, compassion and the direct expression of pity from his ethics 
because all impulses of this sort are merely natural impulses, and are purely instinctual. As such they are said to 
be incompatible with pure reason, with the principle of reason. Therefore, because this extreme view of the 
concept of freedom is based on its absolute independence from all existing beings, from nature as such, it 
threatens to become transformed into unfreedom’. 
18 There are clear affinities here with Hegel’s ‘The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate’ in his Early Theological 
Writings (1961, pp. 182-301) and Marx’s ‘On the Jewish Question’ in his Early Writings (1992, pp. 211-41). 
19 We saw, in chapter 2, how Bernstein linked this to ‘secular practices of purification’ such as the Terror. 
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negative task of exposing the ways in which freedom and compulsion remain entwined in 
current experience, i.e. to the determinate negation of false totalities.20 His negative position 
here seeks to emphasise the historical, rather than formal/transcendental, nature of norms; the 
emphasis on both particularity and non-identity in his philosophy insists on the need to attend 
to everyday practical norms in their (negative) appearance through our shared experiences of 
injury and suffering. Rather than establishing the ‘universality’ and rational authority of 
norms by formal/transcendental means,21 Adorno denies direct access to any pre-given or a 
priori structures that would produce universal solidarity and freedom amongst members of the 
community, instead suggesting that practical norms can only attain validity through their 
acceptance by others.  
 
Having briefly explored the importance of dialectical thought and experience in Hegel, 
Adorno and Rose, I will now outline the ways in which dialectical experience – and the 
implicit notion of absolute recognition - is under threat in contemporary cultural experience 
(as well as contemporary philosophy/social theory), before concluding with a brief outline of 
Adorno’s ethics and his conception of non-reified culture and ethical life. For Adorno and 
Hegel, cultural experience and philosophy are both important expressions of the universal 
insofar as they express and embody social contradictions and point beyond the world as it 
currently is. Following Adorno, I will argue that the dialectical experience they (potentially) 
contain is threatened by the increasing dominance of the culture industry – along with what 
Rose calls the ‘fascism of representation’ - and also by non-dialectical forms of philosophy 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 However, this is not to say that current experience is evidence that such entwinement is ‘how it has always 
been’ and ‘will continue to be’; this is a broadly Nietzchean position which Foucault’s genealogical work closely 
approximates at times. 
21 A position that, incidentally, allows the philosopher to assume a position of representative universality and 
authority in the process. Foucault makes a similar point in his reflections on ‘specific’ and ‘universal’ 
intellectuals in his ‘Truth and Power’ essay (in Gordon, ed., 1980, pp. 109-133). 
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(including Habermas, Honneth and Foucault). Rose’s contribution to Adorno’s culture 
industry thesis, is to suggest that an abstract and technological form of representation is 
increasingly dominant in contemporary society, and is a form of representation that is tied to 
the excessive individualism of civil society. The danger such representation poses is that it 
potentially frees us as subjects from a relationship to the object, such that either we do not 
experience the contradictions between our initial conception and the object itself or our lived 
experience of contradictions holds no significance for us and leads to resignation or nihilism. 
In the absence of such experience, or the absence of transformation in the light of such 
experience, there is no re-cognition of the object and no de-position of the subject; we remain 
trapped in a particular subject-object configuration and the guiding notion of absolute 
recognition I have outlined is in danger of being lost. This idea helps us to comprehend how 
individuals in civil society come to understand themselves and their actions without 
understanding their complicity in the suffering of others – and without being educated 
through contradictory experiences. These arguments also lead us to question Habermas and 
Honneth’s faith in both the public sphere and forms of intersubjective recognition under 
current conditions.22  
 
The culture industry & the loss of dialectical experience. 
Alongside the prevalence of positivism and the horrors of fascism at the time of his writing, 
Adorno also holds the culture industry responsible for the erosion of the kind of dialectical 
experience outlined above. An understanding of the culture industry also helps us explain the 
persistence of late capitalism despite significant contradictions and social ills; it helps us !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 By considering the ways in which the culture industry might pervert the potentials of a democratic public 
sphere, I am also extending the criticisms of Honneth that we saw from Renault in chapter 2, i.e. the limitations 
of seeing social institutions simply as expressions of underlying recognition relations and thereby missing the 
capacity for these institutions to restrict and ‘constitute’ subjects, and to encourage subjects to disavow 
complicity, dependency and recognition. 
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understand how a particular, and highly flawed, socio-historical form comes to assume a 
reified permanence. Adorno suggests that the way we conceptualise the world, and identify 
objects within it, is also increasingly determined by the culture industry as a self-perpetuating 
system that we are both alienated from and have no conscious control over. Our very 
conception of objects in the world is structurally determined by the images and patterns of 
thought that emerge out of the culture industry. The omnipresence of the culture industry, the 
fact that ‘the whole world is made to pass through the filter of the culture industry’ (Adorno, 
1991, p. 126), results in the tendency for it to provide individuals with a framework for 
understanding their lives and the world around them. It enters into our very being and 
provides us with models (of morality, gender identity, heroism etc) to identify with and aspire 
to. Its representations and images – and, as we shall see, its mode of representation – come to 
dominate our experience of the world and how we understand it. The culture industry silences 
thought and reflection by pre-forming or ‘schematising’ our experience. For Adorno the main 
form ideology takes in late capitalism is identity – the closure of the relationship between 
subject and object along with the eternal recurrence of the same without subjective reflection 
or transformative experience. As we have seen, the criticism of such identity would involve a 
form of self-reflection provoked by dialectical experience - the conflict between our 
conception of the object and our actual experience of it. It is this excess of experience in 
relation to our conception of the object, and the despair or loss involved in such an experience 
of the negative, that constitutes the ‘education’ of consciousness; such education requires 
reflection and effort on our part and opens up the possibility of negation. Dialectical 
experience is crucial for Adorno in terms of its ability to break through and point beyond the 
apparent immutability of reified social and historical structures, however it is this experience 
or education that Adorno is suggesting is precluded by the workings of the culture industry.  
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Adorno’s culture industry thesis needs to be understood within the broader context of Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment such that the culture industry is conceived as 
the further triumph of instrumental or subsumptive rationality, alongside commodification 
and the end of reflection.23 In the name of self-preservation, the particular is subsumed under 
the universal by an instrumental rationality that seeks technical control and mastery; it is this 
aspect of enlightenment reason – an aspect which has also brought us both control over nature 
and freedom from myth – that poses the threat of new forms of myth and social control. 
Adorno and Horkheimer argue that the increasing elision of instrumental rationality and 
‘reason as a whole’ leads to the sacrifice not only of the possibility of comprehending 
particularity but also the rational judgement of human ends and therefore the possibility of 
happiness and freedom. As we have seen, this perversion of reason, in the form of 
instrumental rationality, comes to fruition in modern capitalist societies where production is 
primarily for exchange rather than use - production for the market, for profit and further 
accumulation rather than need.24 Of significance here is Marx’s analysis of commodity 
‘fetishism’ whereby the value of commodities, produced through human labour and the social 
process of exchange, appears as ‘objective’ or as the attribute of the objects themselves. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 As we have seen, Habermas and Honneth attempt to sever the link, made by Adorno and Horkheimer, between 
Enlightenment rationality and the commodity form. The purpose of distancing themselves from earlier critical 
theory has been to rescue the democratic possibilities of the public sphere and delineate a relatively autonomous 
realm of communicative rationality. It is this severing, and the associated claims to autonomy, that I seek to 
challenge with the help of Adorno’s work. Honneth’s (and Habermas’s) criticism that Adorno and Horkheimer 
model social domination on the mastery of nature, thereby neglecting the (relatively autonomous) social realm of 
intersubjectivity and producing a functionalist conception of culture, has been one important element in the 
attempt to separate out a (communicative) form of reason from complicity in domination (see Honneth, 1991, 
pp. 51-53). As we have seen, Adorno’s (materialist) refusal to separate out truth and power, intersubjectivity and 
instrumentality, and communication and domination etc for sake of convenience, also applies to nature and the 
social. As Jarvis (1998, p. 35) suggests, ‘to dominate other humans – since humans are not pure culture – is 
already domination of nature as well as social domination’. Honneth concedes this point to a certain extent in his 
‘Afterword’ in Honneth (1991, p. xx-xxii). Jarvis (1998) usefully highlights the related point that Dialectic of 
Enlightenment avoids the separation of social action and (a pre-social) nature we find in cultural idealism, and 
instead seeks a ‘reconciliation of culture and nature’ (p. 35) whereby happiness would involve more than ‘free 
and rational intersubjectivity’ and include ‘bodily delight’ along with freedom from self-preservation and 
‘material suffering’ (p. 221). 
24 Although, as we have seen, for Adorno the distinction between false and ‘true’ or ‘natural’ needs is not clearly 
evident in the context of the thorough mediation of consciousness by exchange value and the consumption (and 
production) of commodities for exchange (rather than use) value. For example, see Adorno (1990, pp. 92-3). 
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Value, which for the purposes of exchange treats objects with a different sensuous 
particularity and use-value as though they are equivalent, is misrepresented as an inherent 
quality of the object itself rather than the outcome of collective social processes. The 
fetishism of the commodity occurs when these social processes and human actions take on a 
life of their own above and beyond the conscious control of human beings (Marx, 1974, pp. 
76-87). It also helps explain how individual citizens in civil society come to understand their 
activity without recognising their complicity in the suffering of others. This notion of 
fetishism is a key element in Adorno’s analysis of the culture industry and will be discussed 
later, however for the time being it is sufficient to note the parallels between instrumental 
rationality and commodity exchange. Both instrumental rationality and capitalist production 
make incommensurable things interchangeable, and transform uniqueness into sameness. 
Instrumental rationality is means rather than ends-based and it subsumes particulars under 
universal categories; capitalist production is primarily for exchange rather than use and it 
subsumes use value under exchange value.  
 
Adorno’s culture industry thesis seeks to understand the ways in which this broader 
standardisation of nature, and process of commodification, has expanded in scope to 
incorporate spheres of social life previously considered immune to the effects of 
rationalisation. The power of the culture industry, as a form of instrumental rationality, is due 
to the way it integrates individuals into society while, or rather by, granting them the right to 
have their desires ‘satisfied’. The severely curtailed notion of culture it contains involves the 
organisation of ‘free time’ or leisure in line with the logic of exchange and fungibility 
apparent in the realm of work and production such that cultural works are produced solely for 
reproduction and consumption. Rather than culture and art offering us the promise of future 
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happiness and freedom from self-preservation, as Adorno suggests they can and should, in the 
guise of the culture industry they, for the most part, merely affirm current reality and offer 
undemanding and pre-digested forms of amusement and escape. Culture ceases to be what 
Bernstein terms ‘the repository of a reflective comprehension of the present in terms of a 
redeemed future’ and instead it becomes a ‘culture industry [which] forsakes the promise of 
happiness in the name of the degraded utopia of the present’ (in Adorno, 1991, p. 8). Rather 
than producing new ‘particular’ experiences, challenging our current conceptions of the 
world, and encouraging our active participation and autonomous judgement – in short, 
fostering the dialectical experience discussed above - it turns us into external consumers of 
culture and encourages us to adapt ourselves to the world in its current configuration. 
Mirroring instrumental rationality’s subsumption of the particular under the (false) universal, 
the culture industry sacrifices individuality and particularity within the false universality it 
proposes. For Adorno, what is excluded from subsumptive rationality – i.e. rational human 
ends and sensuous particularity – takes refuge in art, albeit an autonomous art separated from 
everyday social practice and, for the most part, from the lower social classes. This division 
within culture, between the culture industry and autonomous art, reflects the division between 
the universal and particular in late capitalist society. Art keeps open the possibility of a true 
universality, of a genuine reconciliation of universal and particular, whereas the culture 
industry hides the violent subsumption of the particular under a false or illusory universality. 
As Adorno suggests, ‘culture is the perennial claim of the particular over the general, as long 
as the latter remains unreconciled to the former’ (Adorno, 1991, p. 98). 
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Culture and contradiction 
Culture, in its truest sense, would embody contradictions - quite rightly for Adorno given the 
real social and political contradictions that exist - and thereby make claims that would require 
autonomous judgement on the part of those engaged in it. Rather than resolving such 
contradictions for us it would highlight the lack of reconciliation between subject and 
substance, and our cultural experience would leave us in the difficult position of 
(dialectically) experiencing contradictions, acknowledging our complicity in such 
contradictions, and requiring us to judge and work through them. It would treat us as 
autonomous agents and keep alive the possibility of a reconciled community – of the 
reconciliation between autonomous agency and our social and political relations. Such culture 
points towards true universality and fosters the autonomous judgement such universality 
would, by definition, require. The culture industry, on the other hand, ‘resolves contradictions 
in a spurious harmony’ and fails to make claims on us, leaving us without the need for 
autonomous judgement. 
 
‘While it claims to lead the perplexed, it deludes them with false conflicts which 
they are to exchange for their own. It solves conflicts for them only in appearance, 
in a way that they can hardly be solved in their real lives. In the products of the 
culture industry human beings get into trouble only so that they can be rescued 
unharmed, usually by representatives of a benevolent collective; and then in 
empty harmony, they are reconciled with the general, whose demands they had 
experienced at the outset as irreconcilable with their interests. For this purpose the 
culture industry has developed formulas which even reach into such non-
conceptual areas as light musical entertainment. Here too one gets into a ‘jam’, 
into rhythmic problems, which can be instantly disentangled by the triumph of the 
basic beat’ (Adorno, 1991, p. 90). 
 
Our relationship with its cultural products is one of passive consumption, and a form of 
consumption that leaves us morally intact and separated from ‘dialectical experience’. We are 
not treated as autonomous agents by the culture industry, but instead our capacity for 
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autonomous judgement is deadened. Without the consent and judgement of autonomous 
agents, the possibility of reconciliation is impeded if not precluded. Such culture does not 
point to true universality but proclaims that it already exists insofar as it is possible.  
 
Culture, in the form of the culture industry, no longer seeks to ‘maintain a grasp on the idea of 
the good life’ (Adorno, 1991, p. 90). Instead of embodying social contradictions and 
(implicitly) pointing to the possibility of what Hegel calls ‘absolute ethical life’, a social order 
where subjectivity and objective ethical life would be reconciled without domination, 
 
‘The concepts of order which [the culture industry] hammers into human beings 
are always those of the status quo. They remain unquestioned, unanalysed and 
undialectically presupposed, even though they no longer have any substance for 
those who accept them … The power of the culture industry’s ideology is such 
that conformity has replaced consciousness. The order that springs from it is never 
confronted with what it claims to be or with the real interests of human beings. 
Order, however, is not good in itself. It would be so only as a good order’ (1991, 
p. 90). 
 
Rather than a good order based upon the harmony of individual interests and the interests of 
the whole, which requires autonomous judgement, the culture industry instead promotes 
concepts of order that bypass and diminish autonomous judgement. Rather than a true 
reconciliation of universal and particular, it promotes a false universality. 
 
The promise of true happiness, which Adorno suggests is expressed in ‘autonomous’ 
bourgeois art, is also increasingly under threat by the empty pleasures of the culture industry. 
The decline of high modernism, with its oblique promise of particularity and sensuous 
happiness, runs the risk of eradicating the distinction between the pleasure derived from the 
entertainment of the culture industry and the possibility of true happiness. For Adorno, the 
pleasures offered up by the culture industry deliver neither sensuous happiness nor freedom 
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from the everyday repressions experienced in the context of capital, rather they offer up 
repression as fulfilment. Instead, it is the division between autonomous art and the culture 
industry – itself the result of the historical separation of particular and universal - that 
embodies the truth. Autonomous art’s purposelessness and freedom from the instrumentality 
of everyday life bears witness to the possibility of sensuous particularity and happiness but at 
the expense of excluding the masses, whereas the culture industry gains its legitimacy from 
the lack of exclusion whilst sacrificing the particular.  
 
Instead of culture and art embodying the experience of the negative, contributing to a crisis in 
current values, and pointing beyond the present to a future of possible happiness and freedom 
from self-preservation, the culture industry increasingly secures their services in the interests 
of marketability and profit. The consequences of this are such that ‘the commercial character 
of culture causes the difference between culture and practical life to disappear’ and ‘aesthetic 
semblance (Schein) turns into the sheen which commercial advertising lends to the 
commodities which absorb it in turn’ (Adorno, 1991, p. 53). This aestheticisation of practical 
life embellishes the empirical world but doesn’t radically transform it in the spirit of freedom 
and happiness; it assures us that our current pleasures (of consumption) and freedoms are the 
best that we can hope for and further precludes the possibility of thinking otherwise. Unlike 
autonomous artworks, the products of the culture industry are not (partially) separated from 
the empirical world, despite their claims to provide an escape from it, but rather reinforce it 
such that ‘the borderline between culture and empirical reality becomes more and more 
indistinct’ (Adorno, 1991, p. 53). For Adorno, high modernism expresses (or expressed) a 
truth content in opposition to the instrumental rationality of the culture industry, and it 
contains all those aspects excluded by subsumptive reason such as substantive ends, sensuous 
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happiness, particularity, individuality etc. However, even those characteristics of high art that 
had once contained moments of cultural negativity are often incorporated into the culture 
industry and put to work in the promotion of ‘diverse’ products and lifestyle choices, and the 
fostering of new ‘needs’. Not only does art become increasingly commodified - in terms of 
production, consumption and reception - but also commodities become increasingly 
dependent on their aesthetic representation. Commodities are characterised by, or co-
extensive with, their advertising image, and consumers become increasingly obsessed with 
the promises such representations make rather than simply obsessed with the commodities or 
objects in themselves.  
 
Before further developing these ideas, and exploring the politics of representation along with 
the role of aesthetics in non-reified culture, I will briefly rehearse Adorno’s explanation for 
the ways in which the pervasiveness of this instrumental and commodified culture preclude 
the dialectical experience of contradiction. At the heart of his account are the processes of 
standardisation, the regression of consciousness, pseudo-individualisation (or illusory 
universality), the reproduction of desire, and the flight from resistance. 
 
Standardisation, pseudo-individuality, and the reproduction of desire. 
Instrumental rationality and commodification are at work in the way the culture industry 
seeks to calculate the effects that the products have on consumers. This drive for calculation 
gives rise to uniform and standardised products that are diminished as artworks and which 
deaden aesthetic response. Cultural standardisation produces an eternal sameness hidden 
behind an apparent diversity; the specific qualities of any cultural product cease to have any 
significance and instead must predominantly fit into existing cultural forms. The formulaic 
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nature of such products – the fact that we know how the film will proceed and end without 
seeing it, and we know the structure of the pop song without hearing it – makes them 
exchangeable and, in the process, reduces the particular parts to mere effects that have no 
relationship to an aesthetic whole. The significance of particularity is lost as every detail is 
reduced to a common denominator; thereby standardisation ensures that the cultural industry 
affirms current reality. Autonomous art on the other hand uses existing materials (e.g. sounds, 
words, colours, forms etc) but reconfigures them (and the historical meanings they embody) 
to produce meaningful relationships and new experiences. In such works of art ‘technique is 
concerned with the internal organisation of the object itself, with its inner logic’, whereas in 
the culture industry technique is ‘one of distribution and mechanical reproduction, and 
therefore always remains external to its object’ (Adorno, 1991, pp. 87-88). Autonomous 
artworks use existent reality but open it up, look at it anew and point beyond it. In this way 
they represent ‘a consciousness that is more than the mere imprint of that which exists, and 
which seeks to penetrate into this existence’ (Adorno in Viertel, 1973, p. 199). Autonomous 
art has affinities with non-identity thinking here inasmuch as it undermines the unity of 
thought and (current) being and exposes the domination of the particular by the universal.  
 
The fetish-character of culture industry products, on the other hand, involve their production 
for exchange value rather than their particular quality, and tend to lead a life of their own 
inasmuch as their consumers assume a passive, unreflective role in relation to them. So not 
only does the culture industry lead to the decline of works themselves but also to an increase 
in easily-consumable repetitiveness. This repetition produces automatic reactions in the 
audience and compels us to accept what appears as inescapable. The ‘isolated moments of 
enjoyment’ that pop songs offer up become ‘an excuse for absolving the listener from the 
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thought of the whole’ (Adorno, 1991, p. 92); we are urged to find pleasure in the isolated 
details and effects of these products rather than experience the real joy that comes from our 
thought and reflection on the way the parts interconnect and constitute the whole.25 The only 
response such cultural products demand is passive consumption, without thought or effort or 
reflection, and this ‘impedes the development of autonomous, independent individuals who 
judge and decide consciously for themselves’ (ibid, p. 92). The standardised and pre-digested 
nature of such products – of music that does the listening for you or films that do the 
watching for you – removes the possibility of real choice or spontaneity. Autonomous 
judgements of taste are replaced by familiarity, and the notion of ‘value judgements’ has 
‘become a fiction for the person who finds himself hemmed in by standardised musical 
goods’ (ibid, p. 26). The differences between products – e.g. types of music or film genres – 
are of very little creative importance and rather serve to integrate everyone into the same 
system. All tastes and types are provided for and every response is built-in to the product 
consumed; consumption becomes the only response that counts. 
 
Alongside standardisation, Adorno emphasised the importance of pseudo-individuality to the 
culture industry. Once the particular qualities of a product become less important, due to 
standardisation and the increasing production of exchange-value for its own sake, consumers 
become more concerned with the pseudo-individuality of products – i.e. those aspects of the 
products singled out as unique by advertisers, such as the specific personality of a celebrity or 
the distinctive voice of a new singer etc. Such ‘distinctiveness’ has to be emphasised due to 
the broader context of the sameness of such cultural products and it is this that serves to give 
the illusion that we are consuming unique use-value rather than exchange-value for its own !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 For Adorno, ‘real joy’ tends to lie closer to certain forms of autonomous aesthetic practice that, through 
particular experiences of intense affect, provoke unanticipated outcomes and forms of recognition and 
resistance. I explore this in further depth towards the end of this chapter. 
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sake. As Adorno suggests ‘the more dehumanised its methods of operation and content, the 
more diligently and successfully the culture industry propagates supposedly great 
personalities and operates with heart-throbs’ (1991, p. 87). Such novelty also hides the 
affirmation of the conventional norms of intelligibility. Pseudo-individuality functions by: 
 
‘endowing cultural mass production with the halo of free choice or open market 
on the basis of standardisation itself. Standardisation of song hits keeps the 
customers in line by doing the listening for them. Pseudo-individualisation, for its 
part, keeps them in line by making them forget that what they listen to is already 
listened to for them, or “pre-digested”’ (Adorno, 1991, p. 45). 
 
Although the culture industry provides us with a dazzling array of new products, and succeeds 
in providing for a large range of tastes, the plurality it proffers only operates at a surface level. 
Behind this illusion of diversity and distinctiveness lies sameness and homogeneity and, for 
Adorno, to take this illusion at face value would run the risk of conflating the surface plurality 
of products in the marketplace with the real plurality that would constitute human freedom. It 
would run the risk of conflating consumerist ‘choice’, largely determined by our ability to 
identify with the spectacular world of advertising imagery, and autonomous judgement. 
 
If we recall the discussion of dialectical experience at the beginning of this chapter, where we 
considered the importance of particularity and its resistance to universal conceptions, we can 
see how, given the role of pseudo-individuality in the culture industry, the illusion of 
particularity forecloses the possibility of the kind of dialectical experience that would lead to 
new forms of (relative) recognition.26 The individuality or particularity in cultural works that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 It is worth noting that Adorno uses the Kantian term ‘schema’ to draw parallels between the way the culture 
industry schematises the individual’s experience of the world and the way the schematism in Kant produces a 
correspondence between our concepts, or a priori categories, and our mental images, or representations of 
objects (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997, p. 124; see also Adorno’s ‘Schema of Mass Culture’ in Adorno, 1991, 
pp. 53-84). Kant’s transcendental schema, itself the product of the transcendental imagination, is the positive 
mediating element he uses to account for the relationship between concepts and intuitions (see ‘On the 
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had once posed a threat to aesthetic unity – e.g. the expressiveness of colour or material in 
painting, musical dissonance etc – is integrated and neutralised in the culture industry; details, 
effects and dissonance serve only to help further the uniformity of the whole as they come to 
function as markers of pseudo-specificity for homogenised cultural products. It is in this 
aspect of the culture industry – the illusion of unity between universal and particular - that 
Adorno sees totalitarian tendencies where all qualitative difference and otherness are 
liquidated. The mismatch between the (universal) conception of the object and our (particular) 
experience of it, and the potential negation of contemporary social relations provoked by such 
a contradiction, is under threat once experience itself becomes exchangeable. Once ‘the real 
becomes an image insofar as in its particularity it becomes equivalent to the whole as one 
Ford car is to all the others of the same range, then the image on the other hand turns into 
immediate reality’ (Adorno, 1991, p. 55). Imagination plays no role here as it is ‘replaced by a 
mechanically relentless control mechanism which determines whether the latest imago to be 
distributed really represents an exact, accurate and reliable reflection of the relevant item of 
reality’ (ibid). Particularity is lost once it is reproduced as pseudo-individuality, and our 
experience of the distinction between image and reality is lost once we fetishise the image.  
 
In addition to standardisation and pseudo-individualisation, Adorno emphasises the closed 
totality of desire produced by the ideology of the culture industry. Despite claiming to offer a 
release from the mechanistic conditions of work, the culture industry – itself standardised and 
mechanistic - reproduces them, and our experiences end up becoming after-images of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
schematism of pure concepts of the understanding’ in Kant, 2000, pp. 271-77); elsewhere, Adorno focuses on the 
metaphysical element in Kant’s schematism due to the excessive (and, for Adorno, untenable) separation 
between concepts and intuition (see the ‘schematism’ chapter in Adorno, 2001, pp. 128-137). The parallel 
Adorno draws between Kant’s schematism and the schema of the culture industry brings together nicely 
Adorno’s cultural critique and the philosophical approach we explored in the ‘dialectical experience’ section 
above. 
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work process. The culture industry produces a certain desire for freedom but ultimately denies 
its fulfilment. However, Adorno argues that if individuals have the kind of experiences in 
their free time that are dictated by the culture industry, then they think of themselves as free - 
despite mechanistic experiences - and then their dissatisfaction with the products of the 
culture industry is channelled back into the culture industry with its future promises of 
pleasure, satisfaction and freedom. Rather than these experiences leading us to question the 
form of (mechanical) representation of the culture industry itself, we buy into the 
representation and then our experiences of dissatisfaction reproduce an insatiable desire for 
the next thing that we hope will confirm our freedom and unify our identity. The less the 
products satisfy, the more they reproduce the appetite for them. When considered in relation 
to the notion of dialectical experience that I have outlined, where the lack of identity between 
concept and object leads to a re-cognition of the object and a de-position of the subject, we 
instead have a closed totality of desire-consumption-disappointment-desire. The 
disappointment when compared to our original conception of the product, taken from the 
claims of the culture industry, does not lead us to question the belief that such products would 
satisfy us and then question the industry as a whole. Instead of educating us about our 
conception of the object, and also our conception of ourselves, we end up with an empty 
experience where the lack of identity between our conception of the product and (our 
experience of) the product itself leads to a renewed desire for further consumption of culture 
industry products. 
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Seeing through and obeying 
An oft-repeated criticism of Adorno’s theory of the culture industry is that it over-states the 
manipulation of consumers and the ‘regression’ of consciousness.27 However, Adorno 
emphasises both the way in which the culture industry relies on the ‘active’ participation of its 
consumers and the way that consumers may well ‘see through’ the culture industry’s products 
but ‘feel compelled to buy and use its products even though they see through them’ (Adorno, 
1997, p. 167). Active participation in the culture industry is required under threat of social 
exclusion but it becomes a ‘pseudo-activity’ or leisure-equivalent of ‘production for its own 
sake’ – a mirror of the mechanized work process it is seen as being an escape from. Despite 
the effort required here, it is less effort than that required for truly transformative cultural (and 
political) experiences, i.e. the kind of experiences that point beyond life as it is currently 
configured. Also, although consumers may well see through the products themselves, e.g. 
taking ‘ironic’ pleasure in manufactured pop music, Adorno points out that this does not 
constitute seeing through the illusory character of the culture industry itself: 
 
‘People are not only, as the saying goes, falling for the swindle; if it guarantees 
them even the most fleeting gratification they desire a deception which is 
nonetheless transparent to them. They force their eyes shut and voice approval, in 
a kind of self-loathing, for what is meted out to them, knowing fully the purpose 
for which it is manufactured. Without admitting it they sense that their lives 
would be completely intolerable as soon as they no longer clung to satisfactions 
which are none at all’ (1991, p. 89). 
 
For example, in his study of astrology (see Adorno, 1994) he seeks to understand how readers 
can ‘believe’ in both astrology and modern natural science despite their incompatibility. 
Whilst the everyday practical advice offered by astrology columns and also the movement of 
the stars might be separately rational in themselves, what disturbs Adorno is the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 For example, see Kellner (1989) and (1995), and Collins (1987) 
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indiscriminate mixing of the two, e.g. the idea that the movement of the stars makes 
Wednesday a good day for building social networks etc. The link between the two is left 
unclear, isn’t open to rational scrutiny, and the source of authority is relinquished to a remote 
metaphysical realm. The advice offered is commonplace and taken up by readers without 
needing any rational justification for the legitimacy of underlying astrological beliefs. What is 
disturbing about astrology for Adorno is the way in which it encourages us to hold 
contradictory attitudes and for the contradiction to either go unnoticed or to hold no education 
for us. 
 
As with everyday life more generally, we are left with a level of ordinary and understandable 
activities embedded within broader social structures that, for the most part, exceed both our 
understanding and rational explanation. What is appealing about astrology, even to those who 
‘see through’ it as such and who don’t expect to give up their rational reservations, is that it 
doesn’t demand much of us (e.g. faith, seriousness, commitment, or the labour of thought and 
reflection) but it does offer us a way of making sense of the world and gives us a certain 
direction. It elicits compliance by speaking to our confusions and frustrations and by offering 
practical solutions and comforting beliefs. The ‘fate’ determined by the stars reflects the ‘fate’ 
we are subject to as the result of complicated and reified social structures, that are seemingly 
beyond our control and unyielding to our needs; however the astrological understanding of 
‘fate’ is more palatable as it, along with the culture industry more generally, provides us with 
superficial meaning and a sense of involvement and agency. It operates with an ideology that 
supports current social relations by suggesting that we simply adapt ourselves to the 
predestined path mapped out by the authority of the stars whilst also allowing for a (limited) 
degree of agency geared towards individual achievement and success – e.g. the (pseudo-) 
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activity and (pseudo-) individuality involved in our ability to heed the advice of the astrology 
column and to make the changes necessary to transform our fortunes. In this sense, and 
recalling Lowenthal’s suggestion that ‘mass culture is psychoanalysis in reverse’ (in Jay, 
1974, p. 173), astrology tends to strengthen rather than undermine our narcissistic defences 
whilst also offering us the security and comfort of a lack of responsibility. Astrology, and the 
wider culture industry, bracket out coercion and irrationality and encourage us to adapt and 
accept; rather than pointing beyond current reality they offer us freedom from the very notion 
of resistance to that reality. As Adorno suggests in relation to the pleasure of the culture 
industry: 
 
‘Pleasure always means not to think about anything, to forget suffering even 
where it is shown. Basically it is helplessness. It is flight; not, as is asserted, flight 
from a wretched reality, but from the last remaining thought of resistance. The 
liberation which amusement promises is freedom from thought and from 
negation.’ (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997, p. 144). 
 
The nihilism involved in ‘seeing through’ and believing (and buying) at the same time, and 
particularly taking ironic ‘pleasure’ in cultural vacuity, suggests that real change therefore 
involves more than simple acknowledgement of the swindle. What Adorno calls ‘a tone of 
ironic toleration’ (1991, p. 89) can be seen as a gesture of resignation in the face of an 
apparently inescapable totality.  
 
The Politics of Representation 
The pervasiveness of the culture industry, and its colonisation of social and symbolic 
reproduction, increasingly means that the individual loses his active connection to, and 
responsibility for, the other. Standardisation, regression of consciousness, pseudo-
individualisation, and the reproduction of desire, lead to an emptying out of cultural 
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experience and to potentially dire consequences for mutual social relations. Rather than it 
being the individual’s particular experience – and his consequent self-reflection and 
independent thought – which underlines his individual significance and uniqueness and binds 
him to others in relations of mutual care, the ‘shared’ experiences produced by the impersonal 
mechanisms of the culture industry alienates the individual from others and makes him 
insignificant and expendable. Rather than this ‘universality’ of audience experience in the 
culture industry marking a true reconciliation of universal and particular, it signifies a 
domination of the particular by the universal. Without the real (individual) experience that 
would bring us recognition in a symbolic community, both individualising us before the other 
and making us responsible in relation to the other, we end up lost and in search of meaning 
and also, as Rose (1996) argues, particularly vulnerable to an aesthetic of authenticity. 
 
Gillian Rose extends Adorno’s analysis in her chapter entitled ‘Beginnings of the Day: 
Fascism and Representation’ (in her Mourning Becomes the Law, 1996), where she seeks to 
highlight the ways in which contemporary aesthetic, philosophical and political attempts to 
overcome ‘representation’ are complicit with the ‘spirit of fascism’. Instead of following this 
path, one that leads from an acknowledgement of the inseparability of Fascism and 
representation to the argument for the overcoming of representation, she suggests that: 
 
‘Only the persistence of always fallible and contestable representation opens the 
possibility for our acknowledgement of mutual implication in the fascism of our 
cultural rites and rituals. If Fascism promises the beginnings of the day, 
representation exposes the interests of the middle of the day; then the owl of 
Minerva, flying at dusk, may reflect on the remains of the day – the ruins of the 
morning’s hope, the actuality of the broken middles’ (1996, pp. 41-42). 
 
She argues that what is required is ‘representation, the critique of representation, and the 
critique of the critique of representation’ (1996, p. 62). She criticises what she calls 
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‘Holocaust piety’ in aesthetic representation for its attempt to witness the ‘ineffable’ through 
non-representation, i.e. for its tendency to ‘mystify something we dare not understand, 
because we fear that it may be all too understandable, all too continuous with what we are – 
human, all too human’ (ibid, p. 43).28 She pursues this point by favourably comparing the 
book Schindler’s Ark, which she argues ‘leaves the crisis to the reader’ (ibid, p. 47) and 
provokes the audience to ‘experience the crisis of identity in their own breasts’ (ibid, p. 46), 
with the film adaptation Schindler’s List, which spares the audience ‘the encounter with the 
indecency of their position’ (ibid, p. 45) and ‘makes the crisis external’ (ibid, p. 47). The film 
employs a range of mythological heroes and villains who provide us with clear ethical 
positions; it also relies upon the ‘sentimentality of the ultimate predator … whose 
complacency is left in place and wilfully reinforced’ (ibid). As Rose argues: 
 
‘Schindler’s List betrays the crisis of ambiguity in characterisation, 
mythologisation and identification, because of its anxiety that our sentimentality 
be left intact. It leaves us at the beginning of the day, in a Fascist security of our 
own unreflected predation … It should leave us unsafe, but with the remains of 
the day. To have that experience, we would have to discover and confront our 
own fascism’ (ibid, p. 48). 
 
In contrast to this, the film Remains of the Day succeeds where Schindler’s List fails: 
 
‘Without sentimental voyeurism, it induces a crisis of identification in the viewer, 
who is brought up flat against equally the representation of Fascism, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 There is a tension here with Adorno’s famous account, in Negative Dialectics, of Auschwitz as a ‘model’ 
which blocks dialectical recuperation and which also imposes on us a ‘new categorical imperative’ whereby we 
are impelled to arrange our ‘thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar 
will happen’ (1990, p. 365). As Adorno suggests, ‘our metaphysical faculty is paralysed because actual events 
have shattered the basis on which speculative metaphysical thought could be reconciled with experience’ (1990, 
p. 362). For an excellent comparison of Adorno and Rose (and Lyotard) on the issue of representation, see 
Cohen (2003, pp. 45-50). Lyotard’s (Kantian) position, as found in The Differend (1988) and Heidegger and ‘the 
Jews’ (1990), despite clear and self-conscious links to Adorno, tends to ignore its own complicity by (ironically) 
claiming direct access to the non-identical by conceiving of Auschwitz as ‘the sublime Other of the concept’ 
(Cohen, 2003, p. 48). Adorno and Rose on the other hand emphasise complicity, but ‘where Adorno’s aesthetic 
teaches that Auschwitz ruins representation, Rose’s seems to return to representation its lost efficacity, to draw 
Auschwitz back into the order of historical and psychic intelligibility’, and this runs the risk of not recognising 
its non-identity (ibid. p. 50). 
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honourable tradition which could not recognise the evils of Nazism, and the 
corporate order of the great house, and the fascism of representation, a political 
culture which we identify as our own, and hence an emotional economy which we 
cannot project and disown … Instead of emerging with sentimental tears, which 
leave us emotionally and politically intact, we emerge with the dry eyes of a deep 
grief, which belongs to the recognition of our ineluctable grounding in the norms 
of the emotional and political culture represented, and which leaves us with the 
uncertainty of the remains of the day’ (ibid, pp. 53-54). 
 
The (fascistic) representation of fascism we see in Schindler’s List separates us, as voyeur, 
from the events on screen; it thereby aestheticises political experience. Even if we feel 
‘revulsion’ or ‘pity’, our own moral identity and sense of self remains intact and is affirmed 
rather than shaken. Rather than aestheticising political experience, the acknowledgement of 
the ‘fascism of representation’ on the other hand draws us into it, makes it our own. It reaches 
across the defences of our moral will and our particular interests and, as we saw in the section 
on dialectical experience above, it shakes us out of the fixity of our initial self-definition; we 
experience the otherness of ourselves. We acknowledge the inherent violence in our initial 
self-identity and undergo a transformation wherein we glimpse, albeit momentarily, the 
possibility of ‘absolute recognition’ or the universal. As we have seen from both Adorno and 
Rose, the culture industry and its attendant (fascistic) form of representation aestheticise 
political experience, protect our self-defences and particular interests, affirm our current self-
identity, and prevent the possibility of transformation and ‘the universal’. Rather than 
contributing to a reflection on, and a crisis in, our current values, they preclude such a crisis 
and become an extension of the status quo by reproducing dominant versions of reality rather 
than reconfiguring them. They stabilise a spectatorial relationship to culture and consolidate a 
relationship to the universal in terms of exchange relations and the consumption of 
commodities. Here we find the logic of civil society, of the individual in its freedom from 
others. Our cultural experience is one of consumption rather than the transformative 
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experience of the particularity of the object forcing us to reconfigure our conception of the 
world and of ourselves. Our experience of freedom is as consumer, as master over things and 
others, and takes the form of the freedom from complicity. The experience of the ‘dissolution 
of particular identity’ and the opening up of the possibility of real symbolic community is 
replaced by the shared experience of the audience as consumers. Rose makes this point in her 
distinction between the consumption of the holocaust as spectacle and the attempt at 
comprehending the holocaust. What is required of culture is that it: 
 
‘provokes the grief of encountering the violence normally legitimised by the 
individual moral will, with which we defend our particular interests, and see only 
the egoism of the other – these may be interests of disinterested service, race, 
gender, religion, class. This grief expresses the crisis of the dissolution of 
particular identity and the vision of the universal. Across the unprotected exposure 
of our singularity, of our otherness to ourselves, we sense this ‘we’, which we 
otherwise so partially and carelessly assume’ (Rose, 1996, pp. 54-55). 
 
What is required is our sensitivity to, and exposure of, the particular interests that lie behind 
claims to universalism; as with Adorno, such criticism of forms of universalism is driven by 
the hope and possibility of truly universal, reciprocal social subjectivity. 
 
Tubbs (2008) builds on the work of Adorno and Rose by highlighting what he sees as the 
dangers inherent in both the collapse of the image/reality distinction, as we saw in the brief 
discussion of the culture industry, and in our freedom without complicity. He argues that 
without the resistance of the object as non-identical (as heterogeneous particular, as other, as 
qualitative), the productive (dialectical) gap between thought and being or image and reality 
disappears. The culture industry, alongside advertising, turns the object into an image devoid 
of substance; the image becomes spectacle and pure exchangeability without meaning and 
without reference to history, nature or politics. We come to consume the image of the object 
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or of the event rather than its concrete reality; we fetishise the image rather than the object 
itself. Our experience of the world is thereby foreshortened and we are separated from those 
elements of experience that implicate us in social and political relations. Tubbs draws out the 
significance of this and suggests that: 
 
‘Here representation eschews opposition or negation by rendering all reality 
equivalent as image. Appearing as liberal democracy, this representation in fact 
marks an important development in the spirit of Fascism. It liquidates opposition 
by freeing everything (and everyone) from the illusion, now overcome, of the 
universal. Image is a form of voyeurism of totality from without, meaning that 
there is no totality. As such, freed from any dependence upon the object, image is 
the new political reality, a reality which knows it is liberated from the political per 
se’ (Tubbs, 2008, p. 79). 
 
Tubbs extends this analysis, and the culture industry thesis more generally, in his discussion 
of the ‘freedom from implication’ that develops within what he calls ‘fossil fuel culture’. His 
discussion of fossil fuel culture is concerned with the ways in which ‘the freedoms made 
possible by burning fossil fuels have contributed to a culture which liberates personal freedom 
from the relation to the other, to death and to the universal’ (ibid, p. 69). This ‘freedom’, or 
rather unfreedom, involves the ‘freedom to travel without the recognition of nature as other’ 
and ‘freedom to shop without the recognition of labour and poverty’. We are free ‘because 
released from implication’ and free ‘as voyeur of a negation which is not mine’ (ibid, p. 81). 
Instead of a universality pointed to in the dialectic between image and reality, and thought and 
being, we are left with only image and a freedom which is ‘freedom from otherness per se’ 
(ibid). As Tubbs argues: 
 
‘Thus my identity as a person, my mastery, consists in my having fossil fuel 
culture relieve me from all social and political relations. It relieves me from my 
determination as self and other, because it aestheticises the life and death struggle. 
Death is reduced to an image, something unreal, something represented in such a 
way as to have no actual relation to life. Death, and the slave, and the other – the 
carriers of the meaning of our political education – in fossil fuel culture are 
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entertainment. It means that I am never other because the other is not real. As such 
I am relieved of any experience in which I learn of myself as the master of fossil 
fuel culture, or as the destroyer’ (ibid, p. 81). 
 
The logical extension of this is Benjamin’s comment on Marinetti and the way in which ‘self-
alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic 
pleasure of the first order’ (Benjamin, 1973, p. 244). It is within this context of the 
aestheticisation of the life and death struggle that Habermas and Honneth’s accounts are 
found wanting. In a culture without (or limited in) negative possibilities, where we are 
individuals obsessed by our ‘freedoms’ (and ‘choices’) and increasingly unable to 
acknowledge anything or anyone outside of our particular desires, the intersubjective learning 
process outlined in Habermas and Honneth’s communicative turn appears idealistic. This 
culture fosters a tendency to objectify and instrumentalise the other rather than a realisation of 
the ways in which we are dependent on the other’s recognition. 
 
From the above account of the culture industry and (fascistic) representation, we can see how 
Adorno’s (and Rose’s) position might go some way towards challenging Habermas and 
Honneth’s faith in, and idealisation of, the public sphere and the reflexive models they 
propose. The culture industry thesis, opposed by Habermas and Honneth, calls into question 
the communicative autonomy presupposed in their accounts, whilst also challenging the 
model of intersubjectively-mediated education they see as pointing the way forward to 
substantive freedom. The self-reflection required by individuals in the models put forward by 
Habermas and Honneth is arguably curtailed by a culture that affirms individuals in their 
current (atomistic and acquisitive) form - a culture, and form of representation, that is abstract 
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and promotes freedom as freedom-from-negation or freedom from dialectical experience.29 
Habermas’s and Honneth’s versions of communicative autonomy parallel liberal conceptions 
of democracy inasmuch as they assume a relative autonomy of culture from economic and 
systemic demands alongside the possibility of collective will-formation based on rational and 
autonomous political judgement in the public sphere. Adorno is not necessarily saying that the 
latter is not possible per se, but he is concerned with the ways in which such autonomy and 
judgement are obstructed, and the ways in which the public sphere is liable to administration 
and management at the expense of genuine political participation. He also neither wants to 
dismiss the possibility of mutual recognition nor assume it as a given, but instead he seeks to 
emphasise the fact that it is a fragile, and often fleeting, accomplishment. For Adorno, the 
possibility of genuine mutual recognition is undermined by an abstract culture where the 
social practices that provide us with collective symbolic meaning - and make us count for, and 
be accountable to, each other - are replaced by impersonal mechanisms wherein we cease to 
count for each other.30 Rather than learning about our mutual dependence and our reliance on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 A related issue regarding representation is the fundamental difference in the mode of representation between 
Adorno’s and Habermas’s work, a difference which reflects broader divergences in their social theories and 
which also aligns with their respective historical and theoretical presuppositions. Given Adorno’s philosophical-
historical concern with the growth of reification and instrumental rationality, his philosophy operates with a form 
of representation that is opposed to rational abstraction and to systematic and methodical approaches to 
theoretical understanding (especially those operating with first principles). His emphasis on the non-identical 
commits him to a form of representation that emphasises the reconfiguration of existing categories and the 
possibility of new experience, and in many ways appeals to the mimetic qualities of aesthetic experience rather 
than the demonstrative processes of scientific work. This also explains his use of ‘speculative propositions’, 
which seek to reveal the identity and non-identity of related but different terms (e.g. universal and particular, 
rationality and sensuous particularity, culture industry and advanced art etc), and also implicate the reader into 
the work (for an outline of Adorno’s ‘search for style’ see Rose, 2014, pp. 15-34). Although Habermas does not 
explicitly thematise the form of representation at work in his philosophy, it comes as no surprise that his concern 
for the ways in which communication and dialogue have been deformed and repressed manifests itself in a form 
of representation centred around intersubjective scrutiny and domination-free interaction. The notion of the 
‘scientific community’ - with its associated ideas of intersubjective testability and the discursive construction of 
scientific theory - as making knowledge possible, is his model. See Honneth (1995, pp. 104-110); also Adorno’s 
‘The Essay as form’ in Adorno (1992, pp. 3-23). 
30 Deranty (in Petherbridge, 2011, p. 87) nicely states that ‘Capitalism is viewed by Adorno as that social 
organisation, which, by expanding indefinitely the logic of marketisation and commodification, produces a 
‘social pathology of reason’ by severing subjects from their capacity to take the perspective of the other’. 
Adorno’s position here clearly poses particular problems for Habermas’s moral (or universalisation) principle 
(U), which we encountered in chapter 1, and also Honneth’s dimension of solidarity discussed in chapter 2.  
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the recognition of the other, our relationships are reduced to objectification and 
instrumentality. Rather than culture being concerned with experience, contradiction and 
education, the culture industry abstracts consciousness from culture such that culture is 
something to be (passively) consumed instead of being something in which we are actively, 
and ethically, engaged.  
 
Towards a non-reified culture 
If the culture industry is a misrepresentation of ethical totality and universal subjectivity, then 
how might culture be otherwise? What might an Adornian version of non-reified culture and 
ethics look like, and how might it respond to the instrumentality and atomism of our late 
capitalist acquisitive culture? How might it encompass a notion of dialectical experience (with 
a sensitivity to otherness, non-identity and particularity), avoid the pitfalls of the culture 
industry outlined above (along with the ‘fascism of representation’), and in turn move beyond 
both the procedural, formal and idealised accounts of freedom provided by Habermas and 
Honneth, and the overly subjective version of aesthetic critique in Foucault’s late work? How 
might it also present a fuller sense of recognition than that forwarded by Honneth; one with a 
greater sense of complicity, fallibility and reconfiguration of self, entwined with a greater 
sense of responsibility to (and ethical satisfaction in) the Other? We have already made some 
inroads into Adorno’s response above, in the section on ‘culture and contradiction’, however I 
want to conclude this chapter by making these points more explicit and also relating them 
more explicitly to an ethics (and politics) of aesthetics. 
 
Adorno’s work seeks to reinvigorate ethical life by emphasising the aesthetic, and related 
ethical, elements of social life that tend to go missing in procedural accounts of freedom and 
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solidarity.31 Not surprisingly, the role of aesthetics is downplayed in the more procedural 
accounts of freedom provided by Habermas and Honneth - actively sidelined by Habermas, 
and mostly absent for Honneth.32 As we briefly saw in chapter one, Habermas follows 
Weber’s account of the disenchantment of the lifeworld in modernity and the separation, and 
institutionalisation, of autonomous value spheres.33 These value spheres mirror Kant’s outline 
of the different forms of judgement we make – scientific, moral and aesthetic – and Habermas 
connects each of these to specific human interests: the need for technical control of the natural 
world, the need for the rational determination of shared goals, and the need for expression.34 
In the wake of the collapse of religious world-views, authority shifts from religious traditions 
to the realm of ‘validity’ and each of these value spheres contain their own distinct form of 
validity claim and are dealt with within a specific sphere of discourse (Habermas in 
D’Entreves and Benhabib, eds., 1997, p. 45). Scientific-technical discourse deals with the 
question of truth, moral-legal discourse tackles the issue of rightness, and aesthetic discourse 
concerns itself with truthfulness or authenticity. Habermas accepts this rationalisation as 
irreversible and instead seeks to ‘complete’ this modern project by subjecting the different 
validity claims to an overarching communicative reason which appeals to the free, 
intersubjective agreement between participants on what counts as true, right and beautiful. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Although, of course, Adorno’s position doesn’t seek merely to emphasise the realm of art and aesthetics as a 
counterweight to the dominance of science and morality, but instead, and more radically, conceives of art and 
aesthetics as a realm cast out from truth, and therefore as a realm which contains the deeper (reflective) truth 
concerning the partial nature of, and the damage done to truth by, subsumptive reason and universal morality. I 
will return to this in the final section of the chapter. 
32 Sinnerbrink (in Petherbridge, 2011) also questions the lack of any consideration of the (modernist) aesthetic 
critique of modernity in Honneth’s account of recognition, suggesting that his account would benefit by 
exploring ‘the cultural responses to distorted forms of social intersubjectivity’ (p. 204). 
33 See Weber’s ‘Science as a Vocation’ (in Gerth and Mills, ed., 1982, pp. 129-156) and ‘Religious Rejections of 
the World and Their Directions’ (ibid, pp. 323-359). Here he discusses the clash between ‘the religion of 
brotherliness’ and ‘the orders and values of this world’ (see p. 330) and how the shift leads to disintegration, loss 
of community and loss of meaning (characterised by the differentiation of, and antagonism between, value 
spheres – see p. 357). 
34 Needless to say, Adorno’s critique of the separation of the Kantian faculties and the related (autonomous) 
value spheres relates, contra Habermas, to those critiques of Kant, and thereby the critiques of the fragmentation 
of modernity, attempted by Hegel, Schiller and Schelling. 
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Although he is sympathetic to those who criticise the dominance of procedural rationality and 
scientific-technical discourse in modernity, the violence it fosters and what gets left out as a 
result, he is also critical of those who would seek de-differentiation, or seek to prioritise the 
aesthetic; instead he emphasises the need for a rebalancing of scientific, moral and aesthetic 
spheres.35  
 
Adorno and Foucault, contra Habermas, develop forms of philosophical thinking which seek 
to employ a form of (non-instrumental) aesthetics for the purposes of ethical critique; for 
them, aesthetics and art play a key role in broadening the goals of philosophy and 
transcending limited forms of rationality and social identity. Both thinkers also share a certain 
commitment to autonomous art – an art which, having lost its religious function as 
iconography, and been excluded from (scientific and moral) conceptions of truth and 
rightness, becomes an activity without clear purpose or social function as such. The political 
intimations of aesthetic practice are then due to its status as a refuge for those sensuous or 
transformative elements of human experience excluded by the rationalisation and reification 
of modern life. Whereas Habermas sees cultural differentiation in terms of the cognitive 
separation of value spheres with their different forms of validity, and all open to the 
emancipatory potential of communicative rationality, Adorno sees the dominance of a 
(universal) procedural rationality which has sacrificed meaning and particularity and 
transformed the three spheres into realms of technological instrumentality, formal morality 
and instrumentalised entertainment. In this context of disenchantment, meaning and 
particularity are to be discovered in aesthetics (and ethics), and autonomous art becomes an 
indirect realm of social and political engagement. Habermas, on the other hand, reduces art to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 See Habermas’s reference to terroristic activities and the dangers of overextending one sphere, such as the 
aesthetic, over the others in D’Entreves and Benhabib (eds., 1997, pp. 49-50). 
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it’s communicative potential and instead requires that any claims it might make become 
subject to cognitive justification and rational argumentation; thereby art is only of political 
significance when it is made rational, in the form of art criticism, and its ‘validity’ is open to 
rational accountability. Against Adorno and Foucault, and those more generally who display 
the influences of aesthetic modernism, Habermas is cautious of a political aesthetics or the 
extension of aesthetics into politics. On the one hand, he is critical of those who focus on the 
autonomy of the aesthetic sphere and criticise the process of rationalisation without 
acknowledging the fact that such autonomy is itself the product of rationalisation – this is 
particularly the case in his criticism of Foucault (Habermas, 1992, pp. 284-6). On the other 
hand, he sees aesthetics as merely the realm of subjective expression, emotion and intuition, 
and therefore without reason. Art and aesthetic ways of living are acceptable when expressing 
beauty and authentic desires, and as forms of protest against rationalisation, but for Habermas 
they cannot provide us with a positive conception of freedom or social order (Habermas, 
1984, pp. 238-9).36 
 
Adorno and Foucault would of course disagree with Habermas’s reduction, and sidelining, of 
aesthetics. They would both be concerned that the filtering of art through rational 
justification, even communicative reason, would potentially return us to the problems of 
normalisation, instrumentality and proceduralism, with the subsequent loss of particularity 
and an openness to the broader Other(s) of reason. However, as previously stated, Adorno 
does not respond to this overly rationalised position by appealing, as I’ve argued Foucault !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 This position is at the heart of Habermas’s critique of Foucault, although he tends to misrepresent Foucault’s 
aesthetic critique of modernity, which is less concerned with the expression of an authentic inner self and more 
centred around the project of self-creation and stylisation – the self as a ‘work of art’. In an attempt to avoid the 
implications of notions of inner depth and truth - ideas that allow for normalisation and oppression – Foucault’s 
‘aesthetics of existence’ pursues a radically open and experimental conception of identity. Habermas’s critique 
of aesthetics here is also at the heart of his chapters on Derrida in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 
(Habermas, 1992, pp. 161-184 and 185-210). 
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does, to an inherently free and transgressive aesthetic realm. Adorno’s position on aesthetics 
instead remains more substantive and is tied to notions of solidarity, mutuality, and a (fragile) 
conception of democracy. It is a (politics of) aesthetics that, without being procedural or 
overly aesthetic, responds to damaged and reified social life and incorporates a responsibility 
for, and ethical satisfaction in, the other. As we saw at the end of the last chapter, it is this 
dimension that is predominantly missing from Foucault’s ‘aesthetics of existence’.37 
Foucault’s tendency to idealise ‘aesthetic’ practice as an autonomous sphere neglects the links 
to wider socio-historical processes and to the importance of solidarity and recognition in the 
constitution of the self. His appeal to a (largely unexamined) notion of the aesthetic also fails 
to make wider connections to the power relations that provide the social context for aesthetic 
practice; despite his intentions, he fails to mediate between a position whereby cultural factors 
are simply reproduced in the individual, and a position where the individual freely self-
creates, resulting in a broadly voluntarist ethics. His later work leaves us with an unmediated 
link between aesthetic practice, social context, and (critical) self-knowledge, making it 
difficult for us to assess the meaning and social consequences of our attempts at aesthetic self-
creation, and he thereby misses the importance of the dialectical experience and education we 
saw in Adorno’s philosophy, and also ‘the persistence of always fallible and contestable 
representation’ we saw in Rose. Instead, we end up with an isolated and inward-looking 
account of subjectivity and freedom, with little in the way of links between an ethics of the 
self and any conception, and culture, of democracy or responsibility to (and ethical 
satisfaction in) the other. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Although Foucault’s reflections elsewhere (e.g. Foucault in Fornet-Betancourt et al, 1987, pp. 118-120) would 
make me stop short of accusing Foucault, as others have, of an out and out ‘aesthetic decisionism’ (see Wolin, 
1986). Also, Bernstein (1995, p. 166), in his critique of Habermas, makes a compelling case for seeing the 
importance of aesthetics in Foucault’s work, not simply in terms of his later work or his earlier discussions of the 
transgressive nature of modernist art and literature (e.g. Artaud, Van Gogh, Klossowski etc), but in the very 
fabric of his own books; Bernstein argues that they are philosophically modernist works themselves and should 
be interpreted as asking to be ‘judged as one would judge a work of art rather than raising a validity claim which 
could be vindicated by the force of better argument and outside the context of its inscription’. 
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Adorno’s aesthetics of recognition 
In the final section of this chapter, I will give a brief overview of Adorno’s aesthetics as the 
most promising response to the problems of both communicative democracy (in its 
Habermasian and Honnethian forms) and Foucault’s individualised aesthetics. What I believe 
Adorno does in his work on aesthetics is outline the possibility of a fragile community of 
‘spirit’ in response to the suffering that is produced by commodification, identity thinking and 
technological rationality. Despite some important differences, his work here in many ways 
approximates Kant’s sensus communis from the Critique of Judgment, i.e. the possibility of a 
‘public sense’ involving the subjective exercise of judgement free from domination by either 
concept or law.38 What Adorno proposes here is a project markedly different from 
Habermas’s and Honneth’s accounts of a communicative democracy determined by a 
framework of non-coercive relations that provides the broader context for the possibility of 
dialogical exchange and consensus. Adorno’s work on aesthetics allows us a glimpse of an 
alternative praxis and an alternative account of recognition, one that unites – or rather 
promises to unite - universal and particular (and concept and intuition) in a solidarity without 
subsumption or domination. His account acknowledges the threat (to the self) of recognition, 
our subsequent attempts to avoid recognising the Other, and the importance of aesthetic 
experiences which - often through transformative experiences of ‘shudder’ – can break 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 See §40 ‘Of taste as a kind of sensus communis’ (Kant, 1951, pp. 135-8) where Kant suggests that ‘the 
aesthetical judgement rather than the intellectual may bear the name of a sense common to all, if we are willing 
to use the word “sense” of an effect of mere reflection upon the mind, for then we understand by sense the 
feeling of pleasure. We could even define taste as the faculty of judging of that which makes universally 
communicable, without the mediation of a concept, our feeling in a given representation’ (p. 138). Importantly, 
Kant also suggests that ‘only where the imagination in its freedom awakens the understanding and is put by it 
into regular play, without the aid of concepts, does the representation communicate itself, not as a thought, but as 
an internal feeling of a purposive state of the mind’ (ibid). For an alternative, and more explicitly political, 
appropriation of Kant’s sensus communis, see Arendt’s Between Past and Future (2006) and also her Lectures 
on Kant’s Philosophy (1989). For an excellent overview of the related complex issues involved in the 
aestheticisation of politics and the politicisation of aesthetics, see chapter 6 in Jay (1993, pp. 71-83). 
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through our avoidance of recognition, however fleetingly, and point beyond reified 
consciousness towards the possibility of ‘genuine’ mutual recognition.39 
 
The ethical and political dimensions of Adorno’s work on aesthetics are famously odd 
inasmuch as they appear to mirror a cultural conservative approach, which champions high 
culture and autonomous art for their own sake whilst dismissing politicised art as crude and 
contaminated by concerns outside of aesthetic values.40 However, it is instead art’s forced 
exclusion from dominant forms of cognition which concerns Adorno, along with the ways in 
which art’s autonomy places it in a privileged - albeit relatively impotent - position from 
which to challenge cultural differentiation and the foreshortened version of reason it has 
produced. Bernstein (1993, p. 268), in his Adornian thesis on aesthetic alienation, argues that 
modern politics has become ‘depoliticised’ inasmuch as it has involved an emphatic 
separation (and exclusion) of the particular from the universal, with the former being 
dominated by the latter in its many guises (e.g. identity thinking, technological rationality, 
commodity exchange etc)41; it is in this context that modernist art - in its autonomy, and with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 The (utopian) role of aesthetic experience in breaking through reified consciousness, or experience, in the 
context of instrumental/technological rationality, industrialisation, and commodification is a key feature in a 
number of, otherwise differing, thinkers such as Dewey and Cavell (e.g. see Dewey, 2009, and Cavell, 2002). 
For discussions of the links between Adorno and Dewey, see Lewis (2005) and Lysaker (1998). For further 
attempts to develop an Adornian notion of aesthetics and recognition, see Foster (2011) and Seel (2004). 
40 Adorno is not simply arguing that high culture and autonomous art are to be championed for their own sake, 
i.e. the cultural conservative approach, nor would he in any way accept the argument that they should be 
demonised due to their very existence, i.e. the postmodern response to the conservative critic. 
41 Bernstein further substantiates this point, which in turn is an extension of Marx’s argument in On The Jewish 
Question (1992, pp. 211-41), arguing that liberal politics separates the individual from the collective, and 
separates him from his own concrete (heteronomous) interests and desires, by emphasising ‘respect’ for others 
(institutionalised in the form of legal equality) and by asserting an individual’s freedom to pursue his own goals 
without interference from the will of others. A key aspect of this is the separation between a (silenced) private 
sphere - containing those elements of particularity, concrete individual need, ethics, sensuous desire etc - and a 
political sphere of abstract and legal persons with formal rights and responsibilities. We have also seen echoes of 
this in the work of Habermas and Honneth, despite their critical engagement with the issue, inasmuch as both 
have accepted that the individual (and cultural) needs that are relegated to the private sphere are non-
universalisable and therefore excluded from truth and morality. An account that has similarities to Bernstein’s, 
whilst emphasising the gendered nature of the public/private split, is available in Benhabib (1986). She shares a 
similar concern with Honneth, in terms of doing greater justice to the unique and concrete ‘other’ than 
Habermas’s account allows; however, as with Honneth, and unlike Bernstein, Benhabib believes that the 
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its alternative synthesis of universal and particular alongside its concern for sensuous 
particularity - can be said to assume a truly critical (and political) position. This position is 
very different to, and in many ways explicitly opposed to, those attempts to politicise art in a 
more direct way. 
 
The most relevant attempt to politicise art, and one with which Adorno engaged, was that put 
forward by Benjamin in his 1936 essay ‘The work of art in the age of mechanical 
reproduction’ (Benjamin, 1973). Here Benjamin was generally concerned with the possibility 
of a coherent Marxist position on culture, and specifically concerned with countering what he 
saw as fascism’s ‘aestheticisation of the political’ which sought to ‘organise the newly created 
proletarian masses without affecting the property structure which the masses strive to 
eliminate’; it did this by giving the masses ‘a chance to express themselves’ (Benjamin, 1973, 
p. 243). In response to this, and contra Adorno, he argued that art should give up its 
pretensions to autonomy and, in response, communism should be concerned with ‘politicizing 
art’ (ibid, p. 244). For him, autonomous bourgeois art had sought to counteract the pernicious 
effects of commodified culture, but in the context of Fascism had ended up impotent at best 
or, even worse, an aesthetic resource for Fascism to draw upon. It is Benjamin’s alternative 
suggestion of a non-autonomous and politicised art, alongside his (ambiguous) celebration of 
the decline of aura precipitated by mechanical reproduction, which marks the point of 
disagreement between him and Adorno. 
 
For Benjamin, the mechanical reproducibility of art – i.e. the circulation of multiple copies of 
the ‘original’ – and its acceptance by the audience poses a direct challenge to those !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
concrete other can be simply added to Habermas’s account as a (rational) extra without radically transforming 
the terms of engagement. 
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institutions whose power and authority has relied on the unique and sacred character of art. 
The unique artwork, be it in the form of an idol or statue, had been imbued with an ‘aura’ of 
magical power and detached authority, and such power had been seen to emerge from within 
and to be free from human involvement and control. For Benjamin, a central component of 
the aura carried by the artwork was its singularity and irreproducibility.42 The process of 
mechanical reproducibility was seen to detach the audience from the ritual, and auratic, 
elements of aesthetics and politics and instead turn them into (potentially) critical and rational 
observers. Film as a medium, for example, was not only to be championed for its separation 
of the viewer from ritualistic practice (e.g. from the more immediate experiences of theatre), 
but also for the collective nature of its production and consumption and its ability to produce 
‘shock effects’ in the audience (Benjamin, 1973, p. 240). The ‘shock effects’ - produced by 
the use of montage with its sudden changes and juxtapositions – was seen as preventing 
aesthetic closure and as highlighting the artificial nature of the medium whilst disrupting the 
simple consumption of images and requiring the active contemplation of the viewer. The 
collective aspect of film was also seen as posing a direct challenge to the private production 
and consumption of bourgeois art, which Benjamin saw as isolating and passifying the 
spectator, and as opening up new possibilities for the communication of political ideals (ibid, 
pp. 236-7). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Of course, for Adorno the aura takes on a different significance. What is to be preserved here is the ‘freedom 
toward the object’ and the ‘objective meaning that surpasses subjective intention’ (1997, p. 275). It relates to the 
‘shudder’ experienced in the face of overwhelming nature, and to those important works of art which point us 
towards the experience of the Other in its otherness, non-identity, and sensuous particularity. As I will argues, 
Adorno emphasises the importance of this in interrupting our narcissistic, and subsumptive, forms of rational 
subjectivity. However, both Adorno and Benjamin recognised the ways in which those negative aspects 
Benjamin associates with aura – i.e. cultic value, ritual, and authority – are mass produced in the culture industry 
which fosters a ‘cult of stars’ and operates with a range of devices such as sentimentality and romanticism 
(Adorno, 1991, p. 88). There are parallels to be made for both Adorno and Benjamin between the 
aestheticisation at work in Fascism, which seeks to conceal social contradictions by appealing to pre-modern 
aesthetic categories, and the mass production of aura in the culture industry. As Benjamin argues, ‘film responds 
to the shrivelling of the aura with an artificial build-up of the “personality” outside the studio. The cult of the 
movie star, fostered by the money of the film industry, preserves not the unique aura of the person but the “spell 
of the personality,” the phony spell of a commodity’ (Benjamin, 1973, p. 233).  
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For Adorno, Benjamin’s Brechtian reduction of art to explicit political assertion or 
performance both assumes the possibility of direct communication with the audience and runs 
the risk of sacrificing the degree of autonomy required to provide a sufficient critique of 
contemporary societies. For him, the communicative conception of art fails to take seriously 
the extent to which reification and commodification have precluded the possibility of direct 
and immediate expression (see Adorno in Jameson (ed.), 2007, pp 165-195). Populist realism, 
which Adorno discerns in the otherwise differing positions of Lukács and Brecht, is 
particularly critically impotent from this point of view, even when it seeks to expose the 
myriad ways in which capitalism glosses over its own inherent contradictions. For Adorno, 
the significance of art – i.e. its ability to negate existent reality - is lost once it is subordinated 
to political function; by speaking the language of existent reality, politically committed work 
is always in danger of incorporation. If a central concern of Adorno’s critical theory is to put 
an end to the dominance of instrumental reason - whereby reason is conceived as a tool which 
subsumes the particularity of the object under universal categories, a process culminating in 
the capitalist subsumption of use-value by exchange-value – then the notion that art should 
serve as a political instrument is in danger of universalising that instrumentality. Inasmuch as 
art has a ‘function’ or role in the context of late capitalism, it is its ‘functionlessness’ that is 
important: as Adorno suggests, ‘the instrumentalisation of art sabotages its opposition to 
instrumentalisation; only where art respects its own immanence does it convict practical 
reason of its lack of reason’ (Adorno, 1997, pp. 320-1). 
 
Adorno’s alternative conception of the relationship between art and politics is one in which 
‘autonomous’ art, in negating empirical reality in its current form, holds out the possibility (or 
thought) of a non-violent reconciliation between universal and particular, between finite and 
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infinite, between subjects and between subjects and nature. Advanced works of art are to 
configure and anticipate a genuine collective sociality, albeit one conceived negatively. This 
is not to say that such art works assure us of a coming utopia, but rather that they keep open 
the possibility of new experience – a matter of great urgency for Adorno given the late 
capitalist context of a culture industry which, as we have seen, liquidates the possibility of a 
change in our social experience and which seeks to assert present empirical reality as 
absolute. It is in this context that Adorno emphasises the importance of the (illusory) 
autonomy of art, an illusion which is not simply to be dissolved in the name of ideology-
critique, but rather redeemed in the spirit of freedom.43 
 
To explore the significance of these ideas in relation to Adorno’s aesthetic theory, it is 
important to briefly consider his account of the ‘illusory’ autonomy of art. Central to his 
account of the rise of autonomous art, and its separation from ritual, is the commodification of 
culture in both its production and consumption. Whereas Benjamin concentrated on the role 
of technology in separating art from aura and ritual, Adorno emphasises the role of the 
broader mode of production in this separation and its impact not only on technically 
reproducible art forms but also on the material and character of high art. Art’s claim to 
autonomy – the claim to obey its own laws and to be unique and valuable in itself – is a 
historical development. For Hegel, the emancipation of art from fulfilling a pre-established 
social role was characterised by the shift from ‘classical’ (Greek) art - where art was not part !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 There are clear parallels here between Adorno’s account of the truth content in the illusory character of art and 
his, seemingly paradoxical, account of the truth content of ideology (see his ‘Ideology’ in Viertel, ed., 1973, pp. 
182-205). To dismiss concepts such as freedom and justice, and by extension the ‘illusory’ character of art, as 
mere ideology is to close down the possibility of new experience and a better world for Adorno. Although 
‘justice’ and ‘freedom’ might be inaccurate as descriptive concepts, they do contain a prescriptive truth that we 
should seek to redeem rather than dismiss as a metaphysical anachronism. If ideology in late capitalism is as 
Adorno describes – i.e. it seeks to turn the ‘what is’ of existent reality into ‘what ought to be’ – then we should 
be wary of all tendencies to remove the normative claims contained in our concepts of freedom, justice and 
autonomy.  
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of a specialised sphere but rather pervaded all aspects of communal life - to ‘romantic’ 
(Christian and modern) art. This historical development saw an increasing shift towards 
autonomously selected subject matter, and the self-reflexive treatment of it, at the expense of 
the political and cultural significance of the artwork.44 There are a number of parallels 
between Hegel and Adorno’s accounts of this transition, although it is the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism that is decisive for Adorno’s account of art. He argues that it is the 
commodity character of art, and the commodification of culture in general, which prompted 
art’s separation from its functional role - determined by politics and ritual - and allowed it to 
make a claim to autonomy.  
 
The (dialectical) irony involved in the work of art’s critical capacity is the fact that its 
opposition to a world characterised by commodity fetishism and reification is a product of the 
work of art’s own fetishised character. Adorno is not claiming that the autonomous work of 
art draws its resistant qualities from somehow escaping the clutches of a commodified world, 
but rather that its status as an ‘absolute commodity’ ironically distances it from the 
ideological claims of a commodity producing society. In a world dominated by the 
commodity form, where production is production of exchange value for its own sake, 
commodities operate under the illusion that they are use-values. Unlike the commodity form 
more generally, the autonomous artwork, in its form as absolute commodity, does not conceal 
the fact that it is the result of production for its own sake. Adorno argues that: 
 
‘If artworks are in fact absolute commodities in that they are a social product that 
has rejected every semblance of existing for society, a semblance to which 
commodities otherwise urgently cling, the determining relation of production, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 In many ways, Hegel sees this as a shift from social transparency to a (formal) freedom without transparency. 
See Hegel (1988, particularly section 2, chapter 3 on ‘The Dissolution of the Classical Form of Art’, pp. 502-16, 
and section 3 on ‘The Romantic Form of Art’, pp. 517-551). For an interesting reading of Hegel’s aesthetics, see 
chapter 4 of Rose (1981) – ‘The Division of Labour and Illusion’, pp. 121-48. 
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commodity form, enters the artwork equally with the social force of production 
and the antagonism between the two. The absolute commodity would be free of 
the ideology inherent in the commodity form, which pretends to exist for-another, 
whereas ironically it is something merely for-itself: It exists for those who hold 
power.’ (Adorno, 1997, p. 236).45 
 
A crucial element here is the fact that the illusory autonomy of art has a double character. On 
the one hand, its claim to autonomy – which Adorno refers to as its ‘fetish-character’ - 
enhances the illusory nature of its independence; on the other hand it makes the thought of 
true freedom from domination imaginable. In the context of Adorno’s analysis of late 
capitalism, art’s illusory claim to autonomy signifies the resistance of qualitative uniqueness 
to quantitative exchangeability. As he argues: 
 
‘art becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this position only 
as autonomous art. By crystallizing in itself as something unique to itself, rather 
than complying with existing social norms and qualifying as “socially useful,” it 
criticises society by merely existing, for which puritans of all stripes condemn it. 
There is nothing pure, nothing structured strictly according to its own immanent 
law, that does not implicitly criticise the debasement of a situation evolving in the 
direction of a total exchange society in which everything is heteronomously 
defined. Art’s asociality is the determinate negation of a determinate society… 
Art keeps itself alive through its social force of resistance; unless it reifies itself, it 
becomes a commodity. Its contribution to society is not communication with it but 
rather something extremely mediated: It is resistance in which, by virtue of inner-
aesthetic development, social development is reproduced without being imitated. 
At the risk of its self-alienation, radical modernity preserves art’s immanence by 
admitting society only in an obscured form, as in the dreams with which artworks 
have always been compared. Nothing social in art is immediately social, not even 
when this is its aim’ (Adorno, 1997, pp. 225-6). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 However, this notion of the artwork as produced for its own sake is frequently in danger of claiming access to 
a realm of use-value or ‘real’ needs, i.e. as being the expression of ‘real’ or ‘natural’ needs in a world of falsely 
created needs. For Adorno, as we have seen, late capitalism is characterised by the all-pervasive nature of 
exchange-value - by the way in which access to use-value is thoroughly mediated by exchange value, and the 
distinction between true and false needs is blurred - such that any claim to direct access to use-value or ‘real’ 
need itself becomes an ideological veil. Direct access to use-value depends on the transformation of reified 
social relations, on the end of production of exchange value for its own sake; access is only possible through the 
criticism of reified relations, and such criticism is itself dependent on the end of such relations. In relation to 
artworks, it is not simply a case of protecting them from sale in the marketplace, and therefore of protecting their 
authenticity or purity, because their fetish character is an integral part of what they are. 
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Art’s connection to the social, without being ‘immediately social’, is the way in which it 
mirrors ‘social development’ albeit differently and through its ‘inner-aesthetic development’. 
Modern art’s concern with its own internal developments is part of its autonomy, and also 
appears to be non-social due its tendency to sever direct forms of communication; however 
Adorno asserts that ‘the communication of artworks with what is external to them, with the 
world from which they blissfully or unhappily seal themselves off, occurs through non-
communication’ (ibid, p. 5). Non-representation and dissonance in modernist forms of visual 
art, literature and music can therefore be comprehended in these terms. For Adorno, ‘the acute 
reason today for the social inefficacy of artworks – those that do not surrender to crude 
propaganda – is that in order to resist the all-powerful system of communication they must rid 
themselves of any communicative means that would perhaps make them accessible to the 
public’ (ibid, p. 243). 
 
For Adorno, art’s asociality is not simply wilful incomprehensibility for its own sake, or 
simply an elitist quest for exclusivity, rather it is the outcome of its (historical) exclusion from 
a rational(ised) modernity dominated by scientific-technological and moral reason - in both 
their institutionalised and everyday practical forms - and by commodification. As Bernstein 
(1993, p. 211) argues, ‘art is the remainder, the result of the exclusions which allowed 
enlightened rationality and an autonomous economy to centre themselves without the 
encumbrances of the claims of sensuousness or teleology (the submersion of use-value by 
exchange value)’. Having lost its significance and authority in wider communal life, Adorno 
suggests that art came to acknowledge that its own claims to significance were to be found 
internally, i.e. within the elements of its own practice. So, for example, representational 
paintings gave way to those which emphasised the material nature of the paint used, or 
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focused on shapes and colour, or reflected on the surface of the canvas itself; literature shifted 
from realist representations to a concern with words and narrative themselves etc. This turn 
towards technique and the exploration of forms became a (if not the) driving force of aesthetic 
production, and a process (or inner logic) of internal rationalisation developed whereby art 
came to continually question its own principles of production, its own forms of authority, and 
even its own existence. In this way, modernist art pursued its ‘autonomous’ quest to produce 
works that emphasised their own internal intelligibility without being answerable to external 
(moral, political, religious, traditional) forms, or to the confines of cognitive and moral 
discourse. This helps us to make sense of modernist attempts to refuse interpretation, and 
therefore cognition, and to continually resist being categorised and subsumed within previous 
art traditions or movements. 
 
The importance of this inward turn for Adorno also involves the fact that, in its continual 
reflection on itself as an autonomous practice in the context of cultural differentiation and 
disintegration, modernist art came to criticise modernity (albeit mostly implicitly rather than 
necessarily consciously) for its exclusion of sensuous experience and particularity. The 
(critical) aesthetic response to this was not only an exploration of what had been left to it in 
the context of a divided reason (science, morality, art), but also an alternative praxis which 
foregrounded our sensuous (embodied) engagement with things without seeking to subsume 
such experience under abstract (predetermined) concepts. We can therefore make more sense 
of the lack of direct communication in modernist art, its unintelligibility and the need for 
(discursive) interpretation, as being one of the elements that marks out its solidarity with 
sensuous particularity. In addition to this, in its autonomy and its practice, art came to 
recognise not only the ways in which it had been disfigured itself (as non-cognitive), but also 
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the disfigurement of dominant (non-aesthetic) forms of reason in their separation from the 
particularity of their objects. The privileged position of modernist art, in the context of the 
separation of value spheres, is that its own internal (‘cognitive’) logic of rationalisation 
involves a critical reflection on the state of (fragmented, divided, and instrumental) reason 
itself. Rather than being separated, and isolated, in its own sphere, Adorno argues that 
modernist art resists differentiation by making not only aesthetic claims (beyond mere beauty) 
and ethical claims (beyond formal morality), but also cognitive claims (beyond subsumption 
and towards a differently configured cognition). Art’s capacity to do this, to appear 
meaningful and to engage us in reflection and judgement on its terms and beyond discursive 
comprehension, is what makes it matter and gives it significance for Adorno. Although, of 
course, its claims and its significance arise from its autonomous position, which itself was 
(historically) formed as a position of powerlessness and exclusion, and therefore the 
‘cognitive’ character of art predominantly appears as non-cognitive, meaningless, and 
irrational, in the context of a subsumptive (and exclusionary) rationality. 
 
However, Adorno also argues that art’s autonomy is only possible when it is not made total. 
What he means by this is that by seeking after the merely beautiful – e.g. in the attempt of the 
aestheticist movement to establish art as an end in itself as ‘art for art’s sake’ - art relinquishes 
its position of ‘critical’ autonomy and ‘becomes entangled in the fate of artificial 
ornamentation’ (Adorno, 1997, p. 237). For Adorno, therefore, the social situation of art is 
aporetic: 
 
‘If art cedes its autonomy, it delivers itself over to the machinations of the status 
quo; if art remains strictly for-itself, it nonetheless submits to integration as one 
harmless domain among others. The social totality appears in this aporia, 
swallowing whole whatever occurs. That works renounce communication is a 
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necessary yet by no means sufficient condition of their unideological essence’ 
(ibid, p. 237). 
 
Art is caught in a difficult position: it has to carefully tread the line between remaining 
autonomous, and thereby critical of existing empirical reality on the one hand, and simply 
becoming an illusory, trivial, and affirmative object of aesthetic beauty without cognitive 
claims on the other – merely art. It is the risk taken by modernist art in its refusal of aesthetic 
beauty, or of being ‘merely art’, which attests to its truth-content. Adorno seeks to emphasise 
the ‘cognitive’ content of art whilst arguing that artworks refuse any clear-cut synthesis of 
cognitive-rational and mimetic components; in contrast to the identity-thinking of 
instrumental reason, which covers over the domination and conflict that exists between 
universal and particular, he suggests that artworks instead bear witness to this conflict in the 
tension they display between their cognitive-rational and mimetic elements. He argues that: 
 
‘A successful work … is not one which resolves objective contradictions in a 
spurious harmony, but one which expresses the idea of harmony negatively by 
embodying the contradictions, pure and uncompromised, in its innermost 
structure’ (in Connerton (ed.), 1976, p. 274). 
 
For art to bear witness to the promise of a reconciled society - of a reconciliation between 
universal and particular – from within an unreconciled society, it must contain the oppositions 
and contradictions and present these in an unresolved form: this is its ‘truth-content’. The key 
opposition for Adorno is between the (particular) mimetic and (universal) discursive-rational 
components of artworks: what Adorno calls ‘the dialectic of rationality and mimesis 
immanent to art’ (1997, p. 54). Mimesis, or the non-instrumental attempt to assimilate to the 
object and to know it in its ‘particularity’ – what Adorno refers to as ‘the nonconceptual 
affinity of the subjectively produced with its unposited other’ (ibid, p. 54) – has been confined 
to the ‘aesthetic’ sphere, whilst discursive rationality, or the instrumental attempt to classify 
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the object under ‘universal’ categories, has been the exclusive territory of scientific-
technological rationality.46 The ‘cognitive character’ of art is important in this context, as it 
suggests that advanced artworks are those that do not simply conform to the mimetic function 
designated to them by modern rationality’s separation of classification and mimesis.  
 
Adorno suggests that artworks, despite their claims to autonomy, are inevitably tied to the 
empirical world inasmuch as they rely on certain empirical components that make them up. 
Of central importance is the way in which components, which are not particularly meaningful 
in themselves, are configured within artworks and formed into a whole that displays (new) 
meaning. Sounds, words, colours, and forms themselves do not have fixed discernible 
meanings as such but find meaning in their relationships and in the context of earlier, and 
later, artistic developments. This organisation of components is not to be understood simply 
in terms of subjective interpretation nor in terms of ‘objectivity’ in any traditional sense. It is 
the way that artistic form organises meaning, and also how this meaning exceeds the 
subjective intention of artist and audience, which Adorno refers to as the cognitive-rational 
element in art. It is also important to acknowledge, however, that what Adorno calls the 
‘truth-content’ of art – that is produced in these configurations and discovered in the cognitive 
character of art - does not contain a transhistorical essence or something true for all time; 
instead it is often found in the ‘determinate negation of what is false’. By criticising what is, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 There are clear parallels here with the relationship Adorno discusses between philosophy and art. As 
previously noted, Adorno’s philosophy – his own form of representation - in many ways attempts to assimilate 
itself to aesthetics, i.e. to make itself like the aesthetic objects it analyses. This explains his often unusual writing 
style, e.g. his use of shock, exaggeration, constellations, provocations and speculative propositions etc. However, 
Adorno is also aware of the relationship, and differences between, art and philosophy – for example, the fact that 
‘art requires philosophy, which interprets it in order to say what it is unable to say, whereas art is only able to say 
it by not saying it’ (1997, p. 72). He seeks a mutuality between them, where art (as particular/intuition) bears 
witness to the separation of the universal and particular, and the domination of the latter by the former; 
philosophy (as universal/concept), on the other hand, articulates the nature of that separation and domination 
whilst being implicated and complicit in what it articulates. He suggests that philosophy has a delicate role to 
play in balancing the line between a discursivity, which often compromises the ‘truth’ of art, and an assimilation, 
which risks the loss of (discursive) meaning. 
 261 
and what has come before, artworks hold out the possibility of new experience – of the kind 
of experience excluded from instrumental reason – and thereby point to the possibility of 
reconciliation: for Adorno, ‘the fact that artworks exist signals the possibility of the 
nonexisting … the possibility of the possible’ (Adorno, 1997, p. 132). They do this by 
reconfiguring existing materials (e.g. sounds, words, colours, forms etc) which, rather than 
having any timeless meaning, contain historical meaning.47 
 
The ways in which artworks are configured is important for Adorno, inasmuch as they 
provide us with an alternative view of what real praxis could be – he suggests that ‘the 
process enacted internally by each and every artwork works back on society as the model of a 
possible praxis in which something on the order of a collective subject is constituted’ (1997, 
242).  Artworks utilise form and materials in a non-subsumptive, non-dominating manner, 
and therefore provide an image of a real praxis which would involve a form of cognition that 
does not exclude the aesthetic or the particular. Aesthetic form is not simply conceptual but is 
always already concrete and material, thereby making its meaning contextual and avoiding 
the domination of sensuous particularity characteristic of subsumptive rationality, capital 
exchange relations, and procedural accounts of freedom. As Adorno argues, ‘everything 
appearing in the artwork is virtually content as much as it is form, whereas form remains that 
by which the appearing determines itself and content remains what is self-determining’ (ibid, 
p. 145). Art forms both approximate and diverge from conceptuality; they approximate 
inasmuch as they seek to synthesise their internal elements, but they diverge from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 The historical character of the materials also means that not only is the notion of immediacy problematic – e.g. 
the idea that certain colours or chords have natural expressive effects – but also that previously shocking or 
transgressive artworks and materials become commonplace and neutralised, as suggested above, by the fate of 
abstract art as corporate decoration for example. The resistant impulse of autonomous art is constantly under 
threat by the pernicious effects of the administered world, and previously radical, non-representational art 
becomes ‘suitable for decorating the walls of the newly prosperous’ (Adorno, 1997, p. 229). 
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conceptuality by avoiding subsumption and closure of meaning; Adorno conceives of art 
works as synthesising both conceptual and intuitive aspects. By avoiding subsumption, and 
reconfiguring the form that synthesis takes, (modernist) works of art do justice to, and 
reinstate, sensuous particularity - ‘in art the concept becomes qualitatively other than 
collections of characteristics shared by empirical objects’ (ibid, p. 96). This image of a 
different cognition, and an alternative praxis, is one where reason would no longer be divided 
from its object, would be ends rather than merely means oriented, and also where rationality 
and particularity would be mutually constituting. As Adorno argues: 
 
‘What makes aesthetic comportment as irrational according to the criteria of 
dominant rationality is that art denounces the particular essence of a ratio that 
pursues means rather than ends. Art reminds us of the latter and of an objectivity 
freed from the categorical structure. This is the source of art’s rationality, its 
character as knowledge. Aesthetic comportment is the capacity to perceive more 
in things than they are; it is the gaze under which the given is transformed into an 
image’ (ibid, p. 330). 
 
Art risks alternative forms of meaning and synthesis in an attempt to expose the partial nature 
of meaning in both scientific-technological and practical reason; for Adorno ‘art is no more 
concept than it is pure intuition, and it is precisely thereby that art protests against their 
separation’ (ibid, p. 96). However, Adorno suggests that these alternatives are only possible in 
the form of autonomous art, and this therefore entails the problem that we are left with an 
illusory form of meaning and synthesis. Art provides us with an image of alternative praxis 
only, and this image is trapped within art’s own illusory world, a world which is excluded 
from the everyday (and scientific) realm of cognitive meaningfulness and practical reason. 
Art wants to be more than illusion but fails to be so; however, for Adorno, it does bear 
witness to a historical disfigurement of truth and therefore contains a historical potentiality. 
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It is worth briefly noting at this point how Adorno’s position on art builds on Kant’s 
aesthetics. As Bernstein (1993, p. 211) argues: 
 
‘the Kantian thought that aesthetic awareness mimics the unifying work of 
conceptual judgement without however actually bringing the art object under a 
concept becomes both a conception of artistic practice, of how artistic form is to 
deal with its materials, and a statement about the socio-historical predicament of 
art rather than an a priori account of it’. 
 
Adorno proposes a ‘dialectical aesthetics’ which moves beyond both a ‘subjective aesthetics’ 
which is ‘either abstractly transcendental or arbitrary in its dependence on individual taste’ 
and an ‘objective aesthetics’ which ‘overlooks the objective mediatedness of art by the 
subject’ (Adorno, 1997, p. 166). He suggests that ‘in the artwork the subject is neither the 
observer nor the creator nor absolute spirit, but rather spirit bound up with, preformed and 
mediated by the object’ (ibid.). Kant’s aesthetics recognised this inasmuch as he understood 
that beauty is not simply an inherent quality of the object that can be appealed to without 
recourse to subjective experience, whilst also arguing that beauty cannot be reduced to 
individual feeling and taste. Aesthetic judgement does not have the same ‘objectively’ 
binding characteristics associated with conceptual or scientific judgement, but it also makes a 
claim to universality rather than simply reflecting (heteronomous) individual gratification. It 
is Kant’s transcendental solution to the difficulty of a sensus communis, or a ‘sense common 
to all’ (Kant, 1951, p. 136), however which draws disagreement from Adorno. Kant identifies 
this combination of the non-conceptual and a ‘sense common to all’ in the subjective 
conditions of the possibility of experience: 
 
‘he who feels pleasure in the mere reflection upon the form of an object without 
respect to any concept although this judgement be empirical and singular, justly 
claims the agreement of all men, because the ground of this pleasure is found in 
the universal, although subjective, condition of reflective judgements, viz. the 
purposive harmony of an object (whether a product of nature or of art) with the 
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mutual relations of the cognitive faculties (the imagination and the 
understanding), a harmony which is requisite for every empirical cognition’ 
(Kant, 1951, p. 28). 
 
In other words, I find pleasure in what is beautiful due to the way in which it excites the free 
play of the imagination – a faculty of reason shared by all. Kant believed that the imagination, 
which played a key role in the synthesis of concept and intuition in his first critique, could be 
separated from the conceptual rules of the understanding such that I can have an experience 
which is, in-itself, free from concepts but to which my imagination creates an indeterminate 
unity. Although this unity, in which I find pleasure, is my perception, it is due to a capacity 
shared by all beings with imagination. Despite agreeing with Kant’s critique of the notion that 
aesthetic judgement is merely subjective, Adorno criticises Kant’s transcendental attempt to 
use the subject to ground aesthetic objectivity as ultimately ‘subjective’ due to the neglect of 
art objects themselves which are then only perceived through the lens of the subject, i.e. the 
lens of those who create or judge them (see Adorno, 1997, pp. 10-13). Adorno suggests that 
Kant acknowledges the aporia between the mimetic and cognitive-rational aspects of artworks 
but neglects their cognitive character or ‘truth-content’, something Adorno also argues cannot 
be understood simply through the subjective intentions of the artist or through audience 
reception. In addition to this, Adorno takes Kant’s ‘transcendental’ aesthetics to task for 
turning the historical experience of the autonomy of art into a transhistorical invariant (ibid. 
p. 10).48  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Hegel was already critical of such a transhistorical approach in his distinction between the classical and 
romantic work of art (for Hegel on Kant’s aesthetics, see Hegel, 1988, pp. 56-61). However, despite Adorno’s 
agreement with Hegel’s critique of Kant’s aesthetics for being ultimately subjective and ahistorical, he 
ultimately charges ‘Hegel’s objective idealism’ for becoming a ‘crass, virtually unreflected partisanship for 
subjective spirit’ (Adorno, 1997, p. 75). 
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In his quest for a ‘progressive dialectical aesthetics’ (Adorno, 1997, p. 77), Adorno does 
however pursue Kant’s concern for the role of natural beauty and the sublime.49 He 
concentrates on the parallels between the experience of artworks and the aesthetic experience 
of nature, and particularly focuses on their shared incomprehensibility and the challenges they 
pose to our subjective (and subsumptive) conceptualisations of intuition. He argues that: 
 
‘What is beautiful in nature is what appears to be more than what is literally there. 
Without receptivity there would be no such objective expression, but it is not 
reducible to the subject; natural beauty points to the primacy of the object in 
subjective experience. Natural beauty is perceived both as authoritatively binding 
and as incomprehensible that questioningly awaits its solution. Above all else it is 
this double character of natural beauty that has been conferred on art’ (ibid, p. 70-
71).  
 
Natural beauty and the sublime – ‘which Kant reserved exclusively for nature [but] later 
became the historical constituent of art itself’ (ibid, p. 196) – challenge our (reifed) subjective 
experience and provoke an alternative experience which asks us to reconceptualise the other 
and ourselves in relation to that other. For Adorno, art inherits this role inasmuch as its 
objectifications not only present us with an image of an alternative praxis but, in the process, 
also confront us with dissonant experiences which jar with our current forms of cognition and 
conceptuality; the art object is thereby placed in a (sublime) position of incomprehensibility, 
and encourages us to encounter it in a mimetic, rather than subsumptive, manner. Adorno 
draws out these parallels and suggests that ‘the ascendancy of the sublime is one with art’s 
compulsion that fundamental contradictions not be covered up but fought through in 
themselves’ (ibid, p. 196).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Contra Hegel’s dismissal of natural beauty which ‘flickers out without a trace of it being recognisable in art 
beauty’ due to it not being ‘thoroughly ruled and defined by spirit’ (Adorno, 1977, p. 76). 
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Adorno refers to the ‘feeling of being overwhelmed when faced with an important work’ in 
terms of a ‘shudder’ (1997, p. 79), and he refers to this shudder as ‘the irruption of objectivity 
into subjective consciousness’ (ibid, p. 245). The modernist sublime is capable of producing 
the kind of shudder - a mixture of feelings of fear, wonder and reverence - usually only 
experienced when confronted by an uncontrollable, and incomprehensible, nature. He 
suggests that ‘under patient contemplation artworks begin to move (and) to this extent they 
are truly afterimages of the primordial shudder in the age of reification’ (ibid). He goes on to 
argue that: 
 
‘Ultimately, aesthetic comportment is to be defined as the capacity to shudder, as 
if goose bumps were the first aesthetic image. What later came to be called 
subjectivity, freeing itself from the blind anxiety of the shudder, is at the same 
time the shudder’s own development; life in the subject is nothing but what 
shudders, the reaction to the total spell that transcends the spell. Consciousness 
without shudder is reified consciousness. That shudder in which subjectivity stirs 
without yet being subjectivity is the act of being touched by the other. Aesthetic 
comportment assimilates itself to that other rather than subordinating it. Such a 
constitutive relation of the subject to objectivity in aesthetic comportment joins 
eros and knowledge’ (ibid, p. 331). 
 
This shudder is the experience of the Other in its otherness, its alterity, its non-identity, and its 
sensuous particularity. It interrupts our narcissistic, subsumptive, rational subjectivity, for 
Adorno, and produces ‘real experiences’ whereby ‘the subject’s petrification in his own 
subjectivity dissolves and the narrowness of his self-positedness is revealed’ (ibid, p. 269).50 
It is the non-identity, and the lack of reconciliation, expressed in art works that confronts the 
viewer with an object or experience that transgresses their current means of categorisation. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Of course, Adorno is keen to distinguish these experiences (‘in which recipients forget themselves and 
disappear into the work’ – 1997, p. 244) from those of the culture industry. He argues that: ‘Shudder, radically 
opposed to the conventional idea of experience [Erlebnis], provides no particular satisfaction for the I; it bears 
no similarity to desire. Rather, it is a memento of the liquidation of the I, which, shaken, perceives its own 
limitedness and finitude. This experience [Erfahrung] is contrary to the weakening of the I that the culture 
industry manipulates. For the culture industry the idea of the shudder is idle nonsense … To catch even the 
slightest glimpse beyond the prison that it itself is, the I requires not distraction but rather the utmost tension’ 
(ibid, p. 245). For a discussion of the distinction between the experiences of Erlebnis and Erfahrung as it appears 
in a range of thinkers from Benjamin to Dilthey, Gadamer, and Dewey, see Jay (2005). 
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The viewer’s, or subject’s, experience of mismatch between concept and intuition provokes 
an awareness of their own limits or boundaries and the need to reconstitute them.  
 
This emphasis on non-identity and the lack of reconciliation is, unsurprisingly, a key point of 
contention between the Adornian ‘model’ outlined here and the position taken by those 
committed to the communicative turn in critical theory. In many ways, this area of 
disagreement encapsulates much of what is at stake between the two models of a critical 
theory, and can be seen particularly in the work of Albrecht Wellmer. Wellmer criticises 
Adorno’s work on modern art for relying too heavily on an ‘aesthetics of reconciliation’ 
(Wellmer, 1998, p. 158).51 He is taken to task for his ‘dialectics of subjectification and 
reification (i.e. the dialectics of enlightenment)’, which Wellmer sees as leading to ‘the 
polarity of complete negativity and reconciled spirit’, and for not developing ‘an adequate 
conception of the intersubjectivity of language which would have allowed him to link the 
disenchantment of the world – the “explosion of metaphysical meaning” – to a gain in 
communicative rationality’ (ibid, pp. 161-2). Rather than reading the link between ‘the 
emancipation of the modern subject and the loss of objectively assured systems of meaning’ 
in terms of the connection between subjectification and reification, Adorno should have 
considered this as ‘the price that has to be paid by subjects who are trying to emancipate 
themselves from tradition and convention’ (ibid); rather than a ‘catastrophe of spirit’ he 
should have seen ‘the condition of a spirit that has come to recognise itself as finite, and 
which, as it reflects upon its own finitude, might be able to discover and develop its potential 
as a potential for communicative reason’ (ibid, p. 162). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 See also Wellmer (1991), particularly his ‘Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation’ chapter. 
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It is in this context that Wellmer suggests that advanced artworks should be committed to, and 
understood as provoking, the possibility of ‘communicatively shared meaning’ (1998, p. 177). 
Modern art, for Wellmer, transforms ‘the finitude, the fragmentariness, the unfathomableness 
of meaning and its subjects into aesthetic sense’ and ‘fires the finite world of communicative 
meaning with excitement and makes its colours glow’ (ibid). For Wellmer, and those who 
embrace the Habermasian communicative turn in general, aesthetic ‘truth’ – as well as 
discursive truth – should be subsumed under the norms of communicative reason (e.g. see 
Habermas in D’Entrèves and Benhabib, eds., 1997); its truth-content would therefore lie in 
the universal (and transparent) communicability of meaning. Habermas – alongside Wellmer 
and Honneth – sees aesthetic representation in discursive terms, such that the relation between 
image and discourse can be rendered discursively (Habermas in D’Entrèves and Benhabib, 
eds., 1997, pp. 51-52); whereas Adorno, on the other hand, as we have seen, suggests that the 
relationship between image and discourse is much more problematic. For reasons already 
discussed, these communicative conclusions would be unacceptable to Adorno given his 
emphasis on the importance of dissonance in modern art, its transgression of communicable 
meaning, the importance of reflective judgement, and the argument that the truth-content of 
art resides in its expression of non-identity - of the lack of reconciliation between universal 
and particular.52 
 
Instead, I believe that Adorno’s work on aesthetics offers us more than the procedural 
accounts of (communicative) freedom we have discovered in the work of Habermas and 
Honneth, and more than the overly subjective version of (aesthetic) freedom we found in the 
late work of Foucault. He presents us with an account of non-reified culture which is forever !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 He would also, as we have seen, be critical of the tendency here to identify a (quasi)transcendental realm of 
communicative reason that somehow remains pure and unaffected by the process of cultural rationalisation and 
the entanglement of truth and power. 
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sensitive to the exclusion of sensuous particularity, and to the forms of misrecognition and 
suffering produced by commodification, identity thinking and technological rationality. He 
also, in the process, gives us an alternative account of what recognition might mean in its 
fullness, and the role played by our acknowledgement of complicity, by responsibility for 
(and ethical satisfaction in) the other, by dialectical experience, and by our self-
relinquishment and transformation of identity. Art’s role in all this is to challenge a divided 
reason and its related dualisms which tend to prioritise universality over particularity, form 
over content, concept over intuition, cognition over mimesis etc.53 Artworks form a solidarity 
with the exclusions of rationalised modernity, and present us with an image of an alternative 
praxis, of what a substantive reason might be. They shake us out of our (reifed) subjective 
consciousness and generate emphatic experiences that compel us to reconceptualise the other 
and reconfigure ourselves in relation to that other. Not only do they offer us an alternative 
praxis however, they also point towards an alternative community, albeit one solely in image 
form. As Bernstein (1993, p. 13) argues, ‘art now, or just before now, is (or was) the cipher 
for an absent politics’ and that ‘the modern work of art itself in its unity without a principle or 
concept determining that unity, and the community gathered around particular works with 
their shared sensus communis’ provide us with ‘images or after-images of the (idealised) 
polis’ (ibid.).54 However oblique and rarefied - and historically under threat of being eclipsed 
- the promise made by advanced artworks does bear witness to a divided reason, and to the 
suffering produced by proceduralism, identity thinking and commodification; it also keeps 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 I have also argued that it points beyond the antinomy of autonomy and heteronomy found in Kantian morality 
and liberal theories of justice, which instrumentalise politics and assume that heteronomous factors, along with 
the will of others, are restrictions on freedom rather than conditions for the possibility of (a fuller, recognitive) 
freedom. As we have seen, these assumptions of Kantian morality and liberal justice have reappeared in the 
work of Habermas and Honneth, despite their explicit critical engagement with these problems. 
54 Here Bernstein is referring to the idea that art is an ‘after-image of practical knowing’ (1993, p. 13), a 
reference to Aristotle’s phronesis in Greek ethical life, i.e. of ‘worldly engagement’ prior to practical reason 
becoming ‘the application of theoretical understanding to practical matters’ (ibid, p. 12). 
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open the possibility of reconciliation and points towards fuller forms of recognition and 
solidarity, which are more worldly and more inclusive of sensuous particularity and otherness.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Towards the end of part one of his Minima Moralia,1 Adorno writes the following in his 
aphorism ‘For Anatole France’: 
 
‘In a phase when the subject is capitulating before the alienated predominance of 
things … (t)he universality of beauty can communicate itself to the subject in no 
other way than in obsession with the particular. No gaze attains beauty that is not 
accompanied by indifference, indeed almost by contempt, for all that lies outside 
the object contemplated. And it is only infatuation, the unjust disregard for the 
claims of every existing thing, that does justice to what exists….The eyes that 
lose themselves to the one and only beauty are sabbath eyes. They save in their 
object something of the calm of its day of creation. But if one-sidedness is 
cancelled by the introduction from outside of awareness of universality, if the 
particular is startled from its rapture, interchanged and weighed up, the just 
overall view makes its own the universal injustice that lies in exchangeability 
and substitution. ...Perdition comes from thought as violence, as a short cut that 
breaches the impenetrable to attain the universal, which has content in 
impenetrability alone, not in abstracted correspondences between different 
objects. One might almost say that truth itself depends on the tempo, patience 
and perseverance of lingering with the particular: what passes beyond it without 
having first entirely lost itself, what proceeds to judge without having first been 
guilty of the injustice of contemplation, loses itself at last in emptiness.’ (1999, 
pp. 76-77) 
 
This in many ways captures the concerns of Adorno’s philosophy and negative aesthetics. In 
the broader context of commodification and instrumental rationality, a context which gives 
rise to the suffering of the irreducible and particular, Adorno emphasizes the importance of 
‘Sabbath eyes’ in alluding to true universality - those eyes ‘that lose themselves to the one and 
only beauty’ and ‘save in their object something of the calm of its day of creation’. As he 
argues elsewhere, ‘every individual object of nature that is experienced as beautiful presents 
itself as if it were the only beautiful thing on earth’ and he further argues that ‘this is passed 
on to every artwork’ (1997, p. 70). The Sabbath eyes that rest exclusively (and aesthetically) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The aphoristic form of which enacts Adorno’s concern for the fate of individual experience in the context of 
theoretical and societal totalisation. 
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on the object do so in constant struggle with those imperatives emerging from damaged life - 
what he refers to as the ‘universal injustice that lies in exchangeability and substitution’ and 
which always threatens to pierce the ‘patience and perseverance of lingering with the 
particular’.2 What is required in response, according to Adorno, is an ‘obsession with the 
particular’: an aesthetic gaze which, however fleetingly, acknowledges the object in its 
singularity and fullness, its strangeness and ‘impenetrability’, before it is then subsumed and 
erased, and its ‘one-sidedness is cancelled by the introduction from outside of awareness of 
universality’. To disregard or bypass the particular in the quest for identity or unity, as is the 
case in instrumental rationality and commodification, only produces an empty universal: as 
Adorno suggests above, ‘what passes beyond it without having first entirely lost itself, what 
proceeds to judge without having first been guilty of the injustice of contemplation, loses 
itself at last in emptiness.’ The universal judgements apparent in historical and philosophical 
conceptualization, but particularly characteristic of exchange relations and instrumental 
reason, are guilty of doing violence to the particular by establishing ‘abstracted 
correspondences between different objects’. As we have seen, Adorno’s own philosophy, and 
his negative conception of aesthetics, seeks to counter this and to transform the way we see 
the world; it urges us to do justice to the particularity under threat from the historical forces of 
instrumental reason and the homogenizing power of the culture industry. Seeing the world 
through ‘Sabbath eyes’ is a useful way to conceive of the active and practical-historical 
principle of philosophy emphasized by Adorno, where the ‘obsession with the particular’ is a 
transformative principle in itself. In his early essay ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’ Adorno 
(1977) refers to his philosophy as a form of interpretation and, in doing so, he attempts to 
transcend any simple distinction between philosophers having ‘only variously interpreted the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 For a rare illustration of Adorno’s notion of ‘sabbath eyes’ in the context of literary studies, and specifically 
applied to the poetry of Elizabeth Bishop, see Schweizer (2005). 
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world’ whilst ‘the point was to change it’. He suggests that: 
 
‘The interpretation of given reality and its abolition are connected to each other, 
not, of course, in the sense that reality is negated in the concept, but that out of the 
construction of a configuration of reality the demand for its [reality’s] real change 
always follows promptly’ (ibid. p. 129).  
 
Rather than simply being conceived as passive, the philosophical (and aesthetic) interpretation 
of the world - through Sabbath eyes – arguably engenders forms of ethical and aesthetic 
imagination which open up the possibility of new experience beyond the world as it is. It 
shakes the fixity of current conceptualisations and forms of subsumption and, in solidarity 
with the suffering of the particular under conditions of exchangeability and instrumentality, 
provokes the resistance of objects against their reification.  
 
Adorno’s philosophy adopts what he calls ‘the micrological view’ which ‘cracks the shells of 
what, measured by the subsuming cover concept, is helplessly isolated and explodes its 
identity, the delusion that it is but a specimen’ (1990, p. 408). In a context where ‘the more 
tightly the network of general definitions covers its objects’, and where ‘the greater will be 
the tendency of individual facts to be direct transparencies of their universals’, Adorno 
suggests that ‘the greater the yield a viewer obtains precisely by micrological immersion’ 
(1990, p. 83). As we have seen, this is also the importance of modernist artworks for Adorno, 
particularly those fragile works which, ‘in the face of the abnormity into which reality is 
developing’, have acknowledged that ‘art must turn against itself, in opposition to its own 
concept, and thus become uncertain of itself right into its innermost fiber’ (1997, p. 2). These 
works, which themselves have become ‘qualitatively other’, most faithfully shine a light on 
singularity and serve to protect particularity from the incursion of coercive forms of 
universality; their truth for Adorno ‘depends on whether they succeed at absorbing into their 
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immanent necessity what is not identical with the concept, what is according to that concept 
accidental. The purposefulness of artworks requires the purposeless’ (1997, p.101). They also, 
as we have seen, provide us with an intimation of an alternative praxis: 
 
‘What appears (in art) is not interchangeable because it does not remain a dull 
particular for which other particulars could be substituted, nor is it an empty 
universal that equates everything specific that it comprehends by abstracting the 
common characteristics. If in empirical reality everything has become fungible, 
art holds up to the world of everything-for-something-else images of what it 
itself would be if it were emancipated from the schemata of imposed 
identification’ (Adorno, 1997, p. 83). 
 
In its quest to give voice to the particularity of things, Adorno suggests that ‘art has 
converged with natural beauty’ inasmuch as ‘artworks say that something exists in itself, 
without predicating anything about it’ (1997, p. 77). He argues that with art, as with the 
‘micrological perception of the beautiful in nature’ (1997, p. 70), it is ‘undefinable precisely 
because its own concept has its substance in what withdraws from universal conceptuality’ 
(1997, p. 70). The mimetic form of ‘aesthetic comportment’, which involves ‘the capacity to 
perceive more in things than they are’ (1997, p. 330) and which ‘assimilates itself to that other 
rather than subordinating it’ (1997, p. 331), allows for the ephemeral moment of ‘being 
touched by the other’, by the object in its singularity and irreducible uniqueness. Artworks, 
like natural beauty, resonate with us beyond mere conceptual determination and intention. 
Rather than assimilating the object and subsuming it under our own categories and interests, 
we are instead shaken out of our fixity and encouraged to assimilate ourselves to that 
particular object: as Adorno argues, ‘without receptivity there would be no such objective 
expression, but it is not reducible to the subject; natural beauty points to the primacy of the 
object in subjective experience’ (1997, p. 71). Adorno makes a passing reference to Rilke’s 
‘Archaic Torso of Apollo’ poem, which he says ‘codified the nonsignificative language of 
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artworks in an incomparable fashion’ (1997, p. 112). Arguably this poem, itself the response 
to the ‘patient contemplation’ of a fragmented sculpture, expresses the way in which we are 
left mute when faced with an auratic object, in this case one without a head that ‘still glows 
like a candelabrum’; yet despite its lack of eyes ‘there is no place that does not see you. You 
must change your life’ (Rilke, 2011, p. 83). The object reaches out to us, and touches us, 
beyond any attempt to assimilate or easily interpret it, especially given the lack of original 
face and eyes which might have allowed us an easier conceptualization in line with the 
sculptor’s intention; and the final line of the poem expresses this power of being touched and 
the intense sense of implication in the experience.  
 
It is here where Adorno also suggests that ‘the expression of artworks is the nonsubjective in 
the subject’ (1997, p. 113) and that ‘artworks bear expression not where they communicate 
the subject, but rather where they reverberate with the protohistory of subjectivity’ (1997, p. 
112). As we have seen, not only do artworks involve the ‘non-conceptual affinity of the 
subjectively produced with its unposited other’ (1997, p. 54), but their movement under 
‘patient contemplation’ mark them out as ‘afterimages of the primordial shudder in the age of 
reification’ (1997, p. 79); for Adorno this produces transformative experiences which 
challenge our current (subsumptive) models of cognition and conceptualisation. Artworks, 
and aesthetic comportment, imagine an alternative form of praxis to the dominant 
subsumptive model and, as we have also seen, they perform a critique of divided reason. They 
criticise both the disfigurement of themselves (as non-cognitive art) and the violence of those 
(non-aesthetic) forms of cognition that subsume particularity through proceduralism, 
exchangeability and substitution. Through the tension, or rather irreconcilability, between 
their cognitive-rational and mimetic (aconceptual) components, artworks express the 
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possibility and promise of redemption without violating it; they maintain the necessary 
tension between redemption and finitude without reifying either.3 Art promises but does not 
fulfill, it points to the possibility of undamaged life from within ‘damaged life’ by keeping 
open the possibility of the absolute without attempting to explicitly represent it. As Adorno 
argues, ‘art must be and wants to be utopia, and the more utopia is blocked by the real 
functional order, the more this is true; yet at the same time art may not be utopia in order not 
to betray it by providing semblance and consolation’ (1997, p. 32). In more theological 
language, he suggests that ‘by the autonomy of their form, artworks forbid the incorporation 
of the absolute as if they were symbols. Aesthetic images stand under the prohibition on 
graven images. To this extent aesthetic semblance, even its ultimate form in the hermetic 
artwork, is truth’ (1997, p. 104). By maintaining, although also not reifying, the tension 
between its conceptual and mimetic elements, artworks avoid the temptation to prioritise 
either the conceptual or mimetic side; however, as Adorno is keen to point out, this tension is 
best maintained or elaborated when we critically engage with artworks (and with the wider 
social and material world) micrologically, i.e. through immersion in particulars. For Adorno, 
the universal appears in the particular but not in any immediate sense of identity or unity; 
instead it appears only when it refrains from subsuming the particular into its totalising logic.4 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 This defense of critical tension, and the accompanying criticisms of both claims that there is nothing beyond 
the conditional on the one hand and claims to positive access to the unconditional on the other, can be found in 
Adorno’s critiques of both positivism and positive religion (see his ‘Reason and Revelation’ essay in Critical 
Models, 2005, pp. 135-142, for the latter). It is also apparent in his Hegelian criticisms of Kant (whose account 
of self-critical reason is taken to task for emphasizing finite knowledge and placing a block on thinking the 
absolute), and his Kantian criticisms of Hegel (whose account of self-critical reason is questioned for its claims 
to gain access to Absolute knowledge). Both, in their different ways, are accused by Adorno of violating the 
non-identical. Adorno’s position on the other hand (with, between, and beyond Kant and Hegel), is a defence of 
the restless spirit of self-critical reason and a cautiousness concerning any claims to closure. See in particular the 
final section of Negative Dialectics (i.e. ‘Meditations on Metaphysics’ in Adorno, 1990, pp. 361-408) where he 
outlines his philosophy ‘After Auschwitz’. 
4 He suggests that ‘for the sake of reconciliation, authentic works must blot out every trace of reconciliation in 
memory’ (1997, p. 234). 
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To remain true to the particular and to the (im)possibility of reconciliation, art must give 
voice to the ‘micrological’ suffering of the particular under the broader regime of 
instrumental reason5; as Adorno argues, ‘it would be preferable that some fine day art vanish 
altogether than that it forget the suffering that is its expression and in which form has its 
substance’ (1997, p. 260). However, art cannot do this by seeking to directly represent such 
suffering without itself subsuming, and thereby doing damage to, the very thing it claims to 
represent. This is why the artists he champions in Aesthetic Theory and elsewhere (e.g. Celan, 
Webern, Beckett, Hölderlin, Proust etc) are those who, in their different ways, produce 
‘sublime’ forms which challenge our previous conceptual categories and means of 
comprehension, and do so through their focus on uncertainty, fragmentation, difficulty, 
negation, and silence. Adorno argues that: 
 
‘Suffering remains foreign to [discursive] knowledge; though knowledge can 
subordinate it conceptually and provide means for its amelioration, knowledge 
can scarcely express it through its own means of experience without itself 
becoming irrational. Suffering conceptualized remains mute and 
inconsequential, as is obvious in post-Hitler Germany…. The darkening of the 
world makes the irrationality of art rational: radically darkened art. What the 
enemies of modem art, with a better instinct than its anxious apologists, call its 
negativity is the epitome of what established culture has repressed and that 
toward which art is drawn. In its pleasure in the repressed, art at the same time 
takes into itself the disaster, the principle of repression, rather than merely 
protesting hopelessly against it. That art enunciates the disaster by identifying 
with it anticipates its enervation; this, not any photograph of the disaster or false 
happiness, defines the attitude of authentic contemporary art to a radically 
darkened objectivity; the sweetness of any other gives itself the lie.’ (1997, pp. 
18-19) 
 
The new categorical imperative that Adorno suggests Auschwitz imposes on culture (and 
philosophy) makes previous forms of representation both inaccessible and unattainable, yet 
also requires us to comprehend both the ‘disaster’ and the possibility of reconciliation as a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Here Adorno is following the claim in his Negative Dialectics that ‘the need to lend a voice to suffering is a 
condition of all truth’ (1990, pp. 17-18). 
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moral necessity; although he argues that this cannot be actualised as such, he suggests that it 
instead drives our thinking onwards without repose. Adorno’s standpoint here is a ‘standpoint 
of redemption’, which nevertheless - and simultaneously - refuses redemption; a thought of 
reconciliation which recognises its impossibility even though ‘its own impossibility it must at 
last comprehend for the sake of the possible’ (Adorno, 1999, p. 247). He makes this point in 
the ‘Finale’ section of Minima Moralia, which shares a number of images with his notion of 
‘sabbath eyes’: 
 
‘The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in face of despair is the 
attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the 
standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by 
redemption: all else is reconstruction, mere technique. Perspectives must be 
fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and 
crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic 
light. To gain such perspectives without velleity or violence, entirely from felt 
contact with its objects – this alone is the task of thought. It is the simplest of all 
things, because the situation calls imperatively for such knowledge, indeed 
because consummate negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the mirror 
image of its opposite. But it is also the utterly impossible thing, because it 
presupposes a standpoint removed, even though by a hair’s breadth, from the 
scope of existence, whereas we well know that any possible knowledge must not 
only be first wrested from what is, if it shall hold good, but is also marked, for 
this very reason, by the same distortion and indigence which it seeks to escape. 
The more passionately thought denies its conditionality for the sake of the 
unconditional, the more unconsciously, and so calamitously, it is delivered up to 
the world.’ (Adorno, 1999, p. 247). 
 
Adorno’s philosophy and negative aesthetics, with their emphasis on ‘the felt contact with its 
objects’, are themselves perspectives fashioned ‘without velleity or violence’ and which aim 
to ‘displace and estrange the world’. They also represent a ‘standpoint removed’, yet are 
inevitably ‘marked’ by the ‘distortion and indigence’ they seek to escape; they are complicit 
in what they criticise and, in turn, require self-comprehension and further transformation. 
Both (dialectical) philosophy and art, for Adorno, point towards the unconditional whilst 
remaining inescapably grounded in our conditional experience; they are privileged spheres of 
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immanent (or intramundane) transcendence which maintain and work through these tensions 
and difficulties. 
 
Adorno’s ‘micrological view’, and his concern with aesthetics and the particular, is clearly at 
odds with the proceduralism I have argued is at work in both Habermas’s ‘idealising 
presuppositions of communication’ and Honneth’s ‘idealising presuppositions of 
recognition’; both of which, I’ve argued, despite themselves, share too much with the 
characteristics of a formal (and ultimately) instrumental rationality which abstracts from 
difference, particularity, and subjectivity. Despite Honneth’s attempts to avoid some of the 
shortcomings of Habermas’s work, by reconciling rational principles and the substantive 
norms of lifeworld practices through an emphasis on mutual recognition, his ‘formal 
conception of ethical life’ ends up displaying those characteristics of formal abstraction that 
ultimately exclude sensuous particularity and meaning. As we have seen, in many ways 
Foucault’s work compensates for this lack apparent in Critical Theory’s communicative turn, 
by both highlighting the power relations and exclusions at work in idealised forms of 
recognition, normativity, communication, morality etc, and also by turning to an aesthetic 
critique of modernity in his later work. However, as I’ve argued, his genealogical work 
tended towards an excessive, and often indiscriminate, account of power, along with an overly 
determined conception of subjectivity, whilst his work on ethics and the aesthetics of 
existence ended up with an overly autonomous notion of aesthetics and an account of 
subjectivity unduly disconnected from wider relations of recognition. His work thereby lacks 
a more substantive conception of culture, democracy, recognition, and responsibility. In 
response to the shortcomings of both the communicative turn in Critical Theory and 
Foucault’s philosophy, I have argued that an Adornian account of non-reified culture and 
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ethics - with its fragile community of ‘spirit’ united by the suffering produced by 
commodification, identity thinking and technological rationality - is the most adequate 
response to the instrumentality and atomism of our late capitalist acquisitive culture, and 
therefore provides us with the most promising ‘model’ of a critical theory of contemporary 
society. Its commitment to otherness, non-identity and particularity, its focus on dialectical 
experience and the complicities of representation, and its adherence to a notion of aesthetic 
praxis as a refuge for the sensuous elements of human experience side-lined by the 
rationalisation and reification of modern life, provides us with a fuller sense of what the 
labour of recognition and solidarity involves and the infinite to which it is promised.  
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